How the Collegium’s Clearance of Four High Court Chief Justices and the Prospective Elevation of V Mohana Raises Questions on Appointment Transparency, Eligibility, and Gender Repr

The collegium, acting as the apex judicial body traditionally responsible for recommending appointments to the Supreme Court, has recently announced the clearance of four sitting chief justices of various high courts for elevation to the nation’s highest judicial forum. This development signals a significant reshuffling within the higher judiciary, as each chief justice, having presided over a distinct high court, is poised to bring a wealth of administrative experience and jurisprudential perspective to the apex bench. Among the individuals considered for elevation, the name V Mohana has emerged, with observers noting that her potential appointment could represent the second instance of a woman being selected directly from the Bar rather than from the judicial cadre. The mention of V Mohana potentially becoming only the second woman drawn from the Bar to join the Supreme Court highlights ongoing debates surrounding gender diversity, the criteria for eligibility, and the balance between judicial experience and distinguished legal practice in the nation’s top court. Consequently, the collegium’s clearance of these four chief justices, together with the prospective elevation of V Mohana, raises a series of legal questions relating to the constitutional framework governing judicial appointments, the procedural transparency of the collegium system, and the statutory or constitutional interpretation of eligibility requirements for Supreme Court judges.

One question is whether the collegium’s authority to clear appointments without a transparent selection process withstands scrutiny under the legal framework governing judicial appointments, especially considering that the mechanism operates largely behind closed doors and relies on internal consensus among senior judges. The legal framework, which has evolved through judicial pronouncements rather than explicit legislative detailing, places the ultimate appointment power in the hands of the President but delegates the recommendation function to the senior judiciary, thereby raising the issue of whether such delegation aligns with principles of accountability and reasoned decision‑making. A competing view may argue that the collegium system, by virtue of its composition of experienced judges, embodies the expertise necessary to assess merit and integrity, and that its informal procedures, while opaque, are justified by the need to preserve judicial independence from political pressures. Perhaps the more important legal issue is whether the lack of a publicly articulated criteria for elevation, especially when a candidate from the Bar is considered, satisfies the requirement that appointments be made on the basis of merit, experience, and representation as envisaged by the underlying legal principles.

One question is whether a practising advocate from the Bar, such as the individual mentioned, satisfies the eligibility requirements traditionally applied to Supreme Court judges, given that the prevailing understanding emphasizes prior service as a high‑court judge or distinguished legal scholarship. The legal discourse surrounding eligibility holds that the Constitution envisages a pool of candidates drawn from the judiciary, senior legal academia, or persons of proven distinction, thereby creating a potential tension when a barrister without prior judicial tenure is advanced for appointment. Perhaps a court would examine whether the criterion of ‘distinguished legal practice’ has been sufficiently defined to allow a clear assessment of a candidate’s suitability, and whether the collegium’s recommendation in such a case aligns with the overarching principle that the apex court must comprise members possessing both juridical experience and intellectual gravitas. A fuller legal assessment would require clarity on whether any precedent exists wherein a senior advocate without prior judicial appointment has been elevated, and how such precedent, if any, has been reconciled with the intended balance between judicial expertise and broader legal representation.

Perhaps the more important legal concern is the constitutional guarantee of equality, which may be invoked to argue that the appointment of a second woman from the Bar to the Supreme Court serves to advance substantive equality by enhancing gender diversity at the highest judicial tier. The legal perspective may turn on whether the principle of equality imposes a positive duty on the collegium to consider gender balance as a factor in its deliberations, especially when the pool of eligible candidates from the Bar includes qualified women. A competing view may maintain that the collegium’s primary mandate is to select judges based solely on merit and seniority, contending that any explicit gender criteria could constitute an impermissible deviation from the merit‑based framework entrenched in judicial appointment practice. Perhaps the procedural significance lies in whether future appointments will be scrutinised for adherence to an evolving norm that seeks to balance representational fairness with the traditional emphasis on juridical experience, thereby shaping the jurisprudential trajectory of the Supreme Court’s composition.