Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Others vs The State Of Bihar

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Petitions Nos. 58, 83, 84, 103, 117, 126, 127, 128, 248, 144 and 145 of 1956 and 129 of 1957

Decision Date: 23 April, 1958

Coram: S.K. Das, P.B. Gajendragadkar, Sudhi Ranjan Das, Aiyyur, T.L. Venkatarama Das, P.B. Bose, Vivian

In the matter titled Mohd. Hanif Quareshi and Others versus The State of Bihar, together with a connected petition, the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on the twenty‑third day of April, 1958. The case was heard before a Bench that included Justice S.K. Das, Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, and Justice Sudhi Ranjan serving as Chief Justice, along with Justices Aiyyar, T.L. Venkatarama Das, S.K. Gajendragadkar, P.B. Bose and Justice Vivian. The official citation of the decision appears in 1958 AIR 731 and 1959 SCR 629. The dispute centered on legislation that imposed an absolute prohibition on the slaughter of certain bovine animals. Specifically, the Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act, 1955 (referred to as Bihar Act, 1955), the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 (U P Act, 1955), and the Central Provinces and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949 (C P and Berar Act, 1949) were all under scrutiny. Each of these statutes enacted a total ban on the slaughter of various categories of cattle or buffalo, invoking the Directive Principles of State Policy enshrined in Article 48 of the Constitution. The petitioners, who were engaged in the butchering trade and its related businesses, contended that the statutes infringed upon their fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 25 of the Constitution. Conversely, the respondents argued that the statutes were constitutionally valid because they were enacted in accordance with the Directive Principles, which they claimed held a superior position to the fundamental rights, and that the statutes did not contravene Articles 14, 19(1)(g) or 25.

The Court ultimately held three principal points. First, it found that a complete prohibition on the slaughter of cows of any age, the calves of cows, and both male and female she‑buffaloes was a reasonable and valid measure. Second, the Court ruled that an absolute ban on the slaughter of she‑buffaloes, breeding bulls, or working bullocks—whether cattle or buffalo—remained reasonable and valid provided that the animals were still capable of serving as milch or draught animals. Third, the Court concluded that a total ban on the slaughter of she‑buffaloes, bulls and bullocks—whether cattle or buffalo—after they had ceased to be capable of yielding milk or of breeding or performing draught work was not justified in the public interest and therefore was invalid. In reaching these conclusions, the Court examined the scope of Article 48, which explicitly directs the State to take steps for preventing the slaughter of animals, particularly those that are or could be milk‑producing or draught‑capable. The Court clarified that the protective intent of Article 48 was confined to cows, calves, and animals presently or potentially capable of milch or draught functions, and did not extend to animals that had formerly served such purposes but no longer did. The judgment reaffirmed that the Directive Principles of State Policy, set out in Part IV of the Constitution, must operate in conformity with, and as subsidiary to, the fundamental rights enumerated in Part III, citing the precedent established in State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] SCR 525. Accordingly, the ban on slaughter, even on a designated slaughter day, was not deemed to violate the petitioners’ right to freedom of religion under Article 25, as the necessary connection between the ban and the infringement of that right had not been established.

In its analysis, the Court observed that a total ban on slaughter could be valid only when it served the interests of the general public; otherwise it was deemed invalid. The Court noted that the directive in Article 48 of the Constitution explicitly required the State to take steps for preventing the slaughter of animals. That directive contemplated a ban on the slaughter of particular categories of animals, specifically cows, calves and other cattle that qualified as milch or draught animals. The Court explained that the protection afforded by Article 48 was limited to cows and calves and to those animals that were presently, or could potentially become, capable of producing milk or of working as draught cattle. The protection did not extend to cattle that had once been milch or draught animals but had later ceased to be so.

The Court further held that the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution must conform to, and operate as a subsidiary to, the Fundamental Rights set out in Part III. In support of this proposition, the Court referred to the decision in State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] S.C.R. 525. Regarding the ban on slaughter of cows even on a designated slaughter day, the Court found that this prohibition did not violate the petitioners’ Fundamental Right under Article 25. The Court reasoned that it had not been shown that sacrificing a cow on that day was a mandatory external act required for a Muslim to express his religious belief. The Court applied the principle stated in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, [1954] S.C.R. 1055.

The Court observed that the impugned Acts affected only those butchers who slaughtered cattle and did not affect butchers who slaughtered sheep or goats. Consequently, the Acts did not offend Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court explained that the different categories of animals could be classified into separate groups based on their usefulness to society. Accordingly, the butchers who killed each category could also be placed in distinct classes, reflecting the effect of their occupations on society. This classification rested on an intelligible differentia that placed the petitioners in a well‑defined class and distinguished them from those who slaughtered sheep or goats. The Court emphasized that this differentia was closely connected with the purpose of the Acts, namely, the preservation, protection and improvement of livestock.

In addressing the reasonableness of restrictions on the Fundamental Right conferred by Article 19(1)(g), the Court stated that it could not rely on a general, abstract notion of reasonableness or on the viewpoint of the individuals who were subject to the restrictions. The Court’s task was to determine whether the restrictions were reasonable in the interests of the general public. The Court referred to the test of reasonableness articulated in State of Madras v. I.G. Row, [1952] S.C.R. 597 at 602. The Court also noted that the legislature is the best judge of what is good for the community. While a constitutional question could not be decided solely on the sentiment of a particular section of the people, the Court said that such sentiment must be taken into account as one element among others in reaching a judicial verdict on the reasonableness of the restrictions.

In this case the Court examined whether the restrictions imposed by the challenged legislation were reasonable. The Court observed that the moment the legislation became operative, it immediately affected the petitioners’ fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) to practice their trade. Accordingly, the Court needed to decide whether the legislation could be justified under clause (6) of Article 19. The Court noted that the nation faced a shortage of milch cattle, breeding bulls and working bullocks, which were essential for supplying milk, providing agricultural power and producing manure. Consequently, a complete ban on the slaughter of these animals was considered a reasonable restriction because it served the general public’s interest. However, the Court distinguished this from a total ban on the slaughter of cattle that were deemed useless. It pointed out that such a ban would waste scarce cattle feed, a resource already in short supply, and would deprive productive cattle of necessary nourishment. Therefore, the Court concluded that a blanket prohibition on the slaughter of useless cattle could not be justified as being in the public interest.

The Court then addressed the rules governing intervention in Supreme Court proceedings. Under Order XLI, rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, only the Attorney‑General of India or the Advocates‑General of the States were expressly permitted to intervene. No other rule allowed a third party to intervene. Nevertheless, the Court explained that, in practice, it exercised its inherent powers to permit a third party to intervene when that party was already involved in related proceedings before the Supreme Court or a High Court, and when the resolution of the present case would affect that party’s interest. The Court proceeded to the judgment on the original jurisdiction of the petitions numbered 58, 83, 84, 103, 117, 126, 127, 128, 248, 144, 145 of 1956 and 129 of 1957, filed under Article 32 for enforcement of fundamental rights. Counsel for the petitioners represented all the petitions except No. 103 of 1956. The Court observed that the impugned Acts infringed the petitioners’ rights under Article 19(1)(g), as the petitioners – who were butchers, tanners, gut merchants, curers and cattle dealers – were barred from carrying on their trades. When a law on its face violates a fundamental right, the burden of proof lies on the State to show that the law falls within the scope of clause (6) of Article 19, citing precedents such as Saghir Ahmed v. State of U P. and Chiranjitlal Chowdhuri v. Union of India. The Court held that the Acts imposed a total ban on the trade and business of those who killed only cattle, and that a total prohibition of a trade that is neither immoral nor obnoxious could never qualify as a reasonable restriction under clause (6) of Article 19, referring to earlier decisions including Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, R M Sheshadri v. District Magistrate and Cooverjee B Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner.

In this matter, the Court referred to the decision in Rashid Ahmed reported in The Municipal Board, Kairana, ([1950] S.C.R. 566). The Court observed that a total prohibition on the slaughter of cattle does not serve the interests of the general public because it would damage animal husbandry. It noted that the country already suffers from a shortage of fodder and pasture, and that keeping useless and uneconomic cattle would deprive the useful cattle of the limited resources that are available. The Court added that establishing Gosadans for the purpose of maintaining such uneconomic cattle would represent a massive waste of public funds, a point supported by counsel who cited various official reports. The impugned statutes, the Court said, create an offensive discrimination between butchers and persons who deal only in cows, bulls and similar animals on the one hand, and those who deal in sheep and goats on the other hand, thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court characterised the legislation as hostile and discriminatory because it singled out a community whose members kill only cows, bulls and similar animals. To illustrate the point, the Court quoted several authorities, namely Ye Cong Eng v. Trinidad (70 L. Ed. 1059 at 1071), Fowler v. Rhode Island (97 L. Ed. 828), Lane v. Wilson (83 L. Ed. 1281 at 1287) and Ligget Co. v. Baldrige (73 L. Ed. 204). The Court further held that the statutes contravene Article 25 because they forbid Muslims from performing the religious practice of sacrificing a cow on the occasion of Bakr Id, a conclusion supported by the decision in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay ([1954] S.C.R. 1055 at 1063). Turning to the Directive Principles, the Court declared that the provisions of Article 48, which lay down a policy of the State, cannot override the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, a principle reiterated in State of Madras v. Sm. Champakam Dorairajan ([1951] S.C.R. 525 at 530) and Saghir Ahmed’s Case ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 707 at 727). Consequently, the Court found that the impugned statutes exceed the limits of Article 48. Moreover, the statutes enacted by Bihar and Madhya Pradesh that affect inter‑State trade in cattle and beef were held to offend Article 301, and were declared void because the President’s assent had not been obtained before their enactment. Counsel for the petitioners filed Petition No. 103 of 1956 on this ground. The Court observed that Section 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act makes the slaughter of cattle a cognisable and non‑bailable offence, and that this provision together with others imposes an explicit restriction on the petitioners’ right to carry on their trade. Accordingly, the burden was placed on the respondents to demonstrate that such restrictions constitute reasonable measures in the public interest, a standard articulated in Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh ([1950] S.C.R. 759 at 763) and Saghir Ahmed v. The State of U.P. ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 707 at 726). The Court further described the legislation as colourable, mala‑fide and motivated by religious considerations, relying on State of Madras v. V. G. Rao ([1952] S.C.R. 597). It held that the blanket ban prescribed by Article 48 must yield to the freedom of trade guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g). The restrictions, therefore, amount to a total prohibition and the extinction of the trade of beef butchers, a view supported by Saghir Ahmed’s Case, Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. The State of U.P. ([1954] S.C.R. 803) and the foreign authority Fairmout Creamery Co. v. Minnesota (71 L. Ed. 893).

The Court observed that the impugned Act violated Article 14 because it singled out beef butchers for differential treatment. The Court noted that the butchers possessed a legal entitlement to slaughter cattle either for nourishment or for sacrificial purposes, as recognized in earlier decisions such as Naubahar Singh v. Qadir Bux, Shahbazkhan v. Umrao Puri, and Emperor v. Muhammad Yakub. Counsel for the respondents included C. K. Daphtary, then Solicitor‑General of India, together with the Advocate‑General of Bihar, Mahabir Prasad, and S. P. Varma, who represented Petitions Nos. 58, 83 and 84 of 1956, as well as R. H. Dhebar, who appeared for the State of Bombay in Petition No. 117 of 1956. The respondents submitted that the legislature had properly decided to prohibit the slaughter of cattle in order to further objectives of animal husbandry and public policy that transcended state boundaries. The Court held that it was not its function to comment on whether the policy itself was a wise choice. Rather, the Court would intervene only when it was convinced that, under any conceivable view, the restrictions could not be deemed reasonable. The Court identified two opposing viewpoints in the controversy: one advocating a total prohibition and the other supporting a partial ban. In such factual disputes, the Court stressed that the legislature’s judgment must prevail, and judicial interference is unwarranted where factual controversy exists. This approach was supported by prior authorities including State of Madras v. V. G. Rao, State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh, and Arumugham v. State of Madras.

Continuing its analysis, the Court held that unless it could be shown that the restrictions bore no relation to the purpose intended by the legislation, the statute must be sustained. Article 37 obliges the State to give effect to the directive principles of State policy contained in Part IV of the Constitution when enacting legislation. The Court found that the Act was consistent with the direction provided in Article 48, whose object is to improve cattle breeds and to organize animal husbandry and agriculture, rather than to regulate any trade or industry. Consequently, the Court concluded that the legislation did not directly impinge upon the freedom to trade guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g). The Court referenced numerous decisions supporting this view, including A. K. Gopalan v. State, Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, R. S. Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, and State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamar‑baugwala. Further submissions were made on behalf of the State of Bombay by B. Sen and R. H. Dhebar in Petitions Nos. 126‑128 and 248 of 1956, and on behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh by M. Adhicary, the Advocate‑General, together with I. N. Shroff in Petition No. 145 of 1956. Both sets of counsel adopted the arguments previously advanced by C. K. Daphtary. The Additional Solicitor‑General of India, H. N. Sanyal, also participated in the proceedings.

Counsel G C Mathur and C P Lal, representing the State of Uttar Pradesh, argued that the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Act were reasonably related to the purpose of implementing the directive in Article 48 of the Constitution. They maintained that because the Act pursued a legitimate policy goal, it could not be said to offend Article 19 (1) (g). In support of this view they cited the decision in Chintaman Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, ([1950] S. C. R. 759 at 763). The counsel relied on the figures presented in the Gosamvardhan Enquiry Committee’s Report, which showed a decline in the cattle population and argued that a total ban on slaughter was necessary to protect and preserve cattle. They further pointed out that the State of Uttar Pradesh had made ample arrangements for the care of decrepit cattle, and that such cattle were not economically useless because they continued to provide hides and manure. The counsel emphasized that the Uttar Pradesh Act prohibited the slaughter of cattle but not that of buffaloes, and asserted that this distinction did not offend Article 14 because the classification was based on a proper and rational basis. According to them, buffaloes did not require protection; female buffaloes produced large quantities of milk, and male buffaloes were of limited use for draught purposes, while the buffalo population was steadily increasing. The counsel also contended that the Act did not violate Article 25, noting that Article 25 of the Constitution was analogous to Article 8 of the Irish Constitution and that there was no religious compulsion on Muslims to sacrifice a cow on Bakr Id Day. An amicus curiae, Thakurdas Bhargava, submitted that the directive principles of State policy in Part IV of the Constitution were held to be superior to fundamental rights, and consequently any enactment enacted pursuant to the direction of Article 48 was valid even if it incidentally infringed the petitioners’ fundamental rights. The total ban on cow slaughter embodied in the impugned Acts, the amicus argued, was justified and served the general public interest.

The counsel further stated that the official reports contained inaccurate data and that there was no genuine shortage of fodder or pasture land. They highlighted a shortage of milk in the country and argued that protecting cows was essential. They added that bullocks contributed the largest share of power for agricultural production, and that cow‑dung manure generated approximately rupees 63 crores per year for the national income. Replies were filed by H J Umrigar and by Frank Anthony, dated 23 April 1958. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Chief Justice Das. The twelve petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution raised the question of the constitutional validity of three separate legislative enactments that banned the slaughter of certain animals in the States of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. The Court observed that the controversy over cow slaughter had persisted for many years and had occasionally sparked communal tensions and riots. Nevertheless, the Court noted with satisfaction that the parties had presented their arguments in a rational and objective manner, without inflaming communal passions, thereby allowing the constitutional issues to be examined dispassionately.

The Court observed that the parties were presented before it without invoking communal fervour and that the matters were framed in a rational and objective manner, as is appropriate for issues of constitutional significance. It noted that some of the petitions originated in Bihar, others in Uttar Pradesh and the remainder in Madhya Pradesh. Because all of the petitions raised the same questions of law, the Court considered it convenient to consider and dispose of them together in a single judgment. The petitions identified as numbers 58 of 1956, 83 of 1956 and 84 of 1956 each challenge the constitutional validity of the Bihar Preservation and Improvement of Animals Act, 1955 (referred to in the judgment as the Bihar Act). The Court therefore grouped these three proceedings for simultaneous determination.

Petition number 58 of 1956 was filed by five individuals, all of whom belong to the Muslim Quraishi community, a sizable and notable segment of the Muslim population in the country. The members of this community are principally engaged in the butchery trade and related activities such as the sale of hides, operation of tanneries, manufacture of glue, preparation of guts and dehydration of blood. In addition, a portion of the community is involved in buying, selling and distributing cattle both within Bihar and in other states of the Union. Petitioners one and two are described as butchers and meat vendors who, according to the petition, slaughter only cattle and not sheep or goats; they are known locally as “Kasais” to distinguish them from “Chicks,” who slaughter only sheep and goats. After the cattle are slaughtered, these petitioners sell the hides to tanners or leather merchants who are also members of the community, and they sell the intestines to gut merchants. It is alleged that Patna alone contains roughly five hundred other Kasais, while the whole of Bihar is said to have about two lakh Kasais; although the State did not admit the accuracy of these figures, the Court accepted that the number is considerable. Petitioners three and four are respectively the owner of a tannery and a gut merchant, and petitioner five holds the position of General Secretary of the Bihar State Jamiatul Quraish. Petition number 83 of 1956 lists one hundred and eighty petitioners residing at various locations throughout Bihar; each is a Muslim engaged as a Kasai, a cattle dealer or an exporter of hides. Petition number 84 of 1956 includes one hundred and seventy petitioners, all residents of Patna district, who are also Muslims of the Quraishi community and who conduct business as Kasais or cattle dealers. All of the petitioners in the three proceedings are Indian citizens. The Bill that eventually became the Bihar Act was published in the Bihar Gazette on 20 April 1953. According to the original draft, the Bill intended to impose a complete ban solely on the slaughter of cows and on calves of cows that were younger than three years.

The Bill concerning the slaughter of cows was referred to a Select Committee, and its scope was subsequently expanded considerably. After deliberation, the Bihar Legislature enacted the Bill, and the Governor gave his assent on 8 December 1955. The completed Act was then published in the Official Gazette on 11 January 1956. Section 1 of the Act became effective immediately upon that publication. However, before any notification could be issued under subsection (3) of section 1 to bring the remainder of the Act, or any portion of it, into operation within the State, the present petitions were lodged in the Court challenging the constitutional validity of the legislation. The petitioners sought an interim order to restrain the State of Bihar from issuing the required notification under section 1(3). In response, the State, through the Solicitor General of India, gave a formal undertaking that no such notification would be issued until the petitions were finally disposed of. Because of that undertaking, the Court found that no further order was necessary on the interim applications. Consequently, the status of the Act remained unchanged pending the resolution of the constitutional challenges raised by the petitioners.

Petition No. 103 of 1956 was filed by two Muslim individuals residing in Uttar Pradesh; one conducted a hide‑merchanting business while the other was a butcher. Petition No. 129 involved eight Muslim petitioners, also residents of Uttar Pradesh, who were engaged respectively as gut merchants, cattle dealers, Kasais, beef vendors, bone dealers, hide merchants, or cultivators. All of the petitioners in these two matters were Indian citizens. Through these petitions, the petitioners contested the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Prevention of Cow Slaughter Act, 1955 (referred to as the U P Act) and sought a writ of mandamus directing the State of Uttar Pradesh not to implement any provisions of the U P Act that might infringe upon their fundamental rights. In addition, petitions numbered 117, 126, 127, 128, 248, 144 and 145 of 1956 were filed by 6, 95, 541, 58, 37, 976 and 395 petitioners respectively. All of these petitioners were Muslims belonging to the Quraishi community and were primarily involved in the butchers’ trade and related activities such as hide supply, tannery work, glue making, gut making and blood dehydration. At the time of filing, most of them lived in areas that were part of Madhya Pradesh, but a recent reorganisation of states transferred those areas to the State of Bombay. As a result of that reorganisation, the State of Bombay substituted the State of Madhya Pradesh as the respondent in the first five of those petitions, while Madhya Pradesh remained the respondent in the seventh petition.

The petitions were transferred and added to the sixth petition because a portion of the district where the petitioners lived had been transferred, while the State of Madhya Pradesh remained the respondent in the seventh petition. By these petitions, the petitioners—most of whom were Indian citizens—challenged the validity of the Central Provinces and Berar Animal Preservation Act, 1949 (Central Provinces and Berar Act III of 1949), as subsequently amended. To understand the arguments presented for and against the constitutional validity of the three impugned statutes, it was necessary to examine the relevant constitutional provisions under which those statutes were enacted. The first reference was to Article 48, located in Chapter IV of the Constitution, which embodies the directive principles of State policy. Although Article 37 declares that these directive principles are not enforceable by any court, they are nevertheless fundamental to the governance of the country and must be considered by the State when framing legislation. Article 48 reads as follows: “Organisation—The State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle.” According to counsel for the petitioners, the principal purpose of this article was to direct the State to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines, and that the remaining provisions of the article were ancillary to that main purpose. They argued that the States were required to take steps for preserving and improving breeds and for prohibiting the slaughter of the specified animals only insofar as those steps served the overarching scheme of modernising agriculture and animal husbandry. Counsel for the petitioners relied on the marginal note to Article 48 and also cited entry 15 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, which states: “Preservation, protection and improvement of stock and prevention of animal diseases; veterinary training and practice.” They observed that there is no separate legislative head for the prohibition of animal slaughter, and that this omission supported their conclusion that the ban on slaughter mentioned in the last part of Article 48 was merely ancillary to the primary directive concerning preservation, protection and improvement of stock, which is part of organising agriculture and animal husbandry. On the opposite side, counsel for the respondents, together with Pandit Thakurdas Bhargava who appeared as amicus curiae, contended that Article 48 contains three distinct and separate directions, each of which should be implemented independently and treated as a separate charge.

In this case the Court found it unnecessary to render a definitive ruling on the precise nature of the relationship among the three components of Article 48. The Court merely observed that the various parts of the article do not conflict with one another. It explained that the two concluding directives—one concerning the preservation and improvement of specific breeds and the other concerning the prohibition of slaughter of certain animals—should be understood, as indicated by the expression “in particular,” as special aspects of the earlier, broader directive that calls for the organization of agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines. Whether the latter two directives are merely ancillary to the first, as the petitioners’ counsel argued, or whether they constitute separate and independent directives, as counsel for the respondents contended, was not decisive for the present judgment. What was decisive, the Court held, is that the directive to prevent the slaughter of animals is expressed in clear and positive terms. It imposes a ban on the slaughter of the categories of animals enumerated in the article, namely cows, calves and other cattle that fall within the description of milch or draught cattle. The Court further clarified that the protection contemplated by this part of the article is limited, in its opinion, to cows and calves and to those animals that are currently or potentially capable of producing milk or of being used as draught animals. It does not, according to the Court, extend to cattle that were once milch or draught animals but have since lost that capacity, because that would be contrary to the purpose for which the directive was formulated.

The Court explained that, acting upon these directive principles and exercising the powers granted by Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution, read together with entry 15 in List II of the Seventh Schedule, the legislatures of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh each enacted statutes that are now being challenged as unconstitutional. The Court stressed that, to appreciate the meaning and scope of the statutes under challenge, it must be borne in mind that each of those statutes is a law dealing with “preservation, protection and improvement of stock.” Accordingly, the constitutional validity of each statute must be assessed in that context and against that backdrop. Keeping this perspective in view, the Court proceeded to examine the relevant provisions of the three Acts. It noted that the Bihar legislation bears the title “An Act to provide for the preservation and improvement of certain animals in the State of Bihar.” Sub‑section (3) of section 1 provides that the section itself shall come into force immediately, whereas the remaining provisions of the Act, or any of them, shall become operative on such date as the State Government may specify by notification, and that different dates may be appointed for different provisions and for different areas. Section 2 of the Act contains definitions, and the Court recorded the following: the term “animal” includes (i) bull, bullock, cow, heifer, buffalo, calf, sheep, goat and any other ruminating animal; (ii) poultry; and (iii) elephant, horse, camel, ass, mule, dog, swine and any other domesticated animal that may be specified by the State Government through notification in the Official Gazette.

The definition clause of the Bihar Act states that the State Government may publish a notification in the Official Gazette for this purpose; clause (b) is omitted in the present excerpt. Clause (c) defines “bull” as an un‑castrated male animal older than three years that belongs to the species of bovine cattle. Clause (d) defines “bullock” as a castrated male animal older than three years belonging to the species specified in clause (e). Clause (e) defines “calf” as either a female or a male—whether castrated or un‑castrated—of three years of age or younger, belonging to the species specified in clause (c). Clause (f) is omitted. Clause (g) defines “cow” as a female animal older than three years belonging to the species specified in clause (e). Section 3, which is the principal provision relevant to the Bihar petitions, reads: “Prohibition of slaughter of cow, calf, bull or bullock. Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force or in any usage or custom to the contrary, no person shall slaughter a cow, the calf of a cow, a bull or a bullock; provided that the State Government may, by general or special order and subject to such conditions as it may think fit to impose, allow the slaughter of any such animal for any medicinal or research purposes.” Section 4 prescribes penalties for the contravention, attempted contravention, or abetment of contravention of any of the provisions of Section 3. The remaining provisions contained in the subsequent three chapters are not material for the present purpose. It is observed that the terms “bull,” “bullock,” “calf,” and “cow” have been defined in clauses (c), (d), (e) and (g) of Section 2 as belonging to the species of bovine cattle. The expression “species of bovine cattle” is sufficiently broad to include, in ordinary usage, buffaloes—whether male, female, adult or calf. Consequently, the corresponding categories of buffaloes—namely buffalo bulls, buffalo bullocks, buffalo calves and she‑buffaloes—must be regarded as falling within the four defined categories of the species of bovine cattle and therefore within the prohibition embodied in Section 3 of the Act. It must be noted, however, that the allegations made in the petitions and the affidavits filed in opposition are based on the assumption that buffaloes, in any gender or age, were not covered by the protection of the section. When counsel for the petitioners was directed to the reference to “species of bovine cattle” in each of the four definitions, they attempted to sustain their view by arguing that if buffaloes were to be included within the words defined in clauses (c), (d), (e) and (g), then there would be no need to specify buffaloes separately in the definition of “animal” in clause (a). This line of argument is regarded as untenable, for on the same reasoning it would have been unnecessary to specify “heifer” separately in the definition of “animal.”

In this passage the Court examined the meaning of the term “animal” as used in the definition and explained the consequences of interpreting it in a narrow way. It held that if a heifer were not to be included in the definition of “cow” on the ground that the word “heifer” is separately enumerated in the definition of “animal”, an astonishing result would follow. That result would be that the operative part of section 3, which bans the slaughter of cows, would not forbid the slaughter of a heifer at all, a consequence that could not possibly have been intended by the legislature. The Court observed that the obvious reason for listing the different categories of animals in the definition of “animal” was to provide a word of wide import so that every provision that uses the broader word “animal” could be applied to each of the categories contained within that term. Accordingly, if the intention of the Bihar legislature had been to exclude buffaloes—whether male or female adults or calves—from the protection afforded by section 3, the legislation would have failed to fulfil that intention.

The Court then turned to the Uttar Pradesh Act, which is titled “An Act to prohibit the slaughter of COW and its progeny in Uttar Pradesh”. The preamble to the Act declares the expediency of prohibiting and preventing the slaughter of cow and its progeny in Uttar Pradesh. Although the Act was enacted under entry 15 of List I of the Constitution and presumably under the directive contained in article 48, nowhere in the Act is there any express reference to the “preservation, protection or improvement of stock”. Section 2 defines “beef” as meaning the flesh of a cow but expressly excludes the flesh of a cow that is contained in sealed containers and imported as such into Uttar Pradesh. Clause (b) of the same section is crucial because it defines “cow” to include a bull, a bullock, a heifer, or a calf. Section 3, which is the operative provision, reads: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or any usage or custom to the contrary, no person shall slaughter or cause to be slaughtered or offer or cause to be offered for slaughter any cow in any place in Uttar Pradesh.” Two exceptions are made by section 4 for cows suffering from contagious or infectious disease or for cows that are subjected to experimentation in the interest of medical or public‑health research. Section 5 prohibits the sale or transport of beef or beef products in any form except for medicinal purposes and subject to the provisions of the exception therein mentioned. Section 6, on which counsel for the State relies, provides for the establishment, by the State Government or by any local authority as directed by the State Government, of institutions as may be necessary for taking care of uneconomic cows. Under section 7 the State Government may levy such charges or fees as may be prescribed for keeping uneconomic cows in those institutions. Section 8 provides for punishment for contravention of the provisions of sections 3, 4 and 5. Section 9 makes the offences cognisable and non‑bailable.

The judgment explained that offences created by the legislation were classified as cognisable and non‑bailable. Section 10 conferred on the State Government the authority to formulate rules necessary to give effect to the provisions of the Act. The Court observed that the Uttar Pradesh Act protected the term “cow” as defined in that statute, and that the definition expressly encompassed only bulls, bullocks, heifers and calves. The definition made no reference to the species of bovine cattle, and consequently all buffaloes—whether male or female, adult or calf—were wholly excluded from the protection offered by the Act.

The Court then turned to the historical development of the C. P. and Berar Animal Preservation Act of 1949. The original title of that legislation was “An Act to provide for preservation of certain animals by controlling the slaughter thereof,” and its preamble declared it expedient to preserve certain animals by controlling their slaughter. Section 2 of the 1949 Act defined “animal” as any animal enumerated in the schedule attached to the Act. The schedule listed six categories: (1) bulls, (2) bullocks, (3) cows, (4) calves, (5) male and female buffaloes, and (6) buffalo calves. Under Section 4, the Act initially prohibited the slaughter of any “animal” without first obtaining a certificate from the appropriate authority. At that stage, there was no outright prohibition on the slaughter of any of the categories of animals defined in the schedule.

In 1951 the C. P. and Berar Animal Preservation Act was amended by the Madhya Pradesh Act XXIII of 1951. That amendment inserted the words “by prohibiting or” into the long title and the preamble before the term “controlling,” and it added a new clause to Section 2, clause (i)(a), defining “cow” to include a female calf of a cow. Sub‑section 1 of Section 4 was also revised to read: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any usage to the contrary, no person—(a) shall slaughter a cow; or (b) shall slaughter any other animal unless he has obtained in respect of such other animal a certificate in writing signed by the executive authority and the veterinary officer for the area in which the animal is to be slaughtered that the animal is fit for slaughter.” As a result of this amendment, a total ban was placed on the slaughter of cows and female calves of a cow, while the slaughter of male calves of a cow, bulls, bullocks and buffaloes—whether adult or calf—was permitted only on production of the requisite certificate.

The Court noted that a further amendment occurred in 1956 when Act X of 1956 replaced the definition of “cow” introduced by the 1951 amendment. Clause (1)(a) of Section 2 was substituted with a new definition that described “cow” as including a male or female calf of a cow, a bull, a bullock or a heifer. Simultaneously, a new schedule was introduced, limiting the protected categories to (1) cows, (2) male and female buffaloes, and (3) buffalo calves, thereby removing the earlier broader list. In short, the position in Madhya Pradesh after the 1956 amendment was that the term “cow” carried a broader meaning, but the protection extended only to cows and buffaloes as specified in the revised schedule.

In the original C. P. and Berar Animal Preservation Act of 1949, the slaughter of every class of animal listed in the schedule could be carried out only after obtaining a certificate from the appropriate authority. The passage of the amending Act XXIII of 1951 introduced a complete prohibition on the slaughter of “cows,” which at that time meant only a female calf of a cow; the slaughter of the other animals in the schedule remained subject to the certificate requirement. Subsequently, the amending Act X of 1956 extended the total ban on “cows” to include any male or female calf of a cow, a bull, a bullock or a heifer. Under this amendment, male and female buffaloes as well as buffalo calves could still be slaughtered, but only after a certificate was issued by the authorities specified in the Act.

The amendment known as Madhya Pradesh Act X of 1956, which altered the C. P. and Berar Animal Preservation Act, received the Governor’s assent on 18 May 1956. Henceforth, the 1949 Act as amended up to 1956 was referred to as the Madhya Pradesh Act. According to the Bihar Act, the State of Bihar imposed an absolute ban on the slaughter of every category of bovine cattle. In Uttar Pradesh, the I.F.P. Act instituted a total prohibition on the slaughter of cows and all of their progeny, namely bulls, bullocks, heifers and calves, while buffaloes—whether adult males, adult females or calves—were entirely excluded from the Act’s protection. In the present‑day Madhya Pradesh, including those districts that were formerly part of Madhya Pradesh but are now within the State of Bombay yet still governed by the Madhya Pradesh law, the ban covered cows, their male and female calves, bulls, bullocks and heifers. The slaughter of buffaloes, whether adult or calf, was permitted only upon presentation of a valid certificate issued by the proper authorities named in the Act.

None of these three statutes made any exception for slaughter conducted for bona‑fide religious purposes, a departure from the provision found in the Bombay Animal Preservation Act of 1948 (Bombay LXXXI of 1948). The petitioners were Indian citizens, identified as Muslims belonging predominantly to the Quraishi community, and were principally engaged in the butchery trade and its ancillary activities such as the supply of hides, tannery work, glue making, gut processing and the de‑hydration of blood. Those who practiced the butchery trade were referred to as Kasais, and the petitioners asserted that they slaughtered only cattle, not sheep or goats, which were handled by other persons known locally as Chicks. Counsel representing the petitioners questioned the constitutional…

In the matter before the Court, the petitioners challenged the validity of the statutes applicable to them on three separate bases, contending that the statutes infringed the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 25 of the Constitution. Counsel representing the respondent States, in response, urged the Court to uphold their statutes and sought to dismantle the arguments presented by the petitioners’ counsel. Several organisations—including the Bharat Go‑Sevak Samaj, the All India Anti‑Cow‑Slaughter Movement Committee, the Sarvadeshik Arya Pratinidhi Sabha and the M.P. Gorakshan Sangh—filed petitions requesting permission to intervene in the proceedings. According to Order XLI, Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, a party may intervene only if it is the Attorney‑General of India or an Advocate‑General of a State; the Rules contain no explicit provision permitting any other third party to intervene. Nevertheless, the Court has, on occasion, exercised its inherent powers to admit a third party as an intervenor when that party is already involved in related proceedings before this Court or a High Court and the resolution of the present case would affect its interests. In the present situation the organisations seeking to intervene were not parties to any existing litigation, and the Court therefore found it inappropriate to allow them formal intervention. However, recognizing the significance of the questions raised, the Court appointed Pandit Thakurdas Bhargava, who had been instructed by one of the would‑be intervenors, to appear as amicus curiae. The Court expressed sincere appreciation to all counsel who appeared for the parties and to Pandit Bhargava for the valuable assistance he rendered. Before the Court could consider the alleged violation of the petitioners’ fundamental rights, it deemed it necessary to resolve a preliminary issue raised by the amicus. The Court recalled that the statutes under challenge were enacted by the States in fulfilment of the duty imposed by Article 48 to organise agriculture and animal husbandry, to preserve and improve breeds, and to prohibit the slaughter of certain specified animals. Although the directive principles of State policy are not enforceable by any court, they are nevertheless regarded as fundamental guides for governance, and the State is obligated to give effect to them. Consequently, counsel for the States argued that because the statutes were enacted to meet this constitutional duty, the fundamental rights contained in Chapter III should be regarded as subordinate to these statutes, and that the directive principles, being equally or more fundamental, ought to prevail. The Court was unable to accept this reasoning. Article 13(2) of the Constitution expressly prohibits the State from making any law that takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Chapter III. Accordingly, the Court held that the directive principles cannot override this categorical limitation on the legislative power of the State.

A harmonious construction of the Constitution requires that the State implement the directive principles of State policy, but it must do so without enacting legislation that removes or diminishes the fundamental rights guaranteed in Chapter III, lest those protections become “a mere rope of sand.” The Court previously observed in State of Madras v. Smt. Champakam Dorairajan that “the directive principles of State policy have to conform to and run as subsidiary to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights.” Turning to the petitioners’ claim that their fundamental rights have been infringed, the Court first examined the grievance based on Article 25(1). That provision reads: “Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.” After noting that Article 25(2) contains certain exceptions that are not relevant to the present issue, the Court referred to the explanation given in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. The State of Bombay, where the scope of Article 25 was described as follows: every person has a constitutional right not only to hold religious beliefs approved by his conscience but also to express those beliefs through outward acts endorsed by his religion and to propagate his religious views for the benefit of others, whether the propagation is undertaken personally or on behalf of any religious institution. The free exercise of religion, understood as the performance of external acts in accordance with religious belief, remains subject to State regulation aimed at preserving public order, health and morals. The Court then asked what material had been placed before it to support the assertion that Islam requires or permits the sacrifice of a cow. The material on record was found to be extremely scant, and the Court noted the surprising vagueness of the petition’s allegations on such a specific point. In Bihar Petition No. 58 of 1956 the petitioners advanced the following unelaborated claim: that the impugned legislative section violates the petitioners’ fundamental rights under Article 25 because, on the occasion of their Bakr Id day, it is a religious practice of their community to sacrifice a cow. They further stated that poorer members of the community typically sacrifice one cow for every seven members, whereas sacrificing a sheep or a goat for each individual would entail considerably greater expense. As a

Because of the complete prohibition created by the impugned statutory provision, the petitioners would be prevented from performing the sacrifice that they describe as a practice and custom of their faith, a practice that they assert is commanded by the Holy Qur’an, has been observed by Muslims in India since time immemorial, and is recognised as such in the country. The allegations contained in the other petitions are of the same character. The respondents countered these claims with a succinct denial recorded in paragraph twenty‑one of their affidavit in opposition. No affidavit was presented by any person possessing special competence to explain the relevant doctrines of Islam. The petition did not cite any specific surah of the Holy Qur’an that obligates the sacrifice of a cow. During the hearing the counsel for the petitioners referred only to Surah twenty‑two, verses twenty‑eight and thirty‑three, and to Surah twenty‑two in general. The Holy Book, as quoted, commands that people should pray to the Lord and make a sacrifice. No affidavit from any Maulana was placed before the Court to interpret those verses or to illuminate the issue. However, the Court noted that Hamilton’s translation of the Hedaya, Book forty‑three, page five hundred ninety‑two, states that every free Muslim who has reached maturity is duty‑bound to offer a sacrifice on the Eid al‑Kurbān, provided he possesses the nisab and is not a traveler. The translation further explains that a single individual is to offer a goat, while a group of seven may offer a cow or a camel. Consequently, a Muslim may elect to sacrifice a goat for one person or a cow or a camel for seven persons. The translation makes clear that sacrificing a cow is not obligatory; the existence of an option contradicts the notion of a compulsory duty. The Court also observed that an individual with six family members might be able to afford a cow but could not afford seven goats, indicating that economic considerations may compel the choice of a cow, although no religious compulsion exists. It was additionally pointed out that, historically, Indian Muslims have been sacrificing cows; even if the practice is not strictly mandated, it is certainly sanctioned by their religion and constitutes a religious practice protected by Article twenty‑five. While the petitioners maintain that cow sacrifice is essential, the State disputes the existence of an obligatory religious requirement. The respondents highlighted a factual reality that cannot be denied: many Muslims do not sacrifice a cow on Bakr‑Id day. Historical records show that the Mughal emperor Babur recognized the prudence of prohibiting cow slaughter for religious purposes and instructed his son Humayun to follow this policy. It is also said that subsequent emperors Akbar, Jehangir and Ahmad Shah continued the prohibition of cow slaughter, and that Nawab Hyder Ali of Mysore declared cow slaughter an offence.

The Court observed that, under the law in question, the prescribed punishment for the offence involved the cutting off of the offenders’ hands. It noted that three members of the Gosamvardhan Enquiry Committee, which had been established by the Uttar Pradesh Government in 1953, were Muslims and that they had unanimously recommended a total prohibition on the slaughter of cows. Nevertheless, the Court held that there was no material placed before it that could establish, in view of the foregoing facts, that the sacrifice of a cow on the specified day constituted an obligatory public act for a Muslim to manifest his religious belief. Accordingly, the Court found it impossible to uphold the petitioners’ claim on this basis. The petitioners’ next grievance concerned an alleged denial of equal protection of the law. They asserted that they were Muslims by religion and butchers (Kasais) by occupation, engaged in the trade of selling beef. The Court noted that the impugned statutes affected only Muslim Kasais who killed cattle, while they left untouched other butchers who slaughtered goats and sheep and who dealt in goat meat and mutton. From this, the Court concluded that the statutes singled out Muslim Kasais, who slaughtered only cattle and not sheep or goats, for hostile and discriminatory treatment. The petitioners further complained that the Uttar Pradesh Act distinguished between butchers who killed cattle and those who killed buffaloes, and that the Madhya Pradesh Act made a similar distinction by permitting the slaughter of buffaloes, subject to a certificate, while completely prohibiting the slaughter of cows, bulls, bullocks and calves. On these premises, the petitioners contended that such discrimination violated the protective provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court recalled that the meaning, scope and effect of Article 14, the equal‑protection clause, had been explained in a series of decisions beginning with Chiranjitlal Choudhury v. The Union of India (1) and most recently Ram Krishna Dalmia and others v. S. R. Tendolkar (2). It reiterated the well‑settled principle that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not prohibit reasonable classification for legislative purposes. For a classification to be permissible, two conditions must be satisfied: first, the classification must rest on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes the persons or things placed in one group from those excluded; second, that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. The Court observed that classifications may be based on various grounds such as geography, objects, occupations or similar criteria, but there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the purpose of the Act. Finally, the Court highlighted that its pronouncements consistently maintain a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of legislative enactments.

The Court explained that the party challenging a law bears the responsibility of demonstrating a clear breach of constitutional principles. It emphasized that courts must begin with the assumption that the legislature comprehends and appropriately addresses the needs of its populace, that legislative enactments respond to problems evident from experience, and that any distinctions made by the legislature rest on satisfactory grounds. The Court noted that the legislature may recognise varying degrees of harm and may limit its restrictions to situations where the necessity is most evident. To preserve the presumption of constitutionality, the Court may consider widely known facts, commonly reported information, the historical context of the period, and any conceivable state of affairs existing when the legislation was enacted. Accordingly, the Court turned to examine the statutes that were under challenge in light of the principles previously articulated. It recalled that the statutes had been enacted by the individual States to fulfil the obligations imposed by Article 48 of the Constitution. In order to give effect to the directive principles, the respective legislatures enacted the statutes under the authority provided by Article 246 read with entry 15 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. Consequently, the purpose of the statutes was clearly to preserve, protect and improve livestock. The Court observed that cows, bulls, bullocks and calves constitute the most important cattle for the nation’s agricultural economy. Female buffaloes, while productive of a large volume of milk, receive comparatively less protection because they are already well‑cared for, whereas cows that yield relatively little milk merit greater protection. Male buffaloes used for draught purposes are not as valuable as bullocks. Sheep and goats produce only modest amounts of milk and have little utility as draught animals. Because these various categories of animals differ in their usefulness to society, they can be classified into separate groups. Likewise, the butchers who slaughter each category can be placed in distinct classes according to the impact of their occupations on society. The Court pointed out that, based on the petitioners’ own allegations, the butchers who kill cattle form a well‑defined class based on their trade. This classification rests on an intelligible differentia that separates them from those who kill goats and sheep, and this differentia is closely linked to the objective of the statutes, namely the preservation, protection and improvement of livestock. The Court reasoned that achieving these objectives may legitimately require that cattle slaughterers be dealt with more stringently than slaughterers of goats or sheep, and therefore the statutes had adopted a classification that satisfied the constitutional test.

In this case the Court observed that the classification adopted by the legislature was based on a sound and intelligible principle and therefore satisfied the test laid down by earlier decisions of this Court. The Court noted that, even if there were arguments challenging the validity of the impugned Acts, the allegation that the Acts denied equal protection of the laws did not appear, at first glance, to be a viable ground of attack. Keeping in mind the presumption of constitutionality that attaches to every statute, and accepting the Court’s finding that the legislature is in a position to appreciate the needs of the people it serves, the Court concluded that the petitioners had failed to discharge the burden of proof placed upon them. Accordingly, the petitioners’ challenge under Article 14 could not succeed. The counsel for the petitioners then turned to a final argument based on Article 19(1)(g). The counsel for the respondents responded by stating that Article 19(1)(g) can affect only a law that directly infringes the freedom of trade, business or profession guaranteed by that provision. The Court reminded that the impugned Acts were enacted to give effect to the directive principles in Article 48 and to exercise the power conferred by entry 15 of List II of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the sole objective of those Acts was to ensure the preservation, protection and improvement of livestock, and that the true aim of the legislation was not to deprive any person of the rights guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g). At most, the Acts might affect those rights indirectly and incidentally, but such an incidental impact could not change the essential character and purpose of the statutes. To support this view, the Court relied on observations made by Chief Justice Kania in A. K. Gopalan v. State, where it was held that a statute which directly attempts to control speech, expression or peaceful assembly must be examined under the saving clause of Article 19, whereas a statute that does not directly deal with those freedoms, even if it results in a restriction through another law such as a preventive detention law, does not attract the protection of Article 19. The Court noted that the true test is the directness of the legislation, not the consequences that may follow from its operation. The Court further observed that the same reasoning had been reaffirmed in Ram Singh v. State of Delhi, and that those earlier cases must be read in the factual context in which they arose, namely orders issued under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, and the provisions of Article 22 relating to preventive detention.

The Constitution, in Chapter III, acknowledges that preventive detention may be required, however undesirable it might appear. The legislation that authorized the detention orders in the earlier cases was intended to stop the individuals concerned from acting in any way that could be prejudicial to any of the three important matters specified in the Act. By executing those orders, the State deprived the affected persons of their liberty in accordance with a procedure established by law. Because preventive detention, like punitive detention, removes personal liberty, those persons were unable to invoke the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) to (e) and (g), which are rights of free persons. Consequently, the primary and direct purpose of the Preventive Detention Act 1950, being among other things to safeguard the security of the State and to maintain law and order, was held to affect fundamental rights only indirectly, and therefore the Act could not be challenged on the ground of violating Article 19(1). The matters presently before the Court differ fundamentally from those earlier cases. The final provision of the directive principles contained in Article 48 obliges the State to take measures for prohibiting the slaughter of certain animals, and such a directive can be effected only by forbidding the petitioners and other butchers (Kasais) from performing the slaughter. There can be no doubt that these statutes impact the petitioners and other butchers directly and immediately once they are in force. The title of the Uttar Pradesh Act (1) [1951] 1 S.C.R. 451, 456‑457 makes no effort to conceal the direct effect it has on butchers in Uttar Pradesh. The submission of counsel for the respondents on this point was rejected, and the alleged breach of Article 19(1)(g) was required to be examined on its merits. The petitioners contend that, under Article 19(1)(g), the impugned statutes, if enforced, would force them to shut down their businesses at once, effectively denying them the right to pursue their occupation, trade or business, despite the mandatory guarantee in Article 19(1)(g). They elaborate that a cattle butcher’s livelihood depends on several factors. First, the butcher must acquire the cattle he intends to slaughter. Statistics show that a very large number of cattle are slaughtered for food each year. According to Table 11 on page 24 of the Report on the Marketing of Cattle in India, 1,893,000 heads of cattle and 609,000 buffaloes were slaughtered in the year 1948. If one assumes that seven goats are equivalent in flesh to a cow or buffalo, butchers who slaughter 2,502,000 bovine animals would need to obtain seven times that quantity of goats or sheep, meaning they would have to source approximately 1,751,400,000 goats and sheep annually.

In this matter, the petitioners contended that the statutes being challenged would force them to shut down their trade entirely and would therefore amount to a total denial of their right under Article 19 (1) (g) to pursue any occupation, trade or business. They explained that the livelihood of a cattle butcher depends on several inter‑related factors. First, the butcher must purchase the cattle that he intends to slaughter. Official statistics show that in 1948 a total of 1,893,000 cattle and 609,000 buffaloes were slaughtered in India. If the butchers were required to replace the flesh of those 2,502,000 bovines with an equivalent amount of goat or sheep meat, they would need to obtain an additional 1,75,14,000 goats and sheep each year, a quantity the petitioners claimed does not exist in India. The petitioners further argued that they would then have to find buyers for this enormous volume of goat meat or mutton, whose price, according to the figures given on page 12 of the Expert Committee Report, is considerably higher than the price of beef. They maintained that poorer consumers could occasionally afford beef, but that goat meat or mutton would be beyond their purchasing power, and consequently there would be no market for such a large supply. As a result, the butchers would be compelled to reduce the number of goats and sheep they slaughter, which would drive their income down to a negligible level.

The petitioners also pointed out the problem of disposing of the skins and guts of the additional goats and sheep. Unlike the hides of cows and buffaloes, which find ready uses in the manufacture of boots, shoes, suitcases, belts and other leather goods, the skins of goats and sheep, they argued, have little commercial value for similar purposes. The same difficulty, they said, applies to the intestines and other offal. From these observations, the petitioners concluded that a complete prohibition on the slaughter of all bovine cattle would inevitably result in a total ban on the butchers’ (kasais’) occupation. They acknowledged that Clause 6 of Article 19 permits the State to impose reasonable restrictions in the public interest, but contended that such restrictions cannot extend to an absolute prohibition. They referenced earlier decisions of this Court to support the view that the State may regulate a trade but may not annihilate it.

In response, counsel for the respondents argued that the ordinary meaning of the word “butcher” is “a person who slaughters animals for food, a dealer in meat.” They noted that the term is part of the familiar phrase “the butcher, the baker, the candlestick‑maker” and that, in common usage today, it does not refer to any particular species of animal. Accordingly, the respondents maintained that the statutes in question do not totally stop the petitioners’ business because the butchers may continue to slaughter other animals for meat. To illustrate this point, they drew an analogy with merchants who deal in piece‑goods. Some such merchants import foreign fabrics, while others sell domestically produced cloth. If, in the interest of protecting the indigenous textile industry, the State were to prohibit the import of foreign cloth, the respondents argued, this would not prevent any merchant from remaining a piece‑goods dealer, as they could continue to trade in Indian‑made textiles. Thus, they submitted, a restriction that changes the source of material does not amount to a total prohibition of the occupation, and therefore the impugned Acts do not violate Article 19 (1) (g).

The counsel for the respondents illustrated their argument by describing the trade of piece‑goods merchants, noting that such merchants may deal in long cloth or in various other kinds of piece‑goods. They explained that, although all of these traders were classified as piece‑goods merchants, some might import foreign fabrics while others dealt exclusively in domestically produced cloth. The counsel then posited a hypothetical situation in which, for the purpose of protecting the indigenous textile industry and the general public, the State decided to prohibit the import of foreign cloth altogether. They argued that this prohibition would not prevent any cloth merchant from continuing his trade, because the merchant could still sell cloth and piece‑goods that were manufactured in India. Consequently, they questioned whether a piece‑goods merchant whose business consisted solely of importing foreign fabrics could claim that a total ban on such imports entirely eliminated his right to carry on his trade, thereby violating his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g). The counsel asked where such reasoning would lead. Continuing the illustration, they suggested another scenario in which the State stopped the import of one particular variety of piece‑goods, for example saris, while allowing the import of dhotis and all other varieties. They argued that, on a reasoning similar to the previous example, a dealer who imported only the prohibited variety could not claim that his entire business had been stopped. The counsel further proposed a situation where, in the interest of Khadi and cottage industries, the State imposed a ban on the manufacture or sale of cloth of a very fine count. They asked whether a merchant dealing exclusively in such fine cloth could assert that the ban completely prohibited the carrying on of his business. The respondents submitted that the ban on foreign cloth imports or on the manufacture of very fine cloth was merely a restriction on the piece‑goods trade, affecting one or more segments of the business while leaving other segments untouched. Thus, they maintained, only a partial restriction was imposed, not a total prohibition, because merchants could continue dealing in other kinds of piece‑goods. They drew a parallel with the butchers’ trade, observing that the business also comprised several segments. A ban on one segment, such as the slaughter of cattle or buffaloes, might entirely prohibit that segment, but in the broader context of the butchers’ occupation the ban functioned only as a restriction. Finally, the counsel argued that a dealer in hides could not complain that a ban on the slaughter of cattle and buffaloes prevented him from carrying on his business as a hide merchant, because he could still trade in fallen hides. They supported this point by citing statistics from the Report of Marketing of Hides in India, Second Edition, page 9, which showed that fallen hides constituted 8.8 percent of the total cattle population, whereas slaughtered hides accounted for only 1.4 percent. The same line of reasoning, they said, applied to gut merchants and other dealers in subsidiary articles.

The Court observed that the statistical report on hide marketing showed that the proportion of fallen hides to the total cattle population was eight point eight percent, whereas the proportion of slaughtered hides to the total cattle population was only one point four percent. The same line of argument had been raised with respect to merchants dealing in animal guts and other subsidiary articles. The Court stated that it was unnecessary to elaborate on or to give an opinion on the opposing contentions when they were presented as abstract propositions. Instead, the matter had to be examined objectively by looking at what the statutes actually provided. In Uttar Pradesh, the petitioners were permitted to slaughter buffaloes of any sex or age, including calves, and to sell the meat for human consumption. They were also allowed to slaughter goats and sheep and sell that meat. Consequently, for the butchers of Uttar Pradesh there was no complete prohibition of their trade; the law only imposed certain limitations on the part of their occupation that involved the slaughter of cows, bulls, bullocks and calves of cows. In Madhya Pradesh, the relevant Act absolutely forbade the slaughter of cows, including bulls and bullocks, but it allowed the slaughter of buffaloes of any sex or age subject to specific conditions. Accordingly, even in Madhya Pradesh the legislation did not entirely prohibit the business of a butcher.

In Bihar, the Court noted that the legislation imposed an unequivocal ban on the slaughter of all animals belonging to the bovine species, which included buffaloes of any sex or age. Nevertheless, the butchers of Bihar were still authorised to slaughter goats and sheep and to sell goat meat and mutton for consumption. The Court held that the total ban on the slaughter of bulls, bullocks and buffaloes, irrespective of their age or utility, was not a reasonable restriction imposed on the butchers in the interest of the general public; therefore, the ban was void. As a result, even in Bihar there could be no complete prohibition of the butchers’ right to practise their occupation. The Court clarified that it was not required to give a final opinion on the difficult question of whether restrictions permissible under clause six of Article nineteen might extend to an absolute prohibition. That question had been left open by earlier decisions in Saghir Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh and The State of Bombay v. R. M. D. Chamarbaugwala. Given the factual matrix and the construction of the various Acts, the Court found that answering that broader issue was unnecessary for disposing of the present petitions. The precise issue for determination was whether the restrictions embodied in the statutes were reasonable in the interests of the general public, a question that falls within clause six of Article nineteen, which safeguards laws that impose reasonable restrictions on the right guaranteed by sub‑clause g of clause one of Article nineteen.

In the matter before it, the Court explained that it was required to decide whether the restrictions imposed by the law were reasonable. The Court stated that it could not base its assessment on a vague, general idea of reasonableness or on how the restriction might feel to the individual who was affected. The right guaranteed by sub‑clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 was expressed in broad terms, and without the qualifying provision of clause (6) that right would have been absolute. Consequently, any limitation would appear burdensome and could be viewed by the individual as unreasonable, but the Court could not resolve the issue on that perception alone. Instead, the Court had to examine whether the restrictions served the interests of the general public.

The Court referred to the judgment in State of Madras v. V. O. Row, which laid down the test of reasonableness. That test required the Court to apply the standard of reasonableness separately to each statute that was challenged, and it warned that no single abstract rule could be applied universally. The Court listed the factors that must be considered: the character of the alleged right, the purpose behind the restriction, the seriousness and immediacy of the evil the restriction intended to remedy, the degree of disproportion created by the restriction, and the prevailing circumstances at the relevant time. While assessing these elusive factors, the Court acknowledged that the judges’ social philosophy and value system would inevitably influence the judgment. Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that judicial interference with legislative judgment should be guided by a sense of responsibility, restraint, and the understanding that the Constitution serves all citizens, not merely those who share the judges’ viewpoint. The Court also noted that elected representatives, when authorising the restrictions, had already judged them to be reasonable.

The Court observed that later decisions, such as State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose and Ebrahim Vazir Mavat v. State of Bombay, had adopted the same observations. Additionally, the Court recalled Mahajan J’s remark in State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraj Sir Kameshwar Singh of Dharbangha, which held that the legislature is best placed to decide what benefits the community, since it derives its authority from the people’s suffrage. While that perspective should guide the Court, the ultimate responsibility for determining the validity of any law remained with the judiciary, and the Court must not abandon that constitutional duty.

The judgment observed that the judiciary must not shirk the solemn duty imposed by the Constitution. Accordingly, the matter before the Court had to be examined in accordance with the principles previously articulated by this Court. The stated purpose of each of the statutes under challenge was to secure the preservation, protection and improvement of the cow and its offspring. This concern arose from an appreciation of the utility of cattle in a predominantly agricultural society. The Court noted that early Aryans recognised the importance of cattle as one of the most indispensable adjuncts of agriculture. It appeared that in Vedic times animal flesh formed the staple food of the people, a circumstance attributed to the extremely cold climate of that distant past and to the fact that the Vedic Aryans had originally been a pastoral community before they settled as agriculturists. The judgment recorded that in Rig Vedic times goats, sheep, cows, buffaloes and even horses were slaughtered for food and for religious sacrifice, and that their flesh was offered to the Gods. It cited the Rig Veda (VIII. 43, 11), wherein Agni is described as the “eater of ox or cow.” It also referred to the Satapatha Brahmana (111.4.1‑2), which enjoins the staying of a great ox (Mahoksa) or a “great goat” (Mahaja) for the entertainment of a distinguished guest. The judgment further mentioned that Yagnavalkya expressed a similar view in Vaj 1.109. For additional historical perspective, the Court pointed to the account given in Rg. Vedic Culture by Dr. A. C. Das, chapter 5, pages 203‑205, and to the discussion in History of Dharmasastras (Vol. II‑Part II) by P. V. Kane, pages 772‑773.

Although the custom of slaughtering cows and bulls prevailed during the Vedic period, the Court observed that even in Rig Vedic times a growing revulsion against such slaughter seemed to have emerged. The cow gradually acquired a special sanctity and was termed “Aghnya” (not to be slain). A school of thinkers among the Rishis is said to have opposed the killing of such useful animals as the cow and the bull. The judgment highlighted that high praise was bestowed on the cow in several verses of the Rig Veda, for example in Book VI, Hymn XXVIII (Cows) attributed to Sage Bhardvaja. Selected verses were quoted: “The kine have come and brought good fortune; let them rest in the cow‑pen and be happy near us. Here let them stay prolific, many‑coloured, and yield through many mornings their milk for Indra.” Another verse praised the cows for fattening even the worn and wasted and for making the unlovely beautiful, and for prospering the household with auspicious voices. A further verse urged cows to crop good pasturages, drink pure sweet water, and to avoid becoming the objects of thieves or sinful men, seeking protection from the dart of Rudra. The translation of these verses was provided by Ralph Griffith. The Court then referred to Verse 29 of Hymn 1 in Book X of the Atharva Veda, which forbids the slaughter of an innocent cow, and to Hymn 10 of the same book, which glorifies the cow as heaven, earth and Vishnu, the lord of life. The Court cited P. V. Kane’s argument that in Rig Vedic times only barren cows, if any, were killed for sacrifice, while milch cows were deemed unfit for killing, thereby reconciling the apparent conflict between the practice of slaughter and the high reverence accorded to the cow.

In the verses cited, the text records that “The slaughter of an innocent, O Kritya, is an awful deed, Slay not cow, horse, or man of ours.” (Verse 29). It further notes that Hymn 10 of the same book lavishly praises the cow: “The cow is Heaven, the cow is Earth, the cow is Vishnu, Lord of life, The Sadhyas and the Vasus have drunk the outpourings of the cow” (Verse 30) and adds, “Both Gods and mortal men depend for life and being on the cow. She hath become this universe; all that the sun surveys is she” (Verse 34). P. V. Kane is quoted as observing that during the Rig‑Vedic period only barren cows, if any, were killed for sacrifice or meat, while milking cows were considered unsuitable for killing. According to him, this practice explains how the apparently contradictory customs of killing cows for food and the high reverence accorded to cows in the Rig‑Vedic era can be reconciled. The narration continues that opposition to cow slaughter grew in volume and eventually led to the complete abolition of the custom in a later age. It suggests that a changing climate may have rendered beef consumption unnecessary and even harmful to health. Over time, the cow acquired the status of a wealth indicator. The Neolithic Aryans, unfamiliar with metal tools, did not use coins; as a pastoral people, almost every family possessed a sufficient number of cattle and sometimes exchanged them for essential goods. Consequently, the value of cattle (Pasu) was very great among early Rig‑Vedic Aryans. The passage also notes that ancient Romans used the term “pecus” or “pecu” (cattle) to mean wealth or money, and that the English words “pecuniary” and “impecunious” derive from the same Latin root. Ownership of cattle therefore signified wealth, and a person’s richness was judged by the number of cattle owned. The Ramayana is cited to illustrate that King Janaka’s wealth was described in reference to his large herds. Gradually, the cow was elevated to a divine status. Kautilya’s Arthashastra contains a special chapter (Chapter XXIX) on the “superintendent of cows,” and the duties of cow owners are also mentioned in Chapter XI of Hindu Law, as recorded by Ganga Nath Jha. The text affirms that Hindus, in general, revere the cow highly, and the idea of slaughtering cows for food is abhorrent to their sensibilities, a sentiment that has at times sparked communal riots. It further observes that, following the recent partition of the country, agitation against cow slaughter has intensified.

The Court observed that, although a constitutional issue cannot be resolved solely on the basis of public sentiment, the intensity of feeling must nevertheless be taken into account as one factor among many when assessing the reasonableness of any restriction. It noted that cattle in India serve three principal purposes: the production of milk for food, the provision of bulls for draught work, and the supply of manure for agriculture. The Court then turned to the statistical evidence presented for each of these functions. According to the 1951 census, the nation possessed fifteen crore sixty lakh heads of cattle and four crore buffaloes, giving a combined total of roughly nineteen crore sixty lakh, or approximately twenty crore bovine animals. The density of cattle and buffaloes was reported as one hundred twenty‑three heads per square mile, or forty‑three heads for every one hundred persons. The state‑wise figures indicated that Bihar contained one crore fifty‑two lakh ninety‑seven thousand cattle and thirty‑three lakh sixteen thousand buffaloes; Madhya Pradesh had one crore forty‑eight lakh fifty‑eight thousand cattle and twenty‑six lakh buffaloes; and Uttar Pradesh recorded two crore thirty‑five lakh thirteen thousand cattle together with ninety‑two lakh fifty thousand buffaloes. The Court listed the distribution of these animals by age, sex and functional use, showing that among males there were six lakh fifty‑two thousand breeding bulls, five lakh eighty‑eight thousand one hundred eighty thousand working bullocks, twenty‑seven lakh thirty‑five thousand bulls and bullocks over three years old that were no longer useful for breeding or work, ninety‑seven lakh sixty‑three thousand young stock under one year, and one crore twenty‑two lakh fifty‑seven thousand young stock between one and three years old, amounting to a total of eight crore forty‑two lakh twenty‑five thousand male cattle. For buffaloes, the corresponding figures were three lakh six thousand breeding bulls, sixty lakh thirty‑six thousand working bullocks, four lakh sixty‑six thousand useless bulls and bullocks, twenty‑eight lakh sixty‑three thousand young stock under one year, and twenty‑three lakh eighty‑four thousand young stock aged one to three years, giving a total of one crore twenty lakh two thousand buffaloes. Among females, the records showed four crore sixty‑seven lakh twenty‑three thousand breeding cows, two crore ten lakh eight thousand cows over three years old used for work, twenty‑three lakh seventeen thousand cows over three years that were no longer useful, twelve lakh two thousand useless cows, ninety‑three lakh five thousand young stock over one year, and one crore twenty‑five lakh forty‑four thousand young stock aged one to three years, totalling seven crore twenty lakh ninety‑one thousand female cattle. Buffalo females numbered three crore thirteen lakh forty‑two thousand, bringing the grand total of cattle to fifteen crore sixty‑three lakh sixteen thousand and of buffaloes to four crore thirty‑three lakh forty‑four thousand.

The Court further cited the Report on the Marketing of Cattle in India (1956) issued by the Directorate of Marketing and Inspection, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, which indicated that males comprised slightly more than half of the total cattle population, whereas females formed about three‑quarters of the buffalo population. It explained that, for agricultural work, male cattle are generally preferred because of their relative lightness and vigor. The report identified thirty‑nine lakh fifty‑seven thousand unserviceable cattle nationwide, of which five lakh thirty‑five thousand were in Bihar, one lakh fifty‑five thousand in Madhya Pradesh and one lakh eighty‑four thousand in Uttar Pradesh. Unserviceable buffaloes numbered seven lakh eighty‑one thousand, with one lakh twenty thousand located in Bihar, fifteen thousand in Madhya Pradesh and twenty‑eight thousand in Uttar Pradesh. Despite the vast numerical strength of India’s bovine resources—the largest in the world—the Court highlighted that milk production per animal was among the lowest globally. Data from the Second Five Year Plan showed that at the start of the First Five Year Plan, total milk output exceeded one crore eighty lakh tons, while the average yield per cow was only four hundred thirteen pounds. The Court noted these figures to emphasize the disparity between the country’s large cattle population and its relatively modest milk productivity.

The Court noted that the average milk yield per cow in India was about the lowest of any country in the world, comparing unfavourably with the Netherlands where the yield was eight thousand pounds, Australia seven thousand pounds, Sweden six thousand pounds and the United States five thousand pounds. It observed that she‑buffaloes contributed fifty‑four percent of the total milk yield while cows contributed only forty‑two percent. The Court recorded that buffalo milk contained a higher fat content, ranging from six to seven percent, whereas cow’s milk contained about four and a half percent fat. Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that cow’s milk was richer in other important nutrients and was more easily digestible. According to the First Five Year Plan, the average per‑capita consumption of milk and milk products was calculated at five and a half ounces, equivalent to roughly two and a half chhataks or one sixth of a seer per day, although nutrition experts recommended a daily intake of ten ounces.

The Court then referred to the 1955 publication “Facts and Figures about Bihar” issued by the Department of Public Relations, which stated that the average annual milk yield per cow was six hundred twenty pounds and per buffalo one thousand five hundred twenty‑six pounds. It further cited a memorandum prepared jointly by the Nutrition Advisory Committee of the Indian Council of Medical Research and the Animal Committee of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, which described the performance of Indian cattle, especially cows, as extremely poor. The memorandum argued that from an economic standpoint there seemed to be no justification for maintaining animals that produced two pounds of milk or less per day, and suggested that such animals might be better eliminated. However, the memorandum also warned that before adopting such a drastic measure, the consequences should be considered, because condemning animals that yielded two pounds or less would mean eliminating more than ninety percent of the existing milch cows and losing approximately seventy hundred thousand tons out of the ninety‑seven hundred thousand tons of annual gross milk production contributed by this group, in addition to a large number of bullocks they sired.

According to the table of human food requirements recommended by the Nutrition Advisory Committee, the Court recorded that ten ounces of milk per adult unit per day was necessary for a balanced diet. Using the 1951 census figure of thirty‑five crore sixty‑eight lakh total population, and assuming a continued rate of increase that would raise the number to thirty‑seven crore seventy‑six lakh by 1956, the Court calculated the adult unit population by treating children below ten years of age as thirty‑three percent of an adult value, arriving at a total of thirty‑one crore thirty lakh adult units. At the recommended rate of ten ounces of milk per adult per day, the required annual milk requirement was three crore twenty‑three lakh tons. The Court concluded that, given the large proportion of vegetarians in India, the country faced a substantial shortage of milk supply. Consequently, cows and other milch cattle were of great importance to the nation. The Court added that if milk‑yielding capacity were the sole consideration, the comparatively smaller number of female buffaloes, which produced fifty‑four percent of the nation’s total milk supply, would seemingly warrant a far greater preference over cows in the country’s agricultural policy.

The Court observed that, although buffaloes produced a larger share of the nation’s milk and might therefore have deserved a greater preference over cows, another factor weighed more heavily for human food supply. That factor was the bullock, which supplied the largest portion of the power required for agricultural production. According to the testimony of Pandit Thakurdas Bhargava, Indian farmers traditionally favored cow bullocks rather than buffalo bullocks, a habit that stemmed from long‑standing experience. As a result of this evolutionary, trial‑and‑error process, the 1951 census showed roughly ten cow bullocks for every buffalo bullock. The Court stated that if this relative distribution proved essential for crop production, the ratio would not change unless a revolutionary shift occurred in the methods and practice of land cultivation.

The Court then cited the Report on the Marketing of Cattle in India (1956, p. 22), which categorized animal use in the country under four headings: cultivation (6,54,22,000 animals), urban carting (11,80,000 animals), pack‑animal work (67,705 animals), and work in oil‑crushers and similar tasks (4,30,000 animals), together amounting to a total of 6,70,99,705 animals. By contrast, the 1951 census figures recorded 5,88,18,000 working bullocks and 60,36,000 working buffaloes, a combined total of 6,48,54,000 working bovines. Consequently, the Court calculated a shortfall of 22,45,705 bullocks—including buffaloes that represented dry cows and female buffaloes employed in agricultural labour, as shown in the Second Five‑Year Plan (pp. 281‑282). Although tractors had begun to appear, their numbers were negligible, and the Court noted that for many years the nation would continue to depend on animal power to produce enough food for a rapidly growing population.

Focusing on Uttar Pradesh, the Court noted that the 1951 census listed 2,35,12,839 heads of cattle and 92,50,488 buffaloes, giving a total bovine population of 3,27,63,327. The state’s total area was 7,22,78,809 acres, of which 4,92,30,120 acres were under cultivation. Assuming that a pair of bullocks could ordinarily till ten acres, the cultivated area would require approximately 98,46,000 bullocks. The census, however, showed about 1,15,00,000 bullocks, a slight excess for cultivation alone. The Court further referred to the First Five‑Year Plan (p. 247), which indicated that both Uttar Pradesh and Bihar possessed a surplus of roughly 40,00,000 bullocks, while Punjab and PEPSU had just enough to meet their needs. Nonetheless, when the Court accounted for additional purposes—such as carting, pack‑animal service, operation of oil‑crushers, and drawing water for irrigation—the available animal power fell short of the total requirement. The Court concluded that, in view of the necessity to enlarge cultivated area to satisfy the food demands of a fast‑growing population, the existing deficit would inevitably increase.

The Court noted that further expansion of the cultivated area would be necessary to satisfy the food requirements of a rapidly growing population, and that such expansion would increase the existing deficit of draft animals. The Court then examined the data for Bihar taken from the 1956 Facts and Figures, which recorded a total bovine population consisting of 1,15,64,310 adult cattle (cows and oxen), 37,33,166 young cattle (cows and oxen), 23,78,293 adult buffaloes and 9,37,582 young buffaloes. From these figures the Court calculated that there was approximately one working cattle or buffalo for every six acres of net cultivated area. Accordingly, the Court observed that the present stock of working animals was barely sufficient to provide the power needed for agricultural operations at the existing standard, but recognised that the demand for food was rising and that additional land would have to be brought under cultivation, which would require a substantially larger number of draft animals.

The Court further set out the national totals for breeding stock, stating that India possessed about 6,50,000 breeding bulls and 3,10,000 breeding buffaloes, together with 4,63,40,000 breeding cows and 2,09,90,000 breeding buffaloes. Referring to the First Five‑Year Plan, the Court noted that approximately 750 farm‑bred bulls of known pedigree were distributed each year by the Government to various States for the purpose of improving both draught and milch breeds, and that some privately owned bulls had also been approved. However, the Court pointed out that the private supply of bulls satisfied less than 0.15 percent of the country’s total requirement. The Report on the Marketing of Cattle in India indicated that the number of service bulls was roughly 6,52,000, representing about 0.4 percent of the total cattle population. The Court emphasized that, in the absence of a system to castrate or remove inferior bulls before a pedigree bull was introduced into an area, the progeny of pedigree bulls could feed on scrub, thereby negating the efficiency gained in the first generation. Consequently, the Court concluded that the supply of breeding bulls—both cattle and buffalo—was inadequate to meet the nation’s needs. Although artificial insemination had been introduced in some centres, the Court observed that ordinary breeding bulls would remain essential for Indian animal husbandry for many years and that a shortage of such bulls persisted.

Turning to the third utility of cattle and buffaloes, the Court cited the First Five‑Year Plan’s estimate that 80,00,00,000 tons of dung were produced annually, with half used as fuel by cultivators and the other half as manure. The Court remarked that, if reliable fuel supplies could be provided, the entire dung output could be employed as manure, but expressed doubt that cultivators would be able to afford fuel and thereby make full use of the dung for fertiliser purposes. The Court also highlighted the agricultural value of cattle urine, which contains nitrogen, phosphates and potash. In monetary terms, the Court indicated that dung and urine together accounted for a substantial portion of agricultural income in India, and cited the amicus curiae’s claim that the annual contribution of dung to the national income amounted to Rs. 63,00,00,000.

In the passage under consideration, the Court observed that the contribution of cattle dung to the national income had already been quantified. It proceeded to affirm that the preceding discussion had unmistakably demonstrated the extensive usefulness of the cow and its offspring. The Court emphasized that cows sustained the health of the nation by providing life‑giving milk, an essential component of a scientifically balanced diet. It further observed that working bullocks were indispensable to Indian agriculture because they supplied animal power more than any other creature. The Court highlighted that good breeding bulls were necessary to improve the breed, thereby enhancing the quality and stamina of future cows and working bullocks. Such improvement, the Court noted, would increase the production of both food and milk and would do so in abundant quantities. The Court added that animal dung was cheaper than artificial manures and was extremely useful for agriculture. Consequently, the Court described the cow and her progeny as the backbone of Indian agriculture, quoting Lord Linlithgow’s statement that “The cow and the working bullock have on their patient back the whole structure of Indian agriculture” (Report on the Marketing of Cattle in India, p. 20). The Court then concluded that, in order to achieve self‑sufficiency in food production and to maintain the nation’s health, the efficiency and breed of the cattle population had to be considerably improved. To meet these objectives, the Court asserted that greater attention must be given to the preservation, protection and improvement of the stock and that agriculture and animal husbandry must be organized on modern and scientific lines. Accordingly, the Court explained that it must examine the provisions of the impugned Acts to determine whether they furthered these aims or, conversely, hindered them. The Court stressed that all the considerations previously outlined had to be taken into account in the judicial verdict, and that only if the impugned Acts furthered the stated purposes could the restrictions they imposed be deemed reasonable in the interest of the general public.

The Court then turned to the opposite side of the issue. While reviewing the problem, the Court noted that the petitioners, together with a large number of similarly situated persons, were butchers (Kasais) by occupation and earned roughly Rs. 150 to Rs. 200 per month. The Court recognised that the petitioners would be seriously affected, if not entirely displaced from their occupation, by the provisions of the impugned Acts. The Court acknowledged that, for reasons previously stated, the petitioners could not claim a total deprivation of their business, yet the enactments, if upheld, would force them to make fresh arrangements for the supply of animals that were permitted to be slaughtered for food. The Court observed that, although such arrangements might be theoretically possible, in practice they were likely to cause considerable inconvenience and could generate additional expenses for the butchers. The Court further noted that hide merchants, who according to the petition had already secured up to 95 percent of their required hides from slaughtered animals, might find it difficult to obtain new sources of fallen hides; similar difficulties could arise for gut merchants. The Court concluded that the immediate effect of the Acts would be a serious dislocation of the petitioners’ businesses without any compensatory benefit. Referring to the decision in Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U. P. (1), at p. 727, the Court reiterated that reasonableness of legislation must be judged by its immediate impact, citing the example of bus operators who, despite operating under permits, received no compensation when their livelihood was affected. The Court therefore suggested that similar inconvenience could readily be presumed in the present case.

The Court observed that hide merchants who had previously been able to obtain the skins of slaughtered animals to meet up to ninety‑five percent of their requirements could now face great difficulty in arranging fresh supplies of fallen hides. The same difficulty, the Court noted, could be expected to affect those engaged in the gut trade.

The Court further held that the immediate operation of the impugned Acts would produce a serious disruption of the petitioners’ business enterprises without providing any compensatory advantage. To illustrate how the immediate impact of legislation can be a decisive factor in assessing its reasonableness, the Court cited the earlier decision in Saghir Ahmad v. State of U. P., at page 727. In that case, with reference to persons who operated passenger‑carrying buses, the Court had observed: “One thing, however, in our opinion, has a decided hearing on the question of reasonableness and that is the immediate effect which the legislation is likely to (1)[1955] 1 S.C.R. 707,724. produce. Hundreds of citizens are earning their livelihood by carrying on this business on various routes within the State of Uttar Pradesh. Although they carry on the business only with the aid of permits, which are granted to them by the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act, no compensation has been allowed to them under the Statute.” The Court reasoned that a similar inconvenience could easily be presumed to have befallen the petitioners and other persons of the same class, and that the immediate and possibly adverse impact of the challenged statutes on their occupations must be taken into account as an important element in determining the statutes’ reasonableness.

The Court also emphasized that beef and buffalo meat constitute a staple food for a large segment of the population of India, particularly in the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. It referred to Table 11 on page 24 of the Report on the Marketing of Cattle in India, which recorded that in 1948 the annual food‑type demand for livestock amounted to 1,893,000 heads of cattle and 609,000 heads of buffaloes. These figures demonstrated that the flesh of cattle and buffaloes was widely consumed. The Court noted that poorer sections of Muslims, Christians, and members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes regularly ate beef and buffalo flesh, and that there was also a modest demand for beef among foreign residents.

According to the Court, buffalo meat is comparatively coarse, tough and of lower quality, which explains why the demand for beef exceeds the demand for buffalo flesh. Moreover, the market price of buffalo flesh is estimated to be twenty to forty percent lower than that of beef. Both beef and buffalo meat are priced considerably lower than mutton or goat meat, making them affordable for poorer people, who may be able to purchase these meats only on a day or two each week. The Court cited the Expert Committee Report, which showed that in Bombay in 1938 the price per pound was Rs 0‑3‑9 for beef, Rs 0‑2‑0 for buffalo flesh, and Rs 0‑5‑6 for mutton or goat meat. By 1950, the corresponding prices had risen to Rs 0‑12‑0 for beef, Rs 0‑11‑0 for buffalo flesh, and Rs 1‑3‑0 for mutton or goat meat, illustrating the comparatively low cost of beef and buffalo meat relative to other meats.

The Court observed that the principal reason for the demand for beef and buffalo flesh was their low price, which was roughly half that of mutton or goat meat. The Court noted that habit was a secondary factor. Counsel for some of the petitioners referred to a situation in boarding houses attached to Anglo‑Indian schools, where the only meat that the authorities could afford to provide to the children was beef, and even then it was served only on one or two days a week. The Court stated that if the impugned Acts were enforced, the children would be deprived of this modest source of nourishment and amenity. The Court acknowledged that after the Partition the Muslim population had declined and that some Muslims might not habitually consume beef or buffalo flesh. Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that a large segment of the poorer sections of the Muslim, Christian and Scheduled Castes communities continued to eat beef and buffalo flesh. The Court emphasized that this consumption was not a matter of luxury but was, at least in part, a matter of necessity.

The Court referred to Table VII on page thirty‑two of the Memorandum on Human Nutrition vis‑à‑vis Animal Nutrition in India, which recommended a daily intake of one ounce of meat. The Court noted that the actual quantity available was far lower, and that under the new plan the attainable amount might be only one‑third of an ounce or a little more. Consequently, the Court reasoned that poorer people, who could barely afford fruit, milk or ghee, would be at risk of malnutrition if they were denied even a small portion of beef or buffalo flesh that might occasionally be within their reach. The Court held that this consideration must be taken into account when assessing the reasonableness of the provisions of the challenged Acts. The Court then listed the number of cattle and buffaloes deemed unfit for breeding or work, as shown in Appendices II and III to the Report on the Marketing of Cattle in India. According to the 1951 census, the total number of unserviceable male cattle was 2,735,000 and female cattle 1,202,000. In Bihar there were 293,000 male and 242,000 female unserviceable cattle; in Madhya Pradesh 124,000 male and 31,000 female; and in Uttar Pradesh 163,000 male and 21,000 female. The census also recorded 781,000 unserviceable buffaloes in the whole country, of which 466,000 were males and 315,000 females. In Bihar the numbers were 61,000 male and 59,000 female buffaloes; in Madhya Pradesh 10,000 male and 5,000 female; and in Uttar Pradesh 16,000 male and 12,000 female. The Court cited the First Five Year Plan (page 273), which reported that the Cattle Utilisation Committee estimated about ten percent of the nation’s cattle population—approximately 11,400,000 adult animals—were unserviceable or unproductive. The Report of the Cattle Preservation and Development Committee gave a similar figure, placing the proportion of old, decrepit and unproductive cattle at ten percent of the total. The Court noted that Pandit Thakurdas Bhargava did not accept the correctness of these figures.

In its analysis, the Court observed that it could not accept the accuracy of the statistical figures presented and noted the difficulty of navigating the complex array of data. It concluded that attempting to derive an exact or even approximate count of unserviceable agricultural animals would be futile. For the purposes of the present inquiry, the Court held that it was sufficient to recognise the existence of a considerable number of cattle and buffaloes that were of no use for breeding or work. This situation was succinctly summarised on page 274 of the First Five‑Year Plan, which expressly stated that there was a shortage of good milch cows and working bullocks and a surplus of useless or inefficient animals. The Court explained that the presence of a large number of such unproductive cattle amidst the healthy stock affected the agricultural economy in two principal ways. First, the surplus stock imposed a pressure on the country’s already scanty fodder and feed resources, thereby obstructing efforts to correct the deficit in animal nutrition. Referring to the Expert Committee Report on page 59, the Court reiterated that the most serious impediment to improving cattle wealth was the lack of adequate feeding resources, and that any attempt to enhance cattle condition would fail without proper nutrition. The report’s table on that page recorded a deficiency of six crore (6,00,00,000) tons, that is thirty‑three percent, of straw or Kadbi; a shortfall of ten crore forty lakh (10,40,00,000) tons, that is thirteen percent, of green fodder; and a shortage of two crore sixty‑five lakh twenty thousand (2,65,20,000) tons, that is seventy percent, of concentrates such as oil cakes, bran, oil seeds, maize, barley and gram. The Court noted that the figures for green fodder represented quantities that could be made available only if forest resources were fully tapped, and that even with full utilisation of forest resources a deficit of thirteen percent would persist. Moreover, the actual availability of green fodder was limited because it was produced principally during the monsoon months and much of it was wasted due to the absence of nationwide conservation arrangements. The Court further pointed out that Table V on page 23 of the Memorandum on Human Nutrition vis‑à‑vis Animal Nutrition in India presented estimates of requirements and present supply that were substantially consistent with those of the Expert Committee Report. Table V indicated a deficiency of six crore (6,00,00,000) tons of straw or Kadbi and one crore seventy‑eight lakh (1,78,00,000) tons of green fodder. Shortages of concentrates, including oil cakes, maize, barley, gram, cotton seed and bran, varied between eight‑lakh‑fifty thousand (8,50,000) and seventy‑one‑lakh‑seventeen thousand (71,17,000) tons. Finally, the Court referred to the estimate given in the First Five‑Year Plan on page 273, which stated that the quantity of fodder available amounted to roughly seventy‑five percent of the requirement, while the available concentrates would meet only about twenty‑eight percent of the cattle’s nutritional needs.

The report of the Gosamvardhan Enquiry Committee, which was established by the Government of Uttar Pradesh, contains several noteworthy observations. It estimates that the total cattle and buffalo population in Uttar Pradesh amounts to three hundred twenty‑seven lakh sixty‑three thousand three hundred twenty‑seven animals. The Committee first presents the scientific food requirements for this entire population based on Western standards, which it describes as relatively generous. Recognising that such requirements would be excessive for the smaller village cattle that predominate in the state, the Committee then scales the figures down to reflect an Indian standard of nutrition. The figures derived from the Indian standard are subsequently set out, and they reveal a very large discrepancy between the nutritional requirements and the quantities of feed that are actually available.

The Committee therefore introduces the concept of a “critical limit,” a reduced level of feed that might be considered the minimum acceptable standard. Even when this critical limit is applied, the available feed falls dramatically short. The shortfall between the critical‑limit requirement and the actual supply is quantified as one crore eighty lakh tonnes of dry matter, fifteen lakh tonnes of protein, and twenty‑eight crore sixty‑one lakh seventy thousand therms of energy. The Committee acknowledges that the combined herd of three crore twenty‑seven lakh sixty‑three thousand three hundred twenty‑seven heads can be represented, for feeding calculations, as approximately two crore seventy‑one lakh thirty thousand adult units. With the present availability of straw, green fodder and concentrate feeds, these adult units cannot be fully fed even on the critical‑limit standard. According to the calculations, the existing feed supply is sufficient to support only one crore fifty‑nine lakh twenty thousand adult units, leaving roughly one crore twelve lakh ten thousand units unfed.

The report further observes that, as the cattle population continues to increase—partly because better prophylactic measures against contagious diseases reduce mortality—the nutritional deficit is likely to become even more pronounced. To address this growing problem, the Committee recommends urgent action to increase fodder production on cultivated land and to utilise all marginal and sub‑marginal lands for augmenting both food and fodder resources.

Because a large proportion of the animal population does not yield adequate or timely returns to its owners, many of the animals are left to fend for themselves, subsisting on whatever scant resources the agriculturist can provide. This situation has led to a substantial percentage of uneconomical cattle, together with a rising number of stray, wild, old, diseased and otherwise unproductive animals. These old and useless animals roam freely in search of food, becoming a nuisance and a source of danger in rural areas, and they pose a menace to crop production by damaging fields. The Report of the Expert Committee, cited by the Gosamvardhan Committee, noted similar hazards in the PEPSU region, where slaughter of such animals is completely prohibited. The presence of a large number of old and useless animals also adversely affects the quality of the breed, fostering a tendency for the population to multiply and produce progeny of inferior quality, which in turn can harm milk production and bullock power.

In the discussion, the Court observed that the unchecked growth of the cattle population would inevitably produce offspring of a very inferior quality, which would detrimentally affect both milk production and the availability of bullocks for power. The Court emphasized that it was essential to separate surplus cattle from the healthy and robust animals, and that a total prohibition on the slaughter of cattle and buffaloes would only aggravate the existing problem. The Court referred to the report of the Cattle Preservation and Development Committee, which had been established by the Government of India in 1948. That report, at page 47, recommended a comprehensive scheme for creating cattle concentration camps for old and useless cattle, a scheme that later became known as “Gosadans.” The report provided cost estimates for establishing and operating a camp designed to accommodate two thousand cattle. The non‑recurring expenditure, covering land, cattle sheds, and quarters for staff and servants, was projected at Rs. 32,000. The recurring expenditure, which included the salaries of the manager, stock‑man, watchmen, and others together with allowances, was shown as Rs. 13,000 per year, and it was anticipated that a revenue of Rs. 5,000 could be generated from the sale of hides, manure and similar items. According to the Expert Committee’s report, each Gosadhan intended for two thousand heads of cattle would require four thousand acres of land to allow for rotational and controlled grazing, with provisions for preserving surplus grass during the rainy season for use in the scarce months. The report also stipulated that thatched sheds should be provided to protect the cattle from weather and wild animals, and that a small portion of the land should be used to cultivate fodder. By the end of 1954, when the Expert Committee’s report was issued, the earlier cost figures from 1948 had risen. The new estimates placed the non‑recurring cost at Rs. 50,000 and the recurring cost at Rs. 25,000 per year for a Gosadhan housing two thousand cattle, resulting in a recurring cost of Rs. 12.50 per head per annum for preserving useless cattle. The Gosamvardhan Enquiry Committee’s report presented further calculations. It noted that, in Uttar Pradesh, the number of cattle not used for breeding or work in 1951 was one hundred eighty‑three thousand two hundred seventy‑six. To accommodate these animals, the State would need ninety‑one Gosadans, each with a capacity of two thousand heads. Even if the land requirement were reduced to one acre per animal instead of the two acres recommended by the Expert Committee, the ninety‑one Gosadans would still demand nearly two hundred thousand acres. The total cost for constructing these ninety‑one Gosadans would be Rs. 45,50,000 as a non‑recurring outlay and Rs. 22,75,000 per year as a recurring expense. The Court also noted that a revised model for Gosadans intended to house five hundred heads of cattle, to be managed by State Governments, was set out in Appendix II of the report.

At the Fifth Annual General Meeting of the Central Council of Gosamvardhan, which was held in New Delhi on 21 February 1957, the report stated that the one‑time, non‑recurring cost for establishing a Gosadan would be Rs. 39,000. The recurring, annual running cost was projected at Rs. 12,000. It was further estimated that income of Rs. 2,500 would be obtained each year from the sale of hides and other by‑products. After allowing for this income, the net annual recurring cost for maintaining a Gosadan capable of housing five hundred heads of cattle would be Rs. 9,500, which works out to Rs. 19 per head of cattle per year. The same appendix indicated that when Gosadans were to be operated by private institutions, the institutions would receive a subsidy of Rs. 18 per head per annum, of which 75 percent would be contributed by the Centre and the remaining 25 percent by the State. Consequently, the nation would be paying either Rs. 19 or Rs. 18 per head of “useless” cattle each year for their preservation. By contrast, the total national expenditure on education—both Central and State, including local bodies—during 1955‑56 was only Rs. 4‑9 per capita. That figure was far below the per‑capita education expenditure of the United Kingdom (Rs. 104.6) and the United States (Rs. 223.7). The target set for 1957‑58 was merely Rs. 5 per capita per annum. The report also noted that none of the schemes allocated any amount for fodder. The implication was that the cattle would be left to survive on whatever grass or other green feed they could find by grazing. While green fodder might be available during the monsoon months, there would be a shortage in the dry season, leading to the conclusion that confining the cattle in such “concentration camps” would consign them to a slow death. The authors of the Memorandum on Human Nutrition vis‑à‑vis Animal Nutrition, on page 47, observed that this arrangement contradicted the humanitarian considerations on which the scheme was said to be based.

Putting theory aside, the Gosadan scheme had already been tried and the results were not encouraging. As an experimental measure in the First Five‑Year Plan, the government provided for the establishment of one hundred and sixty Gosadans, each capable of housing two thousand heads of cattle, at an estimated cost of about Rs. 97,00,000. The Planning Commission acknowledged that these measures would address only a fringe portion of the problem and that the success of the movement would depend largely on the amount of public support it received, especially from charitable institutions. The considerable size of the projected expenses forced the Gosamvardhan Enquiry Committee to recognize that, if unwanted and uneconomic cows and their offspring were to be effectively saved from slaughter, the responsibility for doing so would have to be shared among individuals, the community, and other stakeholders. The Committee concluded that it would be utterly impracticable for the State alone to bear the whole burden of collecting such animals from villages and transporting them to the Gosadans. Consequently, the Committee recommended that a substantial portion of the responsibility and cost should rest on the owners and the community themselves, as an equitable way of ensuring the cows’ survival without placing the entire financial load on the State.

The Committee argued that it was unreasonable to assume that the State alone could bear the entire burden of gathering stray cattle from villages and transporting them to the Gosadans. While it recognized that the State should contribute a specific share of the expenditure that fell within its legitimate responsibilities, the Committee emphatically stated—using its own words—that the majority of the responsibility ought to rest on the owners and the community. It reasoned that it would be equitable to expect that, if a cow were to be genuinely saved from slaughter, the costs associated with that rescue should be shared fairly between the people and the State. The Committee’s commentary in the Report of the Gosamvardhan Enquiry Committee was described as sounding like wishful thinking, amounting to little more than hoping for an optimal outcome. The Report noted that when an individual’s conscience or the community’s sense of duty failed to stop a Hindu owner from selling his dry cow to a butcher for a meagre price of thirty to forty rupees per head, the sanctity traditionally ascribed to the cow had to be upheld by legislative compulsion. Moreover, the Report conceded on page 41 that the dharmada and brit collected by Hindu businessmen on each commercial transaction—purportedly for the benefit of the cow—were not made fully available for that purpose. Consequently, many Goshalas had been forced to shut down because of a lack of funds and public support. The author observed that the nation could not even allocate more than five rupees per capita per year for the education of its people, yet a scheme was being devised to establish Gosadans for preserving “useless” cattle at a cost of eighteen or nineteen rupees per head per annum, a scheme that would rely on the same uncertain public support or on a seventy‑five percent subsidy from the Central Government. The Report then asked what the result of this experiment had been. According to the Expert Committee’s Report, since the First Five‑Year Plan only seventeen Gosadans had been started across Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, PEPSU, Coorg, Bhopal, Kutch, Vindhya Pradesh, Tripura and Saurashtra, and none of these establishments was fully stocked. Collectively, these seventeen Gosadans housed only about 5,293 animals instead of the 34,000 initially projected. The Gosamvardhan Enquiry Committee’s Report further indicated that, up to the date of that Report, only two Gosadans had been established in Uttar Pradesh. The Second Five‑Year Plan data (page 283) revealed that of the one‑hundred and sixty Gosadans provisioned in the First Five‑Year Plan, merely twenty‑two had actually been established. The Facts and Figures about Bihar (1955, page 88) listed three Gosadans at Berwadih, Nirmali and Monghyr, which together contained roughly 700 uneconomic animals, far short of the six thousand animals that each Gosadan was intended to accommodate. The Committee therefore concluded that the scheme had fallen dramatically short of its intended scale and purpose.

In examining the various committee reports, the Court observed that the Memorandum on Human Nutrition Vis‑a‑Vis Animal Nutrition in India, page 4, concluded that the existing scheme of establishing Gosadans for the segregation of old and useless animals could serve only a limited purpose and, if extended nationwide, might actually obstruct rather than assist the disposal of surplus animals. The authors of that memorandum, on page 47, expressed the view that the proposal to adopt the Gosadan scheme on a country‑wide basis had not given sufficient consideration to practical aspects. They noted that present estimates placed the total number of useless animals at four times the figure projected by the Second Five‑Year Plan, and that, given the enormous size of the cattle population, the proportion of useless cattle would remain essentially unchanged for many years. The memorandum projected that a sum of Rs 3,04,00,000 would be required merely for the crushing of such animals. The Expert Committee’s Report was unequivocal. Paragraph 133 of that report, page 62, stated that Gosadans did not provide a solution to the problem, because housing and maintaining all these animals would require thousands of Gosadans spread over lakhs of acres. The Committee highlighted that, besides the massive one‑time capital outlay, a very high recurring annual expenditure would also be necessary. In view of these considerations and the tepid response of the States in establishing Gosadans, the Expert Committee concluded that the Gosadan scheme was unlikely to resolve the problem of useless cattle and that it would be far more desirable to apply the country’s limited resources to improve the efficiency of useful cattle. The Report of the Cattle Preservation and Development Committee did not recommend an immediate total ban on the slaughter of all cattle; instead it advocated the establishment of concentration camps, later termed Gosadans, while allowing for the slaughter of animals older than fourteen years and those permanently unfit for work or breeding because of age or deformity. Paragraph 134 of the Expert Committee’s Report, page 63, clearly stated that a total ban on the slaughter of all cattle would not serve the country’s best interests, describing it as a negative rather than a positive approach. The Committee favored a constructive strategy aimed at preventing the slaughter of any useful animal and at fully harnessing national resources to produce better and more efficient cattle. Neither the First Five‑Year Plan nor the Second Five‑Year Plan embraced the notion of a total ban on cattle slaughter; in fact, the Second Five‑Year Plan indicated that a total ban would exacerbate the increase in surplus cattle.

The Court observed that a complete prohibition on the slaughter of all cows, calves and other milch and draught cattle would defeat the purpose of the directive principles contained in Article 48 of the Constitution. The authorities held that such a ban would defeat the purpose of those principles. The Court referred to paragraph 6 on page 283 of the Second Five Year Plan, which recorded that the Gosadan programme had failed to achieve any or satisfactory progress. The Plan noted that, up to the date of that document, the States had been able to establish only twenty‑two Gosadans that together accommodated eight thousand cattle. Even with those limited establishments, many States had encountered difficulties in acquiring the land parcels required for the operation of the Gosadans. The Planning Commission concluded that it would be impossible to create enough Gosadans to meet national needs. Accordingly, the Commission advised that, when defining the scope of a ban on cattle slaughter, the States should adopt a realistic assessment of the fodder resources in the country. The Commission suggested that the States evaluate how far voluntary organisations could assume responsibility for caring for unproductive cattle, with limited assistance from the Government and public support. The Court further cited the Memorandum on Human Nutrition vis‑à‑vis Animal Nutrition, page 4, which expressed the opinion that the Gosadan scheme could serve only a limited purpose. The Memorandum warned that extending the scheme throughout the country would likely hinder, rather than help, the disposal of surplus animals, apart from imposing a large initial cost. The authors of the Memorandum feared that concentrating large numbers of useless animals in a restricted area could cause soil erosion through overgrazing. They also warned that such a concentration created a possibility that contagious and parasitic diseases might spread from the confined animals to the surrounding environment. The Court noted that only the Gosamvardan Enquiry Committee had recommended an immediate total ban on the slaughter of all cattle, regardless of age or sex. However, the Court pointed out that even that Committee did not propose the total ban as a measure, but linked it to a broader scheme dependent on several uncertain factors. Those factors included public enthusiasm and support for establishing and maintaining Gosadans in a state of efficiency, the State’s capacity to bring additional lands under cultivation, and the reclamation of jungle lands. The Court observed that, although some States had imposed a blanket prohibition on cattle slaughter, many other States had deemed such a total ban unnecessary. For example, the Assam Cattle Protection Act 1950, the Bombay Animal Preservation Act 1948 and the West Bengal Animal Slaughter Control Act 1950 all permitted the slaughter of cattle and buffaloes that had reached specified ages. The Hyderabad Slaughter of Animal Act 1950 and the Travancore‑Cochin Notification likewise allowed slaughter of cattle and buffaloes after they attained the ages prescribed by those statutes. Even the Madhya Pradesh Act, as enacted criminally, did not establish a complete ban on the slaughter of all cattle.

The report observed that in earlier periods, when pastures were abundant, the human and cattle populations were smaller and the demands for livestock were limited, it had been possible to maintain large and valuable herds and to organise an economy that was balanced with respect to agricultural development. During those days the nation produced sufficient grain to meet the needs of its people, and ample tracts of land were available for grazing livestock. In addition, fodder derived from agricultural production supplemented the grazing, thereby enabling the growth of quality animals that were appropriate for the requirements of that era and the local conditions, as recorded in the Gosamvardhan Enquiry Committee report. The situation had changed considerably since then. The human population had grown markedly, while famines and epidemics had been largely brought under control, leading also to an increase in the animal population. Consequently, competition for land had arisen between people and cattle. The expanding human populace needed more food, which in turn required more agricultural land. At the same time, the problem of resettling refugees remained unresolved, demanding additional land for their habitation. Although the introduction of artificial fertilisers and scientific cultivation methods promised higher agricultural yields and the prospect of solving the human food‑grain shortage, the gap between the quantity of cattle feed required and that which could be produced remained wide, making it unlikely that the country could, in the foreseeable future, generate enough feed to sustain its livestock adequately. In summary, the nation faced a shortage of milch cattle, breeding bulls and working bullocks. To preserve public health and ensure adequate nutrition, the cattle stock needed improvement. Achieving this objective required that breeding and working cattle receive proper nutrition, and that any existing or future feed resources be allocated to these useful animals. Maintaining cattle that were no longer productive represented a wasteful drain on the nation’s limited feed supplies, depriving the productive animals of the nutrition they required. The presence of large numbers of such unproductive cattle also threatened to deteriorate the overall breed. A total prohibition on the slaughter of cattle, whether useful or not, would inevitably cause a serious disturbance—though not a complete halt—to the livelihoods of a considerable segment of the population engaged in occupations such as butchers and hide dealers. Moreover, such a ban would deprive many people of what might constitute a staple source of protein, forcing them to forgo the modest amount of meat they could otherwise afford to consume once or twice a week. The preservation of unproductive cattle through the establishment of Gosadans was deemed impractical for the reasons previously outlined, and therefore the report concluded that such a measure could not be justified.

It was observed that sending useless cattle to concentration camps where they had to fend for themselves resulted only in a gradual process of death and gave no benefit to the animals. Moreover, this practice harmed the nation’s interests because such cattle consumed a substantial portion of the feed that should have been available for productive animals, weakened the overall breed, and eventually reduced the output of milk, breeding bulls and working bullocks. The practice also generated a large expense that could have been directed to more urgent national requirements. The Court noted that beef and buffalo meat from calves less than one year old, from heifers and from young castrated stock were of superior quality and therefore fetched comparatively higher market prices; consequently, butchers naturally preferred to slaughter these young animals. This circumstance, the Court said, clearly signalled that calves, heifers and young castrated stock—both cattle and buffalo—were future sources of milk and agricultural power and therefore needed protection. The Court further acknowledged that cows also merited protection for very sound reasons, since they supplied milk and produced offspring for future service. Nevertheless, it was pointed out that the average milk yield of a cow was considerably lower than that of a she‑buffalo. According to the Gosamvardhan Enquiry Committee’s Report, despite the widespread reverence for the cow, the she‑buffalo received priority in feeding, while the cow was left to survive on the leftovers after buffaloes, bullocks and calves had been fed. The expansion of cities and the heavy urban demand for milk had contributed to the slaughter of good stock. Because of limited space, a newly calved animal could not be accommodated without first disposing of a dry one. The absence of adequate salvage facilities, or the unaffordability of such facilities when they existed, made it uneconomical for professional gowalas—who were almost entirely Hindus—to keep a cow after it had gone dry. Consequently, they sold the dry cows to butchers for as little as thirty to fifty rupees per head, regardless of the animal’s age or potential productivity, and then imported a fresh cow. The Court observed that the veneration attached to the cow’s sanctity did not stop this practice. In larger towns, municipal regulations were stringent and permitted slaughter only of animals that were unserviceable and unproductive. Yet the Court recorded instances where, to obtain a slaughter permit, the teeth or the rings around the horns of an animal were tampered with, and on some occasions a cow was even maimed so that a veterinary inspector would deem it fit for slaughter. Cows rejected by the inspector were taken outside the city limits and slaughtered in rural areas. Because slaughter was not confined to registered slaughter houses, the Court noted that an accurate count of useful animals being slaughtered could not be ascertained.

The Expert Committee’s report, cited on page 2, estimated that at least fifty thousand high‑yielding cows and she‑buffaloes from the cities of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras are sent each year for premature slaughter, resulting in a loss to the nation. The report, on pages 2, 3 and 9, listed several reasons for the slaughter of otherwise useful cattle. These reasons included lack of space in urban and suburban areas, the long dry season, the absence of timely arrangements for breeding bulls, the pressure to extract the maximum possible milk from a cow, the high cost of maintaining cows in the cities, and the difficulty of obtaining sufficient fodder.

Because of these factors, many animals are driven to slaughterhouses purely by economic pressure, and they are subsequently replaced by fresh stock imported from breeding regions. The risk of premature slaughter is especially acute for cows, which produce relatively little milk during the dry period; owners find it uneconomic to keep such cows alive, creating an incentive to employ cruel methods to have the animals passed by veterinary inspectors as fit for slaughter. In contrast, a dry she‑buffalo remains valuable, as it can yield a substantial return in the next lactation, and buffaloes command lower prices at slaughter than cows. Similarly, farmers and other owners have little motivation to part with breeding bulls or working bullocks, whether cattle or buffalo, while they remain fit for service.

The breeding bulls and working bullocks possess considerable utility and high market value as breeding or draught animals; to the agriculturist they are worth more in gold than their flesh would fetch. Consequently, there is little incentive to maim such valuable animals, because a maimed bull or bullock would sell for less to a butcher than a sound animal would fetch from a farmer. Therefore, the committee concluded that breeding bulls and working bullocks do not require the same level of protection as cows and calves.

The discussion then turned to the appropriate scope of a ban on animal slaughter. One perspective advocated that the State should regulate the slaughter of all cattle and buffaloes across all categories, permitting slaughter only of animals below a specified age or those lacking natural deformities. Although municipal authorities have imposed strict regulations, practical experience has shown that these measures are insufficient to safeguard cows. Enforcement has proven extremely difficult owing to inadequate staffing of veterinary inspectors, the absence of effective oversight, and the tendency of some inspectors to succumb to pressure or inducements from butchers, allowing animals that are not truly useless or aged to be passed for slaughter. As a result, a large percentage of the

The Court observed that animals which are not fit for slaughter are often killed secretly beyond the limits of municipal jurisdiction. It noted that, for reasons of economy, some butchers and agriculturists consider it uneconomic to keep a dry cow and may even resort to cruel practices such as maiming the animal so that it can be presented for slaughter. The Court further pointed out that she‑buffaloes and breeding bulls as well as working bullocks, whether cattle or buffaloes, possess present and future value that does not pose the same danger as a dry cow. Accordingly, the Court held that regulating slaughter only for animals above a specified age may fail to provide adequate protection for cows, but the same regulation could be sufficient for breeding bulls, working bullocks and she‑buffaloes. These observations led the Court to consider making an exception even for old and decrepit cows. The counsel for the petitioners, the Court recorded, did not argue against such an exception. After a careful and thorough consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the issue, and keeping in mind the presumption in favour of the validity of legislation and without any disrespect to the legislative opinions, the Court stated that its constitutional duty required an objective and realistic analysis of the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed by the impugned enactments. On that basis, the Court reached three conclusions: first, a total ban on the slaughter of cows of all ages and of calves of cows and calves of she‑buffaloes, both male and female, is reasonable, valid and in conformity with the directive principle set out in Article 48; second, a total ban on the slaughter of she‑buffaloes or breeding bulls or working bullocks, whether cattle or buffaloes, as long as they are milch or draught animals, is also reasonable and valid; third, a total ban on the slaughter of she‑buffaloes, bulls and bullocks after they have ceased to be capable of producing milk or of breeding or of performing draught work cannot be justified as reasonable in the interest of the general public.

Having articulated these conclusions, the Court proceeded to test each of the impugned statutes against them. Regarding the Bihar Act, the Court held that the provision which prohibits the slaughter of cows of all ages and of calves of cows and buffaloes, both male and female, is constitutionally valid. The Court, however, observed that the Bihar Act makes no distinction between she‑buffaloes, bulls and bullocks that remain useful as milch, breeding or draught animals and those that have become useless; the Act indiscriminately bans the slaughter of all such animals irrespective of their age or usefulness. In the Court’s view, the blanket prohibition on the slaughter of animals that are still useful is reasonable, whereas extending the ban to animals that are no longer useful cannot be supported as a reasonable restriction. Consequently, the portion of the Bihar Act that bans the slaughter of she‑buffaloes, breeding bulls and working bullocks regardless of their usefulness was deemed invalid, while the sections that protect cows and their calves were upheld as valid.

In this case the Court observed that a total ban on the slaughter of she‑buffaloes, breeding bulls and working bullocks that are still useful as milch, breeding or draught animals could not be sustained. Determining the precise moment at which a she‑buffalo, a breeding bull or a working bullock ceases to be useful and becomes useless is a question that must be answered by the legislature. The Bihar Act contains no provision that addresses this question, and the Court was not shown any rule that would illuminate the point. Because the Act does not define the criteria for usefulness, the Court held that it was impossible to apply the doctrine of severability to keep the prohibition on slaughtering useful animals while striking down the ban on slaughtering animals that are no longer useful. Consequently, the Court concluded that the entire provision that bans the slaughter of she‑buffaloes, breeding bulls and working bullocks must be declared invalid. The Court, however, affirmed that the portion of the Bihar Act which prohibits the slaughter of cows of every age and of calves of cows and buffaloes, both male and female, is constitutionally valid. The Court further held that the part of the Bihar Act that totally forbids the slaughter of she‑buffaloes, breeding bulls and working bullocks without prescribing any test or requirement concerning their age or usefulness infringes the petitioners’ right to trade under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution and is therefore void. The same reasoning was applied to the Uttar Pradesh Act: the Court upheld its provisions banning the slaughter of cows and calves of both sexes, but struck down the blanket prohibition on breeding bulls and working bullocks for the same constitutional reason. Likewise, the Court declared the Madhya Pradesh Act valid insofar as it bars the slaughter of cows and calves of both sexes, but void to the extent that it imposes an unconditional ban on breeding bulls and working bullocks without any test of age or usefulness. The Court also noted that the Madhya Pradesh Act remains valid where it authorises the regulated slaughter of other animals upon issuance of certificates by the prescribed authorities. Accordingly, the Court directed the respective State governments not to enforce the portions of their statutes that have been held void. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs, and the petitions were allowed in part.