Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar vs State Of Bombay And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 206 of 1960

Decision Date: 13 December, 1962

Coram: J.R. Mudholkar, Syed Jaffer Imam, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar

Laxman Purshottam Pimputkar brought a petition before the Supreme Court of India against the State of Bombay and several other respondents. The judgment was delivered on 13 December 1962. The opinion was authored by Justice J.R. Mudholkar, who sat on a bench together with Justice Syed Jaffer Imam and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar. The case is reported as 1964 AIR 436 and also appears in the Supreme Court Reporter at 1964 SCR (1) 200, with subsequent citations in later reports. The statutory framework involved the Watan Lands‑Resumption provisions and the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act of 1874, specifically sections 12, 74 and 79.

The factual background began in 1944 when the plaintiff applied to the Government seeking resumption of certain Watan lands that were then possessed by defendants numbered two to four, with a view to having those lands transferred to him. After the Government ordered an inquiry, it issued an order dated 9 October 1946 directing that the lands be resumed and restored to the plaintiff. The defendants subsequently petitioned the Government for reconsideration of that order. In response, the Government issued a modifying order that allowed the defendants to remain in possession of the lands provided they paid rent as the Government might fix from time to time. The plaintiff challenged this modification by filing a suit seeking a declaration that the Government’s modifying order was null, void and inoperative. The plaintiff argued that the original 9 October 1946 order was a judicial order made by the Government in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under section 79 of the Watan Act, and that there was no statutory authority permitting the Government to revise or review that order.

The trial court decreed in favour of the plaintiff, holding the modifying order void. However, the District Judge set aside that decree, and the High Court affirmed the decision of the District Judge. The plaintiff then obtained special leave to appeal to this Court. The Court examined whether the Government possessed the competence to alter the 9 October 1946 order.

The Court held that the trial‑court’s decision was correct and that the Government was not empowered to modify the earlier order. It observed that certain provisions of Part II of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874—particularly sections 12 and 74—impose a judicial or quasi‑judicial duty on the Collector to determine the rights between a Watandar and the alienage of the Watan land. The entire procedure, including the order made under section 3 of the Act, is therefore quasi‑judicial rather than administrative. Consequently, an order issued by the Collector under section 12 is not an administrative order but a quasi‑judicial one, which may be rectified, modified or set aside only by the Commissioner in appeal or by the State Government in revision under section 79, and not by other means. When an authority exercises its revisional powers, it necessarily acts in a judicial or quasi‑judicial capacity, confirming that the Government’s subsequent order of 9 October 1946 was a quasi‑judicial order and could not be altered without express statutory authority.

The Court observed that the order had been issued in a judicial or quasi‑judicial capacity; consequently, the Government order dated 9 October 1956 was to be treated as a judicial or quasi‑judicial order. Because of this character, the order could not be set aside, revised or modified in the same manner as an administrative order that may be altered under section 74. The Court further held that finality attached to the Government’s order issued under section 79 and, in the absence of any specific provision authorising its review, any later order by the Government was ultra vires and beyond its jurisdiction. The Court explained that an order is considered quasi‑judicial not only when there is a dispute between two individuals but also when the dispute is between an authority attempting to exercise a power and a person opposing that exercise, provided the statute obliges the authority to act judicially. No limitation period is prescribed in the Watan Act for filing a revision application; ordinarily the Government would not interfere unless a petition is moved within a reasonable time, and what constitutes a reasonable time is a matter for the Government to determine. In the present case the Government asserted that it had strong reasons to intervene even after a lapse of time, and therefore it proceeded to interfere. The Court reiterated settled law that civil courts possess the power to examine whether a tribunal of limited jurisdiction has acted within the limits conferred by the enabling statute or has exceeded those statutory limits. The judgment referred to the authorities Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, [1959] 1 S.C.R. 319; Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 36; Robinson v. Minister of Town & Country Planning, [1947] I All E.R. 851; Franklin v. Minister of Town and A.C. 87; Ramrao Jankiram Kadam v. State of Bombay, [1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 322; Shrimant Sardan Bhujangarao Daulatrao Ghorpade v. Shrimant Malojirao Daulatrao Ghorpade, [1952] S.C.R. 402; Province of Bombay v. Hormusji Manekji, (1947) 202 L.R. 74 I.A. 103; and The Secretary of State v. Musk & Co., I L.R. 1940 Mad. 599. The judgment then proceeded to set out the civil appellate jurisdiction of Civil Appeal No. 206 of 1960, which was filed by special leave against the High Court of Bombay’s judgment and decree dated 17 February 1955 in Second Appeal No. 1533 of 1952. The parties were represented by counsel for the appellant and respondents. The judgment of the Court was delivered on 13 December 1962 by Justice Mudholkar, noting that the appeal arose from the High Court’s decision affirming the decree of the District Judge, Thana, which had set aside the decree in favour of the plaintiff‑appellant, and then summarising the relevant facts.

The facts that are not contested can be summarised as follows. The plaintiff’s family holds the grant of Patilki Watan in several villages situated in the Umbergaon taluka of Thana District, Maharashtra, the villages named being Solsumbha, Maroli and Vavji. Defendants numbered two to four are also members of the same extended family. Within that family the plaintiff represents the seniormost branch, whereas defendants two, three and four represent other, junior branches. The controversy that gives rise to this appeal concerns the Patilki of the village Solsumbha.

According to the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act of 1874 (Act No. 111 of 1874), the individual who actually discharges the duties of a hereditary office at any time is designated as the Officiator. It is a matter of common agreement that the Officiator had been chosen from the plaintiff’s branch beginning in 1870, the year in which the predecessor Krishna Rao Pimputkar died. Upon his death the office passed to his eldest son Vasudev. When Vasudev died, his eldest son Sadashiv succeeded him in 1893 as Officiator. Sadashiv’s death in 1901 gave rise to the appointment of Purshottam as Officiator, a position he retained until 1921, when a disqualification incurred by him led to the appointment of a deputy to act in his stead. After Purshottam’s death in 1940, his son Laxman, who is the plaintiff‑appellant in this case, assumed the role of Officiator.

In 1914 the descendants of Krishna Rao, who until then held the property jointly, effected a partition of the family estate. The estate comprised both inam and Watan lands spread across the villages of Solsumbha, Maroli and Vavji, and the partition deed is recorded as Exhibit 49. Under that partition the lands that had previously been allotted for the remuneration of the Patilki of Solsumbha were allotted to the branch represented by defendants two to four, while other lands were allocated to the plaintiff’s branch. Although Purshottam did not initially sign the partition deed, he later acquiesced to it, and the lower courts therefore treated him as a party to the partition.

Following Purshottam’s disqualification, the deputies who acted on his behalf were barred from taking possession of the disputed Solsumbha lands, despite objections raised by those deputies. Instead, the family members in actual possession of the Watan lands were required to pay a remuneration of rupees two hundred and forty per annum to the deputies. This arrangement persisted until 1946. After Purshottam’s death, the plaintiff was first appointed Patil for a term of five years and subsequently was appointed Officiator for life.

In 1944 the plaintiff approached the Government, as shown by Exhibit 47, seeking the resumption of the Watan lands that were then in the possession of defendants two to four and requesting that those lands be transferred to him. After an inquiry, the Government issued an order dated 9 October 1916 (Exhibit 36) that resumed the lands and directed their restoration to the plaintiff.

After the original order directing the restoration of the Watan lands to the plaintiff, the defendants applied to the Government for a reconsideration of that order. The Government subsequently altered its earlier directive by ordering that defendants numbered two to four, who were then in possession of the lands, should be allowed to retain possession, but they must pay a rent amount that the Government could determine from time to time. This modification was issued on May 2, 1947, and as a result the rent required from defendants two to four was increased from Rs. 240 per annum to Rs. 1,000 per annum. In response to this increase, the plaintiff instituted the suit from which the present appeal originated. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the Government order dated May 2, 1949 and an ancillary order dated March 1, 1949 were null and void and inoperative; the plaintiff also asked that the defendants remove all obstruction and hindrances to the property that had been acquired by the plaintiff as a Watan grant and that the defendants deliver possession of that property to the plaintiff. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants should render an account of the income derived from the plaintiff’s property and should pay the costs of the suit.

The defendants, the first of whom was the State of Bombay (now Maharashtra), opposed the suit on several grounds. They argued that the orders being challenged were administrative orders and that no civil suit could be maintained to set them aside. They also contended that the suit was barred by the provisions of section 4 (b) of the Bombay Act 10 of 1876 and that it was barred by the limitation period. It is noteworthy that when the defendants appealed before the District Judge, they confined their challenge to the decree on a single ground, namely the competence of the Government to reconsider the 1946 order. The plaintiff maintained that the order issued by the Government on October 9, 1946, was a judicial order passed by the Government exercising its revisional jurisdiction under section 79 of the Watan Act; consequently, the Government lacked the competence to revise or review that order in the absence of a specific provision in the Act authorising such revision. The parties did not dispute that alienation of Watan lands without Government sanction was prohibited by section 5 of the Watan Act, and that alienation of Watan lands assigned as remuneration without Government sanction was prohibited by section 7 of the same Act. Section 11 empowered the Collector, after recording his reasons in writing, to declare certain types of alienations null and void. Section 12 provided that it was lawful for the Collector, whenever necessary for the implementation of the provisions of certain sections including section 11, to summarily evict any person wrongfully in possession of land or to levy any rent due by any person in the manner prescribed by the law then in force for the levy of a revenue demand.

The State argued that the discretion granted to the Collector by section 12—whether to evict a person who is wrongly in possession of land or to require that person to pay rent—was merely administrative. Consequently, the State maintained that a Collector’s order under section 12 could be altered only by the Collector himself or could be contested by the aggrieved party solely in the manner prescribed by the Act, namely by filing an appeal or a revision application, and by no other route. The State further contended that, if such an order were truly administrative, it would lie outside the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The first issue before the Court was to determine whether a Collector’s order under section 12 was administrative in nature. It was observed that, before invoking section 12, the Collector must first issue a declaration under section 11. That declaration must be supported by written reasons, which can be given only after an inquiry in which the Collector hears both sides and considers any oral or documentary evidence they present. Accordingly, the procedure up to that point was characterised as quasi‑judicial. The Court referred to its earlier decisions in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. Andhra Poverty Road Transport Corporation and Board of High School and Intermediate Education U.P. v. Ghanshyam Das Gupta, holding that an order is deemed quasi‑judicial not only when two individuals dispute one another, but also when an authority’s action is contested by a person and the statute obliges the authority to act judicially. Section 12 undeniably gives the Collector discretion to issue one of two possible orders after declaring an alienation null and void. Such an order directly affects parties’ property rights and may be challenged before the Commissioner and the State Government under sections 77 and 79 of the Watan Act, respectively. Thus, it was difficult to regard the order as merely administrative. The State’s counsel, however, argued that while the inquiry envisioned in sections 11 and 12 might be quasi‑judicial, the ultimate decision—whether to restore the land to the Watandar or to confirm possession of the current occupier and impose rent—was not a quasi‑judicial function but a purely administrative one, taken in accordance with Government policy, and he urged that the Collector’s discretion be viewed in that light.

The Court referred to section 74 of the Watan Act, which declares that the Collector’s proceedings are placed under the general supervision of both the Commissioner and the State Government. It was observed, however, that the Collector has been vested with a variety of powers and is required to discharge many duties under the Act, some of which are administrative in nature. Because the Collector’s decision cannot properly be arrived at by exercising the appellate jurisdiction of the Commissioner or the State Government, it was necessary to embed a general provision of this sort in the statute. The right of appeal created by section 77 is limited to decisions of the Collector or other subordinate authorities that are issued after an investigation has been recorded in writing; it does not extend to every decision they render. Section 73 obliges that an investigation be recorded in writing for orders made under certain parts of the Act. In addition, other provisions such as section 11 mandate that reasons be recorded in writing, which by implication also require the Collector to conduct an investigation. These sections do not encompass the entire scope of the Collector’s authority under the Act. Consequently, section 74 is plainly a provision dealing with orders made by the Collector without any written investigation, and this section therefore does not assist the defendants. Relying on the decision in Robinson v. Minister of Town and Country Planning(1) and similar rulings, counsel for the State argued that the Collector’s quasi‑judicial function ceased with the declaration that the alienation was null and void, and that the subsequent decision taken under section 12 was purely administrative. Apart from the fact that the Robinson decision(1) – reported in [1947] 1 All. E.R. 851 – and comparable judgments have been criticized in England (see Griffith and Street, Principles of Administrative Law, p. 168, and Robson, Justice and Administrative Law, p. 533), the Court noted that the statutory scheme examined in those cases differs from Part II of the Watan Act, which contains sections 11 and 12. The Town and Country Planning Act, 1944, to which Robinson’s case pertains, gives the Minister discretion to accept, modify, or reject a scheme prepared by a local authority. For a specific purpose, that Act requires the Minister either to cause an inquiry to be conducted by an Inspector or to conduct the inquiry himself, and such an inquiry has been held to be quasi‑judicial in nature. After the inquiry, the Minister exercises his authority under the Act to accept the scheme wholly, modify it, or reject it. English courts have held that proceedings under the Town and Country Planning Act are administrative in nature, except to the limited extent that the inquiry must conform to principles of natural justice.

The Court observed that the enquiry required under the statute must, to the limited extent that it is conducted, conform to the principles of natural justice. It stated that, irrespective of whether the English courts’ view is correct, the nature of the proceedings and the obligations imposed by the English Act differ fundamentally from those under the relevant provisions of the Watan Act. The Court noted that, as conceded by Mr Bindra, the entire enquiry is not administrative in character. Rather, it rests on a lis between two parties: a Watandar who is out of possession and an alienee who is in possession of Watan property. The Court explained that when the Collector makes a final order under section 12, the lis terminates, and consequently there is no ground on which any part of the proceeding can be described as administrative. It further illustrated that even in an ordinary suit the court may exercise discretion—such as awarding costs, fixing the rate of interest, or choosing one form of relief over another—as cited in the case reported at [1947] 1 All E.R. 851. However, the Court emphasized that the mere existence of discretion does not transform the court’s exercise of its judicial function into something non‑judicial.

The Court clarified that the proceedings before the Collector are not judicial but are certainly quasi‑judicial. It held that when the Collector must exercise discretion to give effect to his finding that a particular alienation is null and void, it is inappropriate to claim that his act suddenly becomes administrative. The declaration made by the Collector under section 11 that an alienation is null and void provides little assistance to the Watandar until an order is issued under section 12. The Court pointed out that the two sections are interlinked, making it hard to conceive that the quasi‑judicial character of the proceedings could degenerate into an administrative one as the case advances. It reiterated that an order issued by the Collector under section 12 is appealable, whereas an order of the Minister is not, marking an important distinction from the cases exemplified by Robinson’s case (1). The Court referred to the decision in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao’s case (2), which considered Robinson’s case (1) and Franklin v Minister of Town and Country Planning (3). While addressing the argument that the Government, in considering a scheme for road‑transport service under section 68(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act, was performing an administrative function, Justice Subba Rao, speaking for the majority, observed that a comparison of the procedural steps under the two statutes reveals significant differences.

Both statutes, when compared, bring out in clear relief the nature of the enquiries contemplated under the two enactments, as shown by the authorities cited at (1) [1947] 1 All E.R. 851, (2) [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 319 and (3) [1948] A.C. 87. Under the earlier Act there was no lis, no personal hearing and even a public enquiry, if any, was limited to questions of statutory compliance or was merely intended to elicit further information for the Minister. In contrast, the present case presents a clear dispute between the two parties. The dispute embraces not only objections raised on public grounds but also claims asserting private rights, and it must be decided by the State Government after granting a personal hearing and adhering to the rules of judicial procedure. Although there may be some justification, based on the facts before the House of Lords, for holding that the earlier Act did not contemplate a judicial act, the Court expressly declined to express an opinion on that point and affirmed that there is no basis for concluding that the Government is not performing a judicial act in the present circumstances. The commentary by Robson in Justice and Administrative Law (p. 533) on the earlier decision is quoted: “It should have been obvious from a cursory glance at the New Towns Act that the rules of natural justice could not apply to the Minister’s action in making an order, for the simple reason that the initiative lies wholly with him. His role is not to consider whether an order made by a local authority should be confirmed, nor does he have to determine a controversy between a public authority and private interests. The responsibility of seeing that the intention of Parliament is carried out is placed on him.” Those observations explain the principles underlying that decision, and the Court held that those principles cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. A further comment on the same decision appears in Principles of Administrative Law by Griffith and Street, which, after examining s. 1 of the New Towns Act, 1946, observes that “Like the town‑planning legislation, this differs from the Housing Acts in that the Minister is a party throughout. Further, the Minister is not statutorily required to consider the objections. It is obvious, as the statute itself states, that the creation of new towns is of national interest” (pp. 349‑50). The author concludes that Franklin’s case is based on interpreting the provisions of that Act, particularly on the ground that the enquiry’s object is to inform the Minister’s mind rather than to resolve any issue between the Minister and objectors, and that decision offers no assistance in deciding the present case, which hinges on construing the provisions of the present Act. Accordingly, the Court held that the State Government’s order under s. 68‑D constitutes a judicial act.

The Court observed that the scheme of certain provisions of Part II of the Watan Act, specifically sections 11 and 12, imposes a judicial or quasi‑judicial duty on the Collector. This duty requires the Collector to determine what is essentially a dispute, or a quasi‑dispute, between the Watandar and the alienated party of the Watan land. Consequently, the Court held that the entire procedure, including the order issued under section 3 of the Act, constitutes a quasi‑judicial process rather than an administrative one as alleged by the respondents. Because the order made by the Collector under section 12 is a quasi‑judicial order, it may be corrected, altered, or set aside either by the Commissioner on appeal or by the State Government on revision under section 79. Such an order does not fall within the category of orders that can be reached under section 74. Section 79, the Court explained, empowers the State Government to request and scrutinise the records of any officer’s proceedings in order to determine the legality or propriety of any order that has been passed. The Government may then reverse or modify the order as it deems appropriate, or, if necessary, order a fresh enquiry.

In the factual matrix, the plaintiff approached the State Government by way of a petition in 1944. The Government returned the petition on 28 November 1944, directing the plaintiff to first apply to the Collector of Thana and, if required, subsequently to the Commissioner of the Northern Division. The Government also indicated that, should the plaintiff remain dissatisfied with the orders rendered, he could approach the Government, presumably by filing an application for revision. The letter concluded with a citation of rule 11 of the Petition Rules, which states that the Government will not entertain a petition unless the petitioner has first applied to the chief local authority and, where applicable, to the controlling authority. It further requires that copies of such petitions, together with the responses or orders issued, be annexed to any petition addressed to the Government. Acting upon this instruction, the plaintiff responded on 15 December 1944, enclosing a copy of his application to the Collector of Thana and the order dated 20 March 1925. In his reply, the plaintiff explained that a revision application had been filed in 1924 before the Collector of Thana. The Collector, relying on the Commissioner’s decision, had informed the plaintiff that the case could not be considered, referencing order No. W.T.N. No. 5 of 1925 (exhibit 7). The plaintiff asserted that the present appeal was filed against that order and, having been told by the Collector that the Commissioner had already confirmed the decision, he felt it would be futile to approach the Commissioner again. Accordingly, he sought the intervention of the Government.

In the letter addressed to the Government, the plaintiff requested that a full and proper justice be done to his case, emphasizing that both the factual and legal aspects required careful consideration. Referring to paragraph two of the Government’s earlier correspondence, the plaintiff explained that he had already approached the Collector of Thana and that a copy of the Collector’s order had been attached to his previous petition. He stated that the same petition was being resubmitted for the Government’s kind consideration.

Upon receipt of this letter, the Government ordered a thorough enquiry to be conducted by revenue officials. The enquiry was held in the presence of the parties, and each party was given the opportunity to present any evidence they wished. The proceedings of the subordinate officers, together with their reports, were subsequently forwarded to the Government. Relying on this report, the Government issued an order in October 1946 restoring possession of the Watan lands to the plaintiff. Although the order did not expressly state that it was made under section 12(a) of the Act read with section 79 thereof, the Court noted that those two provisions, taken together, confer the power to make precisely the type of order that was issued in October 1946. Consequently, the order must be deemed to have been made under those statutory provisions.

The Court observed that when an authority exercises revisional powers it necessarily acts in a judicial or quasi‑judicial capacity. Accordingly, the Government’s order of October 1946 must be treated as a judicial or quasi‑judicial order. Such an order, unlike a purely administrative order, cannot be set aside, revised, or modified under section 74. Section 79 attaches finality to the Government’s order, and in the absence of any express provision authorising a review, the later order issued by the Government on May 2, 1947 is ultra vires and beyond the Government’s jurisdiction.

The Court also considered the contention, raised faintly by Mr Bindra, that the Government could not be deemed to have acted in a quasi‑judicial capacity under section 79 because the order being revised was more than twenty years old. The Court found it sufficient to state that the Act does not prescribe any limitation period for filing an application for revision. While it is generally true that the Government would not intervene unless a matter is raised within a reasonable time, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable time is a matter for the Government itself to decide. In the present case, the Government apparently believed it had strong reasons for interfering even after a long lapse, and therefore it proceeded to do so.

Mr Joshi, appearing for defendants two to four, sought to support the decision of the High Court by invoking section 4(a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. That section provides, “Subject to the exceptions hereinafter appearing, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as to any of the …”

The Court examined the provision of section 4(a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, which states that “subject to the exceptions hereinafter appearing, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction as to any of the following matters: (a) claims against the Government relating to any property appertaining to the office of any hereditary officer appointed or recognised under Bombay Act No 1874 or any other law for the time being in force ….” The Court observed that the plaintiff’s plaint specifically sought relief against the State Government and referred to the first two prayers of the plaint. In the first prayer the plaintiff asked for a declaration that the orders issued by the Government on 2 May 1947 and on 1 March 1949 were null and void and inoperative. The Court held that this prayer was essentially redundant, because if those orders were indeed without jurisdiction they would automatically be void; consequently the prayer did not amount to a claim for relief against the State Government. The second prayer demanded that all the defendants remove “their obstructions and hindrances” to the plaintiff’s possession of his Watan property and that possession of the property be delivered to him. The Court found that the inclusion of the State Government in this prayer appeared to be an inadvertent slip, as there was no allegation that the Government actually possessed the land or was actively obstructing the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court interpreted the second prayer as being directed solely against defendants 2, 3 and 4. Counsel also pointed to the third prayer, in which the plaintiff requested that accounts be taken of the income earned by the defendants from 6 January 1942 until the date of the suit and thereafter. Although the plaint generally referred to the defendants, the Court concluded that the plaintiff meant only those defendants who were in actual physical possession of the property, receiving rent and profits from it. It was submitted that defendants 2 to 4 had been remitting certain sums to the Treasury for the remuneration of the officiator, and that because they would be entitled to credit for those sums the Government might be a necessary party. The Court, however, held that this consideration was irrelevant to the third prayer, which sought merely the accounts of rents and profits and did not involve any claim that the defendants might have against the Government. Taken together, the Court was of the opinion that none of the prayers actually sought any substantive relief against the State Government; the Government had been included only as a formal party to the suit. Consequently, the Court concluded that the provisions of section 4(a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, did not bar the suit from proceeding.

The Court referred to the recent observation made in the case of Ramrao Jankiram Kadam versus the State of Bombay concerning the scope of section 4(c) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act. The observation explained that the bar on approaching civil courts under section 4(c) applied only to certain specified classes of suits that challenged the validity of sales made for the recovery of arrears of land revenue. Those specified classes were the suits in which the plaintiff sought to set aside a sale on the ground of irregularities other than fraud. The provision presupposed that a sale, albeit irregular, had actually taken place, that title had passed to the purchaser, and that the plaintiff had to obtain a decree setting aside that sale on non‑fraudulent grounds before any relief could be granted. The Court further clarified that where the alleged sale was merely a purported transaction that never transferred title, and the plaintiff’s suit was only for recovery of possession of the property disregarding such a sale, the bar created by section 4(c) did not apply. Consequently, if an act or order is utterly without jurisdiction and therefore null and void, as held in the cited judgment ([1963] Supp. 1 SCR 322), the provisions of section 4 are not invoked.

Nevertheless, the Court noted a decision of this Court in Bhujangtao Daulatrao v. Malojirao Daulatrao, which the defendants relied upon. In that case a Saraniamdar instituted a suit in which representatives of two other branches of the Saranjam family and the Province of Bombay were impleaded as defendants. The plaintiff alleged that a Government resolution of 1936, which amended earlier resolutions of 189‑1 and 1932, declared that the portions of the estate held by the various branches should be entered as de‑facto shares, each share to be hereditarily continuable as a separate Saranjam estate, was ultra vires. The plaintiff further claimed an exclusive right to all privileges pertaining to the office of Saranjamdar and sought an injunction restraining the defendants from acting contrary to that claimed right. This Court held that the suit was barred by section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act because it was a suit against the Crown and concerned lands held as Saranjam within the meaning of that section, thereby depriving civil courts of jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court ruled that the plaintiff could not obtain relief against defendants I and II alone, since the right asserted against them could not be separated from the claim against the Government. The decision in The Province of Bombay v. Hormusji (2) was also cited before this Court in support of that position.

In this case, the Court considered the argument that civil courts possess jurisdiction to determine whether the Government exceeded its statutory authority. Justice Bose, who delivered the judgment, expressed the view that the earlier decision on this point was inapplicable. He quoted the observations of counsel Strangman, K.C., noting that the term “authorised” in the plaintiff‑respondent’s claim must be read as “duly authorised”. He explained that, in the specific matter before the lower court, the assessment that was challenged could not be regarded as duly authorised because the Government Resolution dated 11‑4‑1930, which declared the agreement relied upon by the respondent to be cancelled and authorised the levy of the full assessment, was ultra vires of section 211 of the Land Revenue Code. Consequently, before the exclusion of civil‑court jurisdiction under section 4(b) could be invoked, the Court had first to decide whether the Government’s action was ultra vires. The judges therefore held that the question of ultra vires lay outside the bar created by section 4(b). However, Justice Bose distinguished the present matter, stating that it fell under section 4(a), which does not involve any question of a duly authorised act of the Government. Section 4(a) is a general provision that bars claims against the Crown relating to lands held as Saranjam, and it bars such claims even if the Government’s act concerning those lands is ultra vires, provided the claim concerns the land itself.

It is settled law that civil courts have the power to examine whether a tribunal of limited jurisdiction has acted within the scope of the powers granted to it by the statute that created the tribunal, or whether it has transgressed the legislative limits placed upon it. The decision in Hormusiji Maneklal’s case rests on this principle, and many authorities have reiterated it. One such authority is The Secretary of State v. Musk & Co., where the Judicial Committee observed that the exclusion of civil‑court jurisdiction is not to be inferred lightly; such exclusion must be either expressly stated or clearly implied. Moreover, it is well‑settled that even when jurisdiction is expressly excluded, civil courts retain the authority to examine cases where the statutory provisions have not been complied with or where the statutory tribunal has failed to conform to the fundamental principles of judicial procedure (see p. 614). The Court noted that it was not intending to over‑turn a firmly established rule, and had that been the intention, a more extensive discussion would have been included. During the judgment, Justice Bose also highlighted a difference of opinion that had emerged in the Bombay High Court regarding the operation of section 4 when the sole relief sought against the Government is a declaration.

The Court examined a judgment of the Bombay High Court concerning whether section 4 would be engaged when the sole remedy sought against the Government consisted of a declaration. The Court affirmed the view expressed in that judgment that section 4 applied even in situations where the only relief pursued against the Government was a declaratory order. The Court observed, however, that this portion of the High Court’s reasoning did not assist the defendants, because the plaintiff had not required any declaration against the Government. The Court noted that the plaintiff could have simply disregarded the two orders he complained about, treating them as lacking jurisdiction and therefore null and void, and could have proceeded to obtain possession based on the earlier order issued by the Government in October 1946. Accordingly, the Court found that the High Court’s decision, which had upheld the judgment of the District Court, must be set aside. The Court therefore reversed the High Court’s judgment, restored the decision of the trial court, and ordered that the defendants bear the costs of the entire proceeding. The appeal was allowed.