The Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co., Ltd. and Others vs K. Shreepathirao

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No.5 of 1958

Decision Date: 11 April 1958

Coram: S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar

The Court recorded that the matter concerned The Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co., Ltd. and others versus K. Shreepathirao, with the judgment delivered on 11 April 1958 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was authored by Justice S.K. Das, who sat with Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar. The parties were identified as the petitioner, The Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co., Ltd. together with its managers, and the respondent, K. Shreepathirao. The decision was dated 11/04/1958 and cited as 1958 AIR 658 and 1959 SCR 463. The case involved the statutory framework governing termination of service, the construction of the terms “employee” and “workman” under the company’s Standing Orders, and the distinction between the two categories of staff.

The factual backdrop presented to the Court was that the respondent had been employed by the appellant company and that his services were terminated pursuant to the company’s Standing Orders, which had been approved by the appropriate authorities under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947. Standing Order No. 2(a) defined “employees” as all persons employed in the Office, Mains Department, Stores, Power House or Receiving Station of the Company whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters. The same set of Standing Orders also defined “workman” and stipulated that every workman must possess a ticket. The respondent had never been issued a ticket by the company, and consequently his name and any ticket number did not appear in the departmental muster. He challenged the validity of the order that terminated his employment by filing an application before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. His challenge was based, inter alia, on the contention that the Standing Orders applied only to those employees to whom tickets had been issued; therefore, because no ticket had been issued to him, he was not an “employee” within the meaning of the Standing Orders, and the termination under Standing Order No. 16(1) was illegal.

The Court held that the phrase “whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters” in Standing Order No. 2(a) must be interpreted as “whose names and ticket numbers, if any, are included in the departmental musters”. In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied the principles articulated in Cortis v. The Kent Water Works Company (1827) 7 B.& C. 314; 108 E.R. 741 and Perumal Goundan v. The Thirumalarayapuram Jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi (1918) I.L.R. 4 Mad. 624. The Court further observed that while the Standing Orders distinguished between “employees” and “workmen”, and while every workman was required to have a ticket, it was possible for an individual to be an “employee” without possessing a ticket, as the possession of a ticket was not an essential characteristic of an employee. Moreover, the Court affirmed that the Standing Orders were intended to apply to all employees for whose benefit they were framed. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Standing Orders were applicable to the respondent, that the termination of his service under Standing Order No. 16(1) was valid, and that the respondent’s application to the High Court must therefore fail. The judgment was delivered in Civil Appeal No. 5.

The appeal was filed in 1958 by special leave against the judgment and order dated 26 September 1956 of the former Nagpur High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No 66 of 1956, which in turn arose from the judgment and order dated 14 April 1956 of that High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No 6 of 1956. Counsel for the appellants comprised M C Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, together with B Sen, D B Padhya and I N Shroff, while counsel for the respondent was R V S Mani. The judgment of the Supreme Court was delivered in April 1958 by Justice S K Das. The appellants were the Nagpur Electric Light and Power Co. Ltd., a public limited company having its registered office in Nagpur, Madhya Pradesh, together with its Manager and Assistant Manager. The respondent, Shreepathi Rao, had entered the service of the Company in July 1936 as a typist drawing a salary of Rs 30 per month. He was promoted over the years and in 1947 was appointed Deputy Head Clerk in the grade of Rs 120-10-225. From 1952 onward he received a basic salary of Rs 245 per month.

On 28 November 1955 the Company required Rao to give an explanation concerning the issue of certain electricity bills to “high-tension consumers” which had been issued without the printed “notes for the information of consumers” on the reverse side. Rao submitted his explanation the following day, copying a director of the Company. On 2 December 1955 he was again asked to explain why he had copied his explanation to a director, and he responded accordingly. On the same date the Company also asked him to explain the alleged “double adjustments” in the 1954 accounts of the consumers’ department, specifically the claim that a sum of Rs 1,05,894-7-7, representing the Central Railway bills, had been deducted twice. Rao replied on 3 December 1955, stating that the charge was vague and that, since 1949, he had not been involved in the preparation of summaries or annual statements of the consumers’ department accounts.

Subsequently, on 5 December 1955 the Company issued an order of suspension against Rao, declaring that the suspension would take immediate effect and remain in force until further orders pending an investigation. Two days later, on 7 December 1955, a memorandum was served on Rao terminating his employment with effect from 31 January 1956. The memorandum, as relevant here, read: “We hereby give you notice under Standing Order 16(1) that your services will stand terminated as from 31 January 1956. The Company’s Managing Director is satisfied that it is not …”

The termination memorandum indicated that, in the interests of the business of the Company, reasons for terminating the respondent’s services were not to be disclosed. On 19 December 1955 a notice was served on the Company on behalf of the respondent. In that notice the respondent asserted that the order of suspension dated 5 December 1955 and the order of termination dated 7 December 1955 were illegal and ultra vires. The notice demanded that those orders be withdrawn and that the respondent be reinstated within twenty-four hours, otherwise the respondent declared that he would commence legal proceedings. On 26 December 1955 the Company replied to the notice. In its reply the Company denied the allegations and further stated that it had no desire to enter into any discussion with the respondent concerning the propriety of the orders that had been passed. Subsequently, on 2 January 1956 the respondent filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court at Nagpur. In that petition the respondent prayed for the issuance of appropriate writs or directions that would quash both the suspension order of 5 December 1955 and the termination order of 7 December 1955, and he also sought certain other reliefs. The petition was heard by a learned single judge who considered preliminary objections raised by the present appellants. By an order dated 14 April 1956 the judge upheld those preliminary objections and dismissed the petition. The preliminary objections were as follows: first, it was contended that the respondent’s service had been terminated in accordance with the Standing Orders of the Company, which had been approved by the relevant authorities under the provisions of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and also under the provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947. It was further argued that if the respondent had any grievance against the Standing Orders, his only remedy was to seek amendment of those Standing Orders as provided for in the applicable Act, and that he possessed no right to approach the High Court under Article 226 for quashing the orders or for reinstatement. Alternatively, it was submitted that, if the Standing Orders were inapplicable to the respondent, then the ordinary master-servant law would govern, and the sole remedy available to the respondent would be an action for damages for wrongful dismissal. After considering these preliminary objections, the learned judge held that: (1) the respondent was not an employee within the meaning of the Standing Orders and consequently his case was not governed by those Orders; (2) the relationship between the appellants and the respondent was contractual rather than statutory, and therefore the respondent’s remedy lay in an action for damages for wrongful dismissal; and (3) with respect to the amendment of the Standing Orders to include the respondent and persons in his category, the only remedy open to the respondent was the one already indicated.

In order to obtain relief under the applicable statute, the respondent was advised to approach a recognised trade union that could represent his interests in the matter. After his petition was dismissed, the respondent filed an appeal pursuant to clause ten of the Letters Patent. That appeal was heard by a Division Bench, which delivered its judgment on 26 September 1956. The Division Bench held three principal points. First, it found that the Company’s Standing Orders did not govern the respondent, even though he fell within the definition of “employee” contained in section 2(1) of the local legislation. Second, it observed that the terms and conditions of the respondent’s employment were regulated by the provisions of the local Act; consequently, a breach of those provisions gave the respondent the right to approach the High Court for appropriate orders under article 226 of the Constitution. Third, the Bench concluded that the respondent’s termination had been effected without any statutory authority and therefore had to be set aside.

Based on those findings, the Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the orders of suspension and termination, and declared that the respondent remained an employee of the Company. The Court specified that the employment would continue on the same terms that had applied at the time of his suspension, namely on 5 December 1955. In addition, the Bench directed the Company to pay the respondent arrears of wages that were due to him.

Following that judgment, the appellants applied to this Court for special leave to appeal against the Division Bench’s order dated 26 September 1956, and the special leave was granted. The present appeal therefore proceeds on the basis of the order granting that special leave. The principal issue that this Court must consider is whether the Company’s Standing Orders are applicable to the respondent.

It has already been established, without dispute, that the Standing Orders were approved by the certifying officer in accordance with the central legislation and by the Labour Commissioner under section 30 of the local legislation. For clarity, the Court must set out the overall framework of the two Acts that gave effect to the Standing Orders. Under the central legislation, the term “Standing Orders” refers to rules that deal with the matters enumerated in the Schedule. Section 3 of that Act mandates that, within six months after the central Act becomes applicable to an industrial establishment, the employer must submit five copies of the draft Standing Orders he proposes for adoption in that establishment to the certifying officer. Sub-section (2) of section 3 requires that the draft contain provisions for every matter listed in the Schedule that may be relevant to the establishment, and, where model Standing Orders have been prescribed, the draft must conform to those model provisions as far as practicable. The Schedule identifies the subjects that must be covered by the Standing Orders; item 8 of the Schedule deals specifically with “termination of employment and the notice thereof to be given by employer and workman.” It is also relevant to note that the central Act defines “workman” at the material time as any person employed in any industrial establishment to perform skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical labour for hire or reward, excluding members of the armed forces.

At the relevant time the expression “workman” used in the central legislation was understood to encompass any person employed in any industrial establishment to perform any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical labour for hire or reward, and the definition expressly excluded any member of the armed forces. Sections 4 to 10 of the central Act dealt with a series of matters relating to Standing Orders, namely the conditions required for certification of the Orders, the procedure for certification, the right of appeal, the date on which the Orders would become operative, the maintenance of a register of the Orders, the requirement to post the Orders where they could be seen, and finally the duration of the Orders and the manner in which they could be modified. Similar provisions were found in the local legislation, where Chapter IV was dedicated to Standing Orders. Sub-section (1) of section 30 of the local Act stipulated that every employer in any industry to which the Act had been made applicable under subsection (3) of section 1 must, within two months of the date of such notification, submit to the Labour Commissioner for approval a copy of the Standing Orders governing the relationship between the employer and his employees with respect to all industrial matters listed in Schedule 1, and that the submission had to be made in the manner prescribed by the regulations. Item 8 of Schedule I of the local Act again concerned the termination of employment and the notice that had to be given by both employer and employee. The remaining sub-sections of section 30 laid down the procedure to be followed for the Commissioner’s approval, the right of an aggrieved person to file an appeal, and related procedural steps. Sections 31 and 32 prescribed the method for amending the Standing Orders, either at the instance of the employer or at the instance of a representative of the employees. It was noted that sub-section (1) of section 30 required every employer to forward a copy of the Standing Orders that dealt with the relations between him and his employees on all matters mentioned in Schedule 1. The local Act defined “employee” to mean any person employed by an employer to perform any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for contract or hire or reward in any industry, a definition that corresponded closely to the definition of “workman” contained in the central Act. Although there were minor differences between the two definitions, those differences were not material to the present dispute. The Standing Orders that formed the subject of this case had come into force on 14 November 1951, and it was convenient to refer to their specific content. Standing Order No. 2 defined certain expressions used in the Orders and provided that, unless the context indicated otherwise, the term “employees” meant all persons, male or female, employed in the Office, the Mains Department, the Stores, the Power House or the Receiving Station of the Company, whether located at Nagpur or at Wardha, whose names and ticket numbers were recorded in the departmental musters.

The Standing Orders defined a person employed at Nagpur or at Wardha as an employee only when his name and ticket number appeared in the departmental muster. The Manager was described as the person appointed to that position and the term also included the Assistant Manager and, with respect to the Wardha establishment, the Resident Engineer. The expression Ticket was explained to include a card, a pass or a token. The term Workman was defined to mean such categories of employees as may from time to time be declared to be Workman by the Management. Standing Order number three classified employees into various categories, while Standing Order number four dealt specifically with the issuance of tickets. According to the substance of that order, every workman, whether permanent or temporary, must possess a ticket or card, and each apprentice must receive an apprentice card. The tickets or cards issued shall be surrendered when the workman is discharged or ceases to belong to the class of employment for which the card or ticket was issued. It is to be noticed that under the definition clause workman means such categories of employees as may from time to time be declared workmen by the Management and Standing Order four makes clear that every workman, permanent or temporary, will have a ticket. Standing Order sixteen regulated termination of employment, and clause one required a written notice of one calendar month by either employer or employee. If the employee desired, the reasons for termination would be communicated in writing at the time of discharge. Nevertheless, the Management could withhold the reasons when it considered that disclosure might expose the company or the signatory to criminal or civil liability, or when the Managing Director was convinced that such disclosure was not in the company’s business interests. In such circumstances, the Management would direct that the reasons be recorded in writing. It was not contested that the respondent qualified as a “workman” under the Central Act and as an “employee” under the local Act. The principal question before the Court concerned whether the respondent also fell within the definition of “employee” in the Standing Orders. The record showed that the company had never issued a ticket to the respondent, and consequently his ticket number could not appear in the departmental muster. The learned Judges of the High Court held that inclusion of the name and ticket number in the muster was an essential characteristic of an “employee” for the purposes of the Standing Orders. Accordingly, they concluded that mere employment in the Office, Mains Department, Stores, Power House or Receiving Station did not suffice to make a person an “employee” under the Standing Orders. Because the respondent lacked a ticket and his details were absent from the muster, the High Court concluded that he did not meet the condition required to be classified as an “employee” under the Standing Orders.

The Court observed that because the respondent’s name and ticket number were not entered in the departmental muster, he could not be classified as an “employee” within the meaning of the Standing Orders, and consequently those orders did not apply to him. Counsel for the appellants argued that, when the entire context and the whole body of the Standing Orders are considered, the High Court’s view is erroneous and that the inclusion of name and ticket number is not an essential feature of an “employee” under the Orders. It was correctly noted by the appellants that if possession of a ticket and its number were made essential, there would be almost no distinction between an “employee” and a “workman” as defined in the Orders, because “workmen” are defined as those categories of employees that may be declared workmen and who must possess tickets under Standing Order No 4. The argument continued that requiring a ticket before a person could be regarded as an employee, while workmen are simply the subset of employees who have tickets, would eliminate the difference between the two categories and render the existence of two separate definitions difficult to justify. However, when the subject and context of the Standing Orders are read in their entirety and in harmony, the need for two separate definitions becomes clear and the distinction between “employees” and “workmen” can be discerned. The term “employee” is intended to cover a broad group consisting of all males and females employed in the Office, Mains Department, Stores, Power House, or Receiving Station of the Company, whether at Nagpur or Wardha. The term “workmen” refers to a narrower group, namely those categories of employees that have been specifically declared as workmen and for whom a ticket is required. This differentiation is understandable in an industrial setting where security considerations demand a ticket or pass for individuals working in the Power House, Mains Department or other areas with essential machinery, while clerical staff working in an office building may not be subject to such security requirements. Accordingly, every workman is an employee, but not every employee is a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders, and the requirement to insert ticket numbers in the departmental muster applies only to those employees who have actually been issued tickets; it is not an essential attribute of all employees. The Court then examined whether this distinction is consistent with the Standing Orders as a whole. For example, Standing Order No 3, which classifies employees, defines a probationer in clause (c) as an employee appointed to a clear vacancy on probation for a period not exceeding twelve months. Standing Order No 4, by contrast, deals specifically with the issuance of tickets and applies only to workmen.

The Court observed that the provisions of Standing Order No. 4 do not oblige the company to issue a ticket to a probationer, although a probationer is nevertheless classified as an employee. From this observation the Court concluded that the Standing Orders clearly differentiate between “employees” and “workmen”, and that it is possible for an individual to be an employee without possessing a ticket. The Court noted that certain Standing Orders apply exclusively to workmen, for example Standing Orders 12, 13, 14 and 15, whereas other Standing Orders are intended to apply to every employee regardless of whether the employee is a workman. In particular, Standing Order 16 falls within the latter category and therefore governs all employees. The Court further examined Standing Order 8(b) and found that its language clarified the distinction even more. The provision states: “Any employee, who after marking his attendance or presenting his ticket, card, or token, as the case may be, is found absent from his proper place of work during working hours without permission or without any sufficient reason, shall be liable to be treated as absent for the period of his absence.” The Court reasoned that if every employee were required to hold a ticket, the distinction made in this clause between an employee who merely marks attendance and an employee who produces a ticket, card or token would be difficult to understand. Such a distinction makes sense only when some employees do not have any ticket, card or token and therefore merely mark their attendance, while others who do have such items present them. The Court considered a submission that Standing Order 4 is not exhaustive regarding the issue of tickets. Standing Order 4 provides for the issuance of a ticket to every permanent workman, a card to every “badli” workman, a temporary ticket to every temporary workman, and an apprentice card to every apprentice, but it does not expressly provide for a pass or token, even though the definition of “ticket” includes a pass or token. Another suggestion quoted before the Court was that Standing Order 2(a) itself authorises the issuance of tickets to employees other than workmen, thereby allowing one kind of ticket to be issued to workmen under Standing Order 4 and a different kind of ticket to be issued to other employees under Standing Order 2(a). On that basis it was argued that the alternatives mentioned in Standing Order 8(b) effectively give an employee a choice either to mark attendance or to present a ticket. The Court found this line of reasoning difficult to accept, because when every employee is required to have a ticket, providing such a choice would defeat the very purpose for which tickets are issued in an industrial establishment. Moreover, the Court did not think that the respondent’s case was strengthened by interpreting Standing Order 2(a) as authorising the issue of tickets to employees other than workmen. Even assuming that interpretation, the Court held that the company’s failure to issue tickets under Standing Order 2(a) does not strip the affected persons of their genuine status as employees nor deprive them of the benefits conferred by the Standing Orders.

The Court observed that the requirement to issue tickets under the Standing Orders functions merely as an enabling provision and does not constitute an essential attribute of an employee. While Standing Order 4 contains a clause that obliges the surrender of tickets once they have been issued, Standing Order 2(a) – if read as a power to issue tickets – contains no corresponding provision for the surrender of tickets when an employee ceases to be employed. The absence of any surrender clause for such tickets therefore indicates that the issuance of tickets was not intended to be covered by Standing Order 2(a) itself. On the respondent’s side, the primary argument advanced was that a single set of Standing Orders need not apply to every category of employee. The respondent contended that the Standing Orders in question were limited to those employees to whom tickets had actually been issued, and that because the respondent possessed no ticket he fell outside the scope of those orders. Consequently, the respondent claimed that the Company had violated section 30 of the local Act by failing to make Standing Orders applicable to him and to other similarly situated employees, and that no legal action could therefore be pursued against him either under the Standing Orders or under the general law of master and servant. The Court rejected this line of reasoning, finding it untenable.

The Court noted that the Standing Orders themselves draw a clear distinction between “employees” and “work-men,” and it is also possible for an employee to exist without a ticket. To interpret the orders as applying only to those individuals who have received tickets would render the terms employee and work-man synonymous, a result that is contradicted by the two separate definitions provided in Standing Order 2. Both the central Act and the local Act envisage the preparation of Standing Orders for all employees concerning matters that fall within the ambit of such orders. The orders under consideration were not challenged as defective or incomplete by any work-men, had received approval from the appropriate authority, and must therefore be read in light of their overall subject matter and context. In the absence of any compelling reason to the contrary, the orders should be deemed to apply to every employee for whose benefit they were drafted. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the reference in Standing Order 2(a) to “names and ticket numbers” does not establish a fundamental characteristic of employment; it applies only in cases where a ticket has actually been issued. The essential element of the definition of an employee remains the fact of being employed in the Office, Mains Department, etc., irrespective of whether a ticket has been issued.

In the matter before the Court, it was observed that the definition of an employee includes a person employed by the Company at either Nagpur or Wardha, and that a workman must obtain from the Company a declaration which would qualify him for a ticket under Standing Order number four. The Court further noted that, when interpreting the Standing Orders, another important factor must be taken into account. Section thirty of the local Act imposes on every employer a legal duty to prepare Standing Orders that cover all of his employees, and a failure to fulfil that statutory duty gives rise to criminal liability. Consequently, the Court held that it is proper for a court, if it can do so reasonably, to read the Standing Orders in a way that brings them into conformity with the statutory requirement imposed by Section thirty. The Court emphasized that it is mindful of the principle that, in construing any statutory provision or rule, each word must be given its proper meaning and appropriate weight. This principle of careful interpretation is especially necessary when dealing with a definition clause, although even a definition clause must be understood in the context or subject matter to which it applies.

The Court illustrated the method of interpretation by referring to earlier case law. In the decision of Courts v. The Kent Waterworks Company, the issue was the meaning of an appeal clause in an Act concerning paving, cleansing, lighting and other services for the town and parish of Woolwich. Section sixteen of that statute required the commissioners to levy rates upon every person who held, occupied or possessed any land within the parish, and also granted a right of appeal to any aggrieved person. The appeal clause, however, conditioned the right of appeal on the filing of a recognisance, raising the question of whether corporations, which cannot execute a recognisance, were excluded. Lord Justice Bayley explained that, assuming corporations cannot file a recognisance, the part of the clause conferring the right of appeal applies to all persons who are capable of being aggrieved and of appealing, while the part requiring a recognisance applies only to those who are capable of entering into a recognisance and is inapplicable to those who are not. The same interpretative rule was applied in Perumal Goundan v. The Thirumalarayapuram Jananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi, where the Court examined the explanation to Order thirty-three, rule one, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which defined a pauper as a person who does not own property worth more than one hundred rupees other than necessary clothing and the subject matter of the suit. The question was whether the definition extended to companies. The Court held that the definition should not be read so narrowly as to exclude companies, thereby applying the same principle of giving each word its proper meaning within its context.

In the present case the Court held that it would be erroneous to interpret the statutory provision so narrowly as to require a plaintiff to own wearing apparel in order to sue as a pauper, and therefore the same principle of construction must be applied to the wording of Standing Order no. 2(a). The Court read the phrase “whose names and ticket numbers are included in the departmental musters” as “whose names and ticket numbers, if any, are included in the departmental musters”. This construction means that the provision applies only to those employees who actually possess tickets and whose ticket numbers can be entered in the departmental musters; it does not intend to exclude employees who do not hold tickets or to whom tickets have not been issued, whose names alone may be entered. The learned Judges of the High Court had been influenced by an earlier decision, D.C. Dungore v. S.S. Dandige (Miscellaneous Petition No. 134 of 1954, decided on 23 September 1955), in which the Company argued that the Standing Orders applied solely to employees to whom tickets had been issued – a position that was inconsistent with the present case. The Court observed, however, that D.C. Dungore was not an employee within the meaning of the relevant Act and consequently there could be no Standing Orders governing his conditions of service. Moreover, in construing a statutory provision the doctrine of estoppel does not arise, and the High Court judges had noted that the respondent himself regarded the Standing Orders as applicable to all employees. Accordingly, the Court based its decision on a genuine construction of the Standing Orders, including the definition clause in Order 2(a), and concluded that the Standing Orders do indeed apply to the respondent. This finding is decisive for the appeal, because if the Standing Orders govern the respondent and his service was terminated pursuant to Standing Order 16(1), the writ petition he filed in the High Court must fail. The Attorney-General appearing for the appellants addressed the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution and contended that, even assuming an unlawful dismissal by a private employer, the appropriate remedy would be a suit rather than invoking the High Court’s special writ jurisdiction. While the Court recognised that these arguments raise important questions, it held that it was not called upon to resolve them in the present proceeding. Finally, the respondent argued that, even if the Standing Orders were applicable, the matter should be remitted to the High Court for determination of the remaining issues, since the applicability question had been treated as a preliminary issue. The Court inquired what other points remained for decision once the applicability of the Standing Orders and the termination under Order 16(1) were established. Counsel for the respondent referred to Standing Order 18, which prescribes penalties for misconduct, and asserted that the appellants had failed to comply with its provisions, particularly clause (e), claiming that the respondent’s suspension violated the safeguards therein. The Court answered that no penalty under Standing Order 18 had been imposed on the respondent; indeed, the Company continued to pay his salary from the date of suspension until 31 January 1956, which demonstrated that no disciplinary penalty had been effected.

The Court noted that the respondent had raised the issue because the High Court had treated the question of whether the Standing Orders applied as a preliminary matter and had failed to decide any other issues. The Court then asked the counsel for the respondent which additional points, if any, remained for consideration on his writ application after it was established that the Standing Orders applied to the respondent and that his service had been terminated pursuant to Standing Order no 16(1). The counsel for the respondent directed the Court’s attention to Standing Order no 18, which deals with penalties for misconduct, and asserted that the appellants had not complied with the provisions of that order. He specifically cited clause (e) of Standing Order no 18 and contended that the suspension order issued against the respondent contravened the safeguards contained in that clause. The Court answered that no penalty for misconduct had in fact been imposed on the respondent under Standing Order no 18. It observed that the Company continued to pay the respondent’s salary from the date of his suspension until 31 January 1956, a fact that demonstrated the absence of any punitive order for misconduct. The Court further explained that the Company elected to terminate the respondent’s service in accordance with Standing Order no 16 and chose not to pursue any alleged misconduct; the Company, however, retained the right to do so if it wished. Regarding Standing Order no 16, the Court found that all the stipulated requirements had been satisfied. Consequently, the Court concluded that no further point remained for decision in the present matter. On that basis, the appeal was allowed, the judgment and order of the High Court dated 26 September 1956 were set aside, and the respondent’s writ petition was dismissed. Finally, the Court ordered that each party bear its own costs throughout the proceedings, and the appeal was granted.