Shr1 Radeshyam Khare and Another vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 301 of 1958

Decision Date: 30 September 1958

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, S. K. Das, J. L. Kapur

In the matter titled Shri Radeshyam Khare and Another versus the State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, the Supreme Court of India rendered its judgment on 30 September 1958. The bench that heard the case comprised Justice Natwar Lal H. Bhagwati, Justice S.K. Das and Justice J.L. Kapur, with Chief Justice Sudhi Ranjan Das presiding. The case is reported in 1959 AIR 107 and in the Supreme Court Reporter Supplement (1) 1440, and it is cited in subsequent authorities such as 1962 SC 1110, 1965 SC 1518, 1965 SC 1578, 1967 SC 1353, 1967 SC 1507 and 1973 SC 2237. The statutory framework involved the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (Act II of 1922), specifically sections 53A and 57, which deal with the appointment of an Executive Officer by the State Government and the classification of the act as administrative or judicial. The principal issue for determination was whether, in exercising its power under section 53A to appoint an Executive Officer for the Municipal Committee of Dhamtari, the State Government acted in a judicial capacity or merely in an administrative one. Complaints had been lodged against the appellants, leading the additional Deputy Collector to be instructed to conduct an enquiry. Following the enquiry report, the State Government issued a notification under the relevant section, appointing an Executive Officer to the Municipal Committee for a period of eighteen months, defining specific powers and duties. The appellants received notice of the enquiry, submitted objections, and the President of the Municipal Committee attended the enquiry on several occasions. The notification accused the appellants of incompetency and abuse of power. In response, the appellants filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court, seeking a certiorari to quash the notification; the single‑judge bench dismissed the petition, and a subsequent appeal under the Letters Patent was summarily dismissed. Before the Supreme Court, the appellants contended that (1) although the notification was framed as issued under section 53A, it was in substance a notification under section 57; (2) consequently, under section 57(5) the Government was obligated to provide the appellants an opportunity to furnish an explanation; and (3) even if the notification genuinely fell under section 53A, the Government was bound by the principles of natural justice to afford the appellants a chance to defend themselves. The Court, delivering a per curiam decision, held that sections 53A and 57 of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 differed materially in their scope and effect, and that the statute did not impose an obligation on the Government to take any action under either provision. While a finding of incompetency of the Municipal Committee was a condition precedent to any remedial action under both sections, the Government was free to choose its remedy as

The Court held that the circumstances of the case did not permit the argument that a notification issued under section 53A of the Act, even though it was accompanied by a finding of incompetency and exhibited certain instances of abuse of power, could be treated as a notification issued under section 57 of the Act. It further ruled that the fact that the notification vested authority in the Executive Officer, regardless of how substantial that vesting might appear, could not be construed, in fact and in reality, as a dissolution of the Municipal Committee as contemplated by section 57 of the Act. The Court then explained the test for determining whether the State Government acted in a quasi‑judicial or an administrative capacity while exercising its powers under section 53A. The test, according to the Court, is whether the statute expressly or implicitly requires the Government to act judicially. The Court observed that the Act contains no express provision mandating a judicial mode of action, and that the mere determination of the fact of incompetency – which is a condition precedent to any action under the section – does not, by itself, imply a quasi‑judicial function. Consequently, the Government, in making the notification under section 53A, functioned administratively rather than quasi‑judicially. Nonetheless, the Court noted that the enquiry conducted by the State Government provided the appellants with ample opportunity to defend themselves, leaving little scope for any grievance. The Court referred to the authorities Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani [1950] S.C.R. 621, Rex v. Electricity Commissioners [1924] 1 K.B. 171, Rex v. London County Council [1913] 2 K.B. 215, R. v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly (1928) 1 K.B. 411 and Nakkuda Ali’s Case (1951) A.C. 66 in support of its reasoning.

Justice Bhagwati observed that because the enquiry in the present case fully satisfied the requirements of natural justice, it was unnecessary to decide whether the State Government, while acting under section 53A, was performing a quasi‑judicial function or an administrative one. Justice S. K. Das added that if the issue were the compliance with the rules of natural justice, the enquiry could not be said to have complied; however, since the State Government, under section 53A, was required merely to consider policy and expediency and had no adverse claim before it, its action was purely administrative and not subject to a writ of certiorari, citing R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee (1952) 2 Q.B. 413. Justice Subba Rao, after properly appreciating the criteria laid down by section 53A itself, concluded that the provision imposed a duty on the State Government to act judicially in ascertaining the fact of the Municipal Committee’s incompetency. He emphasized that the determination of such a jurisdictional fact could not be left to the Government’s subjective satisfaction but had to be reached objectively, making it incumbent upon the Government to give the appellants a reasonable opportunity to explain the charge levelled against them.

The Court observed that the State Government was obligated to provide the appellants with a reasonable opportunity to respond to the charge that had been made against them. An enquiry of the type that was conducted in the present matter could not be considered a substitute for the opportunity that the Government was required to grant under section 53A of the Act before taking any action. The Court referred to authorities such as Rex v. The Electricity Commissioners (1924) I K. B. 171, Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani [1950] S.C.R. 621 and R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee (1952) 2 Q.B. 413 in support of this principle.

The judgment was rendered in a civil appellate jurisdiction concerning Civil Appeal No. 301 of 1958, which was taken by special leave from the order dated 21 February 1958 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur in Letters Patent Appeal No. 22 of 1958. The appeal challenged the order dated 20 February 1958 of the same High Court in Miscellaneous Petition No. 266 of 1957. Counsel for the appellants included M.K. Nambiyar, S.N. Andley, J.B. Dadachanji and Rameshwar Nath, while the respondents were represented by the Advocate‑General of Madhya Pradesh, M. Adhikari, and N. Shroff. The judgment was delivered on 30 September 1958.

The Court noted that there were two appellants in this proceeding. The second appellant was the Municipal Committee of Dhamtari, which had been constituted under the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (Act 11 of 1922). The first appellant was the President of that Committee, who had been elected on 10 July 1956 and who assumed office on 27 July 1956. Although initially returned as a candidate of the Congress party, the President had been expelled from the party after contesting the most recent general election as an independent against the official Congress candidate.

The Court further described the existence of two factions within the Municipal Committee. The President alleged that on 7 August 1956 a Committee member named Dhurmal Daga, who belonged to the Congress party, had diverted imported cloth within the municipal limits without paying the octroi duty. In response, Dhurmal Daga claimed that the President was guilty of serious mismanagement of the Committee’s affairs and commenced a hunger strike demanding the appointment of a Committee to investigate the President’s alleged misconduct. Copies of the leaflets containing the demands and charges, which were said to have been widely circulated, were annexed to the petition as annexures I and II.

The Court recorded that several other persons and firms also lodged charges against the President. The Collector of Raipur personally intervened, persuading Dhurmal Daga to discontinue his fast after giving an assurance that the matter would be examined. The Collector then deputised Shri N.R. Rana, the Additional Deputy Collector, to investigate the allegations of maladministration relating to the Municipal Committee. By a memorandum dated 24 August 1956, identified as Memorandum No. K/J N.P. Dhamtari, Shri N.R. Rana summoned the President, in his capacity as President of the Municipal Committee, and required him to provide a detailed explanation of each complaint, a list of which was attached to the memorandum.

The petition included a copy of the memorandum issued by the Additional Deputy Collector, together with twenty‑two enclosures, and this composite document was identified in the petition as annexure 111. In addition, annexures IV and V comprised copies of a detailed report that set out the objections raised against the Municipal Committee and the reply to those charges; this reply had been submitted from the Municipal Committee’s office by the first appellant in his capacity as President of the Committee. After receiving the memorandum, the Additional Deputy Collector proceeded to conduct an enquiry into the alleged mis‑administration. The High Court later stated that it had examined the materials on which the State Government based its decision to order the enquiry and that the enquiry records indicated that, on certain occasions, the petitioner had been present during the proceedings. The Court observed that there was no indication that the appellants had sought the chance to produce any evidence, nor that they had been barred from doing so or otherwise obstructed in presenting their defence. It appears that the Additional Deputy Collector prepared a report on the enquiry, which in due course would have been transmitted to the State Government. Subsequently, on 18 November 1957, a notification was published in the Official Gazette whereby the State Government, invoking the authority granted by section 53‑A of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, appointed Shri B. P. Jain, who is the second respondent, as Executive Officer of the Municipal Committee of Dhamtari for a period of eighteen months, conferring upon him the powers specified in the notification. A copy of this notification was annexed to the petition as annexure VIII. Because the principal contention before the Court centered on the content of that notification, the complete text of the notification was reproduced in full. The notification, dated Bhopal, 18 November 1957 and bearing reference number 9262/11538‑U‑XVIII, set out that the State Government considered the Municipal Committee of Dhamtari to be incompetent to discharge its duties under the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. The notification listed several specific allegations: the Committee had granted grain and building advances to employees without prior sanction and had not taken steps to recover them; it had shown carelessness in cases of employee embezzlement and failed to report such incidents to the Government; it had not restrained the President from issuing orders beyond his authority; it had expended thousands of rupees on sanitation and other works without any budgetary provision; it had permitted irrelevant persons to interfere with its operations; it had acted in a biased manner in appointing and dismissing employees, often violating established rules; it had delayed constituting the Committee and framing the budget; it had misused municipal trucks; it had failed to recover lease monies; it had shown partiality in issuing transit passes to certain traders and had levied excess octroi duty on some articles, and in some cases levied octroi where none was legally permissible, apparently to harass the public; and it had distributed municipal manure to certain persons free of charge, similarly distributing the

The municipality had distributed municipal manure without any charge and had used a municipal truck to carry out that distribution. It also failed to control its president, who expended money belonging to the Municipal Committee without possessing any authority to do so. In addition, the municipality spent a large sum on the maintenance of roads and drainage, yet the condition of those roads and drainage systems remained unsatisfactory. The municipality further failed to provide copies of documents as permitted under the applicable rules, and it also denied its members the right to inspect the municipal records, a right that the rules expressly allow. Moreover, the municipality did not invite tenders for the purchase of articles, thereby neglecting the procedural requirements for procurement.

Given these deficiencies, the State Government concluded that a general improvement in municipal administration could be achieved by appointing a government servant as the Executive Officer of the Committee. Consequently, exercising the authority conferred by section 53‑A of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922 (Act 11 of 1922), the State Government appointed Shri B. P. Jain, Deputy Collector, as Executive Officer of the Municipal Committee at Dhamtari for a period of eighteen months, commencing from the date he assumed charge. In accordance with sub‑section (3) of the same section, the State Government directed that the Executive Officer shall discharge the powers and duties of the Committee to the exclusion of the Committee, the President, the Vice‑President and the Secretary, under the provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. The specific powers and duties assigned to the Executive Officer include those enumerated in Chapter III (Appointment of Officers and Servants – Sections 25, 26 and 28), Chapter IV (Procedure in Committee Meetings – Section 31), Chapter V (Property, Contract and Liabilities – Sections 37 to 45), Chapter VI (Duties of Committee – Sections 50 and 51), Chapter VIII (The Municipal Fund – whole chapter), Chapter IX (Imposition, Assessment and Collection of Taxes – whole chapter), Chapter X (Municipal Budgets and Accounts – whole chapter), Chapter XI (Powers to Regulate Streets and Buildings – Sections 90 to 94, 96, 98, 99, 103 and 104), Chapter XII (Powers to Prevent Disease and Public Nuisance – Sections 117, 118(1), 119 and 132), Chapter XVIII (Offences, Practice and Procedure – Sections 218 to 223) and Chapter XIX (Special Provisions for Recovery of Taxes – whole chapter). The Executive Officer shall exercise general supervisory powers over all matters covered by the Act, 1922. The appointment order was issued in Hindi by the Governor of Madhya Pradesh, signed by S. S. Joshi, Deputy Secretary.

On 21 December 1957, the two appellants filed a writ petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which gave rise to the present appeal. The High Court, on 11 January 1958, issued an order staying the operation of the appointment of the Executive Officer. Subsequently, the writ petition was dismissed on 20 February 1958. A Letters Patent Appeal was filed and dismissed in limine on 21 February 1958. An application for a certificate under Articles 132 and 133 was denied on 21 March 1958. The appellants then sought and, on 1 April 1958, obtained special leave to appeal from this Court against the Madhya Pradesh High Court’s judgment. The interim stay order initially granted by this Court was later vacated.

On 13 May 1958 the appeal was listed before the Court for final disposal. The counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants raised three distinct points. First, the counsel contended that although the Notification claimed to have been issued under the authority granted to the State Government by section 53‑A of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, in substance and in reality it was made under section 57 of the same Act. Second, the counsel argued that if the Notification were to be regarded as an exercise of power under section 57, it would be ultra vires and void because the statutory requirement of giving the affected parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard had not been fulfilled. Third, the counsel submitted that even assuming the Notification fell within the scope of section 53‑A, it would still be ultra vires because, before issuing it, the State Government had breached the principles of natural justice by not providing the appellants any chance to defend themselves. The counsel also referred to an allegation of mala‑fide motive on the part of the State Government, stating that the first appellant’s departure from the Congress party had allegedly created ill‑will towards him from the party, which was the ruling party in the State. Since this allegation was not pressed before the Court, no further comment was deemed necessary. The Court then indicated that it would address the three points raised by the appellants’ counsel. Regarding points (i) and (ii), the Court observed that they are closely linked and could be dealt with together. The argument supporting these points was presented in two phases. Firstly, it was asserted that the reasons set out in the impugned Notification clearly show that, in fact, it was issued under section 57 of the Act rather than under section 53‑A. To appreciate this contention, the Court found it necessary to reproduce the full text of the two relevant sections of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922.

Section 53‑A reads as follows: “(1) If a committee is not competent to perform the duties imposed on it or undertaken by it by or under this Act or any other enactment for the time being in force and the State Government considers that a general improvement in the administration of the municipality is likely to be secured by the appointment of a servant of the Government as the executive officer of the committee, the State Government may, by an order stating the reasons therefor published in the Gazette, appoint such servant as the executive officer of the committee for such period not exceeding eighteen months as may be specified in such order. (2) Any executive officer appointed under subsection (1) shall be deemed to be an officer lent to the committee by Government under sub‑section (3) of section 25. (3) When under subsection (1) an executive officer is appointed for any committee, the State Government shall determine from time to time which powers, duties and functions of the committee, president, vice‑president or secretary under this Act or any rule or byelaw made thereunder shall be exercised and.” The Court proceeded to analyse these provisions in relation to the facts of the present case, considering whether the Notification in question was correctly framed under the powers conferred by section 53‑A or whether it more appropriately fell within the ambit of section 57, which deals with dissolution of committees and ordering fresh elections. This analysis formed the basis for the Court’s subsequent determination of the ultra vires character of the Notification and the compliance, or lack thereof, with procedural safeguards required by law.

The provision states that the functions performed by the executive officer may be carried out either in addition to, or to the exclusion of, the functions normally exercised by the committee, its president, vice‑president or secretary. It further provides that the secretary of the committee shall be subordinate to the executive officer. The executive officer is entitled to attend every meeting of the committee, as well as any joint committee or sub‑committee, and may participate in the discussions in order to give explanations on the matters under consideration. However, the executive officer is expressly barred from moving, seconding or casting a vote on any resolution or other motion that may be proposed at such meetings.

Section 57 deals with the powers of the State Government when a municipal committee is found to be incompetent or abusive. Sub‑section (1) permits the State Government, by publishing an order in the Official Gazette and stating the reasons, to dissolve a committee that is not competent to perform its duties, persistently defaults in performing those duties, or gravely exceeds or abuses its powers, and to direct that a fresh election be held. Sub‑section (2) provides that if, after a fresh election, the newly elected committee continues to be incompetent, defaults, or seriously exceeds or abuses its powers, the State Government may again issue a gazetted order declaring the committee incompetent, in default, or having abused its powers, and may supersede it for a period specified in that order. Sub‑section (3) outlines the consequences of dissolution or supersession: (a) all members must vacate their offices from the date of the order; (b) the powers and duties of the committee may, until it is reconstituted, be exercised by any person or persons appointed by the State Government; and (c) all property vested in the committee shall, until reconstitution, vest in the State Government. Sub‑section (4) provides that when the period of supersession expires, the committee shall be reconstituted and the former members who vacated their offices shall not be disqualified solely because of that supersession. Sub‑section (5) requires that no order under sub‑sections (1) or (2) be made until the committee has been given a reasonable opportunity to present an explanation. Finally, sub‑section (6) allows that any person appointed by the State Government to perform the powers and duties of a dissolved or superseded committee may be paid from the municipal fund if the State Government so directs. Learned counsel for the appellants highlighted that action may be taken under section 53‑A when a committee is not competent to perform its duties and the State Government believes that appointing a government servant as executive officer would improve municipal administration, whereas the present discussion concerns the provisions of section 57.

The Court observed that action could be taken not only when a municipal committee was incompetent to perform its duties or repeatedly defaulted in performing those duties, but also when the committee exceeded or abused its powers in a serious manner. It was noted that in situations of incompetency, the State Government could act under either section 53‑A or section 57, whereas in cases of abuse of power the State Government could act only under section 57. The Court then examined the grounds listed in the impugned notification and found that, apart from grounds a, b, c and g, which might suggest incompetency, the remaining grounds—numerously more numerous—clearly indicated abuse of power. From this observation, it was argued that the notification had effectively been issued under section 57 and therefore could not be sustained because it failed to comply with sub‑section (5) of section 57, which required that no order under sub‑section (1) or (2) be made until the committee had been given a reasonable opportunity to provide an explanation. The Court was not persuaded by this argument. It first reminded that the two sections merely conferred discretionary powers on the State Government and did not obligate the Government to take action under either provision. The Court further explained that the two sections differed substantially in their scope and effect. Under section 53‑A, the State Government could only appoint a government servant as the Executive Officer of the committee and could, from time to time, specify which powers, duties and functions of the committee, its president, vice‑president or secretary were to be exercised by that officer, either in addition to or in place of the committee officers. The language of section 53‑A made clear that any action taken under it was temporary, limited to a period not exceeding eighteen months, and was intended solely to ensure the proper performance of certain powers, duties and functions under the Act. Section 53‑A did not, in any legal or factual sense, affect the existence of the committee, its president, vice‑president or secretary. By contrast, section 57 empowered the State Government, in the circumstances described at the beginning of that section, to dissolve the committee altogether and to order a fresh election, thereby causing the committee as a legal entity to cease to exist and rendering all sitting members of the committee functi officio. Moreover, if after such a fresh election the same problems persisted, section 57 further authorized the State Government to declare the committee incompetent.

In circumstances where the committee is found to be in default, has exceeded its authority, or has abused its power, the State Government may supersede the committee for a period that is not limited by the provision and that may be specified in the order. An order issued under section 57 therefore has an extremely drastic effect because it terminates the very existence of the committee. Because of the seriousness of the consequences that follow such termination, the legislature apparently intended to provide some safeguard for the committee before a decision of this magnitude could be taken. Accordingly, sub‑section (5) of section 57 requires that no order be passed until the committee has been given a reasonable opportunity to present an explanation. That sub‑section makes clear that action under section 57 can be taken only after the explanations furnished by or on behalf of the committee have been considered. The legislature did not create a comparable safeguard in section 53A, probably because an order under that section is of temporary duration, is not as drastic, and does not threaten the existence of the committee. A brief reading of the two sections also shows that the conditions precedent for exercising the powers under both sections overlap to some degree, namely that action may be taken under either provision where the committee “is not competent to perform the duties imposed on it.” To the extent that the requirements of the two sections intersect, the State Government may choose to act under one or the other according to its assessment of the situation’s exigencies. Consequently, when the committee is found not competent to perform its duties, the State Government must first decide whether any action at all is required. If it decides that action is warranted, it must then determine which of the two sections it will employ. Where the Government assesses that the incompetency is not grave and that the circumstances can be adequately addressed by appointing an Executive Officer for a period not exceeding eighteen months, with certain powers to be exercised by that officer either in addition to or in exclusion of those exercised by the committee, its president, vice‑president or secretary, the Government may properly act under section 53‑A. Conversely, if the Government, after considering all the facts, concludes that the incompetency is so serious that the committee, its president, vice‑president or secretary cannot function at all, it may invoke section 57, dissolve the committee and order a fresh election. Thus, the existence of incompetency on the part of the committee gives the State Government the option to apply one of two remedies provided by the Act.

In this case the Court noted that written charges had been lodged against the municipal committee and its president, and those charges were sent to the president together with a request that he provide a detailed written explanation. The president, while performing his official duties, prepared a comprehensive written response and transmitted it through the municipal committee’s office to the Additional Deputy Collector, who had been appointed by the Collector to conduct an enquiry into the matters raised. The Additional Deputy Collector proceeded to hold the enquiry, during which the president personally appeared on several occasions, answered questions, and, after examining the material, arrived at certain findings. The Additional Deputy Collector then prepared a report summarising those findings, and that report was eventually transmitted to the State Government.

The Court observed that the State Government appears to have accepted those portions of the findings that were incorporated into the notification issued by the State. According to the counsel for the appellants, some of the findings recorded in the notification relate merely to the committee’s incompetency, while the remaining findings relate to an abuse of power by the committee. The Court stated that it need not examine in detail whether the alleged abuse of power was of such a grave character as to fall within the ambit of section 57 of the Act, or whether it was a minor transgression that merely demonstrated incompetency. Assuming the position advanced by the appellants’ counsel, the State Government, as a result of the enquiry, concluded two things with respect to the appellant committee: first, that the committee was guilty of incompetency, and second, that the committee was guilty of certain abuses of power.

The Court further explained that the State Government was under no statutory obligation to take any action at all, whether under section 53‑A or under section 57. If the State Government decided that action was necessary, the discretion to choose the appropriate provision lay entirely with the State Government. The Court recognised that the State Government might have determined that the abuse of power identified by the enquiry was not sufficiently grave to warrant dissolution of the committee under section 57, and might have regarded the matter as a question of incompetency only. The Court also observed that a committee which exercises its powers in an abusive manner could reasonably be considered incompetent to perform the duties imposed on it.

Assuming that the committee was found to be both incompetent and abusive, the Court asked what prevented the State Government, as a matter of policy, from exercising its authority under section 53‑A to address the incompetency. The Court held that the mere presence of findings of abuse of power in the catalogue of the committee’s misdeeds does not erase the findings of incompetency. Accordingly, there is nothing improper in the State Government informing the committee that it has been found guilty of both incompetency and abuse of power, yet opting not to dissolve the committee outright. Instead, the State Government may elect to appoint an Executive Officer for a period not exceeding eighteen months and to confer upon that officer certain powers under section 53‑A, while leaving the committee in place.

State Government was well within its tights, in exercise of its option, to take action under s. 53‑A as it has in terms purported to do. To say that because some of the findings amount to abuse of power the State Government must act under s. 57 is to deprive it of its discretion which the Act undoubtedly confers on it. In the view expressed, the fact that the impugned notification records, apart from the findings of incompetency, certain findings of abuse of power, does not lead to the conclusion, as contended for the appellants, that the State Government had taken action under s. 57 and not under s. 53‑A although, in terms, it says it acted under the last mentioned section. Counsel for the appellants, in support of the contention that the impugned notification was really made under s. 57 of the Act, refers to the powers and duties conferred on the executive Officer thereby appointed to be exercised and performed by him to the exclusion of the committee, its president, vicepresident, or the secretary. The argument advanced is that although the municipal committee is not ostensibly dissolved, it is in effect and in reality so dissolved, because the substance of the powers of the committee, its president, vice‑president or the secretary has been taken away from them, leaving only a semblance of power that is nothing but a mere husk, and therefore the impugned notification must be regarded as having been made under s. 57. In the first place, s. 57 does not contemplate the appointment of any executive Officer or the conferment of any power on him, while such appointment and conferment of power is directly contemplated by s. 53‑A. In the second place, the legal existence of the municipal committee and the status of its members and its president, vice‑president or the secretary have not been impaired at all. In the eye of the law the municipal committee still exists and, along with it, the members of the committee, the president, vice‑president and the secretary still hold their respective offices. These features clearly militate against the suggestion that action has been taken under s. 57. Counsel says that the Court must look beyond mere form and get to the substance of the matter. There can be no doubt that most of the important powers have been taken away from the committee, its president, vice‑president and the secretary, but that may well be due to the degree of gravity of the incompetency found or inferred from the other findings. Further, a cursory perusal of the Act and of the notification will show that various other powers and duties have not been taken away from the committee or conferred on the Executive Officer. Thus the powers of the committee under ss. 128, 130, 131, 133 to 141 and 144, 145 arid 147 to 149 are still vested in and are exercisable by the committee. Likewise the powers under ss. 120, 121, 122,

In this case, the Court observed that the statutory powers enumerated in sections 123 to 127, 129, 150, 152 to 160, 162, 163, 163A and 168 remain vested in and exercisable by the President. The Court held that these powers, which continue to be retained by the Committee or the President, cannot be described as mere husks. It further noted that the suggestion that real power had been removed, leaving only a semblance, constituted an argument‑in‑aid of a charge of mala fides, yet such a charge of mala fides or fraud on the part of the State Government had not been pressed before the Court. Consequently, the Court found no warrant for contending that the impugned notification, when judged by its effect, must be regarded as having been issued under section 57 of the Act. In view of that conclusion, the argument that the action was invalid because it failed to comply with the requirements of sub‑section (5) of section 57 did not arise for consideration.

The Court then examined the writ application from which the present appeal arose. The principal prayer of the appellants was for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 18 November 1957 passed by the State Government. The second prayer, seeking a writ of mandamus to restrain the respondents from giving effect to the impugned order, was held to be consequential and ancillary to the main prayer, while the third prayer comprised the usual request for further or other reliefs. Accordingly, the Court characterised the petition essentially as one for the issue of a writ of certiorari. The Court explained that certiorari is an ancient prerogative writ, originally issued by the Courts of the King’s Bench to correct errors of inferior courts. Over time the scope of the writ expanded so that superior courts could control bodies established by statute that performed functions resembling those of ordinary inferior courts. The Court affirmed the settled principle that a writ of certiorari will lie to control a statutory body when that body acts without jurisdiction, exceeds its jurisdiction, violates natural‑justice principles, or commits an error apparent on the face of the record, provided that the statute creating the body can be interpreted as vesting it with quasi‑judicial functions. Conversely, the Court reiterated that certiorari will not lie to correct errors of a statutory body whose functions are purely administrative. Therefore, the Court said it was necessary to determine the true nature of the functions entrusted to and exercised by the State Government under section 53‑A of the Act, and referred to the decision in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani for guidance in that determination.

The Court observed that a long discussion had been devoted to distinguishing judicial acts from administrative acts, and that several tests had been formulated for determining whether the act of a statutory body should be regarded as quasi‑judicial or merely administrative. It stated that it was sufficient to refer to the well‑known definition of a quasi‑judicial body articulated by Atkin L.J. in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, a definition that continues to be authoritative. The definition reads: “Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially, act in excess of their legal authority, they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King’s Bench Division exercised in these writs.”

This definition, the Court noted, had been accepted as correct in Rex v. London County Council and in many subsequent decisions both in England and in this country. The definition requires satisfaction of three requisites before an act may be characterized as quasi‑judicial: first, the body must possess legal authority; second, it must be empowered to determine questions that affect the rights of parties; and third, it must have a duty to act judicially. Because a writ of certiorari may be issued only to correct the errors of a court or a quasi‑judicial body, the Court explained that the decisive test for distinguishing a statutory act as quasi‑judicial or administrative is whether the statute expressly or impliedly imposes on the body the duty to act judicially, the third condition of Atkin L.J.’s definition.

The Court then applied this principle to the question of whether, when acting under section 53‑A, the State Government should be regarded as a quasi‑judicial body or merely an administrative authority. It held that the inquiry must determine whether the statute expressly or by implication places upon the State Government a duty to act judicially. Relying on paragraphs 114 and 115 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 11, at page 5558, and citing R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee, counsel for the appellants argued that where a statute requires a decision to be made solely on policy considerations or expediency, the authority owes no duty to act judicially. The counsel further contended that where a decision must be based on evidence, either under an express statutory provision or by implication, and where the authority must determine specific facts on which its jurisdiction depends, or where a proposal is met with opposition, the authority is under a duty to act judicially. The Court cited paragraph 115 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 1, at page 57, which states that the duty to act judicially may arise in a variety of circumstances.

The Court observed that the duty of a statutory authority to act judicially may arise under a wide variety of factual situations and that it is impossible to compile an exhaustive list of every possible circumstance. Consequently, the existence of such a duty must be determined on a case‑by‑case basis, taking into account the specific facts of the case, the wording of the statute in question, and the general principles that have been articulated in earlier judicial decisions. The Court then recalled the principles derived from several decisions that it had considered in the earlier case of Province of Bombay v. K. S. Advani, page 725. Those principles were expressed as follows: first, when a statute gives an authority – which is not a court in the ordinary sense – the power to resolve disputes that arise from a claim made by one party under the statute and opposed by another party, and when that authority must determine the respective rights of the opposing parties, a “lis” is deemed to exist. In the absence of any contrary provision in the statute, the authority is then required to act judicially, and its decision is characterised as a quasi‑judicial act. Second, when a statutory authority possesses the power to take an action that will adversely affect the subject of that action, even though there are not two distinct parties apart from the authority itself, the contest is essentially between the authority, which proposes to act, and the subject, which opposes the action. In such a scenario, the final determination made by the authority is also a quasi‑judicial act, provided the statute obliges the authority to act in a judicial manner. Applying these principles to the present matter, the Court found that there is no dispute between two opposing parties that the State Government is called upon to resolve under section 53‑A of the C. P. and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. Accordingly, no “lis” in the ordinary sense exists, and the first principle concerning a dispute between two parties does not apply. The Court therefore turned to the second principle to decide whether the statute compels the State Government to act judicially when it exercises its powers under section 53‑A. Counsel for the appellant highlighted the wording of section 53‑A and acknowledged that the final order that may be issued under that provision is discretionary; that is, the State Government is under no obligation to make any order at all. The Government may either issue an order or decline to do so, according to its judgment. However, the Court noted that if the State Government elects to act under section 53‑A, it may do so only when two conditions set out in the section are satisfied. A brief examination of section 53‑A reveals that the first condition is an objective test: the municipal committee must be found incompetent to perform the duties assigned to it. The second condition is subjective: the State Government must be of the opinion that appointing a Government servant as Executive Officer of the committee will bring about a general improvement in the administration of the municipality. Only when both of these prerequisites are met may the State Government validly exercise its authority under section 53‑A.

In this case, the Court explained that the statute provides two conditions that must be satisfied before the State Government may invoke section 53‑A and appoint a Government servant as the Executive Officer of the municipal committee. The second condition, according to the language of the provision, is that the general administration of the municipality is likely to be improved by such an appointment. The provision expressly leaves this consideration to the State Government, meaning that it is a matter of the Government’s own judgment about its duty and responsibility in the circumstances before it. In other words, the statute makes this second condition a subjective determination of the State Government. The first condition, by contrast, is an objective factual requirement: the municipal committee must be incompetent to perform the duties imposed upon it. The Court noted that the determination of this fact is not left to the subjective opinion of the State Government. Counsel for the appellants argued that, had the Legislature intended to leave the finding of incompetence to the State Government’s discretion, the wording of the section would have been different. They suggested that the section would have read something akin to: “If the State Government considers that a committee is not competent to perform the duties and that the general improvement in the administration of the municipalities is likely to be secured by…”. The fact that the Legislature did not phrase the provision in that way, the counsel submitted, shows a clear intention not to submit the question of competence to the State Government’s ipse dixit. The Court further observed that section 53‑A differs materially from section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance (V of 1947), which the Court examined in the decision of Kusaldas Advani. The Bombay ordinance began with the words “If, in the opinion of the Provincial Government…”, indicating that the Legislature intended to leave the existence of all conditions precedent entirely to the Provincial Government’s subjective opinion, thereby making the action purely administrative. By contrast, the first requirement in section 53‑A is a jurisdictional fact that must be established before the power can be exercised. The Court held that the existence of this jurisdictional fact is not left to the State Government’s subjective view; although the ultimate act is administrative, the State Government must at the preliminary stage determine the jurisdictional fact judicially, that is, by an objective, quasi‑judicial assessment. It was assumed that whenever a fact affecting the rights of parties must be determined, the decision should be quasi‑judicial and therefore subject to correction by a writ of certiorari, as discussed in Advani’s case.

In the case, the Court recorded that Kania C. J., with A hom Patanjali Sastri J. agreeing, observed on page 632 that “The respondent’s argument that whenever there is a determination of a fact which affects the rights of parties, the decision is quasi‑judicial, does not appear to be sound.” The learned Chief Justice went on to explain that a decision is characterised as quasi‑judicial when it is determined by an objective test and, in consequence, it affects the rights of a person. He cautioned that this statement overlooks the fact that virtually every executive decision involves a finding of fact and, in many instances, influences the rights of someone. The Court emphasized that because an executive authority must ascertain certain objective facts as a preliminary step in performing its function, it is not required to make those factual determinations judicially. When the executive has to form an opinion about an objective matter before exercising a conferred power, both the fact‑finding and the subsequent exercise of power are matters of an administrative nature and are not subject to the writ of certiorari.

Supporting this view, Fazl Ali J., in the same case on page 642, remarked that “The mere fact that an executive authority has to decide something does not make the decision judicial. It is the manner in which the decision has to be arrived at which makes the difference, and the real test is: Is there any duty to decide judicially? As I have already said, there is nothing in the Ordinance to show that the Provincial Government has to decide the existence of a public purpose judicially or quasi‑judicially.” Further, the Court discussed the essential characteristics that differentiate a quasi‑judicial act from an administrative act, noting on page 719 that a person entrusted with an administrative function often must determine questions of fact, consider circumstances, and weigh pros and cons before exercising power, much like a person performing a judicial or quasi‑judicial function. Both categories of actors must act in good faith, and a valid administrative or executive act binds the subject, affecting his rights or imposing liability as effectively as a quasi‑judicial act. The legislature may, however, make the exercise of an administrative power dependent on a condition or contingency involving a factual question, leaving the determination of that fact to the subjective satisfaction of the executive authority, as reflected in various ordinances, regulations, and enactments examined in earlier decisions. The Court noted that the first two elements of the definition given by Atkin L. J. can equally apply to an administrative act, reserving the third element— the duty to act judicially— as the true test distinguishing the two.

The Court observed that the decisive factor separating a quasi‑judicial act from a purely administrative act was contained in the third element of Atkin L.J.’s definition, namely the duty to act judicially. Support for this view was found in a passage from the judgment of Lord Hewart C.J. in B. v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly, where it was stated that a body must not only possess legal authority to determine questions affecting subjects’ rights but must also have the additional characteristic of a duty to act judicially. That passage had been quoted with approval by Lord Radcliffe in delivering the Privy Council’s judgment in Nakkuda Ali’s case. Having set out the principle, the Court then applied it to the facts of the present matter. It held that the mere fact that the committee’s incompetence struck at the core of the State Government’s jurisdiction under section 53‑A did not, by itself, require a judicial determination. The sole issue to be decided was whether the statute compelled the State Government to act judicially. The Court clarified that an explicit provision mandating a judicial mode of action was not essential; it would be sufficient if such a duty could be inferred from the statute’s language. However, the presence of a factual question as a preliminary condition for action did not automatically create that inference. There had to be a clear indication in the enactment regarding the manner in which the preliminary fact should be ascertained. Upon examining section 53‑A, the Court found no language imposing any duty on the State Government to act judicially, nor any procedural formula from which such a duty could be deduced. In contrast, the Court noted a notable omission of a provision similar to subsection (5) of section 57, which requires that no order under that section be made until the committee has been given a reasonable opportunity to explain itself. The Court further pointed out that an order issued under section 57 is of a permanent character, whereas an order under section 53‑A is limited to a period not exceeding fifteen months as specified in the order. Because section 53‑A envisions swift action, a full judicial hearing would undermine its purpose; a judicial act would be subject to superintendence by higher courts and could cause the operation of the order to be delayed, as had occurred in the present case where the matter moved from one court to another until finally resolved by this Court.

In the present matter, reference was also made to section 25‑A of the Act, which empowered the State Government to direct the committee to appoint, among other persons, a Chief Executive Officer. The provision stipulated that if the committee failed to comply with such a direction within the time prescribed, the State Government could, under sub‑section (3), if it deemed appropriate, appoint the officer itself and determine the officer’s salary and allowances. Further, sub‑section (4) authorized the State Government to require the committee to delegate to the appointed officer any powers, duties or functions that normally belonged to the committee, its president, vice‑president or secretary under the Act or any rule or bye‑law made thereunder, as specified in the requisition. Should the committee again fail to comply with this requirement within a reasonable period, the State Government was permitted to decide which powers, duties and functions the officer would exercise and perform, either in addition to or in exclusion of those exercised by the committee, its president, vice‑president or secretary. No argument was advanced that the State Government was obliged to hold a judicial enquiry before exercising the powers conferred by section 25‑A. The only distinction noted between the language of section 25‑A and section 53‑A, both inserted into the Act in 1947, was that action under section 53‑A could be taken only when the committee was found incompetent to perform its duties – a determination left to the State Government’s subjective opinion – whereas action under section 25‑A could be taken upon the State Government’s satisfaction of certain facts, also left to its subjective determination. It was observed that the mere determination of a jurisdictional fact did not, by itself, require a judicial process, and there was nothing elsewhere in section 53‑A or any other provision of the Act that imposed a duty to proceed judicially. Counsel for the appellants also emphasized that the State Government could exercise its power under section 53‑A by issuing an order stating reasons for the action, published in the Gazette. The requirement to give reasons was interpreted not as a mandate to record a judicially arrived judgment, but rather as a legislative intention that an authority exercising substantial administrative power should explain its reasons to allay public concerns. Accordingly, the action taken by the State Government under section 53‑A was characterized as an administrative act, not a judicial or quasi‑judicial one. Counsel for the appellants relied upon the decision in Capel v Child, which concerned statutory construction, and noted that the case held that where a statute allowed action, it did not necessarily require a judicial hearing. The present analysis concluded that the authority under section 53‑A remained administrative in nature.

The reference to the authority that dealt with affidavits, namely 2 Cr. and Jr. at page 558 and 37 R. R. at page 761, was interpreted as a clear indication that, in that case, the Bishop was required to reach a finding on the alleged negligence of the Vicar after hearing the evidence presented by affidavit. That interpretation led to the further conclusion that the Vicar should be afforded a chance to be heard and to present evidence in his own defence. From this circumstance the court inferred that even when the Bishop acted on facts known to him, he was still obliged to proceed in a judicial manner because the statute treated both procedural modes—judicial and otherwise—on an equal footing. As I have explained, there is nothing in section 53‑A or any other provision that can be read as imposing a duty to proceed judicially in the manner applied in that earlier case. On the contrary, the language of the statute and other surrounding indications point to a different conclusion. Declaring that the action taken under section 53‑A is an administrative action does not mean that the State Government may disregard the ordinary rules of fair play. The observation made by Fortesque J. in Dr. Bentley’s case, which likened a judicial inquiry to God asking Adam and Eve whether they had eaten the forbidden fruit, as quoted by Byles J. in Cooper v. The Wandsworth Board of Works, is pertinent. That decision makes clear that, in certain situations, a party must be given an opportunity to be heard before an administrative measure is imposed against him. However, this requirement is distinct from the more rigorous procedure that demands notice and a hearing before a quasi‑judicial action, which is subject to correction by a superior court through a writ of certiorari. The essential difference lies in the manner and mode of the two procedures. A breach of the rules of fair play in the context of administrative action does not give rise to a writ of certiorari. I have already set out the events and proceedings that preceded the issuance of the order under section 53‑A. If the action taken under that section is treated as an administrative action, as I am of the opinion it should be, then I am convinced that the appellants were afforded more than sufficient fairness. It has been asserted that the State Government did not conduct any enquiry before making the order, and therefore the appellants were denied an opportunity to defend themselves. I find no merit in that contention. Had the State Government wished to hold an enquiry, it would have done so through its officials. The most appropriate and competent officers to conduct such an enquiry would be those present at the scene, namely the Additional Deputy Collector, who is the officer best suited to be entrusted with that duty.

In this case, the court observed that the charges against the appellants had been sent to them and that they had furnished explanations. The first appellant, who was the President, had personally attended many of the official sittings of the enquiry. No indication was found that the appellants had been barred from presenting proper evidence in their own defence. The enquiry examined the allegations concerning their conduct and was conducted in a purposeful manner, rather than being a purposeless exercise. After completing the enquiry, certain findings were reached, those findings were accepted by the State Government, and an order was issued under section 53‑A. The court concluded that the appellants had no viable grievance and that the State Government had not been negligent. Accordingly, the court ordered that the appeal be dismissed in its entirety, without any relief to the appellants. Justice Bhagwati also concurred with the dismissal of the appeal and added several further observations to clarify the legal reasoning. He noted that he had read the judgments of the Chief Justice, Justice Kapur and Justice Subba Rao. He expressed agreement with their reasoning on both point (i) and point (ii) as articulated in the earlier judgments. Point (i) concerned the view that although the notification was presented as being made under the powers of section 53‑A, in substance it was made under section 57 of the Act. Point (ii) held that if the notification were regarded as made under section 57, it was ultra vires because the statutory requirement of giving a reasonable opportunity to explain had not been fulfilled. Regarding point (iii), Justice Bhagwati accepted that even if the notification fell within section 53‑A, it remained ultra vires because the State Government had breached natural‑justice rules by not allowing the appellants to defend themselves. He noted a difference of opinion between the Chief Justice and Justice Kapur on one side and Justice Subba Rao on the other. The disagreement concerned whether the State Government’s act of concluding that the Committee was not competent was administrative or quasi‑judicial. Justice Bhagwati expressed the opinion that the characterization of the function was immaterial for the present appeal because an inquiry had been instituted. He added that the appellants had been given a full opportunity to defend themselves and that the principles of natural justice had been observed. He therefore concurred with the final order that dismissed the appeal and awarded costs against the appellants in the proceedings.

In this case, the Court observed that the appellants were given sufficient opportunity to defend themselves and therefore required no further comment on the points already articulated by the Chief Justice in his earlier judgment. The Court noted that the facts described by the Chief Justice clearly showed that the appellants had received proper notice of the charges brought against them, had offered full explanations in response, and that, during the inquiry into those charges, the principles of natural justice had been strictly observed. Consequently, the Court held that the State Government’s conclusion that the committee was incompetent was beyond criticism. Because of this, the Court chose not to express any view on the difficult question of whether the State Government’s action was quasi‑judicial or administrative in nature, and it affirmed that the outcome would be the same regardless, thereby agreeing with the proposed order to dismiss the appeal and to award costs.

The judgment then recorded that Justice S K DAS agreed in general with the conclusions reached by the Chief Justice and the reasoning underlying those conclusions. However, he added a few observations relating to the third issue, namely whether the State Government had breached the principles of natural justice when it issued the impugned notification. He explained that the answer to this issue depended on a correct construction of the relevant statute and on determining whether the State Government’s act under section 53‑A of the Act constituted an administrative function or a quasi‑judicial function. Justice DAS expressed the view that the action taken under section 53‑A was, in its true nature, an administrative act. He observed that a statement often made – that a “duty to act judicially” automatically makes a function quasi‑judicial – does not substantially clarify the distinction between administrative and quasi‑judicial functions. He added that where the statute expressly defines a function as judicial, no difficulty arises, but complications emerge when the statute only implies by necessary implication that an administrative body must act judicially. While it is generally correct to say that an administrative authority bearing a duty to act judicially performs a judicial or quasi‑judicial function, he cautioned that this observation can become a tautology if it merely restates that a function is judicial because it must be performed judicially. To elucidate the difference, he suggested examining the deeper meaning of the phrase “duty to act judicially.” He acknowledged that the expression can arise in a wide variety of circumstances and that a precise, exhaustive definition is not possible. Nonetheless, he referred to several tests that courts have applied in such determinations, including whether there is a lis inter partes, whether a claim or proposition and an opposition exist, and whether the decision is founded on the consideration of evidence or policy considerations.

The Court examined a series of analytical tests that had been formulated to determine whether a statutory body's function was judicial or administrative. The tests considered included: whether the body dealt with the taking of evidence or affidavits; whether the decision was driven wholly or partly by questions of policy or expediency and, if so, whether the body had to weigh proposals, objections and evidence in reaching its conclusion; and whether, in arriving at its decision, the body confined itself solely to considerations of policy and expediency without confronting any form of dispute or lis. The last two of these tests were discussed in the decision of R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee (1). Upon review, the Court found that the first four tests (i) to (iv) were inappropriate for the present matter because the provisions of section 53‑A, when contrasted with section 57 and other sections of the Act, did not give rise to a situation involving evidentiary hearings, adversarial claims, or a mixed policy‑and‑evidence inquiry. The only test that was satisfied was test (v), which looks to whether the decision is based entirely on policy and expediency and no lis is presented. Consequently, the Court concluded that the function exercised under section 53‑A was a purely administrative one, despite the statutory requirement to make an initial determination of a jurisdictional fact and to record reasons for the decision. The Court therefore rested its judgment on this ground, expressing doubt that the enquiry conducted by the Deputy Collector constituted a proper quasi‑judicial enquiry. The Court held that section 53‑A did not entrust a quasi‑judicial function to the State Government, and thus the principles of natural justice were not triggered. It further observed that the enquiry pursued a different purpose, that the charges investigated were not the same as those later acted upon by the State Government, and that the Municipal Committee had not been given a real opportunity to meet the charges that formed the basis of the State Government’s action. For these reasons the Court preferred to base its decision on the third question, concluding that the State Government’s function under section 53‑A was administrative in nature and, as settled law holds, such administrative action is not subject to a writ of certiorari.

The Court affirmed complete agreement with the rulings on the first two questions, citing the earlier judgment of the Chief Justice, (1)[1952] 2 Q.B. 4I3, and indicated there was nothing further to add. The appeal, granted by special leave, challenged the judgment and order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The appellants were the Municipal Committee of Dhamtari and its President, Radheshyam Khare, who contested the State Government’s appointment of an Executive Officer for the Municipal Committee under section 53‑A of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922. The factual background presented to the Court explained that a member of the Dhamtari Municipal Committee, Dhurmal Daga, had been discovered importing cotton into the municipal area without paying octroi duty. In protest, Daga undertook a hunger strike and distributed pamphlets alleging misdeeds by both the Municipal Committee and its President. The Collector of Raipur district personally intervened, persuading Daga to end his fast on the assurance that the Collector would investigate his allegations. Acting on that assurance, the Deputy Collector, Mr. Rana, proceeded to conduct an enquiry.

After the Collector’s intervention, Deputy Collector Rana conducted an inquiry and called for an explanation from the Dhamtari Municipal Committee and its President. He completed his investigation and submitted a report dated 22 November 1956, which was later transmitted to the State Government on 24 April 1957. Relying on that report, the State Government exercised the power granted under section 53‑A of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act, 1922, and by a notification dated 18 November 1957 appointed Deputy Collector B. P. Jain, respondent No. 3, as Executive Officer of the Dhamtari Municipal Committee for an initial term of eighteen months. The appointment was justified on the basis that the Municipal Committee had been found incompetent to perform the duties imposed on it by the Act.

The notification set out the reasons for finding the Committee incompetent. It stated that the Committee, Dhamtari, had demonstrated inability to fulfil its statutory responsibilities in several respects. Firstly, it had granted grain and building advances to employees without obtaining prior sanction and had made no effort to recover those advances. Secondly, it had displayed carelessness in instances of employee embezzlement and had failed to report such cases to the Government. Thirdly, it had not restrained its President, who issued orders beyond his authority. Fourthly, it had spent thousands of rupees on sanitation and other works without any provision for such expenditure in the budget. Fifthly, it had permitted uninvolved persons to interfere with its functioning. Sixthly, it had shown partiality in appointing and dismissing employees, and those appointments and dismissals had been made contrary to the rules. Seventhly, it had delayed constituting the Committee and framing the budget. Eighthly, it had misused municipal trucks. Ninthly, it had failed to recover lease money. Tenthly, it had shown bias in issuing transit passes to certain traders, had levied excess octroi duty on certain articles, and in cases where octroi was not leviable, had imposed it merely to harass the public. Eleventhly, it had distributed municipal manure to selected persons free of charge and had used municipal trucks for that purpose. Twelfthly, it had again failed to control its President, who spent municipal money without authority. Thirteenthly, it had expended large sums on road and drainage maintenance while the condition of those works remained unsatisfactory. Fourteenthly, it had declined to provide copies of documents as required by the rules and had denied its members access to inspect records as permitted by the rules. Finally, it had failed to invite tenders for the purchase of articles.

The State Government’s order was subsequently challenged before the Madhya Pradesh High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioners alleged that the order amounted to a flagrant abuse of the powers conferred by section 53‑A of the Municipalities Act. They contended that the specific charges listed in the notification had never been formally framed, that the State Government had not served any notice on the Municipal Committee or its President to show cause, and that the Committee had been deprived of any opportunity to be heard or to present its case. The appellants further submitted that the conclusion that the Committee was incompetent was vitiated because no proper enquiry had been conducted, there was no evidential basis for the findings, and consequently the order should be regarded as void and inoperative.

The appellants contended that the finding against the municipal committee was fundamentally flawed because no enquiry had been conducted and no evidentiary material supported the finding. They argued that the order was therefore void and inoperative on several grounds. First, they said the mandatory statutory provisions were not observed and the power was exercised beyond the limits prescribed by law. Second, they claimed that the basic facts had not been determined. Third, they maintained that the order violated the rules of natural justice. Finally, they asserted that the action was mala fide. In response, the respondents denied all of these allegations. They submitted that the State Government had issued the order under section 53‑A of the Act based on the report of Mr Rana, the Deputy Collector, who had conducted an enquiry into the allegations against the appellant on the Collector of Raipur’s instructions. The respondents further stated that proper notice had been given to the Secretary of the Municipal Committee, which had filed a written statement through its President, appellant No 1, who personally appeared during the enquiry proceedings. According to the respondents, the appellant neither demanded nor was denied any opportunity to lead evidence. Moreover, they argued that no formal enquiry was required by law and that the Court could not examine the sufficiency of the reasons for taking action, holding that such an examination was not within the Court’s objective jurisdiction.

A learned single judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed the petition, holding that while section 57 might require an explanation, section 53‑A did not oblige the State Government to call for an explanation from the municipal committee, and the State was authorised to act promptly under the statute. The High Court also rejected the allegation that the State Government had acted at the instance of Dhurmal Daga against the Municipal Committee, appellant No 2. The judge observed that the material on which the State Government relied included several complaints other than those made by Dhurmal Daga, and that the record of the enquiry showed the petitioner’s presence on some occasions. Consequently, the judge concluded that invoking the jurisdiction of the Court under article 226 of the Constitution was not appropriate in the present case. A Letters Patent appeal against this judgment was dismissed on 21 February 1958. The present appeal, filed by special leave, raised four points before this Court: (1) that the notification, although purporting to be issued under section 53‑A of the Act, was in fact made under section 57, as indicated by the grounds, the powers vested in the Executive Officer, and the effect of the order; (2) that if the notification fell under section 57, it was ultra vires because the statutory requirements of that section had not been complied with; (3) that even assuming the notification was issued under section 53‑A, it remained null and void for contravening the principles of natural justice; and (4) that the order

The Court observed that the order in question was alleged to have been made in bad faith because it purportedly sought to remove the control of the municipality from the Independent Party, which at that time held a majority in the municipal body. According to the allegation, the motive behind the order was to implement a policy of the State Government that favoured the supersession or suspension of municipalities that were not under the control of the Congress Party. As further alleged evidence of bad faith on the part of Respondent No. 1, the State Government, it was contended that the appellant, Radheshyam Khare, who is also identified as appellant No. 1, had been expelled from the Congress Party for a period of six years around March 1957 because he had contested the 1957 parliamentary elections for the Lower House as an Independent candidate. The Court noted, however, that this allegation of malice was not seriously pursued during the proceedings and that there was no material placed on record that could substantiate the claim of bad faith. Consequently, the Court proceeded to address the remaining issues raised in the appeal by turning to an examination of the legislative scheme and the specific provisions of the Act that relate to the powers of the State Government over municipal committees.

In order to resolve the questions presented, the Court set out the relevant structure of the Act. Chapter I of the Act contains the provisions governing the constitution of municipalities. Under Section 4 the State Government is empowered to issue a notification indicating its intention either to declare a particular local area a municipality, to alter the boundaries of an existing municipality, or to withdraw the entire area from municipal status. Section 5 then confers upon the inhabitants of the affected local area the right to file objections to any part of the notification within a period of six weeks. After considering any objections that are raised, the State Government may confirm, modify, or reverse its original notification made under Section 4. Sections 6 through 8 deal with the consequential orders that follow from the inclusion or exclusion of local areas. Section 9 authorises the State Government to grant to a municipality such powers as it deems appropriate. Section 9 further provides that, if the circumstances of a municipality are such that any provision of the Act is unsuitable, the State Government may, by a further notification, (a) withdraw the operation of that provision from the municipality; (b) apply the provision to the municipality in a modified form as specified in the notification; or (c) make any additional provision for the municipality concerning the matter addressed by the withdrawn or modified provision. Chapter II of the Act deals with the composition of municipal committees, while Chapter III concerns subordinate agencies, including sub‑committees, presidents and other officers of municipal committees. Section 25‑A, which relates to the appointment of a Chief Executive Officer, Health Officer or Supervisor, states that the State Government may, if it is of the opinion that the appointment of a Chief Executive Officer is necessary for the general improvement of municipal administration and that the municipal fund can support the expense, require the committee to appoint such an officer. The subsection further requires that any requisition issued by the State Government under this provision must specify the period within which the committee must comply with the requirement.

Section 53‑A stipulates that, if a municipal committee does not obey a requisition within the period specified, the State Government may, at its discretion, appoint the required officer. In such a case the appointment is to be made at the expense of the committee, and the Government may determine the officer’s salary, allowances, contribution rate to the provident fund, pension provisions, and any other conditions of service. Further, the State Government may direct the committee to transfer to the Chief Executive Officer appointed under this section any powers, duties and functions that normally belong to the committee, its president, vice‑president or secretary, as defined in the Act, any rule or bye‑law, and as detailed in the requisition. Should the committee again fail to comply with that requisition within a reasonable time, the Government may decide which of those powers, duties and functions will be exercised by the appointed officer, either in addition to or in exclusion of their exercise by the committee, the president, vice‑president or secretary. Moreover, the statute provides that the committee’s secretary shall be subordinate to the Chief Executive Officer. The provisions of subsection (5) of section 53‑A are also applicable to a Chief Executive Officer, Health Officer or Supervisor who is appointed under this section.

Chapter IV of the Act outlines the procedure to be followed in committee meetings, while Chapter V deals with property, contracts and liabilities, and Chapter VI addresses the duties of committees. Chapter VIII, titled “Control,” identifies the authorities empowered to supervise the actions of committees, defines the scope of such control, and prescribes the method of its exercise. Specifically, section 52 empowers the Deputy Commissioner to examine the proceedings of committees or sub‑committees. Section 53 authorises a Deputy Commissioner to suspend the execution of any order or resolution of a committee or sub‑committee, subject to the circumstances delineated in that provision. Section 53‑A, already referenced, authorises the State Government to appoint an Executive Officer. In an emergency, section 54 allows the State Government, upon receipt of a report under section 52 or otherwise, to require a municipality to carry out any work or act it deems necessary for public service. Under section 55, if, after receiving a report under section 52 or after an inquiry, the State Government is satisfied that a municipal committee has defaulted in performing its duties, it may appoint a person to perform the duty and may direct the committee to pay reasonable remuneration to that person. If the committee defaults in making such payment, section 56 permits the State Government to direct a custodian of municipal funds to effect the payment. Section 57 grants the State Government the authority to dissolve or supersede a municipal committee. Finally, section 58 provides the State Government with powers of revision and overall control over the actions of officers acting under the Act, although it may not reverse any order unless notice is given to the interested parties and they are afforded an opportunity to be heard.

It was held that any modification of an order must be preceded by reasonable notice to all interested parties, and that such parties must be given an opportunity to appear and be heard. Section 58‑A empowers the State Government to enforce any order that it issues under the municipal legislation. Section 58‑B confers upon the State Government the authority to review orders that it itself has passed, and it also provides that Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners possess comparable powers to review their own orders, provided that no order may be altered unless notice is served on the parties concerned and those parties are allowed to appear and be heard in support of the order. Under Section 59, officers who are appointed by general or special orders of the State Government are entitled to attend any meeting of the municipal committee and may address the committee on any matter that influences the work of the officers’ respective departments. Section 60 deals with the settlement of disputes that may arise between municipal committees and other local bodies. Since Sections 53‑A and 57 formed the main point of controversy in the present proceedings, the Court found it necessary to reproduce the full text of those provisions for thorough consideration.

Section 53‑A reads as follows: “(1) If a committee is not competent to perform the duties imposed on it or undertaken by it under this Act or any other enactment then in force, and the State Government is of the view that appointing a servant of the Government as the executive officer of the committee would substantially improve municipal administration, the State Government may, by an order stating the reasons and published in the Gazette, appoint such a servant as the executive officer of the committee for a period not exceeding eighteen months as may be specified in the order. (2) Any executive officer appointed under subsection (1) shall be deemed to be an officer lent to the committee by the Government under sub‑section (3) of Section 25. (3) When an executive officer is appointed for any committee under subsection (1), the State Government shall from time to time determine which powers, duties and functions of the committee, its president, vice‑president or secretary under this Act or any rule or bye‑law made thereunder shall be exercised and performed by the appointed officer, either in addition to or to the exclusion of those exercised by the committee, president, vice‑president or secretary. (4) The Secretary of the committee shall be subordinate to the executive officer. (5) The executive officer shall have the right to attend all meetings of the committee and any joint committee and to take part in the discussion so as to make an explanation on the subject under discussion, but shall not move, second or vote on any resolution or other motion.” Section 57, which authorises the Government to dissolve or supersede a municipal committee, provides: “(1) If a committee is not competent to perform, or persistently defaults in performing, the duties imposed on it or undertaken by it under this Act or any other enactment then in force, or if it grossly exceeds or abuses its powers, the State Government may, by an order stating the reasons and published in the Official Gazette, dissolve such committee and may order a fresh election to be held.”

The Court explained that Section 57 of the Act authorized the State Government to dissolve a municipal committee and to order a fresh election. According to subsection (1), if the Government determined that a committee was not competent to perform its duties, repeatedly defaulted in the performance of its functions, or gravely exceeded or abused its powers, it could issue an order, publish the reasons in the Official Gazette, dissolve the committee and direct that a new election be held. Subsection (2) provided that, after fresh elections, if the newly elected committee again proved incompetent, defaulted in its duties, or seriously exceeded or abused its powers, the Government could, by another Gazette‑published order stating the reasons, declare the committee incompetent or in default, or find that it had exceeded or abused its powers, and could supersede the committee for a period specified in that order. Subsection (3) set out the consequences of dissolution or supersession: (a) all members of the committee were to vacate their offices as of the date of the order; (b) until a new committee was constituted, the powers and duties of the committee could be exercised and performed by persons appointed by the State Government; and (c) any property vested in the committee would, until reconstitution, vest in the State Government. Subsection (4) clarified that when the period of supersession expired, the committee would be reconstituted and that persons who had vacated their offices under clause (a) would not be disqualified from membership solely because of the supersession. Subsection (5) required that no order under subsection (1) or (2) could be made unless the committee was given a reasonable opportunity to furnish an explanation. Finally, subsection (6) provided that any person or persons appointed by the State Government to exercise the powers and duties of a dissolved or superseded committee could receive payment for their services from the municipal fund, if the Government so directed.

In reviewing these provisions, the Court observed that the Act did not create independent municipal corporations free from governmental control. Instead, the legislation granted the State Government regulatory authority over municipalities, with the extent and method of that control varying according to the circumstances and the exigencies of each case. The statute left the Government discretion to choose the appropriate action and the specific provision under which to act. Where the legislature intended an enquiry before taking action, it had expressly provided for such an enquiry; likewise, where it intended a person to be heard, it had specifically included that right. Generally, except where an order needed reversal concerning a particular individual, the Act contained no provision for a hearing. The Court characterized the nature and scope of the State Government’s regulatory powers, and the manner of their exercise, as matters of policy and expediency. It held that such actions constituted administrative measures rather than the exercise of judicial power and, consequently, were excluded from judicial review. The appellants’ counsel had submitted that although the State Government claimed to act under Section 53‑A, the order actually fell within Section 57 and that the requirements of subsection (5) had not been complied with, rendering the order illegal, null and void. The Court noted this argument as part of the discussion of the applicable statutory provisions.

The Court observed that although the State Government claimed to act under section 53‑A, the order in question actually fell within the ambit of section 57 and, because the requirements of subsection (5) of that provision had not been fulfilled, the order was illegal, null and void. The Court then compared sections 53‑A and 57 and explained that the powers exercisable by the State Government under each provision were distinct and produced different legal consequences. Under section 53‑A the State Government is authorised merely to appoint an Executive Officer for a period not exceeding eighteen months. That Executive Officer may exercise those powers of the Act that are specified in the order, and such powers may be exercised in addition to, or to the exclusion of, the powers normally exercised by the municipality. The same provision also allows the Executive Officer to exercise powers that are otherwise available under section 25‑A or, to a limited extent, under section 9. By contrast, section 57 provides for the dissolution of the municipal committee. When the committee is dissolved its members cease to hold office, and the powers and duties of the committee vest in the person or persons appointed by the State Government for that purpose; the property of the municipal body also vests in the State Government. The Court stressed that those consequences do not follow from an order made under section 53‑A.

The appellants submitted that, in practice, the effect of the order was the same because the Executive Officer had been given powers that left the municipal committee merely a “husk”. They argued that if any action were taken under section 9 of the Act or under section 25‑A, such action would amount to a supersession of the municipal committee and therefore should be treated as falling under section 57. The Court rejected that contention, noting that the argument had not been advanced by either party and was untenable. According to the language of the two sections, the classes of actions contemplated by sections 53‑A and 57 are quite different, and different results follow; one provision must not be confused with the other.

The Court further held that the allegation that the action taken under section 53‑A was colourable and in reality fell within section 57 amounted to an accusation of mala‑fide intent, which had not been established. It observed that the statute confers on the State Government a range of powers, and the State may, at its discretion, choose which power to exercise. Unless there is a clear case of abuse, a court may not challenge that discretion, citing Lord Halsbury L.C.’s remark in the Westminster Corporation v. London and North Western Railway Co. (1905) A.C. 426. Accordingly, the mere selection of one statutory power over another does not, by itself, constitute a mala‑fide act.

The appellants’ counsel emphasised the withdrawal of municipal powers, particularly those under section 31, and contended that the municipal committee would be unable to hold its required monthly meetings. The Court found that interpreting the notification in that manner would lead to an absurd result, whereby only the Executive Officer would meet monthly for the transaction of business. The Court therefore concluded that the reference in the notification must pertain to subsection (2) of section 31, which empowers the President, etc., to convene a meeting suo motu or upon the requisition of one‑fifth of the members, rather than extinguishing the committee’s regular meeting power.

The Court observed that interpreting the notification to require the Executive Officer alone to conduct business meetings at least once a month would create an absurd situation. It held that the reference in the notification must be to sub‑section (2) of section 31, which authorises the President, or a similarly situated officer, to call a meeting on his own initiative or upon the request of one‑fifth of the members. In the same vein, the Court said that the mention of Chapter V in the notification cannot be understood as vesting the property of the municipal committee in the Executive Officer, because the notification concerns powers and duties, not the transfer of ownership. The Court further noted that even where the State Government does not appoint an Executive Officer, it retains the authority under section 38 to direct that any property previously vested in the municipality cease to be so vested and to issue orders it deems appropriate for the disposal and management of such property.

According to the Court, the powers set out in section 39, which relate to the management of public institutions and the powers and duties of the municipality, are withdrawn from the municipality and vested in the Executive Officer; however, those powers remain subject to rules framed by the Government, and such rules may be altered at any time by the State Government. The Court also pointed out that the municipal committee’s authority under section 40 to petition the State Government for acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act has been removed. While section 41 deals with the transfer of municipal property to the Government and section 42 deals with the municipality’s power to transfer its own property, the Court explained that the State’s control is not excluded under those provisions even in the absence of an Executive Officer. Section 44 relates to the making of contracts, and apart from section 49, the remaining sections of that chapter do not concern the powers and duties of a municipal committee.

The Court observed that Chapter VI outlines the duties of a municipal committee, and some of those duties have also been transferred to the Executive Officer. It acknowledged that the notification has withdrawn several important powers from the municipal committee and conferred them upon the Executive Officer, but it stressed that this withdrawal does not amount to a suspension of the committee itself. The Court further stated that the State Government’s exercise of these functions is not of a different quality or likely to produce different results than actions that might have been taken under section 25‑A or clause B.9 of the Act. Consequently, the Court held that, under the facts of this case, the State Government’s action cannot be described as a mere “cobweb varnish,” a colourable order, or a device to avoid the requirements of sub‑section 5 of section 57.

The Court noted that the notification enumerates certain acts of the municipality, some of which constitute instances of mismanagement and others of abuse of power. It concluded that the allegations concerning expenditures made without a provision in the budget, or showing partiality in the

In the matters of appointment and dismissal, issuance of transport passes, distribution of municipal manure, and the large expenditures on road and drainage maintenance without any improvement in their condition, the Court observed that these acts constitute gross mismanagement or abuse of power. Such conduct, according to the Court, does not merely amount to incompetency in the performance of duties or in the exercise of powers by the municipality. Assuming that these acts can only be classified as abuse, the Court held that the State Government was entitled to list all the misdeeds and wrongs committed by the municipal committee and to decide that action should be taken under section 53‑A rather than under section 57. The Court noted that, if the acts and omissions are indeed instances of abuse, the State Government could, if it so chose, have invoked section 57. When two alternative courses of action were available, the Court observed that the State Government’s choice of the lesser measure could not be questioned so long as there was no evidence of bad faith. Consequently, the Court concluded that it could not be said that the State Government merely pretended to act under section 53‑A while, in substance, it was operating under section 57 of the Act.

The Court further considered the contention that, when acting under section 53‑A, the State Government must exercise a judicial duty and must afford the appellants an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Referring to section 9 of the Act, the Court recalled that the State Government, on the ground of unsuitability, may withdraw any of the powers conferred on the municipality, either wholly or partially. Under section 25‑A, the State Government may appoint a Chief Executive Officer when such appointment is necessary for the overall improvement of municipal administration, and the consequences of such appointment are the same as those resulting from the appointment of an Executive Officer under section 53‑A. The Court also noted that sections 52, 53, 54, 55 and 56 place regulatory control in certain Government agencies. The Court asked whether the exercise of executive functions under those provisions, if similarly exercised under section 53‑A for the purpose of improving general administration in cases of municipal incompetency, would transform an administrative decision into a quasi‑judicial one. The Court explained that the proper test for distinguishing a quasi‑judicial act from an administrative act lies in whether the authority exercising the power has a duty to act judicially. Citing Lord Hewart, C.J., in R. v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly (1), the Court reiterated that it is insufficient for a body merely to possess legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of persons; the body must also have the additional characteristic of a duty to act judicially. The Court concluded that the State Government, in the present circumstances, lacked such a judicial duty.

The Court observed that an authority which makes a decision must do more than merely resolve a question; it must also be bound by a duty to act judicially. The Court held that this essential characteristic was absent in the State Government’s conduct in the present case. When the State Government considered the probable consequences of its action, the Court said it was engaging in executive activity rather than in a judicial determination. The Court noted that the dictum of Lord Hewart, recorded in R. v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly, had been endorsed by Das J. in the case of Kusaldas Advani. Das J. had remarked that, in deciding whether a statutory body is quasi‑judicial or merely administrative, one must ascertain whether the body has a duty to act judicially.

The Court found that the statute itself contained no indication that the State Government bore such a judicial duty when it appointed an Executive Officer under section 53‑A, and that the statute prescribed no procedure for exercising the power conferred by that section that might reveal the nature of the decision. The municipal committee, being a creature of the Act, possessed all powers granted by the Act and was subject to all controls provided therein. The Act allocated to the State Government various modes of regulatory control, ranging from revising the municipal committee’s actions, orders and resolutions, to excluding local areas from its jurisdiction, to withdrawing powers conferred by the Act, to appointing Executive Officers, and to suspending or superseding municipalities.

The Court pointed out that certain provisions, for example section 57, required that the committee be called upon to give an explanation before the State Government could take a specific action, while other provisions imposed no such requirement. The Court interpreted this distinction as a clear legislative intention to provide an opportunity to be heard in some cases, indicating a quasi‑judicial approach, and to dispense with such a requirement in others, indicating a purely administrative approach. The Court referred to the Privy Council’s decision in Nakkuda Ali’s case, a Ceylon regulation matter, which observed that the regulation set no procedure to give the licensee notice of the Controller’s intention to revoke the licence or to conduct any inquiry before the Controller acted. Similarly, in Advani’s case, Fazl Ali J. examined the authority to act judicially and held, at page 641, that there were no express words in section 3 or any other provision imposing a judicial duty, nor any implication that such a duty existed. The learned judge took this consideration into account in the present analysis.

In this case, the Court observed that certain provisions of the statute expressly required an enquiry while other provisions did not, and it quoted that “the fact remains that there is nothing in the Ordinance to suggest that the public purpose is to be determined in a judicial way.” Consequently, where a law such as the one under consideration contains some sections that mandate that the municipality be called upon to give an explanation before the State Government takes any action, and other sections that impose no such requirement, the Legislature intended to exclude the principle of audi alteram partem in the latter situation. The Court held that section 53‑A must be read as a single, unified provision and not as separate compartments. The relevant wording of the section was reproduced: “If the committee is not competent to perform the duties imposed upon it and the State considers that a general improvement in the administration of the municipality is likely to be secured by …” The Court explained that the phrase “the State Government considers is likely to be secured” signified a purely subjective determination and a policy decision. It noted that the terms “considers” and “is likely” denoted subjectivity rather than objectivity. To “consider” meant to think, to contemplate mentally, to regard, and “likely” meant probably, or something that might well happen and appeared suitable. Therefore those words could not be given an objective meaning; they indicated subjectivity. The Court further stated that the introductory words “If the committee is not competent” could not be separated from the latter part of the provision. When, under section 53‑A, the State Government appoints an Executive Officer whose action it “considers likely to improve the general administration of the municipality,” the Government does not make two separate decisions—one objective finding of incompetence and another subjective choice of remedial action. Instead, it makes a single decision. The State Government alone acted as the judge of both the alleged incompetence of the municipal committee and the appropriate remedy. Both aspects formed an integrated whole, a decision taken in the exercise of the State Government’s administrative functions, and the Court found that no element of a judicial process was involved. The Court cited the decision in The Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas Advani, referring to the observations of Kania C.J. at pages 633‑635 and of Das J. at page 703. The Court concluded that the State Government must necessarily be the sole judge of the municipality’s incompetence; otherwise it could not take the administrative step it deemed likely to improve administration. Both the determination of incompetence and the exercise of the executive function to decide the action to be taken were characterized as administrative matters, as affirmed in Kusaldas Advani at page 633. The Court warned that if the incompetence question were treated differently, the State Government’s procedure would become analogous to a

The Court observed that if the decision concerning the incompetency of a municipal committee were to be treated as a judicial process subject to review by the Courts, then the subsequent action taken would be characterised as an administrative decision that would escape judicial review. Such a configuration, the Court said, would cause not only inconvenience but also confusion. The Privy Council, in Venkatarao v. Secretary of State (2), had remarked that inconvenience, while not a decisive factor in statutory construction, is nevertheless a matter worthy of consideration, and that subjecting the detailed management of governmental services to court‑controlled procedures would create not merely inconvenience but also confusion. The Court further noted that an order issued under section 53‑A is intended to be an emergency measure aimed at protecting the interests of rate‑payers and is limited in duration to a maximum of eighteen months. Consequently, the order cannot be founded on an objective determination of the committee’s incompetency, for such a construction would defeat the very purpose of section 53‑A. In contrast, action authorised under section 57 is of a permanent nature and has expressly been made conditional upon an explanation by the municipal committee. The absence of a similar explanatory requirement in section 53‑A demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to provide for an elaborate hearing in that context, but rather intended that the State, acting under section 53‑A, make a swift administrative decision. The cited authorities, (1) [1950] S.C.R. 621 and (2) (1936) L.R. 64 I.A. 55, support this interpretation.

The Court explained that the correct position, as indicated above, is that the State Government’s decision regarding incompetency and the decision about the action to be taken constitute a single, integrated decision. This decision is a subjective judgment by the State that the appointment of an executive officer would likely bring about a general improvement in the administration that had previously been deficient. Because the finding of incompetency is merely a preliminary step to exercising an administrative function, section 53‑A does not require that this fact be determined judicially. When the exercise of the administrative functions of an executive authority such as the State Government depends upon a factual determination, there is no duty imposed on the State to act in a judicial manner. Accordingly, the determination of the fact and the selection of the consequent action are not two separate decisions but one decision made for the purpose of taking appropriate administrative action. The Court stressed that this integrated whole cannot be split into parts possessing different legal qualities. This view aligns with the observation of Kania C.J. in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas Advani (1) at page 633, where it was held that an executive authority’s need to determine certain objective facts as a preliminary step to performing an executive function does not obligate it to determine those facts judicially. When an executive authority must form an opinion about an objective matter, the process remains administrative rather than judicial.

In the present matter the Court observed that when an authority must first determine an objective fact before exercising a power that has been conferred on it, both the fact‑finding activity and the subsequent use of the executive power are of an administrative nature. The Court quoted Fazl Ali J., noting that for the purpose of prompt action executive bodies often must take swift decisions, and it would be an overstatement to describe such actions as the performance of judicial or quasi‑judicial functions. The Court explained that the ordinary word “decision” can refer to both purely executive actions and judicial orders, and that the mere existence of a decision by an executive authority does not convert the act into a judicial one. What matters, according to the Court, is the manner in which the decision is reached. The Court referred to the “Teal test”, which asks whether there is any duty to act judicially. Turning to the language of subsection (1) of section 63‑A, the Court noted that the question before the State Government is whether the appointment of an Executive Officer under the section is likely to improve the general administration of the municipality. This question is one of expediency, opinion and policy – matters that are exclusively within the State Government’s domain, assuming it acts bona‑fide. No objective test can be applied to such a question. Consequently, the use of the terms “considers” and “is likely” eliminates any possibility of an objective or judicial approach, rendering the decision administrative rather than judicial or quasi‑judicial.

The Court further emphasized that the State Government is not, by its nature, a judicial or quasi‑judicial body; its core function is administrative. The various provisions of the relevant Act demonstrate that the Government decides the manner and extent of municipal control based on its own opinion, policy and considerations of expediency. In reaching its decision, the Government does not face any form of lis or quasi‑lis, nor are there two opposing parties before it. The Municipal Committee and the State Government cannot be described as quasi‑litigants or adversarial parties. Moreover, the Government is not compelled to act under section 53‑A or any other provision; it must simply evaluate the matter from the standpoint of policy, expediency and the specific circumstances of the case. This analysis shows that the Government bears no duty at any stage to act judicially in determining the question. The Court therefore held that a proper reading of the words “considers” and “is likely to be secured” indicates a subjective decision‑making process, and that these expressions make the order issued by the State Government administrative in character, not judicial or quasi‑judicial.

The Court rejected the argument that the order should be regarded as quasi‑judicial because it affects the rights of the Municipal Committee. The Court found this contention vacuous, observing that the order in question merely restricts the exercise of certain powers by the Municipal Committee and transfers some powers to another authority as contemplated by the statute. In other words, the order does not adjudicate rights in a judicial sense; it simply re‑allocates functions in accordance with the policy and administrative objectives of the State Government.

The Court observed that the order issued by the State Government not only limited the powers of the municipal committee but also transferred certain functions to another authority that the statute contemplated. It noted that, in general, every executive decision involves a finding of fact and consequently affects the rights of some individual or another. In this connection, the Court referred to the judgment of Kania C. J. in Advani’s case, where it was stated that when a fact must be determined by an objective test and the decision influences a person’s rights, the act is deemed quasi‑judicial. The Court added that this observation overlooks the broader principle that executive actions are essentially factual determinations and, in most instances, impact the rights of one party or another.

The submission was made that, under section 53‑A, the State Government was obligated to give reasons for the action it had taken. The Court acknowledged that, in a democratic system, the electorate and the citizenry have a legitimate interest in knowing why the Government chooses a particular course of action. However, the Court emphasized that merely requiring reasons does not convert an administrative body into a judicial one, nor does it transform an administrative decision into a judicial or quasi‑judicial determination. To illustrate the prevailing law, the Court cited a passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume II, page 56 (third edition), which explains that an administrative body, which at no stage faces any form of lis and must consider matters from the standpoint of policy and expediency, cannot be said to be under a duty to act judicially.

The Court also referred to the case of R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee and to the decision in B. Johnson & Co. (Builders) Ltd. v. Minister of Health, noting that the Minister was permitted to form his opinion through informal investigative procedures. The Court explained that the mere fact that an inquiry was held to inform the Minister’s mind did not mean that the Minister was not performing an administrative function. Further, the Court reproduced the words of Cohen L. J., who observed that the Minister’s duty, when acting in an executive capacity, is to use received information fairly and impartially; this may require giving an opportunity to the concerned authority or objector to address allegations before the quasi‑lis commences. If the Minister fails to provide such an opportunity, his responsibility remains to Parliament for the performance of his executive duties, and he cannot be held accountable in the courts for that failure.

Finally, the Court noted that counsel for the appellants relied upon several English authorities, the first being Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works. In that case, Byles J. had remarked that, although a statute may not contain explicit words requiring a hearing, the common‑law principle of justice supplies the legislative omission. The Court recorded this observation as part of the counsel’s argument, while indicating that the subsequent discussion would consider its relevance in the present context.

The view expressed earlier does not align with the modern exposition of the law as articulated in Nakkuda Ali’s case (2) and in Franklin’s case (3). In the decision of Arlidge’s case (4), Lord Shaw rejected the concept of natural justice, stating that “in so far as it attempts to reflect the old jus naturale it is a confused and unwarranted transfer into the ethical sphere of a term employed for other distinctions; and, in so far it is resorted to for other purposes, it is vacuous.” The judgment in R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee (5) observed that “the true view, as it seems to us, is that the duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances which it would be impossible, and indeed inadvisable, to attempt to define exhaustively. Where the decision is that of a court then, unless, as in the case, for instance, of Justices granting excise licences, it is acting in a purely ministerial capacity, it is clearly under a duty to act judicially.” The Court further explained that “when, on the other hand, the decision is that of an administrative body and is actuated in whole or in part by questions of policy, the duty to act judicially may arise in the course of arriving at that decision.” However, at page 431 the same judgment added that “if, on the other hand, an administrative body in arriving at its decision at no stage has before it any form of lis and throughout has to consider the question from the point of view of policy and expediency, it cannot be said that it is under a duty at any stage to act judicially.” The factual backdrop involved a debtor who had applied for and obtained a certificate of legal aid under the Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1949, in connection with his claim for damages against a company. After the debtor was adjudicated bankrupt, the certificate was cancelled because his claim vested in the trustee in bankruptcy, and the trustee subsequently applied for and obtained a new certificate of legal aid. The National Assistance Board and the local Committee examined only the financial circumstances of the bankrupt debtor and ignored the trustee’s disposable income, which exceeded the lowest limit for entitlement to legal aid. The debtor‑company then sought a certiorari order to quash the certificate, alleging that the Committee had acted beyond its jurisdiction. Under the Legal Aid (General) Regulation, 1950, regulation 4(1), a prerequisite for granting a certificate was that the National Assistance Board determine the trustee’s disposable income, since the trustee was personally liable to the opponent. The Court held that the Board, possessing legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, was bound by a duty to act judicially and therefore had exceeded its jurisdiction.

The Court observed that the Board had exceeded its jurisdiction. It noted that the earlier case possessed certain distinguishing features that were absent here. Under the relevant statute, the income limit for an applicant seeking a legal‑aid certificate was prescribed, and the accompanying regulations required the National Assistance Board to determine both the disposable income and disposable capital of that applicant. This determination was expressly made a condition precedent to the issuance of any certificate. Consequently, without such a determination, the Board lacked authority to grant a certificate, and it was therefore obliged to decide the questioned matter and to act judicially in accordance with the rule set out in the majority judgment of Kusaldas Advani’s case (1). The Board, by virtue of the statute, was bound to provide aid only when the specified conditions were satisfied, and it was not permitted to consider policy matters. It was required to decide the issue solely on the facts of the particular case, based only on the evidence before it, and without reference to any extraneous considerations. In other words, the Board must act judicially, not judiciously. The Court cited the principle from Capel v. Child (2), where the phrase “whenever it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Bishop” was interpreted as imposing a duty to act judicially, thereby invoking the principles of natural justice.

The Court further explained that this rule conflicted with decisions such as the Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali’s case (3), the House of Lords in Franklin’s case (4), and later English authorities that gave a different meaning to the word “satisfied,” including Robinson v. Minister of Town and Country Planning (5) and B. Johnson & Co. (Builders) Ltd. v. Minister of Health (6). In Kusaldas Advani’s case (1) the Court had also held that the word indicated a subjective approach. It referred to Wijeysekera v. Festing (7), where the statutory language read “whenever it shall appear to the Governor,” and to R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner (8), where the words “if he is so satisfied” were held not to imply the presence of a judge or quasi‑judge. The Court emphasized that the rulings in those cases were limited to their own facts and the specific statutory language they interpreted; no universal rule could be extracted from them for application to other statutes or circumstances. Applying this reasoning to the present matter, the Court observed that it was not a situation where no enquiry had been held. An enquiry had indeed been conducted against the appellants concerning particular allegations. After hearing the appellants, a Deputy Collector prepared a report, which was then forwarded to the State Government before any action was taken. The allegations, made by Dhurmal Daga and detailed in Annexures I and II, had received support from other parties.

The record, including affidavits filed by the State Government in the High Court and statements from parties such as Dear and Co., Poonam Chand Somraj, Dhamtari Traders and Shilaram, demonstrated that a notice had been issued to both appellants requiring them to answer the allegations made by Dhurmal Daga and others. Appellant No. 1 subsequently presented a lengthy explanation in which he denied the accusations raised by Dhurmal Daga and the other informants. After hearing this explanation, the Enquiry Officer prepared a report, which was transmitted to the State Government. The Government then took the action it deemed appropriate under section 53‑A, and that action formed the subject of the present complaint. The appellants contended that they had not received any notice specifying the nature of the complaint or the particular charges enumerated in the notification, and that they were not invited to show cause why action should not be taken pursuant to section 53‑A. The Court observed, however, that the language of the section, as previously explained, does not require a separate notice of that kind, and that the argument founded on the opening words of the section—that the municipality was guilty of incompetence as an objective fact—could not be accepted. The Court further held that it could not be said that the appellants were unaware of the complaint or were denied an opportunity to explain themselves, because all the acts listed in the notification were contained in the allegations made by Dhurmal Daga and others. The appellants had indeed submitted a detailed explanation of the facts underlying the complaint, and the Enquiry Officer, after hearing them, sent his report to the State Government, which then issued its order under section 53‑A. The High Court, having examined the entire enquiry record, was satisfied that the enquiry had been conducted properly and lawfully. The appellants also argued that the enquiry conducted by Mr Rana was not authorized by the State Government and could not replace the enquiry required by statute. The Court responded that the statute prescribes no specific procedure for enquiries under section 53‑A, even if the provision is interpreted to envisage an enquiry, and that it was irrelevant whether the enquiry originated in the manner it did or was ordered by the Government. Consequently, the third ground raised by the appellants could not be upheld, and their submission was deemed without merit. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and costs were awarded throughout. Justice Subba Rao, having reviewed the judgment prepared by the Chief Justice and Justice Kapur, expressed his dissent on two points: whether, under section 53‑A of the Central Provinces and Berar Municipalities Act (Act II of 1922), the Government performs a judicial function, and whether the Government complied with the principles of natural justice in making the order dated 8 November 1956 under the same provision.

In this case the second appellant was the Municipal Committee of Dhamtari and the first appellant was the President of that Committee. The President was elected on 10 July 1956 and assumed office on 27 July 1956. On 8 August 1956 a person named Dhurmal Daga began a hunger strike to obtain redress for grievances he claimed against the appellants. The Collector of Raipur intervened, persuaded Daga to end his fast and ordered an inquiry into allegations of maladministration. The Deputy Collector conducted that inquiry, gave notice of it to the Secretary of the Committee, and the President filed a written reply on 7 September 1956 and personally appeared at the inquiry. The result of this inquiry was apparently forwarded to the Government. On 18 November 1957 the Government issued an Order under section 53‑A of the C .P. & Berar Municipalities Act, enumerating fifteen charges that included non‑feasance, mis‑feasance, gross negligence and fraud. The Order stated that, on the basis of these charges, the Government considered the Committee to have proved itself incompetent to perform the duties imposed on it by the Act. Consequently, the Order declared that a general improvement in municipal administration would likely result from appointing a Government servant as the Executive Officer of the Committee. The Order appointed Shri B P Jain as Executive Officer and transferred to him most of the important powers and duties of the Committee and the President.

Before the Government took this drastic action, neither the President nor the Committee was given any opportunity to explain their conduct in relation to any of the charges. The earlier inquiry conducted by the Deputy Collector was aimed solely at persuading Dhurmal Daga to abandon his fast and cannot be regarded as an inquiry made under section 53‑A of the Act. The records do not show that the earlier inquiry concerned the same charges that formed the basis of the Government’s action under the Act. Accordingly, the Government proceeded under section 53‑A without affording the appellants a chance to be heard on the serious accusations that led to a finding of incompetence within the meaning of that provision. The material part of section 53‑A reads: “If a committee is not competent to perform the duties imposed on it or undertaken by it by or under this Act or any other enactment for the time being in force and the State Government considers that a general improvement in the administration of the municipality is likely to be secured by the appointment of a servant of the Government as the executive officer of the committee, the State Government may, by an order stating the reasons therefor published in the Gazette, appoint such servant as the executive officer of the committee for such period not exceeding eighteen months as may be specified in such order.”

The provision stated that if the State Government, acting under the Act or any other law then in force, believed that appointing a Government servant as the executive officer of the municipal committee would substantially improve municipal administration, it could, by issuing an order published in the Gazette and stating the reasons, appoint such a servant for a period not exceeding eighteen months as specified in that order. The learned Advocate‑General, appearing on behalf of the State, argued that the appointment of an executive officer under this provision was merely an administrative act; consequently, the State was not required to give any prior opportunity to the parties affected before taking such action.

Counsel for the appellants, Mr M K Nambiar, contended that the same provision empowered the State to deprive a duly elected municipal committee of its powers for up to eighteen months on the ground of incompetence. He maintained that labeling the committee as incompetent without first allowing it to explain its conduct violated the fundamental principles of natural justice. According to his submission, the question of the committee’s competence was an objective, jurisdictional fact that had to be determined judicially by the State Government; therefore, the State’s action was a judicial act and could be taken only after observing the requirements of natural justice.

Before addressing the merits of these rival arguments, the Court found it appropriate to outline the distinction between judicial and administrative acts and to set out the criteria established by case law for identifying the nature of a particular act. The criteria were articulated with clarity by Lord Justice Atkin in Rex v the Electricity Commissioners, further developed by Lord Justice Scrutton in Rex v London County Council, and authoritatively restated in Province of Bombay v Kusaldas S Advani. Those decisions identified three essential conditions: first, the body must possess legal authority; second, that authority must be conferred to determine questions that affect the rights of individuals; and third, the body must have a duty to act judicially.

While the first two conditions were not in dispute, the present case raised the question of the meaning of “a duty to act judicially.” The Court noted that if a statute expressly required a decision to be made judicially, the duty was obvious. However, when the statute is silent, the Court must consider whether the legislature’s intent can be inferred from the statutory language and, if so, identify the factors that imply such a judicial duty upon the tribunal or authority concerned.

In order to clarify the principles that govern the distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act, the Court found it useful to refer to several relevant authorities. The Court reiterated, as it had previously done, the legal test laid down in the earlier decision concerning the case of Kusaldas, where the central issue was whether the Provincial Government had acted judicially when it issued an order of requisition under section 3 of the Bombay Land Requisition Ordinance (Bombay Ordinance V of 1947). The operative portion of that statutory provision stated: “If in the opinion of the Provincial Government it is necessary or expedient to do so, the Provincial Government may, by order in writing, requisition any land for any public purpose.” To determine the character of the Government’s action under this clause, the Court examined the prevailing law on the subject and, by a majority, concluded that a proper construction of section 3 showed that the decision of the Bombay Government declaring that a particular parcel of land was required for a public purpose was not a judicial or quasi‑judicial determination but rather an administrative act. Consequently, the Bombay High Court was held to lack jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari challenging the requisition order. Justice Das, then serving as a judge, summarized the applicable principles at page 725, observing first that when a statute confers on an authority— which is not a court in the ordinary sense— the power to resolve disputes arising from a claim made by one party and contested by another, and to determine the respective rights of the opposing parties, a cause of action arises and, unless the statute expressly provides otherwise, the authority is obligated to act judicially, rendering its decision a quasi‑judicial act. Secondly, he noted that where a statutory authority possesses the power to undertake an act that may prejudice an individual, even though the contest is between the authority and the affected subject, the final determination will still be considered quasi‑judicial provided the statute requires the authority to act judicially. The Court regarded these propositions as straightforward. Nonetheless, a further issue arose concerning whether the duty to act judicially must be expressly articulated in the legislation or whether it could be inferred from the statutory scheme. The Court expressed the view that Justice Das did not intend to impose a condition that the duty be expressly stated, recognizing that statutes rarely describe the precise character of the disposal of a particular proceeding; had the judge required an explicit statutory command, he would not have examined the Ordinance’s provisions to ascertain whether the order was intended to be judicial in nature.

The Court examined the provisions of the Ordinance to determine whether an order made under it was intended to be a judicial act. A clear illustration of the distinction between judicial and administrative acts is provided in the case of R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee. In that case, a debtor applied to a local legal aid committee, created under the Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949, for a certificate of legal aid so that he could pursue a claim alleging breach of contract against a limited company. After the debtor was declared insolvent, the certificate was withdrawn, but upon a subsequent application by his trustee, the certificate was re‑issued. One of the issues raised was whether the legal aid committee, when issuing the certificate, was performing a judicial function and therefore subject to a certiorari order. The Court held that the committee was indeed under a duty to act judicially. Parker J., delivering the judgment, summarized the law on page 428, stating: “The true view, as it seems to us, is that the duty to act judicially may arise in widely different circumstances which it would be impossible, and indeed inadvisable, to attempt to define exhaustively. Where the decision is that of a Court, then, unless, as in the case of justices granting excise licences, it is acting in a purely ministerial capacity, it is clearly under a duty to act judicially. When, on the other hand, the decision is that of an administrative body and is actuated in whole or in part by questions of policy, the duty to act judicially may arise in the course of arriving at that decision. Thus, if, in order to arrive at the decision, the body concerned had to consider proposals and objections and consider evidence, then there is the duty to act judicially in the course of that inquiry… Further, an administrative body in ascertaining facts or law may be under a duty to act judicially notwithstanding that its proceedings have none of the formalities of and are not in accordance with the practice of a court of law… If, on the other hand, an administrative body in arriving at its decision at no stage has before it any form of lis and throughout has to consider the question from the point of view of policy and expediency, it cannot be said that it is under a duty at any stage to act judicially.” Applying these principles, the learned Judge concluded that the local committee, although an administrative body, was acting judicially in issuing the certificates because it was determining factual matters for the certificate and was not concerned with policy considerations. The present author respectfully agrees with the principles articulated by the learned Judge and finds them consistent with the principles previously laid down by this Court. The law on this point has been succinctly summarized in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 11, at

The judgment reproduced the passage from pages fifty‑five and fifty‑six of the referenced text, stating that it is not essential for a body to be a court in order to be under a duty to act judicially. The excerpt explained that an administrative body, whilst lacking the formalities and practices of a court of law, may still be required to exercise judicial functions once it has heard evidence and must decide between a proposal and an opposition. It further clarified that such a body may be subject to judicial‑type orders even when no formal adversarial proceeding, or lis inter partes, exists before it, provided that the body is required to resolve a question solely on the facts and evidence of the particular case, without reference to policy considerations or any other extraneous factors. The passage continued by observing that an administrative body whose decision is wholly or partly driven by policy considerations may nevertheless be under a duty to act judicially during the course of reaching that decision. Conversely, the text asserted that where an administrative body never faces any form of lis and is required to consider the matter exclusively from the standpoint of policy and expediency, it cannot be said to be under any duty to act judicially at any stage.

The Court observed that it was unnecessary to multiply citations for this proposition. It noted that the notion of a “judicial act” has been fashioned by English judges with the purpose of keeping administrative tribunals within appropriate limits. The Court warned that if this concept is not interpreted broadly and liberally, the aim of judicial review would be undermined, rendering the power ineffective. The Court further pointed out that the expansive language of Article two hundred twenty‑six of the Constitution supports, rather than opposes, a liberal construction of the concept. The argument that courts should refrain from interfering with the smooth operation of the administrative machinery was rejected, because the very existence of judicial review, albeit invoked for only a few cases out of thousands, prevents arbitrary action and enables the administration to operate without bias or discrimination. With this background, the Court succinctly summarized its principles: not every act of an administrative authority is merely administrative or ministerial. A statute may command an authority to act administratively, judicially, or in a mixed manner. When policy and expediency dominate the entire decision‑making process, the act is plainly administrative. Conversely, when a statute expressly imposes on the authority a duty to act judicially, the act is clearly judicial.

In this matter the Court explained that between purely judicial acts and purely administrative or ministerial acts there existed a wide range of intermediate actions, and that determining the precise character of such intermediate actions often created difficult problems for the judiciary. The Court noted that it was possible for a body, at one stage of a process, to be required to perform a judicial function, while at another stage the same body might be required to act in a ministerial capacity. Accordingly, the Court framed a general rule: although a duty to act judicially might not be expressly stated in a statute, such a duty could be inferred from the statutory language. The inference could be drawn by examining the cumulative effect of several factors, including the nature of the rights that were affected, the method prescribed for disposing of the matter, the objective criteria that the statute required to be applied, the specific wording used by the legislature, the character of the power that was conferred or the duty imposed on the authority, and any other indicia provided by the legislation. The Court emphasized that a judicial duty could arise under a variety of circumstances and that it was neither possible nor advisable to lay down a rigid or inexorable rule to guide every determination.

The Court then turned to the specific provision that was under consideration, namely section 53‑A of the Act. It observed that the provision itself contained the criteria necessary to resolve the question of whether the Government could exercise its power. Before the Government could act under that section, the statute required satisfaction of three preliminary conditions. The first condition was that the Committee was not competent to perform the duties that had been imposed on it. The second condition was that the State Government considered that a general improvement in the administration of the municipality would likely be secured by the appointment of a servant of the Government. The third condition required that an order be issued stating the reasons for the action.

The Court explained that the first condition depended on the determination of an objective fact – namely, whether the Committee actually possessed the competence to carry out the duties assigned to it. This factual determination was a jurisdictional fact, and it conferred jurisdiction on the Government to proceed further. The Court stressed that the finding of this fact could not be left to the Government’s subjective satisfaction. By contrast, the wording of the second condition – “the State Government considers” – clearly indicated a subjective element, leaving the assessment of improvement to the Government’s own judgment. The Court observed that the different language used for the two conditions highlighted the distinction between an objective factual test and a subjective consideration.

The Court added that if both conditions were to be decided solely on the Government’s subjective satisfaction, the statutory language would have been drafted differently. It would have read, for example, “If the Government considers that the Committee is not competent to perform the duties imposed on it… and that a general improvement… is likely to be secured by the appointment of a servant of the Government as the Executive Officer of the Committee…”. Accepting the argument of the respondents that the statute should be read in that way would amount to rewriting the legislation, which the Court said was impermissible. Finally, the Court noted that a practical reason existed for the differing phrasing in the section: the municipality was an elected corporate body, and the legislature intended to balance the public interest with the rights and prestige of that elected body.

The municipality is entrusted with responsible statutory functions. While it may be necessary, in the public interest, to strip the committee of certain powers for a short period when it is shown to be demonstrably incompetent, such a body cannot be easily reduced to a subordinate position merely because the Government desires it to be so. The provision in the statute balances the public good against the committee’s rights and prestige by making the exercise of the Government’s power dependent upon an objective determination of a jurisdictional fact. Any ambiguity that might appear in the provision is removed by the third condition, which requires the Government to give reasons for its action. The Legislature’s purpose in imposing this condition would be defeated if the matter were left to the Government’s subjective satisfaction. The notion of subjective satisfaction does not involve an attempt to align with the mind or the good sense of another person; the internal workings of the mind need not be disclosed, and the validity of the provision does not rest on any objective standard. Requiring the Government to issue a speaking order destroys any notion of invulnerability, because it obliges the order to meet the expectations of a reasonable person. It has been argued that a comparative study of sections 53‑A and 57 shows that the Government must give notice before acting under section 57, whereas no such duty is imposed under section 53‑A, and that this indicates the Legislature’s intention that the Government not act judicially under section 53‑A. There is some force in that argument, but it does not settle the question before the Court. Even if a particular provision necessarily implies a duty to act judicially, the mere absence of an express requirement to issue notice to the affected parties does not transform a judicial act into an administrative one. Likewise, the argument that the appointment of an Executive Officer is intended only for a temporary period does not, by itself, demonstrate that the act is administrative in character. The finding of incompetence carries a stigma, and it is highly derogatory to the reputation of the committee members to be labelled incompetent in discharging their statutory duties. It would not be reasonable to assume that public officials in a democratic country may be condemned without being heard. What is material is not the length of the Executive Officer’s tenure, but the ground for his appointment, namely the incompetence of the committee. In short, the situation is as follows: the committee consists of elected representatives of the various constituencies, and they are presumed to be competent individuals in whom the electorate places its confidence. The Government must reach a conclusion about their incompetence based on objective facts that are to be ascertained, and it must provide reasons for that conclusion. It

In this case, the Court held that it violated every principle of natural justice for a tribunal to reach a far‑reaching finding without giving the persons who would be affected a chance to explain themselves. Consequently, the Court was convinced that the statutory provision required the Government to act in a judicial manner when determining the objective and jurisdictional fact concerning the committee’s competence. The Court explained that a necessary part of that duty was to afford the committee an opportunity to answer the serious accusations made against it. The Court observed that the committee had not been afforded such an opportunity and therefore could not agree with the Advocate‑General’s submission that an earlier inquiry conducted by the Deputy Collector for a different purpose had, in effect, given the committee a chance to be heard. The Court noted that the nature of the charges that prompted that earlier inquiry was unknown. The record showed that the inquiry had been carried out by a subordinate officer, and there was no evidence that the Government had authorized either the Collector or the Deputy Collector to conduct an inquiry in relation to the fast of Dhurmal Daga. In the Court’s view, that inquiry could not be treated as a substitute for the reasonable opportunity that the Government was required to provide under section 53‑A of the Act before taking the proposed action. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the High Court’s order should be set aside and the Government’s appointment of the Executive Officer should be declared null and void. The Court therefore set aside the order and quashed the appointment. ORDER PER CURIAM: The appeal was dismissed with costs for both this Court and the subordinate courts, and the appeal was dismissed.