Razia Begum vs Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 695 of 1957

Decision Date: 23 May, 1958

Coram: Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Syed Jaffer Imam, J. L. Kapur

In this case the Supreme Court of India recorded a judgment dated 23 May 1958. The bench comprised Justice Bhuvneshwar P. Sinha, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam and Justice J.L. Kapur. The petitioner was Razia Begum and the respondents were Sahebzadi Anwar Begum together with two other persons, identified as respondents I and II. The citation for the case was 1958 AIR 886 and 1959 SCR 1111. The matters involved the Code of Civil Procedure (Act V of 1908), specifically Order I, Rule 10(2), and the Specific Relief Act 1877, sections 42 and 43.

The petitioner instituted a suit against the third respondent seeking a declaration that she was his lawfully married wife. She alleged that although the fact of her marriage was known to everyone who knew the husband, he was deliberately suppressing that fact so that his family would think she was not his Nikah wife. She further asserted that the husband refused to acknowledge her openly as his legal wife, and that his conduct cast doubt on her status and was harming the rights of her three daughters, who were children of the alleged marriage.

The third respondent filed a written statement in which he admitted the petitioner's claim. On the same day respondents I and II filed an application under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure requesting that they be impleaded as defendants. They contended that they were respectively the wife and the son of the third respondent, that they were interested in denying the petitioner's status as a legal wife and in contesting the legitimacy of her children, and that the suit was the result of a collusion between the petitioner and the third respondent. They further argued that if the court declared the petitioner to be lawfully married to the third respondent, the property rights and interests of respondents I and II in the third respondent’s estate would be adversely affected.

Both the petitioner and the third respondent opposed the application to implead respondents I and II. Despite this opposition, the trial court allowed the application and ordered that respondents I and II be added as parties to the suit. The High Court, exercising its revisional jurisdiction, affirmed the trial court’s order.

The principal question before the Supreme Court was whether the lower courts had exceeded their jurisdiction by directing the addition of respondents I and II as defendants. The Court, by a majority judgment of Justices Sinha and Kapur, held that the pleadings in the plaint demonstrated that not only the third respondent but also other members of his family, including respondents I and II, had a vested interest in denying the petitioner’s status as a legally wedded wife. Consequently, the Court concluded that respondents I and II were proper parties to be impleaded in the suit. Justice Imam delivered a dissenting opinion, disagreeing with the majority’s view on the addition of parties under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In a suit seeking a declaration of status or legal character under Section 42 of 1112 the Specific Relief Act, the Court observed that the requirement that a person be added as a party only when he has a present or direct interest in the subject‑matter of the suit is not absolute. The Court explained that this requirement is a matter of judicial discretion rather than a matter of initial jurisdiction, and it may be relaxed where the Court is of the opinion that including the additional party will enable it to adjudicate the controversy more effectively and completely. The Court further stated that in such declaratory suits the Court is not bound to grant the declaration merely on the defendant’s admission of the claim; the Court may require clear proof beyond the admission when it finds reason to do so. A declaratory judgment concerning a disputed status, the Court held, is binding not only on the parties before the Court but also on persons claiming through them, as contemplated by Section 43 of the Specific Relief Act. The word “respectively” in that provision, the Court explained, is intended to indicate that the parties on either side are truly adverse to each other as to the declaration sought. Per Imam J., the facts of the present case did not justify the addition of respondents I and II as defendants under Order I, Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure because (1) the pleadings contained no suggestion that respondents I and II were denying the appellant’s status as wife of the third respondent, and the Court should not compel the plaintiff to add parties when the pleadings show no cause of action against them; (2) under Mohammedan law a man may have up to four wives simultaneously, and since the third respondent had admitted that the appellant was his wife, respondents I and II lacked locus standi to claim collusion between the appellant and the third respondent; (3) during the lifetime of the third respondent neither the appellant nor her children nor respondents I and II possessed any rights to his estate under Mohammedan law; and (4) even assuming that a declaratory judgment would bind respondents I and II—a doubtful proposition in view of Section 43 of the Specific Relief Act—such binding effect does not justify their impleader where the issue concerns marriage rather than inheritance. The judgment was rendered in Civil Appellate Jurisdiction, Civil Appeal No. 695 of 1957, an appeal by special leave from the September 17, 1957 judgment and order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Civil Revision Petition No.

The appeal, numbered 1112 of 1957, arose from an order dated 6 July 1957 passed by the Second Additional Judge of the City Civil Court, Hyderabad (Deccan). That order had been made on an application filed under Order I, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the original suit bearing the number 43/1 of 1957. The appellant was represented by M. C. Setalvad, Attorney‑General for India, together with C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor‑General for India, H. N. Sanyal, Additional Solicitor‑General for India, and a team of counsel comprising N. C. Chatterjee, Syed Mohasim, Akbar Ali Mosavi, H. J. Umrigar, O. N. Srivastava, J. B. Dadachanji, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra. Respondent No 1 was defended by counsel Purshottam Tricumdas, Anwarull Pusha and G. Gopalakrishnan. Respondent No 2 was defended by Sir Sultan Ahmed, A. Ramaswami Iyengar, C. Chakravarthy, S. Ranganathan and G. Gopalakrishnan. Respondent No 3 was defended by G. S. Pathak, A. V. Viswanatha Sastri, Mohd. Yunus Saleem, Ghulam Ahmed Khan, Choudhary Akhtar Hussain, Shaukat Hussain and Sardar Bahadur. The appeal had been filed by special leave against the Andhra Pradesh High Court judgment and order dated 17 September 1957 in Civil Revision Petition No. 1112 of 1957. The judgment dated 23 May 1958 was delivered by Justices B. P. Sinha and J. L. Kapur, with a separate opinion authored by Justice Jafer Imam.

This appeal by special leave challenged the concurring judgments and orders of the lower courts that permitted the intervention of respondents I and II and added them as defendants II and III in the suit originally filed by the appellant against her alleged husband, now respondent III, who had been the sole defendant when the suit was first framed. The principal issue in controversy was the proper construction of sub‑rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order I of the Code of Civil Procedure and how that rule applied to the facts of the present case. On 12 April 1957 the plaintiff‑appellant instituted the suit from which the present appeal arises, naming as defendant the third respondent, the second son of His Exalted Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad, hereinafter referred to as the Prince. In the plaint the plaintiff asserted that she was the lawfully wedded wife of the Prince, stating that the marriage (Nikah) had been solemnised in accordance with Shia law by a Shia Mujtahid on 19 October 1948. She further averred that the marriage produced three daughters aged eight, seven and five years, that the fact of the marriage was known to all persons acquainted with the Prince, and that a prenuptial agreement existed whereby the Prince had undertaken to pay the plaintiff a monthly allowance of Rs 2,000 as Kharch‑e‑pandan. The plaintiff claimed that the Prince had ceased to make the said payment from January 1953 onward, without any reason and in breach of the agreement. On the basis of these allegations the plaintiff sought two declarations: first, that she be declared to be the legally wedded wife (Mankuha) of the defendant; and second, that a decree be passed directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff Rs 2,000 per month as Kharch‑e‑pandan. It was noted that the plaintiff did not seek any claim for arrears of the allowance from the date when the Prince allegedly stopped making the payments.

The plaintiff claimed that the Prince had failed to pay the monthly allowance of Rs 2,000 since the date on which he allegedly stopped the payments, and therefore she sought recovery of the arrears of that allowance. Ten days after the filing of the plaint, on 22 April 1957, the Prince filed his written statement in which he expressly admitted the entire claim of the plaintiff for the two declarations that she had sought. On the same day the Prince also filed an application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure on behalf of two persons: (1) Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and (2) Prince Shahainat Ali Khan, a minor who was placed under the guardianship of his mother, the said Sahebzadi. The two persons named in the application were designated as respondents I and II respectively in the present proceeding. In the application the Sahebzadi, identified as respondent I, asserted that she was the lawful and legally wedded wife of the Prince, while respondent II was described as the son of the Prince by the first respondent. In the petition they set out, inter alia, the following allegations: “The plaintiff herself has stated in the plaint that the defendant is trying to suppress the facts of his marriage with the plaintiff so that the members of his family should conclude that the plaintiff is not his Nikah wife, and the defendant is interested in denying the rights and status of the plaintiff. The petitioners on being joined as parties to the suit will be equally interested in denying the marriage of the plaintiff and her rights and status… The petitioners have reasons to believe that the above suit is a result of collusion. The object and motive of the plaintiff in instituting the above suit is to adversely affect the relationship of the petitioners and the defendant and also to deprive the rights and interests of the petitioners in the defendant’s estate.” On 15 June 1957 the plaintiff filed an answer to the petition for intervention that had been filed by respondents I and II. In her answer she denied that the interveners were entitled to be impleaded in the suit and she argued that the possibility of any infringement of the petitioners’ rights was very remote, being conditional upon their or the plaintiff surviving the defendant or on other uncertain circumstances that might or might not arise. She further grounded her objection on the fact that, in view of the Prince’s admission in his written statement, there was no serious controversy remaining in the suit. The plaintiff also raised a number of additional legal objections, which were not specifically noted because they had not been pressed before this Court. Moreover, she contended that the petitioners, i.e., respondents I and II, were neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit. Anticipating the principal ground that would be advanced in this Court, she asserted that the judgment of this Hon’ble Court in the suit would not be conclusive as against the petitioners, since they alleged collusion and would not be prejudiced by not being made parties. In the concluding part of her statement she made a further substantial allegation, saying: “The alleged collusion and motive attributed to the plaintiff for instituting this suit are denied. On the other hand, the application to be added as defendants is mala fide and malicious and…”

In the course of the proceedings, the opposition argued that the claim to intervene was clearly motivated by a powerful influence seeking to harass the plaintiff and to expose her to a vexatious and lengthy litigation. The Prince, responding to the application for intervention, acknowledged that the first respondent was his wife and that the second respondent was his son. He reiterated his earlier admission that he had married the plaintiff in October 1948 and that he had married the first respondent in December 1952. He further stated that at the time of his marriage to the first respondent he already had three daughters by the plaintiff, a fact that the first respondent was aware of when she entered into marriage with him. The Prince supported the plaintiff’s objection to the intervention by asserting that the rights of respondents one and two would not be impaired in any manner and by invoking his Muslim right to have four wives living simultaneously. He also backed the plaintiff’s denial of any collusion and emphasized that the suit was not intended to damage the relationship between the petitioners and the defendant‑respondent or to deprive the petitioners of any rights or interests in the estate of the defendant‑respondent. In addition, the Prince submitted a further paragraph in which he claimed that the petitioners’ application had been filed solely to extend the litigation and that the father of the defendant‑respondent, His Exalted‑Highness the Nizam, seemed more interested than petitioner number one herself in creating unnecessary complications in the suit. After hearing all the parties, the trial court issued a judgment dated 6 July 1957 allowing the application for intervention and directing that respondents one and two be added as defendants. In its reasoning, the trial court noted that the record contained indications of a possible collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant; it observed that the relief sought under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act was discretionary and therefore could not be granted as a matter of right; it held that the inclusion of the interveners would assist the court in unraveling the complexities of the litigation; and it found merit in the interveners’ contention that, under section 43 of the Specific Relief Act, any declaration made in favour of the plaintiff would be binding on the interveners. Consequently, the court concluded that the presence of the interveners was essential for a complete and effective adjudication of the controversy. Dissatisfied with this order, the plaintiff filed a revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad. After a thorough consideration of the arguments for and against the addition of the parties, and after reviewing the authorities cited, the High Court upheld the trial court’s discretionary exercise and dismissed the revisionary application.

The High Court, after dismissing the revisional application, concluded that the first respondent – who was the admitted wife of the defendant – and the second respondent – who was the admitted son of that wife – were parties eager to dispute the status claimed by the plaintiff. The Court observed that these two respondents possessed certain rights against the estate of the third respondent. It further remarked that, given the great reverence attached to the institution of marriage, it would appear anomalous for individuals so closely connected to the third respondent as his wife and son to be excluded from the opportunity to contest the plaintiff’s claim of being his lawfully married wife. The Court emphasized that the plaintiff was not pursuing a futile or empty relief, and it could not be presumed that she was engaged in a purposeless litigation. If the relief she sought entailed legal consequences, then persons who intended to deny her status should indeed be joined as proper parties to the suit. The Court also noted that Rule 10(2) of Order I was designed to prevent the multiplication of suits by allowing the addition of parties when necessary. Although the argument under section 43 of the Specific Relief Act was mentioned, the Court did not render a definitive opinion on that point because it had already determined that the proposed parties were necessary within the meaning of Order I, Rule 10(2), so that the dispute could be finally resolved once and for all in the presence of all interested parties.

Against the High Court’s judgment refusing to set aside the trial judge’s order, the plaintiff obtained special leave to appeal before this Court. The primary contentions raised in support of the appeal were presented by counsel for the appellant, the Attorney‑General. He contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to add the first two respondents as defendants in the suit. Relying on the wording of sub‑rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order I of the Code of Civil Procedure, he quoted: “and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.” He correctly observed, and there was no dispute between the parties on this point, that the added respondents did not fall within the phrase “who ought to have been joined,” which is understood to refer to parties whose presence is indispensable for an effective disposition of the suit. Counsel vigorously argued that it could not be said that the presence of the added respondents – the wife and the son – was essential to enable the Court to adjudicate the matters fully and completely.

In this portion of the decision, the Court explained that the learned counsel based his argument on the legal position that the wife and the son of the Prince‑respondents I and II had no present interest in the Prince’s estate. Their expectancy of succeeding to the estate, the counsel asserted, did not furnish them with any vested or contingent right to intervene in the present action. He further pointed out that Rule 10 of Order I of the Code of Civil Procedure, which corresponds to portions of Order 16, Rule 11 of the Rules of the Supreme Court in England, has been the subject of extensive judicial interpretation in a number of cases. Both in this country and in England, two distinct currents of judicial opinion have emerged. One current, which may be described as the narrower view, has been illustrated by the authorities of Moser v. Marsden (1) and McCheane v. Gyles (No. 2) (2). In India, the narrower view is represented by the decision in Sri Mahant Prayaga Doss Jee Varyu v. The Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras (3). The opposite current, identified as the wider view, is exemplified by Dollfus Mieg Et Compagnie S.A. v. Bank of England (4). Indian authorities cited in support of the wider view include the Madras High Court judgments in Vydianadayyan v. Sitaramayyan (5) and Secretary of State v. M. Murugesa Mudaliar (6). Counsel for the appellants contended, however, that irrespective of whether the narrower or the wider approach to the interpretation of sub‑rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order I is adopted, the ultimate result would be the same for the controversy before the Court. The Court then turned to the leading authority of Moser v. Marsden (1), where Lindley L.J. held that a person who is not directly interested in the dispute between plaintiff and defendant, but is only indirectly or commercially affected, cannot be added as a defendant because the rule does not confer jurisdiction upon the Court to bring such a person onto the record even as a “proper party.” The case involved a suit to restrain an alleged infringement of the plaintiff’s patent by the defendant, Marsden. The Court, overturning the trial judge’s order, observed that the party sought to be added lacked any direct interest in the subject‑matter of the litigation; the only argument that could be made on his behalf was that a judgment against the defendant would affect his commercial interest. The Court distinguished earlier decisions in Vavasseur v. Krupp (7) and Apollinaris Company v. Wilson (8) on the ground that, in those cases, the litigation would have affected the property of persons not before the Court. This leading judgment of Moser v. Marsden (1) is therefore a clear authority for the proposition that only persons directly bound by the judgment may be joined as parties, and not those whose interest is merely indirect or commercial.

The Court explained that its power to intervene and add a person as a defendant is limited to those individuals who are directly interested in the subject‑matter of the litigation and not merely those whose commercial position may be indirectly affected. The authority for this proposition is found in a series of decisions, namely (1) [1892] 1 Ch. 487, (2) [1902] 1 Ch. 911, (3) (1926) I. L. R. 50 Mad. 34, (4) [1950] 2 All E. R. 605, (5) (1881) I. L. R. 5 Mad. 5.2, (6) A. I. R. 1929 Mad. 443, (7) (1878) 9 Ch. D. 351 and (8) (1886) 31 Ch. D. 632. Kay L. J., who concurred with Lindley L. J. in the earlier case, noted that the relevant rule of the Supreme Court, when properly construed, permits the addition of only those persons who will be bound by the judgment to be rendered, and expressly excludes persons whose interest would be affected only in a commercial sense. A similar principle was reiterated in Re I. G. Farbenindustri A. G. Agreement (1). The Court held that, for a party to be added as a defendant, he must possess a legal interest in the subject‑matter of the suit – a legal interest distinct from an equitable one, but one that the law recognises. Lord Greene M‑R., delivering the judgment, also affirmed that the court lacks jurisdiction to add any person who does not have a legal interest in the issue under consideration. In Vydianadayyan v. Sitaramayyan (2), Turner C. J. adopted a broader interpretation of the rule, observing that such an interpretation would prevent conflicting decisions on the same question and would finally bring the litigation to an effective close. Nevertheless, even in that case the added defendant had a direct interest in the subject‑matter, and there was no obstacle to the court determining the issues between the original parties. After reviewing both English and Indian authorities, the learned judge concluded that a material question common to all parties, including third parties, should be tried once for all. He therefore affirmed that the court possesses a discretionary power to add parties, a discretion that must be exercised judicially so that the inclusion of new parties does not cause injustice to the parties already on the record, in the sense that they would be prejudiced in the fair trial of the questions in controversy, as reflected in (1) [1943] 2 All E. R. 525 and (2) (1881) I.L.R. 5 Mad. 52. The two Madras decisions in Sri Mahant Prayaga Doss Jee Varu v. The Board of Commissioners for …

In the two Madras decisions, Hindu Religious Enclothing, Madras (1) and Secretary of State v. M. Murugesa Mudaliar (2), the judges seemed to reach opposite conclusions on whether the Government could be impleaded as a party when the issue before the court was not a direct interest of the Government but rather a question concerning the validity of a statute passed by the State legislature. The same controversy later arose before the Federal Court in the matter of The United Provinces v. Mst. Atiqa Begum (3). In that case the legislature of the United Provinces had enacted the United Provinces Regularization of Remissions Act (XIV of 1938), which barred courts from examining the legality of certain rent‑remission orders. A dispute between a landlord and his tenants raised the validity of that Act. At the High Court level the Advocate‑General moved that the Provincial Government be impleaded so that the Government could appear on appeal before the Federal Court and obtain an authoritative decision on the Act’s validity. When the matter reached the Federal Court, the question was specifically whether the High Court possessed authority to add the Provincial Government as a party. Chief Justice Gwyer, while noting the two Madras cases, presumed that a properly constructed case would give the Court jurisdiction to do so, and therefore refrained from expressing a definitive view. He observed that his fellow judges, Sulaiman and Varadachariar, had each affirmed the High Court’s power to implead the Government, although they reached that conclusion for different reasons. Justice Sulaiman inclined toward the view that the High Court retained a discretionary power to add the Government as a party. Justice Varadachariar, on the other hand, argued that the State did not occupy the same position as a private third party for all purposes. He held that, as the guardian of the public interest, the State should not be required to demonstrate any pecuniary, proprietary, or revenue interest in the subject matter before being added as a party. He further observed that any intervention by the State must be decided on broad principles of justice and convenience rather than merely on the technical interpretation of a rule of the Civil Procedure Code. Addressing whether the addition of a party constituted a matter of discretion or of jurisdiction, the learned judge remarked that, in his opinion, no defect of jurisdiction arose in the sense that consent could cure such a defect.

In this passage, the Court observed that a defect of jurisdiction was not present in the present matter. It noted that although in Moser v. Marsden (1) Lindley L. J. had expressed that the issue was one of jurisdiction rather than discretion, the learned judge appeared to be contrasting the decision on joinder based on the interpretation of a legal rule with a direction issued by a lower court exercising its discretion. The Court explained that when a lower court gives such a direction, an appellate court would normally be reluctant to interfere. The Court further stated that a finding of excess of jurisdiction within the meaning of section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code might arise, but that such a finding would not render the order void in the sense that it could be ignored or treated as if it had never been made. From this discussion, the Court concluded that Indian courts had not treated the addition of parties as raising a question of the original jurisdiction of the trial court. The Court recognised that the addition of a party might sometimes raise a limited jurisdictional question as defined in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but emphasised that each case must be decided on its own facts. The Court observed that no authority on record was directly on all fours with the present facts and circumstances. The Court affirmed the established principle that a person could be added as a party only when he had a direct interest in the subject‑matter of the suit, whether the matter involved movable or immovable property. In the instant case, the Court noted that the dispute did not concern any question of property or estate. Accordingly, the Court held that the authorities cited by the parties, which required a present interest in the subject‑matter for joinder, were decisions dealing with property rights and were therefore not applicable. The Court explained that the present suit sought a declaration of status pursuant to section 42 of the Specific Relief Act. Section 42 provides that any person entitled to a legal character or to any right in property may sue a person who denies or is interested to deny that title, and that the court may, at its discretion, declare the plaintiff’s entitlement without requiring any further relief. The Court therefore identified the relevant statutory provision governing the present declaration claim.

In a suit that sought only a declaration, the law required that any person who denied, or was interested in denying, the existence of a legal character or an alleged right to property must be joined as a necessary party. The plaintiff‑appellant, however, chose to implead only her alleged husband, referred to as the Prince. The plaint did not contain a clear allegation that the Prince had ever denied the legal character in question, namely, the plaintiff’s status as his wife. The essential substance of the plaintiff’s cause of action was set out in paragraph three of the plaint. From the language used in that paragraph, it was evident that the individuals alleged to have known about the marital relationship between the parties included respondents 1 and 2. Moreover, the plaint asserted that the Prince had been attempting to suppress the fact of his marriage to the plaintiff so that members of his family would be led to conclude that the plaintiff was not his wife. The charge against the Prince was that he “refuses to openly acknowledge the plaintiff as his legally wedded wife,” and that this conduct had created a cloud over the plaintiff’s status as such a wife. The plaint further alleged that the Prince’s conduct was not only injurious and detrimental to the plaintiff’s rights but also adversely affected the rights of the children born of the marriage, namely the three daughters of the plaintiff. Respondents 1 and 2 argued that, reading between the lines of these averments, it was suggested that not only respondent 3 (the Prince) but also other members of his family, including respondents 1 and 2, were interested in denying the plaintiff’s alleged status. Accordingly, the suit was presented as an action intended to remove the cloud that had been cast not only on the plaintiff’s status as a legally wedded wife but also on the status of her three daughters. The Court observed that, had the plaintiff been less selective and had also impleaded respondents 1 and 2 as defendants, those respondents could not have been dismissed on the ground that they were unnecessary parties or that no cause of action existed against them. Instead, they would have been proper parties to the suit. This point was identified as a crucial aspect of the case that needed to be kept in view when determining whether respondents 1 and 2 had been correctly added as defendants through their own intervention. The Court further noted that, according to the statutory language quoted earlier, the grant of a declaration under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act was entirely within the discretion of the court. At this juncture, the Court turned to consider another contention raised by the appellant, namely that the unequivocal admission of the plaintiff’s claim by the Prince in his written statement…

It was observed that the same statement which had been repeated in the Prince’s counter‑argument to the application for intervention by respondents I and II now removed any serious controversy from the proceedings. The parties suggested that, on that basis, the declarations that the plaintiff sought would be granted automatically. In considering that suggestion, reference was made to rule 6 of Order 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that when admissions such as those made by the Prince are on record, the court may pass judgment in favour of the plaintiff.

Those provisions, however, had to be read together with rule 5 of Order 8 of the Code, especially the proviso attached to it, which states: “Provided that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.” The same language appears in the proviso to section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, which declares that facts that have been admitted need not be proved. When all of these rules are read in concert, it becomes clear that the court is not compelled to issue the declarations sought merely because the plaintiff’s factual allegations have been admitted.

To illustrate this point, the Court cited a passage from Anderson’s Actions for Declaratory Judgments, volume 1, page 340, under article 177, which reads: “A claim of legal or equitable rights and denial thereof on behalf of an adverse interest or party constitutes a ripe cause for a proceeding, seeking declaratory relief. A declaration of rights is not proper where the defendant seeks to uphold the plaintiff‑, in such an action. The required element of adverse parties is absent.” In other words, the controversy must exist between the plaintiff and a respondent who holds an interest adverse to the plaintiff. If such an adverse interest is absent, there is no justiciable controversy and the suit becomes an advisory opinion, academic rather than justiciable. The passage further emphasizes that “there must be an actual controversy of justiciable character between parties having adverse interest.”

The Court therefore concluded that, if in the particular circumstances of a case the trial judge chooses to require the burden of proof to be fully discharged, and if, pursuant to section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, the judge insists on clear proof of even those facts that have been admitted, the judge would not be exceeding judicial authority. The Court noted that the plaintiff herself, or her advisers, had not adopted the position that the court should simply accept the admissions. This was demonstrated by the fact that, a few days after the Prince’s written statement was filed, on 27 April, the witness identified as Barkat Ali, the Mujtahid alleged to have solemnised the marriage, was examined in court. He gave an oath‑bound statement supporting the plaintiff’s claim and produced documentary evidence that corroborated the plaintiff’s case.

The witness presented his own evidence, but the defence did not cross‑examine him. Respondents 1 and 2 informed the Court that, besides certain alleged admissions made by or on behalf of the plaintiff, there existed documentary material that seriously undermined both the plaintiff’s case and the testimony of the aforementioned witness. The Court observed that it need not examine that controversy at this stage because the issue before it is not the truth or falsity of the plaintiff’s substantive claim. Rather, the immediate question is whether the lower courts exceeded their jurisdiction by adding respondents 1 and 2 as defendants in the suit. The Court noted that the plaintiff never invited the trial court to invoke the powers granted under Rule 6 of Order 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure; consequently, the appellate Court is not required to determine whether the trial judge was correct in declining to pass a judgment on a mere admission. When a court is asked to make a formal declaration of the plaintiff’s alleged status as the wife of the defendant, the court must proceed with heightened vigilance and cannot treat the matter as a routine money claim that the defendant has admitted. Declaring the plaintiff’s marital status is a weighty adjudication because, by its very nature and ultimate effect, it impacts not only the parties originally before the court but also the plaintiff’s children, who are not litigants, as well as respondents 1 and 2. If the court grants the plaintiff’s claim for a declaration of status, her three daughters would obtain the status of legitimate children of the Prince; if the declaration is refused, the daughters would be regarded as illegitimate. Thus, the suit advances the interests of the plaintiff and her children, while the Prince and his entire family, including respondents 1 and 2 and their descendants, are also directly affected. This leads to an examination of Section 43 of the Specific Relief Act, which forms an integral part of the scheme of declaratory decrees under Chapter VI of that Act. Section 43 states that a declaration made under this Chapter is binding only on the parties to the suit, on persons claiming through them respectively, and, where any of the parties are trustees, on the persons for whom, if existing at the date of the declaration, such parties would be trustees. The appellant, through counsel, argued that the declaration of status sought by the plaintiff would bind only the plaintiff and the Prince, operating as a rule of res judicata that affects only the parties and their privies.

The submission was that the declaration under section 42 would bind only the plaintiff and the Prince, and that, as a rule of res judicata, it would apply solely to the parties to the suit and to any persons who were privy to them. It was further argued that respondents I and II could not be regarded as such privies. The argument was elaborated by stating that section 43 establishes a modified rule of res judicata and that the provision was deliberately worded with the term “only” to eliminate any doubt that a declaration made under section 42 is enforceable only against the parties to the suit and against persons claiming through those parties. Consequently, if a question were to arise in the future after the Prince’s inheritance to his estate, it could not be said that the plaintiff and respondents I and II were claiming through different persons under a conflicting title, which would be the essence of the rule of res judicata. To support this position, reliance was placed on the decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Syed Ashgar Reza Khan v. Syed Mahomed Mehdi Hossein Khan (1). That judgment held that a decision in an earlier suit, which declared that the common ancestor of all parties to a later suit was entitled to the entire profit of a market in dispute against his co‑sharers in the zamindari where the market was situated, did not operate as res judicata in a subsequent dispute between those who claimed under the ancestor. The same principle was reinforced by a decision of the Madras High Court in Vythilinga Muppanar v. Vijayathammal (2), which reached an identical conclusion.

Counsel for the Prince, the third respondent, advanced an additional point. He argued that the expression “claiming through” has the same meaning as “claiming under” in section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which articulates the rule of res judicata. He further contended that the phrase “claiming through” is not appropriate when referring to a declaration of a personal status, and that it should be understood in the same sense as privity in estate law as recognized under common law. To illustrate this view, he quoted a passage from Bigelow on Estoppel (6th edition, pages 158‑159), which states: “In the law of estoppel one person becomes privy to another (1) by succeeding to the position of that other as regards the subject of the estoppel, (2) by holding in subordination to that other… But it should be noticed that the ground of privity is property and not personal relations. To make a man a privy to an action he must have acquired an interest in the subject‑matter of the action either by inheritance, succession, or purchase from a party subsequent to the action, or he must hold property subordinately.” He also referred to comparable observations in Casperz on Estoppel. On the opposite side, counsel for respondents I and II presented their counter‑arguments.

Counsel appearing for respondents I and II argued that the expressions “claiming through” and “claiming under” did not carry the same legal significance, and that the rule set out in section 43 of the Specific Relief Act was not comparable to a rule of res judicata found in section II of the Code of Civil Procedure, nor to the doctrine of estoppel by judgment as discussed in the authorities cited by the opposite side, namely the works of Bigelow and Casperz. The counsel further maintained that the suit was intended to bind only respondents I and II and not the Prince, who had shown no hostility to the claim. It was submitted that, should the court grant a declaration that the plaintiff was the lawfully wedded wife of the Prince, any later dispute between the plaintiff and her children on one side and respondents I and II on the other would be affected in several ways. First, the judgment would be admissible as evidence in the subsequent litigation. Second, the judgment would bind the plaintiff because she was a party privy to it, and it would also bind her children because they would claim the benefit of the declaration through her. Third, respondents I and II would be bound because they were respectively the wife and the son of the Prince and would manifestly be claiming through him. In this context, the counsel observed that the discretion of a court to grant a purely declaratory relief, as opposed to a judgment that could be enforced by execution, derived its usefulness from the objectives of preventing future litigation by removing existing controversies, quieting title, preserving testimony, and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings. The practice of granting declaratory reliefs originated in the courts of equity in England and had been extensively adopted in the United States through statutory provisions. In India, the law was codified in Chapter VI of the Specific Relief Act, which broadened the scope of the rule to include declarations not only concerning property claims but also disputes concerning status. Section 42 of the Act indicated that Indian courts were not empowered to grant every form of declaration that might be available in the United States. A declaratory decree, in its entirety, did not create a new right but merely cleared the doubts that had gathered around the title to property, status, or legal character. When a court issued a declaration concerning a disputed status, it gave rise to important rights; consequently, a declaration granted in respect of a legal character or status in favour of a person was intended to have binding effect.

In this case, the Court explained that a declaration under section 43 of the Specific Relief Act binds not only the persons who are actual parties to the litigation but also those who claim through those parties, as prescribed by the statute. The Court described this provision as a rule of substantive law that is separate from the doctrines of res judicata or estoppel by judgment. It noted that the doctrine of res judicata, set out in section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, covers a far broader range of situations than the rule contained in section 43 of the Specific Relief Act. For instance, the doctrine of res judicata stresses the importance of the competence of the court that rendered the earlier judgment. By contrast, section 43 focuses on the principle that the declaration is a judgment in personam, distinguished from a judgment in rem. Accordingly, a judgment can operate as res judicata in a later suit only when the earlier court had the authority to decide the later controversy. Such considerations of competence do not appear in section 43 of the Specific Relief Act. The Court further observed that a previous judgment may serve as res judicata in a subsequent case even when the parties in the later suit were not named as parties in the earlier suit or were not claiming through them. As an illustration, the Court pointed out that a judgment rendered in a representative suit, or a judgment obtained by a presumptive reversioner, can bind the actual reversioner although that person was not a party to the earlier proceeding and did not claim through the earlier parties.

The Court then turned to the effect of a declaratory judgment issued under section 43. It held that such a judgment is binding not only on the individuals who are parties to the judgment but also on their privies. The term “privy” was explained to be used in a broad sense, extending beyond the narrow concept of a privy in estate to include privies by blood relationship. The Court described three ways in which privity may arise. First, privity may arise by operation of law, for example through a contract that creates a legal relationship between the parties. Second, privity may arise by the creation of a subordinate interest in property, such as the relationship between a landlord and a tenant or between a mortgagor and a mortgagee. Third, privity may arise by blood, for example between an ancestor and his heir. The Court warned that if this broader interpretation were not adopted, the provisions of section 43 would become useless in many conceivable situations. The appellant, supported by the third respondent through counsel, argued that a declaratory judgment should bind only the party to the suit unless the declaration affects property, that is, unless the parties are privy in estate. The Court rejected this argument, observing that such a view would limit the operation of section 43 to declarations concerning property and would exclude declarations concerning status, which was not the intention of the legislature. The Court emphasized that sections 42 and 43 are intended to operate together and to be co‑extensive. Consequently, a declaratory judgment concerning a disputed status is binding not only on the parties who actually appear before the court but also on persons who claim through them.

The Court observed that a declaration issued by a court binds not only the parties who are actually before the court but also those persons who claim rights through them. It noted that the expression “only” in section 43 of the Specific Relief Act, as correctly argued by counsel for the appellant, is intended to underscore that a declaration made under Chapter VI of that Act is not a judgment in rem. Nevertheless, although such a declaration operates only in personam, the provision further provides that it binds not only the parties to the suit but also persons claiming through those parties. The addition of the term “respectively” was explained as indicating that the parties on opposite sides are, for the purpose of the declaration, adversarial to each other. This, the Court said, reflects the established principle that where the court is persuaded that no genuine dispute exists, it may, exercising its judicial discretion, decline to grant the requested declaration for indirect reasons. On the basis of these observations, the Court articulated several propositions. First, the question of adding parties under Rule 10 of Order I of the Code of Civil Procedure is generally not a matter of the court’s original jurisdiction but rather a matter of judicial discretion that must be exercised after considering all the facts and circumstances of the particular case; nevertheless, in certain situations the power to add parties may raise issues about the court’s authority, distinguishing it from the court’s inherent jurisdiction or, alternatively, from the limited jurisdiction described in section 115 of the Code. Second, in a suit concerning immovable property, a person may be added as a party only if he possesses a direct interest in the subject matter, as distinguished from a mere commercial interest. Third, when the subject matter of the litigation is a declaration concerning status or legal character, the requirement of a present or direct interest may be relaxed if the court is of the opinion that including the additional party will enable it to adjudicate the controversy more effectively and completely. Fourth, the cases contemplated by this relaxed approach must be decided in accordance with the statutory provisions of sections 42 and 43 of the Specific Relief Act. Fifth, even in matters falling within those statutory provisions, the court is not obligated to grant the declaration merely because the defendant admits the claim; the court may require clear proof beyond the admission where it deems such proof necessary. Sixth, the effect of a declaratory decree concerning status, as in the present controversy, extends not only to the parties presently before the court but also to future generations; consequently, the rule of “present interest” that has been developed in property disputes does not apply with full force in such cases. Seventh, the rule laid down in section 43 of the Specific Relief Act is therefore to be understood as a nuanced principle that does not operate as a strict rule of res judicata but rather as a narrower and, in some respects, broader guideline.

Section 43 of the Specific Relief Act does not constitute a strict rule of res judicata; it is limited in one respect and broader in another. Applying the principles previously set out to the facts of the present case, the Court concluded that the lower courts had not exceeded their authority in ordering the addition of respondents one and two as defendants. The exercise of discretion by those courts cannot be characterised as unsound, and no error in judgment was identified. Because this appeal is before the Supreme Court by way of special leave, the Court decided that interference with the lower courts' discretionary jurisdiction was not warranted. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the matter of costs was directed to follow the final outcome of the trial court proceedings. A dissenting judge expressed regret that he could not agree with the opinion of his learned colleagues expressed in the immediately preceding judgment. The plaintiff’s original petition sought a declaration that she was the legally wedded wife of respondent three and that she was entitled to receive a monthly Kharch‑e‑Pandan of two thousand rupees. Respondent three’s written statement unequivocally admitted the marriage, confirmed the plaintiff’s entitlement to the stated allowance, and acknowledged that she had borne him three children. The plaintiff did not claim any relief or declaration against respondents one and two, as she possessed no cause of action against them. The pleadings of both the plaintiff and respondent three contain no allegation that respondents one and two had any cause of action against the plaintiff. Nevertheless, respondents one and two filed an application under Order 1 rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure before the City Civil Court judge in Hyderabad, requesting their addition as parties to the suit. The City Civil Court judge allowed the application, and that decision was subsequently affirmed by the High Court on appeal. The principal issue for determination in this appeal is whether the City Civil Court judge was justified in adding respondents one and two as parties and whether the High Court’s confirmation of that order should be upheld. Order 1 rule 1 sets out who may be joined as plaintiffs, while Order 1 rule 3 specifies who may be joined as defendants in any suit. The parties to be joined as plaintiffs or defendants are those against whom any right to relief arising from the same act, transaction, or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or alternatively, where, if such persons were

The Court observed that a civil court possesses jurisdiction under Order 1 Rule 10(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure to substitute or to add any person as plaintiff when the court deems such addition necessary for the determination of the real matters in dispute. Likewise, under Order 1 Rule 10(2) the court may strike off a party who has been improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, and may likewise join any person as plaintiff or defendant who ought to have been joined or whose presence is necessary for the court to adjudicate fully and effectively all the questions involved in the suit. From an examination of the plaint and the written statement filed by respondent 3, the Court found that there was no occasion for the appellant to have joined respondents 1 and 2 as defendants in the proceeding. Consequently the Court turned to the question of whether the circumstances of the present case justified the Judge of the City Civil Court in adding respondents 1 and 2 as defendants under the authority of Order 1 Rule 10(2).

Respondents 1 and 2, relying on Order 1 Rule 10(2), advanced five grounds for their plea to be added as defendants: (1) respondent 1 was the lawful and legally wedded wife of respondent 3; (2) respondent 2 was the son of respondent 3; (3) they should be joined because the issue to be adjudicated would seriously affect their rights and interest in the estate of respondent 3; (4) that their addition would neither introduce a new cause of action nor alter the nature of the suit; and (5) that the issue to be tried, even after their inclusion, would remain the same as the appellant’s case, namely that respondent 3 was denying the appellant’s marriage, a denial which respondents 1 and 2 were equally interested in denying. The Court held that the first two grounds did not justify the addition of respondents 1 and 2, because the only question to be decided was whether the appellant was married to respondent 3 and whether respondent 3 had contracted to pay the appellant Rs 2,000 per month as Kharch‑e‑pandan. Even assuming the appellant proved the marriage and the payment contract, the status and rights of respondents 1 and 2 as wife and son of respondent 3 would remain unaffected. Moreover, a Mohammedan is entitled to marry more than once and have up to four wives simultaneously; this is his right under his personal law and no one can question the

In this case, the Court observed that a Muslim man is permitted by his personal law to contract more than one marriage, up to a maximum of four wives, and that the exercise of this statutory right could not be lawfully questioned. The suit that had been filed by the appellant against respondent 3 concerned solely the existence of a marriage between those two individuals. The appellant maintained that she had been lawfully married to respondent 3, and it was within respondent 3’s power either to deny or to admit that claim. In the factual record, respondent 3 had actually admitted the appellant’s allegation that a marriage existed between them. The Court held that no other party to the present proceedings could contend that respondent 3’s admission was false or fabricated.

The Court further noted that respondents 1 and 2 had put forward an allegation that the appellant and respondent 3 were colluding with one another. However, the Court found that the parties had offered no positive factual material to substantiate that accusation; the suggestion rested solely on suspicion. Consequently, the Court concluded that, unless there was a clear justification for adding respondents 1 and 2 as defendants, the insinuation of collusion should be disregarded because respondents 1 and 2 lacked any locus standi to make such a representation in the matter that was before the Court.

Regarding the third, fourth and fifth grounds raised by respondents 1 and 2, the Court considered them together because they were inter‑connected. Grounds 4 and 5 asserted that the inclusion of respondents 1 and 2 would neither create a new cause of action nor alter the nature of the suit; the issue to be tried would remain the same even if those parties were joined. The Court reiterated that the sole question in the appellant’s suit was whether a lawful marriage existed between her and respondent 3 and whether respondent 3 had entered into a contract to pay her a monthly allowance of Rs 2,000 as “Kharch‑e‑pandan.”

The Court explained that if respondents 1 and 2 were added as parties, the litigation would inevitably expand to cover questions of inheritance in respondent 3’s estate, which were not part of the original issue. The principal ground on which respondents 1 and 2 sought to be joined, identified as ground 3, was that a declaration confirming the appellant’s marriage would affect the rights and interests of respondents 1 and 2 in respondent 3’s estate. In other words, on the death of respondent 3, the appellant and her three children would acquire inheritance rights, thereby diminishing the share that respondents 1 and 2 would otherwise receive.

Finally, the Court observed that the respondents argued that a declaration in favour of the appellant would constitute a judgment exercised under matrimonial jurisdiction and would be a judgment in rem as defined in section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act. Such a judgment, they contended, would be binding on respondents 1 and 2. The Court recorded these arguments for consideration, noting the implications for the parties’ respective rights.

The Court observed that the relief the appellant pursued was sought under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, while the operation of a declaration made under that provision was governed by section 43 of the same Act. Section 42 authorises any person who asserts a claim to a particular legal character or to any right to property to institute a suit against any other person who denies, or is prepared to deny, that character or right. In the present matter, respondents 1 and 2 sought to deny that the appellant was the lawful wife of respondent 3 and also to deny that her three children were the legitimate issue of respondent 3. The Court explained that if a declaration in favour of the appellant were to be issued, that declaration would bind respondents 1 and 2, thereby placing them in a position where they could never again contest the appellant’s marriage to respondent 3. The Court characterised such a situation as impossible, describing it as a declaration that would have been obtained from the court as a result of collusion between the appellant and respondent 3. The submission on which this argument was based presupposed that respondents 1 and 2 would survive respondent 3. However, the Court held that, during the lifetime of respondent 3, neither the appellant nor her children, nor respondents 1 and 2, possessed any right, whatsoever, in respondent 3’s estate under Mohammedan law. During that lifetime, the only right that respondents 1 and 2 could claim was the right to be maintained by respondent 3, and, if the appellant were also recognised as his wife, she and her children would similarly be entitled to maintenance. The appellant and respondent 1 might also have rights arising from any contract, if one existed, between them and respondent 3, but none of these rights constituted a proprietary interest in respondent 3’s estate. The Court further noted that the submission assumed that, upon the death of respondent 3, he would leave behind an estate to be inherited by his heirs. The Court found these assumptions to be purely speculative and said they provided no legal basis for impleading respondents 1 and 2 as parties to the appellant’s suit. It was also contended that the right to inherit was a present right of respondents 1 and 2 and that a declaration that the appellant was the wife of respondent 3 would affect that right. The Court rejected this contention as erroneous and without legal support. Even if a declaration were made that the appellant was the lawful wife of respondent 3, such a declaration could not extinguish or alter the respondents’ present right to inherit from respondent 3’s estate, assuming that respondent 3 left an estate on his death and that all parties survived him. At most, the respective shares of inheritance might be reduced, but the exact extent of each party’s inheritance could not be determined during respondent 3’s lifetime. Finally, the Court reiterated that, under the Mohammedan law governing the parties, respondent 3 was still entitled to contract valid marriages with two other women and to have children by them.

In this case the Court noted that any inheritance resulting from respondent 3’s death could not be of the same magnitude if he died leaving only respondents I and II as his heirs. The Court observed that the entire question raised by respondents I and II rested on the assumption that they possessed rights in respondent 3’s estate, but under Mohammedan law they did not have such rights. The Court explained that only if respondents I and II survived respondent 3 would their rights vest in his estate, and the size of any inheritance would be determined by the number of persons entitled to inherit at the time of his death. It was further urged that, unless respondents I and II were given an opportunity to demonstrate that no valid marriage existed between the appellant and respondent 3, a declaration that a marriage had occurred would bind them under section 43 of the Specific Relief Act. The Court pointed out that, should a dispute arise after respondent 3’s death about who was entitled to inherit, respondents I and II would be unable to contest the rights of the appellant and her children and would consequently be adversely affected by such a declaration. However, the Court expressed doubt, in view of the wording of section 43, that a declaration in the present suit would be binding on respondents I and II, because they were not asserting inheritance rights through the appellant and respondent 3. Assuming, for argument’s sake, that the declaration would bind them, the Court held that this did not justify impleading them in the present litigation, where the issue concerned only the existence of a marriage and not inheritance. The Court further observed that if the submission had merit, the appropriate remedy would be to implead the interested party as a separate suit‑member so that he could defend himself, even though there was no direct cause of action against him, because a decree could bind him through res judicata. The Court affirmed that under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act the court possesses discretion to grant or refuse the requested declaration, but that such discretion must be exercised judicially. In the present matter the Court found no legal obstacle to refusing the declaration, since respondent 3 had acknowledged the marriage and had admitted a claim for Rs 2,000 per month as kharch‑e‑pandan. The appellant had not sought any monetary award, and no cause of action remained that could support the suit. Consequently the Court concluded that the appellant could rely only on the acknowledgement, which created a presumption under Mohammedan law that she was married to respondent 3.

In this case the Court observed that there was no satisfactory basis for joining respondents one and two to the suit that the appellant had instituted. The Court explained that if, at some future time, a factual event or a particular circumstance gave rise to a question about whether the appellant was married to respondent three, then only those persons who wished to refute the marriage could be called upon to do so and to challenge the presumption created by the appellant’s acknowledgement. The Court noted that Order one, rule ten of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers a court to make orders for the addition or removal of parties, but that the character of that power – whether it is a matter of jurisdiction or merely of discretion – has been debated in Indian courts as well as in English jurisprudence. Irrespective of which view is correct, the Court held that the Court may invoke this power only when it is satisfied that such an order is necessary to enable it to adjudicate all the questions raised in the suit in a complete and effective manner. The Court further declared that a plaintiff should not be forced to add a defendant when the plaint, on its face, does not disclose any cause of action against that person. If a court adds a party without demonstrating that the presence of that party is essential for the full and proper determination of the suit, the exercise of the power is improper; and even if the addition is described as a discretionary act, the order must be set aside when it is challenged before a higher tribunal. Consequently, the Court stated that a plaintiff is entitled to select as defendants only those against whom a genuine cause of action exists, and that the plaintiff must not be burdened with defending a party against whom no cause of action is disclosed.

The Court also considered a claim that, besides respondent three, respondents one and two might also have an interest in denying the alleged marriage. The Court observed that the plaint contains no allegation, however tenuous, indicating that respondents one and two sought to repudiate the appellant’s claim of being the wife of respondent three. Under section forty‑two of the Specific Relief Act a suit may be filed against any person who denies or seeks to deny the plaintiff’s legal status or right to property. The Court found that the present plaint does not allege that respondents one and two denied the appellant’s status as wife of respondent three; the denial was raised only against respondent three. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, in law, it could not be said that respondents one and two were interested in challenging the appellant’s marital status because the pleadings do not show any such interest, and because respondents one and two are respectively the wife and the son of respondent three, their positions do not give them standing to contest the appellant’s claim.

In this case, the Court observed that respondent 3 would not be adversely affected even if the appellant were declared to be his wife, because under Mohammedan law respondent 3 is permitted to have both the appellant and respondent 1 as his wives and to have children through them. The Court further explained that the proper legal position in the suit between the appellant and respondent 3 is that respondents 1 and 2 lack any locus standi to be joined in such proceedings. The Court noted that there is no risk of multiple suits arising during the lifetime of respondent 3, and that the suggestion that the present suit might lead to multiplicity of suits is based on an assumption that no court can rationally make. Specifically, the Court stated that it cannot be presumed that respondent 3 will die before respondents 1 and 2; it is equally possible that respondent 3 may survive both of them, in which situation no separate suit by the latter parties would arise. The Court warned that if the order permitting respondents 1 and 2 to be added as parties were allowed to stand, it would permit a broader exercise of the powers under Order 1, rule 10, in a way not contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure, nor by section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, nor permissible under Mohammedan law. Consequently, the Court indicated that it would allow the appeal, finding that the lower courts were in error in treating the matter as one where Order 1, rule 10, applied, and it would set aside their orders and grant the appellant her costs throughout. However, the final pronouncement of the Court was that the appeal was dismissed, that costs were to be borne by the party prevailing in the trial court, and that the appeal was consequently dismissed.