Radha Sundar Dutta vs Mohd. Jahadur Rahim And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 108 of 1954

Decision Date: 18 September 1958

Coram: P.B. Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, T.L. VenkataraMA

The case of Radha Sundar Dutta versus Mohd Jahadur Rahim and others was decided on 18 September 1958 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was rendered by a bench composed of Justices P. B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar and T. L. Venkatarama. The petitioner in the proceedings was Radha Sundar Dutta and the respondents were Mohd Jahadur Rahim together with other parties. The citation of the decision appears in the law reports as 1959 AIR 24 and 1959 SCR 1309, and it is also recorded in the citator as R 1973 SC2609 (21). The matters addressed in the case involved a range of statutory and regulatory provisions concerning grant construction, Patni settlement, Chaukidari Chakaran lands, resumption and transfer of such lands to a Zamindar, the grant of lands by the Zamindar to a person holding the village in Patni settlement, the concept of a distinct Patni, and the validity of a sale of lands for arrears of revenue. The relevant statutory framework included the Bengal Patni Taluks Regulation 1819 (Bengal Regulation VIII of 1819), sections 8 and 14, and the Village Chaukidari Act 1870 (Bengal Act VI of 1870), sections 48, 50 and 51.

The lands that formed the subject of the dispute were located in the lot of Ahiyapur, one of the villages that constituted part of the permanently settled estate of Burdwan. These lands had previously been designated as Chaukidari Chakaran lands, held by Chaukidars who performed watch‑men duties in the village. At the time of the permanent settlement, the income from these lands was excluded from the calculation of the jama payable on the estate. Before the Bengal Patni Taluks Regulation of 1819 came into force, the entire village of Ahiyapur had been granted by the then Zamindar of Burdwan to the predecessors‑in‑title of the defendants under a Patni settlement. When the Village Chaukidari Act became operative in 1870, the Government, exercising powers under that Act, terminated the services of the Chaukidars, resumed the lands, levied an assessment upon them and, subject to payment of that assessment, transferred the lands back to the Zamindar. On 3 June 1899 the Zamindar granted the so‑called suit lands on Patni to the defendants’ predecessors‑in‑title, who were then the holders of the village under Patni settlement. The Zamindar subsequently initiated proceedings under the Bengal Patni Taluks Regulation, 1819, and the suit lands were ordered to be sold for arrears of rent. The Zamindar purchased the lands at that sale and, on 13 February 1941, sold them to the appellant, who thereafter instituted a suit to recover possession of the lands from the defendants. The defendants contested the suit, arguing principally that the grant of the Chaukidari Chakaran lands on 3 June 1899 had incorporated those lands into the Patni settlement of Ahiyapur, rendering any subsequent sale of those lands, apart from the rest of the village, invalid as it represented a sale of a portion of a Patni. The Court held that when the Zamindar granted the Chaukidari Chakaran lands, which formed part of a village already settled under Patni, the parties were free to agree that those lands would constitute a new and distinct Patni. Such an agreement would mean that the grantee would hold the lands in Patni right, that is, with a tenure that was permanent, heritable and alienable, while the Zamindar retained the right to levy jama and, in case of default, to sell the lands under the Regulation. Consequently, the Court concluded that the intention of the parties, as expressed in the grant of 3 June 1899, was to treat the Chaukidari Chakaran lands as a distinct Patni, and therefore the subsequent sale of the lands for arrears of rent was valid.

In this case the Court explained that a Patni right meant a tenure that was permanent, heritable and alienable, subject only to the holder’s obligation to pay the jama and the Zamindar’s right to sell the land under the Regulation if the payment was in default. Consequently, the new grant created a distinct Patni that was independent of the original Patni. The Court further held that when the grant dated 3 June 1899 was read in its entirety, the parties intended that the Chaukidari Chakaran lands should be treated as a separate Patni, and therefore the sale of those lands for arrears of rent was valid. The judgment concerned Civil Appeal No 108 of 1954, which appealed the decree of 21 March 1952 of the Calcutta High Court, itself an appeal from the decree of 29 August 1950 of the District Judge of Zillah Burdwan in Title Appeal No 247/16 of 1948, arising out of the decree of 25 September 1948 of the Additional Sub‑Judge, 1st Court, Burdwan, in Title Suit No 7 of 1946/27 of 1947. Counsel for the appellant were N C Chatterjee and Sukumar Ghose, while counsel for the respondents were J N Banerjee and P K Ghose. The judgment was delivered on 18 September 1958 by Justice Venkatarama Aiyar. The plaintiff appealed the High Court’s judgment in a second appeal that had reversed the lower courts and dismissed his ejectment suit. The property in dispute was a Mahal covering 84 Bighas 18 Cottas in Ahiyapur village, which formed part of the permanently settled estate of Burdwan Zamindari. The village had been granted in Patni settlement to the predecessors‑in‑title of defendants I to VII before the Bengal Patni Taluks Regulation, 1819, came into force, although the exact date of that grant was not recorded and was not material to the case. The Mahal had previously been designated as Chaukidari Chakaran lands, meaning that it was held by Chaukidars who performed watchman duties for the village. In 1870 the Village Chaukidari Act, 1870 (Bengal VI of 1870) was enacted; section 48 required that all Chaukidari Chakaran lands assigned for any village’s benefit be transferred to the Zamindar according to the Act’s provisions. Section 50 authorized the Collector to order such transfer after assessing the payable rent, and section 51 stipulated that the order would transfer the land to the Zamindar subject to the assessed amount and to any pre‑existing contracts that gave rights to persons other than the Zamindar. Accordingly, the suit properties were transferred to the Maharaja of Burdwan, who on 3 June 1899 granted them to the predecessors‑in‑title of defendants I to VII, who at that time held the Patni interest in the Ahiyapur lot. Exhibit B of the grant fixed the yearly rent at Rs 126‑8, of which Rs 84‑4 was to be paid to the Panchayat by the 7th of Baisakh as a contribution to the Chaukidari Fund, and the remaining Rs 42‑4 was to be paid to the Zamindar by the month of Chaitra.

In that provision, the order was to transfer to the zamindar the land described, subject to the amount of assessment mentioned. It was also subject to any contracts previously made, in respect of, under, or by virtue of which any person other than the zamindar might have any right to any land. Such contracts could also affect any portion of his estate or any tenure in the place where such land might be situated. In compliance with those provisions, the properties that are the subject of the present suit were transferred to the Maharaja of Burdwan. On June 3, 1899, the Maharaja granted those lands to the predecessors‑in‑title of defendants I through VII, who then held the Patni interest in lot Ahiyapur. Exhibit B fixed the annual rent at Rs. 126‑8 annas, and prescribed that Rs. 84‑4 annas be paid to the Panchayat on or before the seventh day of Baisakh for credit to the Chaukidari Fund. The balance of Rs. 42‑4 annas was to be paid to the Zamindar during the month of Chaitra. Exhibit B also provided that if the kist was not paid, the lands could be sold under proceedings authorized by the Bengal Regulation VIII of 1819. Relying on that clause, the Maharaja applied under section 8 of the Regulation to bring the suit lands to sale for the purpose of realizing arrears. An auction was held on May 15, 1937, at which the Maharaja himself became the purchaser of the property. Later, on February 13, 1941, the Maharaja granted the lands again on a Patni basis to the appellant.

The appellant subsequently filed the present suit in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Burdwan, seeking recovery of possession from the defendants on the allegation that they were trespassing upon the land. The respondents contested the suit, asserting that no rent was overdue under Exhibit B and consequently that the sale of the land was void. The Subordinate Judge found that the respondents indeed owed arrears of rent at the rate fixed by Exhibit B. He also observed that they had failed to file a suit under section 14 of the Regulation within the statutory period for setting aside the sale. Accordingly, the Judge held that the respondents could not rely on the alleged invalidity of the sale as a defence in the ejectment proceeding. The defendants then appealed this judgment to the District Court of Burdwan, seeking reversal of the finding by raising additional arguments. Before that court they raised a new contention that, according to the grant recorded in Exhibit B, the suit lands had become part of lot Ahiyapur. They further argued that a sale of those lands was unlawful because it amounted to the sale of a portion of the Patni. The District Judge noted that this issue had not been raised in any of the earlier proceedings before this court. He interpreted Exhibit B as having created a new Patni, thereby permitting the land to be sold under the law. He also held that section 14 of the Regulation operated as a bar to questioning the validity of the sale on the ground that the rent claimed was not actually due. On that basis, the District Judge dismissed the appeal and affirmed the lower court’s finding that the sale was valid. The respondents took

In the second appeal filed before the High Court, the matter was heard by a bench composed of Justice Das Gupta and Justice Lahiri. The two judges disagreed with the earlier decision of the District Judge on two principal points: first, the interpretation of Exhibit B, and second, the operation of the limitation provision contained in section 14 of the Regulation. They concluded that Exhibit B served only to incorporate the disputed suit lands into the existing Patni known as lot Ahiyapur, and therefore a sale that dealt only with those lands was improper because it amounted to a sale of a portion of the Patni. The bench further held that because such a sale was void, the bar created by section 14 of the Regulation could not be invoked. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the plaintiff’s suit. The present appeal arises against that judgment, having been taken on a certificate issued by the High Court under Article 133(1)(a). Counsel for the appellant advanced three specific contentions. First, the appellant argued that the defendants had never, either in their written statement or during the trial, pleaded that Exhibit B, by the terms of the sanction, made the Chaukidari Chakaran lands part of the Patni settlement of lot Ahiyapur and thus rendered the sale illegal as a partial Patni sale, and that the judges should not have permitted this new point to be raised on appeal. Second, the appellant contended that a proper construction of Exhibit B would show that it created a new Patni distinct from lot Ahiyapur, making the sale valid. Third, the appellant maintained that assuming the sale was invalid as a partial tenure sale, the only remedy available to the defendants was to invoke section 14 of the Regulation to set aside the transaction, and because they had failed to do so, they could not now attack the sale collaterally in the present proceedings.

The court observed that the first contention lacked merit. It noted that, indeed, the defendants had not raised in the trial court the plea that Exhibit B’s effect was to merge the suit lands into the Patni of lot Ahiyapur, thereby making the sale improper. Instead, the defendants’ written statement advanced the opposite view, asserting that Exhibit B created a new Patni unrelated to lot Ahiyapur, and the sole defence they raised on that basis was that no rent arrears were due under Exhibit B, which they claimed rendered the sale invalid. The court emphasized that the true character of the grant embodied in Exhibit B must be determined by interpreting its terms, a matter that falls squarely within the domain of legal construction. The appellant submitted that a proper determination of Exhibit B’s character required consideration of the surrounding circumstances, and that ascertaining those circumstances would necessitate the admission of evidence, thereby rendering the issue unsuitable for adjudication on appeal. The court rejected this submission, holding that questions of construction of a document must be decided solely on the language of the document itself, without resorting to extrinsic evidence, and therefore such a question could not be reopened for fresh evidence at this stage.

It was observed that, for the first time on appeal, the parties attempted to introduce evidence concerning the construction of the grant. The Court reiterated that, as a matter of established law, no evidence may be admitted when the question is one of interpreting the terms of a contract or grant; the interpretation must be based solely on the language contained in the document itself. No indication was found in the record that any dispute existed as to how the contents of the document related to the surrounding facts. This principle was supported by the authorities in Balkishen Das v. Legge (1) and Maung Kyin v. Ma Shwe La (2). The Court also noted that, when the defendants had previously raised this contention before the District Court, the plaintiff had not objected to it. Consequently, the learned Judges were correct in permitting the point to be considered at that stage. In the present appeal, the contention was therefore rejected.

The next issue for determination concerned the true character of the grant embodied in Exhibit B. The question was whether Exhibit B created a new Patni referring to the Chaukidari Chakaran lands, as the appellant asserted, or whether the grant incorporated those lands into the existing Patni of lot Ahiyapur, as the respondents contended, thereby making them an integral part of the lands comprising that Patni. To resolve this, the Court examined the rights that the Zamindar and the Patnidar possessed with respect to the Chaukidari Chakaran lands at the time Exhibit B was executed. Historically, these lands had been set apart as remuneration for the village chaukidars who performed watch‑men duties, and when the village was granted to the Zamindar under the Permanent Settlement, the income from those lands was excluded from the calculation of the jama payable by the Zamindar, although the lands themselves passed to him under the settlement. Subsequently, the Village Chaukidari Act terminated the chaukidars’ watch‑men services, the Government resumed the lands, imposed an assessment upon them, and, subject to that assessment, transferred the lands to the Zamindar. When the Zamindar later granted a Patni that included the village containing those lands, it became necessary to define the respective rights of the Zamindar and the Patnidar concerning the Chaukidari Chakaran lands. Section 51 of the Act provides that the Zamindar’s title on resumption and transfer by the Government shall be subject to “all contracts theretofore made.” Under this provision, the Patnidar would be entitled to the Chaukidari Chakaran lands on the same footing and under the same terms as the village in which the lands were situated. The nature of this right has been considered in numerous decisions, and the law is settled. In Ranjit Singh v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh (1) the Privy Council held that, although the term “contract” primarily denotes a transaction creating personal obligations, it may also refer to transactions establishing real rights, and that this broader meaning was intended in section 51. Accordingly, the Patnidar was entitled to bring a suit for possession of those lands against the Zamindar and was not required to sue for specific performance.

In interpreting section 51 of the Act, the Court observed that the ordinary meaning of the word “contract” is a transaction that creates personal obligations, but the term can also refer to transactions that create real rights. The Court held that the latter meaning was intended in section 51, and consequently the Patnidar was entitled to bring a suit against the Zamindar to recover possession of the Chaukidari Chakaran lands. The Patnidar was not required to sue for specific performance of any agreement. However, this entitlement did not confer on the Patnidar an absolute right to hold the lands without any obligations. The Court explained that the Patnidar remained liable to pay the assessment that the Zamindar fixed under section 50, and the Patnidar also had to share any profits derived from the lands. The Court referred to the earlier decision in Bhupendra Narayan Singh v. Narapat Singh, where the Privy Council held that when Chaukidari Chakaran lands that formed part of a Patni settlement were resumed and transferred to the Zamindar under section 51, the Patnidar was entitled to receive a fair and equitable rent for those lands, and that the determination of the rent was a condition precedent to placing the Patnidar in possession. The Court also cited the authorities Rajendra Nath Mukherjee v. Hiralal Mukherjee and Gopendra Chandra v. Taraprasanna in support of this principle.

Having set out the rights and duties of the Zamindar and the Patnidar under section 51, the Court explained that a grant of the Chaukidari Chakaran lands by the Zamindar to the Patnidar served two distinct purposes. First, the grant acknowledged that the Patnidar was entitled to hold the lands by virtue of his title as Patnidar of the village to which the lands belonged. Second, the grant fixed the amount that the Patnidar must pay in respect of the assessment and the share of profits. The Court then considered the precise relationship between this new grant and the original Patni grant. Since section 51 recognises and preserves rights that were acquired under a contract with the Zamindar, it was reasonably implied that the rights recognised by the statute were the same as those created by the original contract. Accordingly, the settlement of the Chaukidari Chakaran lands in Patni should be regarded as a continuation of the village Patni to which the lands belong. Nevertheless, the Court observed that the parties could agree that the Chaukidari Chakaran lands would constitute a new and distinct Patni. Under such an agreement, the grantee would hold the lands in Patni right, meaning that the tenure would be permanent, heritable and alienable, subject only to his liability to pay the assessment (jama) and the Zamindar’s corresponding right to sell the land under the Regulation in case of default in payment of the assessment or share of profits. In that situation, the new grant would become an independent entity separate from the original Patni. The Court affirmed that the creation of such an independent Patni by agreement of the parties was a well‑settled principle.

The Court observed that the basic premise was not contested before it. Assuming that premise to be correct, the essential issue for determination became the nature of the parties’ agreement concerning the Chaukidari Chakaran lands—whether those lands were intended to form an independent Patni or whether they were to be regarded as a continuation or an addition to the original Patni. The resolution of that issue, the Court held, required an interpretation of the grant itself. Consequently, the Court turned its attention to the substantive provisions of Exhibit B, which recorded the manner in which the Chaukidari Chakaran lands had been allotted to the predecessors of respondents I to VII. Exhibit B opened by noting that the Patnidars of lot Ahiyapur had appeared before the Zamindar and had prayed for the accession of a Patni settlement covering the specified eighty‑four Bighas and eighteen Cottas of land at an annual rent of Rs 126‑8. The document then set out the mode of payment of that rent. A particularly significant clause followed, which read: “You will pay the rent etc., Kist after Kist according to the Kistbandi in accordance with law, and if you do not pay the same, I will realise the arrears together with interest and costs by causing the aforesaid lands to be sold by auction by instituting proceedings under Regulation VIII of 1819 and other laws which are in force or will come into force…” The grant further contained provisions dealing with the transfer of “the aforesaid lands” by the Patnidars, the succession of those lands by inheritance or will, and the requirement that the name of any transferee or successor be entered in the Sherista. It was expressly stipulated that “so long as the name of the new Patnidar is not recorded in the Sherista, the former Patnidar whose name is recorded in the Sherista will remain liable for the rent, and on a sale of the Mahal by auction on institution of proceedings against him under Regulation VIII of 1819 or any other law that will be in force for realisation of arrears of rent, no objection thereto on the part of the new Patnidar can be entertained.” The respondents relied upon two additional clauses. The first of those stated: “If in future it transpires that any other persons besides yourselves have Patni rights in the Patni interest of the said lot Ahiyapur, such persons shall have Patni rights in these Chakaran lands also to the same extent and in the same manner as they will be found to have interests in the Patni of the aforesaid lot, and if for the said reason any person puts forward any claim against the Raj Estate and the Raj Estate has to suffer any loss therefor, you will make good the said claim and the loss without any objection.” The second clause provided: “If in future the Patni interest in the said lot Ahiyapur be transferred for liability for arrears of rent or if the same comes to an end for any reason, then your Patni …” (the passage continues in the subsequent portion of the judgment).

The Court observed that the provision stating “interest in these Chakaran lands also will be transferred or will come to an end along with the original Patni, simultaneously” formed one of the two clauses on which the lower court based its decision. The lower court held that the parties intended the suit lands to be treated as part of the Patni of lot Ahiyapur. The present Court agreed that these two clauses strongly support that conclusion.

The first of the two clauses provides that if, besides the grantee named in Exhibit B, any other persons were entitled to Patni rights in lot Ahiyapur, those persons would also enjoy Patni rights in the Chaukidari Chakaran lands to the same extent as they enjoy rights in the Patni of Ahiyapur. This language indicates that the rights granted to the grantees under Exhibit B are rooted in the Patni of the Ahiyapur lot. In other words, the grant of the Chakaran lands is derived from, and dependent upon, the original Patni.

The second clause states that the grantees will lose their rights over the Chaukidari Chakaran lands if their interest in the Ahiyapur Patni is sold. This provision clearly shows that the grant contained in Exhibit B is intended to be an annex to the grant of Ahiyapur. The loss of rights in the Chakaran lands is directly linked to the disposition of the Ahiyapur interest, reinforcing the view that the two parcels are not independent.

The appellant, however, contended that other clauses in Exhibit B demonstrate an intention to treat the suit lands as a distinct Patni. To support this contention, the appellant referred to the opening clause of Exhibit B, which records that the grantees desired to take a Patni settlement of 84 Bighas 18 Cottas. While this clause hints at a separate entity, the Court considered it only a weak indication. The appellant also highlighted a clause providing that, in the event of default in payment of kist, the lands could be sold under proceedings instituted under the Regulation. The Court noted that the law has long held that the sale of a portion of a Patni is invalid, except where all interested parties agree that different portions are held under separate sanads that expressly allow sale for default of kist. In such cases, each sanad may create a separate Patni for its portion, as explained in Mohadeb Mundul v. Mr. H. Cowell (1) and Monomothonath Dev and another v. Mr. G. Glascott (2).

Applying this principle, the Court observed that when the Zamindar and the Patnidar agreed in Exhibit B that the lands could be sold under the Regulation upon default of kist, they must have intended those lands to constitute a distinct Patni. If the clause were interpreted otherwise, it would become inoperative and void. Accordingly, the lower court had declined to give effect to that clause. Finally, the Court reiterated the settled rule of interpretation: when two plausible constructions of a document exist, the one that gives effect to all the clauses should be preferred over a construction that renders any clause nugatory, following the maxim that the substance of a document must be preserved.

In construing a document, when two plausible meanings exist, the Court must adopt the meaning that gives effect to every clause rather than rendering any clause ineffective, following the maxim “ut res magis valeat quam pereat”. Accordingly, the Court examined whether the contested clause could be given effect by interpreting Exhibit B as creating a distinct Patni, while at the same time harmonising the final two clauses with that interpretation.

The first provision states that any other persons entitled to the Patni of lot Ahiyapur shall enjoy the same rights in the lands described in Exhibit B. Although this language appears to preserve the original title in those persons, the Court understood its true purpose not as a declaration of statutory rights but as a condition that the grantees under the document must accept the existing rights. This purpose is evident from the indemnity clause incorporated in the same provision. Moreover, even if the remaining clauses of the grant are read to show that a new Patni is created for the grantees, the reservation of rights of other Patnidars of lot Ahiyapur does not defeat that conclusion, and nothing in the contested clause opposes the view that Exhibit B establishes a new Patni. The next clause deals with the cessation of the grantees’ interest in the Chaukidari Chakaran lands when their title to lot Ahiyapur ends. The respondents argued that this indicates the Chaukidari Chakaran lands form part of the Ahiyapur Patni; however, if that were true, a sale of lot Ahiyapur would automatically transfer the Chakaran lands, making the additional provision unnecessary. The Court found that the clause serves a real purpose only if the Patni created by Exhibit B is separate from the Ahiyapur Patni, so that when the major Patni of lot Ahiyapur is sold, the minor Patni created under Exhibit B is extinguished by a special provision. Finally, the provisions concerning transfer or succession of the Chaukidari Chakaran lands, and the recognition of any transferee or successor as a Patnidar of those lands, demonstrate that such a transferee holds the lands as a Patnidar distinct from the Patnidar of lot Ahiyapur. Reading these clauses together confirms that the parties intended the Chaukidari Chakaran lands to be held as a separate Patni.

In this matter, the Court observed that the parties’ intention, as expressed in the final clause, was that a sale of the Ahiyapur Patni would extinguish the title held by the owners of the Chaukidari Chakaran lands, whereas a conveyance of those Chaukidari Chakaran lands would not affect the title to the Ahiyapur Patni. By reading Exhibit B in its entirety, the Court concluded that the parties intended the Chaukidari Chakaran lands to constitute a separate Patni distinct from the Ahiyapur Patni. The Court then turned to the decision that the lower court had relied upon, namely Kanchan Barani Debi v. Umesh Chandra (1). In that case, the Maharaja of Burdwan had created a Patni of lot Kooly in 1820. The Chaukidari Chakaran lands situated within the same village were later resumed under the relevant Act and transferred to the Zamindar, who in 1899 granted them to Syamlal Chatterjee in Patni on terms similar to those found in Exhibit B. In 1914 the Patni of lot Kooly was sold under the Regulation and purchased by the plaintiff, Sint Kanchan Barani Debi, who thereafter sued to recover possession of the Chaukidari Chakaran lands. The defendants, representing the grantees under the 1899 Patni settlement, opposed the suit on the ground that the sale of Patni Kooly did not convey title to the Chaukidari Chakaran lands because those lands formed a distinct Patni. Justice B. B. Ghose, delivering the judgment of the Court, noted that the issue required an examination of whether the original Patni terms had been altered, and that such an examination depended upon the wording of the pattah by which the Chaukidari Chakaran lands were granted to Syamlal Chatterjee. He referred to the two clauses that correspond to the last two clauses of Exhibit B and held that their effect was merely to restore the situation as it existed when the original Patni was created in 1820. Consequently, the Court concluded that the purchaser was entitled to the Patni as it stood in 1820 and that the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the Chaukidari Chakaran lands as part of that Patni (1) A.I.R. 1925 Cal. 807. The Court further observed that the lower‑court judge had not considered the clause that provided for the sale of those lands as a distinct entity under the Regulation when there was default in the payment of rent payable under the deed. In the Court’s view, this omission substantially weakened the earlier decision, and therefore the Court was unable to accept the conclusion drawn by the lower court on the basis of the two clauses cited.

The Court found that the two clauses cited by the lower judges were not truly inconsistent with the earlier clauses that supported the interpretation that the grant recorded in Exhibit B created a distinct Patni. The Court also rejected the proposition that the earlier clause, which permitted the sale of the Chaukidari Chakaran lands when there was a default in the payment of jama, should be read in a way that prevented it from overriding the later clauses. The Court explained that, where a genuine conflict exists between an earlier clause and later clauses and it is impossible to give effect to all of them, the well‑established rule of construction requires that the earlier clause prevail over the later ones. The Court cited the authority of Forbes v. Git (1), recalling Lord Wrenbury’s statement of that rule: “If in a deed an earlier clause is followed by a later clause which destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause, the later clause is to be rejected as repugnant and the earlier clause prevails. In this case the two clauses cannot be reconciled and the earlier provision in the deed prevails over the later.” Applying this principle, the Court held that Exhibit B indeed created a new Patni and that the sale of the lands described in that exhibit was not a prohibited part‑sale of an existing Patni. The Court acknowledged that its view differed from that of the learned judges of the lower court, who possessed special knowledge and experience of the local tenure and whose opinion normally carried great weight. The Court also noted that the decision in Kanchan Barani Debi v. (1) [1922] 1 A.C. 256, 259, reported by Umesh Chandra (1), had remained on the books for more than three decades, although its correctness had not been examined by the Calcutta High Court in any subsequent case before the present litigation. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that the matter before it was a question of deed construction, and that interpreting Exhibit B as creating a distinct Patni would not cause any injustice to the parties. The Court further observed that, although a general rule disfavors the sale of a portion of a Patni that is intended for the benefit of the Patnidars, there is no reason to deny effect to an agreement entered into by the Patnidars and the Zamindars that authorises the sale of a portion which actually benefits the Patnidars. After careful consideration, the Court concluded that Exhibit B created a distinct Patni, that the sale dated 15 May 1937 was valid, and that the plaintiff therefore obtained a good title to the suit lands under the grant dated 13 February 1941. Consequently, the Court deemed it unnecessary to express an opinion on the contentious issue that had been extensively argued before it regarding whether the defendants could raise the invalidity of the 1937 sale.

In this case, the Court considered whether the defendants could contest the validity of the sale that occurred on May 15, 1937 in response to the present action, given that they had not taken any steps to have the sale set aside in accordance with section 14 of the Regulation.

The Court observed that the failure to invoke the procedural mechanism prescribed by the Regulation demonstrated an implicit acceptance of the sale's legality.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the defendants could not successfully raise the invalidity of that sale as a defence in the present suit.

Based on this reasoning, the Court allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff.

Consequently, the judgment rendered by the lower Court was reversed, and the judgment previously delivered by the District Judge was restored.

The Court further ordered that each party bear the costs of the proceedings throughout the entire litigation.

The final order recorded that the appeal was allowed, and the citation of the earlier decision was noted as A.I.R. 1925 Cal. 807.