J.K.Chaudhuri vs R. K. Datta Gupta and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 321 of 1957

Decision Date: 7 April 1958

Coram: J.L. Kapur, Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, A.K. Sarkar

J.K. Chaudhuri filed a petition against R. K. Datta Gupta and other respondents, and the matter was decided on 7 April 1958 by the Supreme Court of India. The judgment was authored by Justice J. L. Kapur, who was joined by Justices Natwarlal H. Bhagwati and A. K. Sarkar. The case is reported in the 1958 volume of the All India Reporter at page 722 and in the 1959 Supreme Court Reports at page 455. The dispute concerned the powers of the Executive Council of Gauhati University under the Gauhati University Act (Assumption XVI of 1947) and the university statutes, specifically sections 2, 9, 12 and 21 of the Act and clauses 1, 2 and 3 of the statutes.

According to the headnote, R. K. Datta Gupta had been appointed Professor of Mathematics in a college affiliated to Gauhati University and was later elevated to the position of Principal of that college. After certain complaints were lodged against him, the governing body of the college conducted an enquiry and subsequently ordered his dismissal both as Principal and as Professor of Mathematics. Datta Gupta then made representations to the Vice‑Chancellor of Gauhati University. The Executive Council of the university responded by constituting a committee to examine the propriety of the college’s action. The committee reported that there was no reasonable ground to justify the dismissal, and the Executive Council thereafter passed a resolution directing the governing body to reinstate Datta Gupta. The Court held that the Executive Council had acted without jurisdiction in interfering with the action taken against him in his capacity as Principal. The Gauhati University Act, 1947, and the statutes framed under section 21(g) distinguished between a Principal and a teacher. Clause 3(g)(v) of the statutes empowered the Executive Council to intervene only in matters where the governing body of an affiliated college took action against a teacher, not against a Principal.

The appeal, designated as Civil Appeal No. 321 of 1957, was filed by special leave against the judgment and order of the Assam High Court dated 13 June 1956 in Civil Rule No. 80 of 1955, which had dismissed the petition filed under article 226 of the Constitution. Counsel for the appellant were identified as the legal representatives of J. K. Chaudhuri, while counsel for respondents numbered two and three, and for respondent No. 1, were also listed. The judgment was delivered on 7 April 1958 by Justice Kapur. The Court described the matter as an appeal on behalf of the governing body of Guru Charan College, Silchar (referred to as “the College”) challenging the High Court’s decision. The central issue was the scope of jurisdiction of the Executive Council of Gauhati University concerning disciplinary measures taken by the College’s governing body against its Principal, R. K. Datta Gupta, who is respondent No. 1. The factual background noted that Datta Gupta had been appointed Professor of Mathematics in 1937 and subsequently promoted to Vice‑Principal, and later to Principal, establishing the timeline of his service before the controversy arose.

The respondent was appointed Vice‑Principal in 1947 and subsequently became Principal in 1950. After certain representations were made to the Governing Body alleging misconduct by the respondent, the Governing Body constituted a committee to investigate those allegations. The committee held several sittings, examined the material before it and then prepared a report. On the basis of that report the Governing Body concluded that a prima facie case existed against the respondent, suspended him from his duties and directed him to answer the charges within fifteen days. He did not comply with the fifteen‑day deadline, but later submitted an explanation which the Governing Body considered. Subsequent to his suspension additional material came to light; consequently the respondent was asked to give a further explanation. He then requested that the earlier charges be finally decided before any enquiry into the new charges could commence. The Governing Body met on 1 November 1953, examined all the evidence and, finding the respondent guilty of moral turpitude, dishonesty, gross negligence of duty, inefficiency and insubordination, resolved to dismiss him both as Principal and as Professor of Mathematics of the college.

On 30 November 1953 the respondent filed Title Suit No. 282 of 1953 in the Court of Munsif Sadar, Silchar, challenging the legality of the committee’s proceedings and the decisions of the Governing Body. He prayed for an injunction restraining the Governing Body from appointing another Principal and also sought a temporary injunction. The suit was later transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge U. A. D., Silchar and was renumbered Title Suit No. 10 of 1954; at the time of the present proceedings that suit had not yet been decided.

Prior to that, on 11 November 1953, the respondent made a representation to the Vice‑Chancellor of Gauhati University, contesting his dismissal and requesting that the Governing Body be directed not to fill the vacancy of Principal until his appeal, filed on 30 November 1953, was disposed of. That appeal reiterated the allegations set out in the plaint of the earlier suit. In response, the Executive Council of the University (respondent No. 2) invoked paragraph 3(h) of the Statutes framed under section 21(g) of the Gauhati University Act (Assam XV1 of 1947) and appointed a committee (respondent No. 3) comprising the Vice‑Chancellor, the Director of Public Instruction and the Legal Remembrancer of the State of Assam. After giving both parties full opportunity to present their case, the committee reported on 30 March 1955 to the Executive Council that there was no reasonable ground justifying the dismissal of Shri R. K. Datta Gupta from the post of Principal of Guru Charan College, Silchar. The Executive Council accepted this report on 20 April 1955 and passed a resolution stating that the findings of the committee were accepted and, in view of the facts, Shri R. K. Datta Gupta was not dismissed on any …

The resolution directed that, because there were no reasonable grounds for dismissal, the Governing Body should reinstate the Principal before thirty‑first July, 1955. The Governing Body of the college responded by filing a petition under article 226 in the High Court of Assam. That petition was dismissed on thirteenth June, 1956. In the High Court the appellant had contested the university’s power to interfere with the Governing Body’s decision to remove the respondent both from the principalship and from the professorship of Mathematics. However, before this Court the arguments were limited to the removal from the principalship only. The appellant submitted that the two categories – principal and teacher – were distinct and that the Act and the statutes made thereunder dealt with them separately. It was contended that the principal was merely the administrative head of the college, while a teacher was a person engaged solely in imparting instruction. Accordingly, the Act envisioned that the two offices performed different functions. To support this position, the appellant referred to various provisions of the Act and the statutes created under the Act.

The Act defined the terms “principal” and “teacher” in section two. Section 2(h) stated that “principal means the head of a college and includes, where there is no principal, the person for the time being duly appointed to act as principal and, in the absence of the principal, a vice‑principal duly appointed as such.” Section 2(k) provided that “teacher includes professors, readers, lecturers and other persons imparting instructions in the university or in any college or hall.” Further distinction was found in other parts of the Act. Section 9, which dealt with the constitution of the Court, created three classes of members: ex‑officio members, life members and other members. Principals were placed in class I and mentioned in sub‑section (vii), whereas teachers were listed among “other members” in class III. Sub‑section (xiv) gave representation to teachers elected from their own body who were not professors or readers of the university. Likewise, section 12, which outlined the composition of the Executive Council, distinguished principals as ex‑officio members (class I) from university professors who were other members (class II). The latter class also included two principals of recognised colleges elected from their own bodies, but gave no representation to teachers. Consequently, whenever the Act used the word “principal” or “teacher,” it referred to two separate entities that were not interchangeable. The statutes made under section 21(g) of the Act reinforced this distinction, employing the term “principal” in its specific and limited sense and using “teacher,” “member of the teaching staff,” or similar expressions exclusively to refer to teachers.

The Court noted that Clause I of the Statute mandates that every college which is not maintained by the University must have a Governing Body. Clause 2(a) then sets out the composition of that Governing Body, specifying that the Principal and the Vice‑Principal are to sit as ex‑officio members and that two representatives of the teaching staff are to be elected each year. This provision demonstrates that the Principal, taken as a separate category, is distinct from the members of the teaching staff, who are the employees engaged in delivering the various academic subjects. Clause 2(c) further assigns the Principal the role of Secretary of the Governing Body. The Court then turned to Clause 3, whose sub‑clauses (a) through (d) regulate a teacher’s appointment, the scale of pay, the probationary period and the overall period of appointment. Sub‑clause (e) concerns the question of increments. It provides that an increment, according to the applicable pay scale, shall be granted as a matter of course, but that such an increment may be withheld on the ground of unsatisfactory work of an employee. Because the earlier sub‑clauses deal exclusively with teachers, the reference to “employee” in this context must necessarily be understood as referring to a teacher. Sub‑clause (f) deals with the period of service, while sub‑clauses (i) and (ii) of sub‑clause (g) state that the services of a permanent employee cannot be terminated except on reasonable grounds, and that termination during an academic session is permissible only on very special grounds such as moral turpitude, proven incapacity or inefficiency. If the Governing Body deems termination on any of those grounds appropriate, it must immediately report the matter to the University’s Executive Council. The Court observed that the use of the phrase “academic session” indicates that the “permanent employee” contemplated here must be a person connected with teaching, for otherwise the expression would lack meaning. Sub‑clause (g)(iii) provides that a teacher whose services are terminated on grounds other than those listed in sub‑clause (g)(ii) shall receive compensation equal to one month’s salary for each completed year of service, subject to a maximum of twelve months’ pay. This further confirms that the “permanent employee” mentioned in sub‑clause (g)(ii) is intended to be a teacher and not any other college employee. Sub‑clause (g)(iv) prescribes the procedure for an enquiry when a teacher is to be dismissed, suspended or subjected to a reduction in pay, and sub‑clause (g)(v) vests the Executive Council of the University with the authority to investigate the causes of a teacher’s dismissal, either on its own initiative or on an appeal made by the teacher. Finally, sub‑clause (h) declares that all cases of dismissal, suspension or any other serious grievance affecting the teaching staff shall be dealt with in accordance with the mechanisms set out in the Statute.

In this case the Court observed that the Committee described in the Statutes, which is tasked with considering matters involving the “teaching staff”, clearly refers to teachers and not to a Principal. Clause 3, when read in its entirety, deals with the conditions of service applicable to a teacher, the compensation payable to that teacher, and the procedure to be followed when disciplinary action is taken against a teacher. Consequently, the expression “teaching staff” as used in the Statutes and in the language of the Act cannot be interpreted to include anyone other than a member of the teaching staff, that is, a teacher. The Court therefore concluded that wherever clause 3 of the Statute uses the terms “permanent employee”, “teacher” or “teaching staff”, the reference is confined to those members of the college who are teachers, and it does not extend to other employees such as a Principal. The learned Judge Deka had held that because respondent No 1 occupied two capacities—those of Principal and of a member of the teaching staff—respondent No 2 could order his restoration to both offices, reasoning that the two capacities could not be separated. The Court disagreed, noting that the two capacities are distinct, have separate functions, and are dealt with separately in the Act and in the Statutes made under the Act; consequently, Judge Deka’s view was erroneous. Likewise, Justice Sarjoo Parshad had given the phrase “permanent employee” an enlarged meaning that would include a Principal as well as a college teacher. The Court found this interpretation contrary to the analysis previously set out and therefore also erroneous. Counsel for respondent No 2, relying on sub‑clause 3(h) of the Statutes, contended that because respondent No 1 was a Professor of Mathematics, he was a member of the teaching staff and his case fell within the words “any other serious grievance of the teaching staff”. The Court held that those words refer only to grievances that a member of the teaching staff may have in his capacity as a teacher, not to grievances arising from any other capacity. Thus the clause cannot be extended to cover grievances of a person who is also the Principal. As previously emphasized, the provisions of the Act and the Statutes made under section 21(g) of the Act demonstrate the separate capacities of Principal and Teacher. The jurisdiction of respondent No 2 to interfere with actions taken by the Governing Body is limited to matters concerning a teacher and does not extend to situations where the same individual holds both offices, because there is no provision in the Act or the Statutes granting the University power to interfere in such a dual‑office scenario. Consequently, as far as respondent …

The Court observed that respondent No. 2 had intervened in the action taken by the Governing Body against respondent No. 1 in his capacity as the Principal of the college. It held that such interference was beyond the authority granted to respondent No. 2 and therefore amounted to an act without jurisdiction. Consequently, the portion of the order issued by respondent No. 2 and the corresponding portion of the High Court judgment that relied on that order could not be sustained and had to be set aside because respondent No. 2 had acted in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon it. Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, modified the decree of the High Court, and declared that the order of respondent No. 2 concerning respondent No. 1 in his office as Principal was devoid of jurisdiction. The Court further ordered that the reinstatement of respondent No. 1 by the University to the post of Principal be nullified. Since special leave had been granted against the High Court judgment with reference both to the office of Principal and to the office of teacher of the college, and because, at the stage of arguments, the dispute had been confined to the question of the Principal’s office, the Court directed that each party should bear its own costs in both the Supreme Court and the High Court. The appeal was therefore allowed.