State of Madhya Pradesh vs Revashankar

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1956

Decision Date: 24 September 1958

Coram: S.K. Das, Syed Jaffer Imam, J.L. Kapur

In this case the Supreme Court recorded that the petitioner was the State of Madhya Pradesh and the respondent was Revashankar. The matter was decided on 24 September 1958 by a Bench consisting of S K Das, Syed Jaffer Imam and J L Kapur. The judgment was reported as 1959 AIR 102 and 1959 SCR Supl. (1) 1367, with subsequent citations in several law reports. The statutory provisions involved were the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (section 3(2)) and the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (section 228). The headnote set out the factual background and the legal issue.

The respondent had earlier filed a complaint alleging an offence under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code before the Additional District Magistrate of Indore. In an application made to that magistrate under section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the respondent made several statements that impugned the magistrate, two of which were described as being of a serious character. The respondent alleged that the magistrate was a party to a conspiracy intended to implicate the complainant in a false theft case, and further claimed that a lawyer representing the accused, to whom the magistrate was allegedly favourable, had admitted paying a sum of Rs 500 to the magistrate. The respondent later reiterated those allegations in an affidavit.

Upon learning of these allegations, the magistrate reported the matter to the Registrar of the High Court and requested that necessary action be taken. The High Court subsequently issued a notice to the respondent requiring him to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. A Division Bench of the High Court examined the matter without delving into the merits of the underlying accusations. The Bench held that, on a prima facie basis, the alleged conduct constituted an intentional insult under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and, consequently, the High Court’s jurisdiction was ousted by section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had taken an erroneous view of the law and that its order must be set aside. It observed that the mere presence of an element of insult in the alleged contemptuous act was not conclusive proof that section 228 of the Indian Penal Code applied, nor that such application automatically ousted the High Court’s jurisdiction under section 3(2) of the Contempt Act. While acknowledging that judges and courts are not beyond criticism and that recognised limits exist to such criticism, the Court emphasized that contempt proceedings are not intended to shield judges from personal insults. However, the Court stated that when defamatory remarks are made that attack the character and ability of individual judges or the judiciary as an institution, thereby scandalising the court and undermining public confidence in it, such remarks go beyond personal insult and constitute contempt. Consequently, the High Court retained jurisdiction to take cognisance of the respondent’s statements.

The Court explained that contempt which goes beyond the limits set by section 228 of the Indian Penal Code must be examined by first asking whether the act complained of actually constitutes an offence under that statutory provision, or whether it represents something more serious. If the conduct is found to be something more than an offence punishable under section 228, then the jurisdiction of the High Court is not removed by section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Applying this principle, the Court observed that the statements made in the present matter amounted to scandalising the Court itself, were not merely personal insults directed at an individual magistrate, and therefore the High Court possessed the authority to take cognisance of the contemptuous conduct. The Court relied on the decisions in Bathina Ramkrishna Reddy v. The State of Madras, [1952] S.C.R. 425 and Brahma Prakash Shayma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, [1953] S.C.R. 1169, and also referred to Ambard v. Attorney‑General for Trinidad and Tobago, [1936] A.C. 322, to support this view.

In addressing whether an insult offered to a public servant is intentional so as to attract the provisions of section 228, the Court held that such a determination must be made on the facts of each individual case and that no rigid formula could be laid down. The Court examined earlier authorities, including Narotam Das v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1943 All. 97, Queen Empress v. Abdullah Khan, (1898) A.W.N. 145, and Emperor v. Murli Dhar, (1916) I.L.R. 38 All. 284, to illustrate that intention must be assessed case by case. The judgment in this criminal appeal, identified as Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1956, was presented by counsel for the appellant. The sole issue for determination was whether, based on the facts and circumstances, the High Court was correct in concluding that the respondent’s act constituted an offence under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and that, consequently, the High Court’s jurisdiction was ousted by section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The High Court had apparently based its conclusion on two Supreme Court decisions—[1952] S.C.R. 425 and [1953] S.C.R. 1169—but the Court noted that the factual situations in those precedents differed markedly from the present case and therefore did not justify the High Court’s approach. The Court submitted that the allegations made in the disputed transfer application and the accompanying affidavit were of such a serious nature that they went far beyond a mere personal insult to the magistrate; they scandalised the Court, engendered public distrust, and threatened the integrity of the judicial process, which meant that the High Court’s jurisdiction was not ousted. The Court then read extracts from the transfer application and the affidavit, finding that the accusations against the magistrate alleged a criminal conspiracy and claimed that the magistrate had accepted a bribe of five hundred rupees from the opposing party, demonstrating the gravity of the contemptuous allegations.

Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code requires, as its first essential element, that the act be committed with an intention to insult. The respondent, when replying to the show‑cause notice in the High Court, filed an affidavit in which he declared that there was no intention to insult or show disrespect to the Magistrate. The bench, however, noted that the language employed in both the transfer application and the accompanying affidavit clearly manifested an intention to insult. While that observation may be contested, the Court referred to several earlier decisions of the Allahabad High Court that had been cited by the High Court, notably Narotam Das v. The Emperor, A.I.R. 1943 All. 97. In that case the Court held that when scandalous allegations are incorporated in a transfer application, the primary purpose may be to obtain a transfer rather than to insult the Court, and therefore an intention to insult is not automatically presumed. The present counsel argued that those precedents support the contention that scandalous allegations made against a Magistrate in a transfer application do not necessarily amount to an offence under section 228 and that such matters could be dealt with by the High Court as a contempt of court proceeding.

In I.L.R. 1941 Nagpur 304 the judge, who was the custodian of the case, lodged a complaint with the High Court concerning a letter received from one of the parties. The High Court held that the sender of the letter could be punished for contempt by that Court. Although that judgment did not explicitly discuss section 228, it cited Emperor v. Jagnath Prasad Swadhiry, I.L.R. 1938 All. 548, where, during the pendency of a suit, a litigant sent postal communications to the judge containing scandalous accusations. It was urged that section 228 would bar the High Court’s jurisdiction under section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, but the High Court rejected that argument and affirmed that its power to punish for contempt was not ousted. The judgment also referred to I.L.R. 12 Patna I and I.L.R. 12 Patna 172. The counsel submitted that when allegations extend beyond a mere personal insult and threaten to discredit the entire administration of justice, the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 3(2) of the Act remains intact. Conversely, in cases where the insult is limited to vulgar abuse such as calling a judge a “rogue” or “rascal” made ex facie curiae, the Court may consider that the jurisdiction of the High Court is ousted because the offence falls within the scope of section 228 of the Penal Code. The counsel further observed that if the abusive language attacks the private life of the judge, for example labeling him a drunkard or imputing immorality unrelated to his judicial duties, similar considerations would apply.

The Court observed that the magistrate in the present matter must have been fully aware of the authority conferred on him by section 228 of the Indian Penal Code as well as the relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code that enable him to punish for contempt of court. Yet, the magistrate apparently considered that the allegations made in the present case were so serious that they went beyond a simple personal insult and therefore warranted referral to the High Court for appropriate action. The submissions thereafter asserted that the view adopted by the High Court was overly narrow and could not be sustained either on principle or on the authority cited. Counsel for the respondent, identified as J. B. Dadachanji and S. N. Andley, advanced this argument. In contrast, another submission insisted that the High Court’s approach was correct and aligned with Supreme Court judgments reported in [1952] S.C.R. and [1953] S.C.R.

The Court further noted that if the complained‑of act deliberately offered a personal insult to the magistrate, such conduct might undermine the administration of justice, but it would nonetheless constitute an offence punishable under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, thereby causing the jurisdiction of the High Court to be ousted by section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act. The submissions rejected the notion that two categories of contempt exist, with a lesser form falling within section 228 and a greater form escaping it, insisting that every insult to a court, irrespective of its character, is contempt and is punishable under section 228. The Court quoted Kapur J, who held that not every insult to a judge amounts to contempt and that a libel attacking a judge’s integrity might not constitute contempt in the circumstances of a particular case, though it could be the subject of a libel proceeding. Das J was also quoted, pointing out a further difficulty: whether the magistrate was presiding over a judicial proceeding when the application and affidavit were filed, because if he was not, an essential ingredient of section 228 would be missing. The High Court had assumed that the magistrate was in session, a view supported by the facts in the petition for special leave to appeal, which stated that the application was presented during the court’s sitting and was intended to lower the court’s dignity in the public mind. Finally, the Court noted that section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly refers to section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and treats it as a form of contempt, implying that the offence is punishable under the Indian Penal Code and that the High Court’s jurisdiction would consequently be ousted.

The Court observed that the High Court’s jurisdiction would not be displaced by the provisions of section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act. The argument submitted was that the view expressed by the High Court was correct and that it was supported by two earlier Supreme Court decisions as well as by the Bombay High Court judgment reported in (1922) I.L.R. 46 Bom. 973. During the argument, doubts were raised concerning three essential elements: whether there was any intention to insult, whether the words spoken actually constituted an insult, and whether the alleged insult was made at any stage of a judicial proceeding. The Court explained that if any one of these three essentials is absent, then an offence under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be established. The Court further held that where there exists serious doubt as to the commission of an offence under section 228, yet there is no doubt that a prima facie contempt of court—apart from the specific provisions of section 228—has occurred, it would be erroneous to conclude that the High Court’s jurisdiction is ousted. The submission also relied upon the case of Narotam Das v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1943 All. 97, which the Court affirmed as correctly stating the law on the question of intention.

The judgment, delivered by Justice S.K. Das on 24 September 1958, concerned an appeal by special leave from an order of the then Madhya Bharat High Court dated 9 February 1955 in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 2 of 1954. The appeal was originally filed on behalf of the State of Madhya Bharat, which has since been succeeded by the State of Madhya Pradesh. The central issue raised on appeal was the interpretation of section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (XXXII of 1952), which had replaced the earlier Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (XII of 1926), as well as the Indore Contempt of Courts Act (V of 1930) that had previously been operative in Madhya Bharat. The factual background relevant to the appeal was set out as follows: a person named Ganga Ram, described as the landlord of the respondent Revashankar, instituted suit 1383 of 1952 before the Additional City Civil Judge, Indore, seeking ejectment and recovery of rent arrears from Revashankar. The suit was filed in the names of Ganga Ram and his wife, Chandra Mukhi Bai. It was alleged that a lawyer, Mr Uma Shankar Chaturvedi, who was acting for Ganga Ram, had advised his client to sign the plaint in his wife’s name, although Chandra Mukhi Bai herself did not execute the plaint or the vakalatnama. Within the same suit, Chandra Mukhi Bai filed an application requesting permission to prosecute her husband for forgery. A further application was lodged by other individuals described as tenants of Ganga Ram, in which additional allegations were leveled against the respondent.

In this matter, the Court recorded that on 29 June 1953 the respondent, Revashankar, filed a complaint against five persons alleging an offence punishable under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. The complaint was verified on 13 July 1953 and was entered as Criminal Case No 637 of 1953 before the Additional District Magistrate, N. K. Acharya, in Indore. The complainant was represented by Mr Kulkarni, who appeared on his behalf. The accused persons were represented on 8 August 1953 by Messrs Mohan Singh and Uma Shankar Chaturvedi. During that appearance an objection was raised on behalf of the accused to the presence of Mr Kulkarni, because his name had been listed among the witnesses. Following that objection a series of applications and counter‑applications were filed, and on 12 October 1953 the Additional District Magistrate issued an order directing that the copies of all applications and affidavits filed by both parties be forwarded to the District Judge for appropriate action against the lawyers involved.

Subsequently, a separate criminal proceeding was instituted against Revashankar before the Additional City Magistrate, Circle No 2, on a complaint filed by Ganga Ram, alleging an offence under section 497 of the Indian Penal Code; this case was assigned the number 644 of 1953. The pivotal event occurred on 17 December 1953, when Revashankar filed an application in the court of the Additional District Magistrate who was then in charge of Criminal Case No 637 of 1953. The application claimed to be made under section 528 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and contained serious allegations against Magistrate N. K. Acharya. The High Court later summarised those allegations under four headings. First, it was alleged that the order dated 12 October 1953 indicated that the Magistrate intended to favour Mr Uma Shankar Chaturvedi. Second, the Magistrate’s expressed opinions led Revashankar to conclude that he would not receive impartial and lawful justice from that magistrate. Third, a more grave allegation asserted that the Magistrate participated in a conspiracy devised by Messrs Mohan Singh and Uma Shankar Chaturvedi concerning certain ornaments belonging to Chandra Mukhi Bai, with the purpose of implicating Revashankar and his brother Sushil Kumar in a fabricated theft case. Fourth, it was claimed that Mr Uma Shankar Chaturvedi had said he paid Rs 500 to the Magistrate through Ganga Ram. Those same allegations were reiterated in an affidavit filed on 21 December 1953. On 11 January 1954 the Magistrate reported these facts to the Registrar of the Madhya Bharat High Court and requested appropriate action against Revashankar for contempt of court. In response, the High Court directed that a notice be issued to Revashankar requiring him to show cause why contempt proceedings should not be instituted against him under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952, and consequently a contempt application numbered 2 of 1954 was commenced against him.

In this matter, the contempt proceeding under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 together with Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 2 of 1954 was initiated against Revashankar. Revashankar filed a show‑cause notice on 3 March 1954. The matter was subsequently placed before a Division Bench composed of Justices V. R. Newaskar and S. M. Samvatsar. By an order dated 9 February 1955, the learned judges concluded that, because of the provisions of section 3(2) of the Act, the High Court’s jurisdiction was removed, since the conduct alleged to constitute contempt also amounted to an offence punishable under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. The issue before the present appeal was whether that view of the High Court was correct. Counsel appearing for the appellant, identified as H. J. Umrigar, strongly argued that the High Court was wrong in holding that the respondent’s conduct fell within section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, and consequently that the High Court’s jurisdiction had not been ousted by section 3(2) of the Act. The Court first turned to the wording of section 3(2) of the 1952 Act. It noted that the equivalent provision in the earlier Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, was section 2(3), and that the judgment under review contained some confusion regarding the correct sub‑section number. Section 3(2) reads as follows: “No High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860).” This sub‑section had been examined in two earlier decisions of this Court: Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras and Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh. In the Ramakrishna Reddy case, the appellant was the publisher and managing editor of the Telugu weekly ‘Praja Rajyam’. An article published on 10 February 1949 contained defamatory remarks about the stationary sub‑magistrate of Kovvur. The question was whether the High Court’s jurisdiction to take cognizance of the contempt claim was barred under section 2(3) of the 1926 Act, because the allegations in the article also constituted an offence under section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. Counsel for the appellant argued that the sub‑section meant that if the act alleged to constitute contempt of a subordinate court was an offence of any description punishable under the Indian Penal Code, then the High Court was precluded from taking cognizance. The Court rejected that argument and, quoting its earlier decision at page 429, observed that the sub‑section excluded the High Court’s jurisdiction only in cases where the acts alleged to constitute contempt were themselves offences under the specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code.

The Court clarified that the High Court’s jurisdiction is excluded only in those situations where the acts alleged to constitute contempt of a subordinate court are punishable as contempt by specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code, and not where those acts simply amount to offences of another description that the Penal Code also punishes. This interpretation follows from the wording of the sub‑section, which employs the phrase “where such contempt is an offence” rather than stating “where the act alleged to constitute such contempt is an offence.” In reviewing the authorities of several High Courts in India, the Court noted that those courts have held the High Court possesses the power to protect subordinate courts from contempt, but that power is limited by the restriction that cases of contempt already provided for in the Indian Penal Code must not be taken up by the High Court. The relevant decisions are reported in (1) [1952] S.C.R. 425 and (2) [1953] S.C.R. 1169, and this principle forms the foundation of section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926. The Court further observed that it was unnecessary to compile an exhaustive list of contempt offences already covered by the Penal Code; nevertheless, guidance is found in section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which authorises any civil, criminal or revenue court to summarily punish a person found guilty of committing any offence under sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or 228 of the Indian Penal Code in the view or presence of the court. The later decision of Brahma Prakash Sharma (1) elucidated the true purpose of contempt proceedings. As Mukherjea J., delivering the judgment of the Court, explained at page 1176, the object of contempt proceedings is not to shield individual judges from personal imputations, but rather to protect the public, whose interests would be seriously affected if the authority of the court were diminished and public confidence in the administration of justice were weakened. The Court also pointed out that countless methods exist to obstruct the proper administration of justice, one such method being conduct that “scandalises the court itself.” Such scandalising may appear in various forms, but essentially it constitutes an attack on individual judges or the court as an institution, with or without reference to specific cases, and it spreads unwarranted and defamatory accusations against the character and abilities of the judges. This type of conduct is punishable as contempt because it tends to foster distrust among the public and to erode confidence in the courts, which is of paramount importance to litigants seeking protection of their rights and liberties.

Keeping the aforementioned principles in mind, the Court turned its attention to the matter presently before it. The High Court had held that the respondent’s conduct merely attracted punishment under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Justice Nevaskar expressed his view that, although the filing was nominally presented as an application for transfer, its true purpose was to offend and insult the Magistrate. He explained that a person’s intention could be inferred from the nature of the act he performed, and that the application directly attributed partiality and corruption to the Magistrate. He further observed that the filing was not a bona‑fide request to a competent court for transferring the case, but rather a document aimed at the Magistrate personally. The Judge described the action as tantamount to confronting the Magistrate with accusations of bias and corruption, noting that the allegations were undoubtedly insulting and that the Magistrate had perceived them as such when the application was submitted on 17 December 1953, while he was presiding over the opponent’s case. Consequently, Justice Nevaskar concluded that because the opponent intended to insult the Magistrate, the conduct unquestionably fell within the ambit of section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, and that the Court would be barred from taking action for contempt committed before the Magistrate’s Court by virtue of section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act.

The other learned Judge echoed this perspective, stating that subordinate Courts possessed adequate authority to safeguard their dignity by prosecuting offenders under the relevant criminal provisions. He noted that the legislature had deliberately excluded such matters from the High Court’s jurisdiction under section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, but clarified that this exclusion did not extend to situations where the complained‑of act, alleged to constitute contempt, also constituted an offence under the Indian Penal Code. The Judge identified the central issue as whether the act in question was punishable as contempt under any specific provision of the Indian Penal Code, specifically sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or 228. He explained that if the act satisfied any of these sections, it could be dealt with by the subordinate Court pursuant to section 480 of the Criminal Procedure Code, thereby depriving the High Court of cognizance under the Contempt of Courts Act. The Court expressed the view that the learned Judges had been

The Court held that the earlier Judges had erred in concluding, on a preliminary basis, that the act complained of merely constituted an offence under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and nothing more. The Court emphasized that this view was only preliminary because the High Court had not examined the merits of the case, and the Court did not intend to make a final determination on the substantive issues at this stage. Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code provides that “whoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes any interruption to any public servant, while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.” The Court identified the three essential ingredients of the offence as (1) the presence of intention, (2) an insult or interruption directed at a public servant, and (3) the requirement that the public servant be sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding at the time of the insult or interruption. The Court then noted a preliminary difficulty in the present matter. The respondent was sought to be proceeded against because of certain disparaging statements made in an application dated 17 December 1953 and an affidavit dated 21 December 1953. The record did not clearly indicate whether the learned Magistrate was sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding when those documents were filed. Although the High Court asserted that the Magistrate was “sitting as a court” at that time, it did not specify the particular work—judicial or otherwise—that the Magistrate was engaged in. The Court explained that practice varies among courts; in some jurisdictions, applications and affidavits are filed within a set period before a reader or bench clerk and may be filed while the Judge or Magistrate is in chambers or attending to administrative duties. Consequently, from the material placed before the Court, it could not be ascertained what judicial activity, if any, the Magistrate was performing when the application and affidavit were submitted. If the Magistrate was not engaged in any judicial work at that moment, the third essential element of section 228 would be missing, and the act complained of would not amount to an offence under that provision. The Court clarified that its decision would not be based merely on the lack of material showing the Magistrate’s exact activity at the relevant time; if that were the sole issue, the appropriate remedy would be to order a factual finding on that question. Instead, the Court’s decision rested on a more fundamental ground. The counsel for the parties had taken the Court through the contents of the application dated 17 December 1953 and the affidavit dated 21 December 1953, and the disparaging statements contained therein were examined by the Court.

The Court observed that the allegations presented were more than a simple insult to the learned Magistrate; on their face they scandalised the Court and were likely to create distrust in the public mind and to impair the confidence of the people in the courts. Two specific aspersions were highlighted. First, it was alleged that the learned Magistrate had joined a conspiracy to implicate the respondent in a false theft case. The affidavit claimed that the magistrate had summoned the respondent and his brother and had asked them to make a false report to the police regarding the alleged theft of the ornaments of Chandra Mukhi Bai. The magistrate categorically denied this allegation, stating that he neither knew the respondent nor his brother and had no acquaintance with them. Second, an allegation was made that the magistrate had taken a bribe of Rs 500, which the magistrate also stoutly rejected. The Court clarified that it was not expressing any opinion on the merits or truth of these allegations; it merely held that, taken at their face value, they amounted to scandalising the court itself, an attack intended to generate public distrust and to erode confidence in the judiciary. The Court recognised that genuine criticism of the courts is permissible, but drew a line between permissible criticism and malicious attacks designed to impair the administration of justice. In support of this distinction it quoted Lord Atkin in Ambard v. Attorney‑General for Trinidad and Tobago: “The path of criticism… is a public way; the wrong‑headed are permitted to err therein, provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice, they are immune.” Accordingly, if the respondent had merely criticised the magistrate, no contempt of court would arise; however, if the respondent acted with malice and sought to impair the administration of justice, the offence would exceed the scope of section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. Counsel for the respondent argued that any element of insult automatically invoked section 228 and removed the High Court’s jurisdiction to take cognisance of contempt. The Court rejected this contention, explaining that section 228 deals with an intentional insult to a public servant in certain circumstances and prescribes punishment of simple imprisonment for up to six months, a fine of up to one thousand rupees, or both.

Both provisions were considered. Our attention was drawn to the circumstance that under section 4 of (1) [1936] A. C.322, 335, the Act the sentence for contempt of court is more or less the same, namely, simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months. The fine that may be imposed under that provision is a little higher, as it may extend to two thousand rupees. Section 4 of the Act also contains a proviso that the accused person may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on an apology being made to the satisfaction of the court.

We do not, however, think that a similarity of the sentence in the two sections referred to above is a real test. The true test, in our view, is whether the act complained of constitutes an offence under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, or whether it is something more than that. If, when examined in its true nature and effect, the act complained of is really “scandalising the court” rather than a mere insult, then, following the ratio of our decision in Ramakrishna Reddy’s case, the jurisdiction of the High Court is not ousted by reason of the provision in section 3(2) of the Act.

Mr. Umrigar urged a further point in this connection and contended that for an offence under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code the insult must be intentional. He argued that the first essential requirement of the offence is that the insult be offered intentionally. He pointed out that the application which the respondent filed purported to be an application under section 528 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and although it is difficult to see how that section applied in the present case, the intention of the respondent was not to insult the Magistrate but merely to state the circumstances in which the respondent was praying for a transfer of the case. Mr. Umrigar also highlighted that in the reply which the respondent gave to the notice issued by the High Court, the respondent said that he had no intention to insult or show disrespect to the learned Magistrate.

Mr. Umrigar further submitted that the decision in Narotam Das v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1943 All. 97), on which the learned judges of the High Court relied, does not correctly lay down the law. In that case Justice Yorke observed that it would be a matter for consideration in each individual case how insulting the expressions used were and whether there was any necessity for the applicant to make use of those expressions in the application which he was actually making to the court. While we agree that the question of intention must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, we are unable to accept as correct the other tests laid down by the learned judge as finally determinative of the question of intention. In two earlier

In earlier judgments of the same High Court, namely Queen Empress v. Abdullah Khan ( 1) and Emperor v. Murli Dhar (2), the Court held that when an accused person filed an application seeking transfer of the criminal proceeding pending against him and inserted statements that were defamatory toward the magistrate who was trying the case, the accused’s motive was not to insult the court but merely to obtain a transfer of the case. The Court emphasized that no rigid or hard‑and‑fast rule could be laid down on this point. Whether an intention to insult the magistrate exists must be examined in light of the specific facts and circumstances of each case, and the Court considered it neither necessary nor advisable to impose an inflexible rule. Examining the allegations made by the respondent in the application dated 17 December 1953 and the affidavit dated 21 December 1953 at their face value, the Court previously expressed the view that those allegations amounted to more than a simple personal insult to the magistrate; they scandalised the court itself and impaired the administration of justice. Accordingly, the Court concluded that section 3(2) of the Act did not bar the High Court from exercising jurisdiction, and that the learned Judges of the High Court were wrong in holding that the High Court’s jurisdiction had been ousted. Consequently, the appellate Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court order dated 9 February 1955. The Court further held that the High Court possessed jurisdiction to take cognizance of the act complained of and that the matter must now be decided by the High Court on its merits in accordance with law, citing the authorities (1) (1898) A.W.N. 145 and (2) (1916) 38 All. 284. The Court noted that the act in question was committed as early as 1953 and expressed the desirability that the case be dealt with as expeditiously as possible. The appeal was therefore allowed.