Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Others vs The State Of Mysore And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 403 of 1956

Decision Date: 8 November 1957

Coram: Syed Jaffer Imam, A.K. Sarkar, Sudhi Ranjan, Venkataramana Aiyar

In the matter titled Sri Venkataramana Devaru and Others versus The State of Mysore and Others, a judgment was delivered on 8 November 1957 by the Supreme Court of India. The bench that heard the case comprised Justice Syed Jaffer Imam and Justice A. K. Sarkar, with the bench identification also noting Justices Aiyyur, T. L. Venkatarama, Bose, Vivian Das, Sudhi Ranjan (Chief Justice), and the two aforementioned judges. The official citation for the decision is reported in 1958 AIR 255 and 1958 SCR 895. The matter arose under the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act of 1947, specifically invoking sections 2(2) and 3 of that statute, and it engaged the constitutional provisions of Articles 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the Constitution of India concerning freedom of religion and the right of a religious denomination to manage its own affairs.

The petitioners, who were the trustees of the ancient and well‑known Sri Venkataramana temple located at Moolky Petta, managed the temple on behalf of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community in accordance with a scheme framed in a suit filed under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act of 1947 was enacted with the purpose of removing the prohibition that prevented Harijans from entering Hindu public temples, the trustees submitted a representation to the Government asserting that their temple was a private institution and therefore fell outside the scope of the Act. The Government rejected this claim and maintained that the Act applied to the temple. Consequently, the trustees instituted the suit from which the present appeal originates, seeking a declaration that the temple was not a “public” temple as defined by section 2(2) of the Act but rather a denominational temple established exclusively for the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. The trustees also argued that section 3 of the Act was unconstitutional because it conflicted with Article 26(b), which guarantees a religious denomination the right to manage its own religious affairs.

The trial court ruled against the trustees, holding that matters of religion did not encompass rituals and ceremonies. On appeal, the High Court affirmed that the public had a right to worship in the temple but issued a limited decree in favour of the trustees, reserving to them the authority to exclude the general public during certain ceremonies that were intended solely for members of the denomination. The principal question before the Supreme Court was whether the rights of a religious denomination to manage its own affairs under Article 26(b) could be subjected to, and controlled by, a law protected by Article 25(2)(b). The Court held that the phrase “religious institutions of a public character” in Article 25(2)(b) refers not only to temples intended for the whole public but also includes those founded for the benefit of specific sections of the public, thereby encompassing denominational temples as well. While Article 25(1) addresses the rights of individuals, Article 26(b) concerns the rights of religious denominations; consequently, Article 26(b) must be read subject to the broader scope of Article 25(2)(b).

The Court observed that while Article 26(b) of the Constitution protects the rights of individuals, Article 25(2)(b) extends to both individuals and religious denominations, thereby covering a much broader field and exercising control over both categories. Consequently, Article 26(b) must be interpreted in a manner that is subordinate to Article 25(2)(b). The Court further explained that the right to enter a temple for worship, which is safeguarded by Article 25(2)(b), must be construed liberally in favour of the public, but this does not make the right absolute or without limitation. The right must necessarily be subject to any limitation or regulation that arises when it is harmonised with the right protected under Article 26(b). Where the rights claimed by a denomination are not capable of nullifying or substantially diminishing the public right conferred by Article 25(2)(b), the provision should be interpreted so as to give effect to those denominational rights while leaving the public’s rights in other respects untouched. The expression “matters of religion” in Article 26(b) was explained to include practices regarded by a community as integral to its religion; under ceremonial law relating to temples, questions such as who may enter for worship, where they may stand, and how worship is to be conducted are all matters of religion. The Court referred to the authorities in Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshimindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt (1954) S.C.R. 1005; Gopala Muppanar v. Subramania Aiyar (1094) 27 M.L.J. 253; and Sankaralinga Nadan v. Raja Rajeswara Dorai (1908) L.R. 35 I.A. 176. It further held that it is settled law that when an original dedication of a temple is proved to have been for the benefit of a particular community, the fact that members of other communities were later allowed to worship there does not lead to the inference that the dedication was also intended for their benefit, as affirmed in Babu Bhagwan Din v. Gir Hay Saroop (1939) L.R. 67 I.A. The judgment proceeded with the civil appellate jurisdiction, noting that this was Civil Appeal No. 403 of 1956, appealed from the judgment and order dated 11 April 1956 of the Madras High Court in Appeal No. 145 of 1952, which arose out of the decree dated 31 March 1951 of the Subordinate Judge, South Kanara, in Original Suit No. 24 of 1949. Counsel for the appellant appeared on behalf of the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 403 of 1956 and the respondents in Special Leave Petition No. 327 of 1957, while counsel for the respondents appeared on behalf of the respondents in Special Leave Petition No. 403 of 1956 and the petitioner in Special Leave Petition No. 327 of 1957. The judgment was delivered on 8 November 1957 by Justice Venkatarama Aiyer. The substantial question of law to be decided was whether the right of a religious denomination to manage its own affairs in matters of religion, guaranteed under Article 26(b), is subject to and can be controlled by a law protected by Article 25(2)(b), thereby opening a further inquiry.

In the district of South Kanara, which until recently formed part of the State of Madras and now belongs to the State of Mysore, there is a grouping of three villages called Mannampady, Bappanad and Karnad, collectively known as Moolky Petah. Within the village of Mannampady stands an ancient temple dedicated to Sri Venkataramana, a shrine that has long been recognised for its sanctity. The temple is a Hindu public temple intended for all classes and sections of Hindus. The trustees of this temple are the appellants in the present proceedings. All of the trustees belong to a sect called the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. Historically, this community is said to have originated in Kashmir, later migrated to Mithila and Bihar, and subsequently moved southwards to settle in the region around Goa in sixty villages. They retained a distinct identity, spoke their own language, Konkani, married only within the community, and brought with them idols for worship. Because of persecution by the Portuguese, the community moved further south, some families establishing themselves at Bhatkal and others at Cochin. Later, a chieftain who ruled the Moolky area brought five of these families from Bhatkal, settled them at Mannampady, erected a temple for their benefit and installed an idol known as Tirumalaivaru or Venkataramana, endowing lands for its support. Over time additional Gowda Saraswath Brahmin families settled in the three villages that constitute Moolky, and the temple came under the management of members of this community residing in those villages.

In 1915 a suit, identified as O.S. No. 26 of 1915, was filed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of South Kanara under section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking a scheme for the temple’s administration. The decree that resulted from that suit, exhibited as Exhibit A‑6, declares that “Shri Venkataramana temple of Moolky situated in the village of Mannampadi, Nadisal Mangane, Mangalore taluk is an ancient institution belonging to the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community, i.e., the commodity to which the parties to the suit belong residing in the Moolky Petah, i.e., the villages of Bappanad, Karnad and Mannampadi according to the existing survey demarcation.” Clause two of the decree vests the general control and management of both the secular and religious affairs of the temple in the members of that community. Clause three provides that the actual day‑to‑day management shall be carried out by a Board of Trustees elected from among the community members by the community itself. The decree further details elaborate provisions for preparing an electoral register, convening meetings of the general body, and conducting elections of trustees. This decree was passed on 9 March 1921, and it is agreed by the parties that the temple has been administered ever since in accordance with the scheme set out in that decree. This was the state of affairs when the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act was enacted.

In this case, the Court explained that the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, had been enacted by the Legislature of the Province of Madras. It was necessary to set out the relevant provisions because the validity of section three of that Act formed the principal question to be decided on appeal. The preamble to the Act stated that the policy of the Provincial Government was to remove the disabilities imposed by custom or usage on certain classes of Hindus against entry into Hindu temples in the Province which are open to the general Hindu public. Section two clause two defined the term “temple” as “a place by whatever name known, which is dedicated to or for the benefit, of or used as of right by the Hindu community in general as a place of public religious worship.” Section three paragraph one provided that, notwithstanding any law, custom or usage to the contrary, persons belonging to the excluded classes shall be entitled to enter any Hindu temple and offer worship therein in the same manner and to the same extent as Hindus in general; and that no member of any excluded class shall, by reason only of such entry or worship, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, be deemed to have committed any actionable wrong or offence or be sued or prosecuted therefor. Section six of the Act stipulated that if any question arose as to whether a place was or was not a temple as defined in this Act, the question should be referred to the Provincial Government and that its decision would be final, subject however to any decree passed by a competent civil court in a suit filed before it within six months from the date of the decision of the Provincial Government. The appellants contended, and the Court agreed that the contention was well founded, that the true purpose of the enactment, as expressed in the foregoing provisions, was to remove the disability imposed on Harijans from entering temples that were dedicated to the Hindu public generally. Anticipating that the provisions of the Act might be applied to the temple that was the subject of the suit, the trustees of that temple sent a memorial to the Government of Madras claiming that the temple was a private temple belonging exclusively to the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins and therefore did not fall within the scope of the Act. In response, the Government issued an order on 25 June 1948, marked Exhibit B‑13, holding that the temple was one that was open to all Hindus generally and that the Act would therefore apply to it. Consequently, the trustees filed the suit, which gave rise to the present appeal, seeking a declaration that the Sri Venkataramana temple at Moolky was not a temple as defined in section two clause two of the Act. The plaint alleged that the temple had been founded for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins in Moolky Petah, that it had always been under their management, that they were followers of the Kashi Mutt, that the head of the Mutt performed various religious ceremonies in the temple, and that other communities possessed no right to worship there.

In the plaint, the petitioners asserted that the temple had always been managed by the followers of the Kashi Mutt, that the head of that Mutt performed all religious ceremonies in the temple, and that no other communities possessed any right to worship there. The suit was instituted on 8 February 1949. On 25 July 1949 the Province of Madras filed a written statement in which it contested the petitioners’ claim. In the interval between these two filings the Madras Legislature enacted the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation (Amendment) Act, known as Madras Act XIII of 1949, which altered the definition of “temple” in section 2(2) of Act V of 1947 and made related changes to the preamble and other provisions of that Act. Under the amended definition a temple was described as “a place which is dedicated to or for the benefit of the Hindu community or any section thereof as a place of public religious worship.” The Amendment Act became effective on 28 June 1949. In its written statement dated 25 July 1949 the Government denied that the temple had been founded solely for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. It maintained that the Hindu public generally had a right to worship in the temple and therefore the temple fell within the original definition of a temple. The Government further pleaded that, regardless of the original purpose, the temple also satisfied the definition as amended by Act XIII of 1949 because the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins constituted a section of the Hindu community, and consequently the suit ought to be dismissed. After the Constitution of India came into force on 26 January 1950, the petitioners amended their plaint on 11 February 1950, contending that, even if the temple were denominational, they were protected by Article 26 of the Constitution. They argued that the question of who may participate in worship was a matter of religion and that section 3 of the Act, which opened the institution to communities other than the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, conflicted with Article 26(b) and was therefore void. The matter proceeded to trial before the Subordinate Judge of South Kanara. The judge observed that although the temple had originally been established for certain immigrant families of Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, over time it had become a place of worship for Hindus of all classes. Accordingly, he concluded that the temple satisfied the definition of “temple” in section 2(2) of the Act as originally drafted. Regarding the claim that Article 26(b) gave the petitioners a right to exclude all others from worship, the judge held that the phrase “matters of religion” in that Article referred only to religious beliefs and doctrines and did not extend to rituals.

The trial judge dismissed the suit, awarding costs, on the ground that Articles 17 and 25(2) of the Constitution, which were enacted on a policy of high importance, must prevail. The plaintiffs therefore filed an appeal before the High Court of Madras, recorded as A.S. No. 145 of 1952. The Court noted that another inter‑parties proceeding, which bore directly on the questions now before it, required reference. In 1951 the Madras Legislature enacted the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (Madras XIX of 1951), a statute that transferred to the State the power of superintendence and control over temples and mutts. The Act established a hierarchy of officials to be appointed by the State and conferred on those officials extensive authority to control and even manage the religious institutions. As a consequence of that legislation a series of writ applications were filed in the Madras High Court challenging the validity of the Act’s provisions on the basis that they were repugnant to Articles 19, 25 and 26 of the Constitution. One of those writs was Writ Petition No. 668 of 1951, filed by the trustees of the Sri Venkataramana Temple at Moolky. The trustees asserted that, because the temple was a denominational institution, it possessed a right under Article 26(b) to govern its own religious affairs without interference from any external authority, and that the statutory provisions of the Act violated that constitutional right.

On 13 December 1951 the Madras High Court delivered its judgment, holding that the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community constituted a distinct section of the Hindu public, that the Venkataramana Temple at Moolky was a denominational temple founded for the benefit of that community, and that many of the Act’s provisions infringed the right guaranteed by Article 26(b) and were therefore void, as reflected in the decision reported in Devaraja Shenoy v. State of Madras. The State of Madras appealed this judgment before this Court in Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1953; however, the appeal was subsequently withdrawn and formally dismissed on 30 September 1954. The appellants contend that, by virtue of the inter‑parties decision in those earlier proceedings, the question of whether the temple is denominational has already been settled in their favour. Returning to the present litigation, after the dismissal of Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1953 by this Court, the plaintiffs’ appeal (A.S. No. 145 of 1952) was scheduled for hearing. On the application of the appellants, the proceedings of the earlier writ petition were admitted as additional evidence. Upon reviewing the complete record, including the materials from Writ Petition No. 668 of 1951, the learned Judges concluded that the Sri Venkataramana Temple had indeed been founded for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community and was therefore a denominational temple. Addressing the contention that section 3 of the Act conflicted with Article 26(b), they

The Court held that because a denominational institution is also a public institution, Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution applied, granting all Hindus entry for worship. However, the Court also found that evidence showed certain religious ceremonies were exclusive to Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, and that exclusivity was protected by Article 26(b). The cited authority (1) (1952) 2 M.L.J. 481 was relied upon to support that finding. Accordingly, the decree specifically reserved to the appellants the right to exclude the general public during those particular ceremonies and occasions. Subject to that reservation, the Court dismissed the appeal. The plaintiffs responded by filing Civil Appeal No. 403 of 1956, based on a certificate issued by the High Court. In addition, Petition No. 327 of 1957 seeking leave to appeal under Article 136 was placed before this Court, referring to the High Court’s modifications favoring the appellants. During the pendency of these proceedings, a reorganisation of states transferred the District of South Kanara, where the temple stands, from Madras to Mysore. Consequently, the State of Mysore substituted for the State of Madras in the record and now contests the appeal, applying for leave to appeal against the modifications. The application was markedly out of time, and counsel for the appellants, Mr M K Nambiar, strongly objected to its consideration at this stage. It was observed that the State of Madras had never filed any application for leave to appeal this Court against the Madras High Court decision. Furthermore, the State of Madras had accepted the High Court’s decision as correct and had opposed granting leave to the appellants on the ground that the issues were purely factual, not legal, and that the judgment recognised the rights of all Hindus. The State later argued that a party which acquiesces in a judgment and deliberately lets the time for appeal lapse should not be allowed to later seek condonation of delay. While that argument was persuasive, the Court noted that the outcome of the present litigation would affect public rights, making it just to decide the matter on its merits. Accordingly, the Court condoned the delay and proceeded to hear counsel on the application. Because of this decision, it was unnecessary to address the arguments raised at the Bar concerning the scope of Article 132 and the entitlement to appeal on a certificate.

In the present matter no appeal had, in fact, been filed by the respondent, and the Court therefore turned to the arguments that had been presented for consideration. The issues that required determination were as follows: (1) whether the Sri Venkataramana Temple at Moolky qualified as a temple within the meaning of section 2(2) of the Madras Act V of 1947; (2) if it did qualify, whether it could be characterized as a denominational temple; (3) assuming it was a denominational temple, whether the plaintiffs were entitled to exclude all Hindus other than Gowda Saraswath Brahmins from entering the temple for worship on the ground that such exclusion was a matter of religion protected by article 26(b) of the Constitution; (4) if that were so, whether section 3 of the Act was valid on the basis that it was a law protected by article 25(2)(b) and that such a law would prevail over the right conferred by article 26(b); and (5) if section 3 of the Act was valid, whether the modifications made by the High Court in favour of the appellants were legal and proper.

The first of these questions was addressed by counsel for the appellants, who argued that the temple in question was a private temple and consequently fell outside the scope of the Act. That particular plea, however, had not been advanced in any of the pleadings. The plaint merely alleged that the temple had been founded for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins residing in Moolky Petah, and it contained no allegation that the temple was private. At the time the suit was instituted, the definition of “temple” then in force covered only institutions that were dedicated to or for the benefit of the Hindu public in general. Under that definition it would have been sufficient for the plaintiffs simply to state that the temple was not a public‑interest institution, and it would not have affected the legal position whether the temple was private or intended for the benefit of a particular section of the public.

Subsequently, the Legislature amended the definition of “temple” by means of Act XIII of 1949, expanding it to include institutions dedicated to or for the benefit of any section of the public. That amendment therefore encompassed a temple founded for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, but it did not bring a private temple within the definition. In the written statement filed by the Government, the amended definition of “temple” was expressly relied upon in response to the plaintiffs’ claim. In that context, the plaintiffs would have needed to raise the defence that the temple was private if they wished to rely upon it. Instead of advancing such a plea, they accepted the position taken by the Government in its written statement and simply contended that, on the basis that the temple was denominational, they were entitled to the protection afforded by article 26(b).

Article 26(b) was discussed in the judgment, and the Subordinate Judge noted in paragraph 19 that the plaintiffs had conceded that the temple fell within the definition that had been amended by Act XIII of 1949. Counsel for the respondents, Mr M K Nambiar, directed attention to Exhibit A‑2, which reproduced an award dated 28 November 1847 and stated that the temple had originally been founded for the benefit of five families of Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. He also pointed to Exhibit A‑6, the decree in the scheme suit numbered O S No 26 of 1915, in which it was declared that the institution belonged to that community. On the basis of these documents and other evidence, he argued that the character of the temple—whether it was a private or a public institution—was a matter of legal inference that could be drawn from the materials, and that even though the issue had not been raised in the pleadings, it should be permitted to be considered as a pure question of law. The Court was unable to accept this submission. It explained that the purpose of requiring a party to set out its pleas in the pleadings is to give the opposite party an opportunity to contest them and to present evidence in support of its own case. To refer to evidence that was offered in relation to a matter that was actually in dispute, and then to reach a finding on a matter that was not pleaded, would be neither lawful nor equitable, and it would be inappropriate to decide the parties’ rights on the basis of such a finding. Accordingly, the Court declined to entertain the contention. It held, agreeing with the lower courts, that the Sri Venkataramana Temple at Mookly is a public temple and that it falls under the operation of Act V of 1947. The next question was whether the temple should be regarded as a denominational institution. Both lower courts had concurred that at its inception the temple had been founded for the benefit of Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. However, the Subordinate Judge observed that over time public endowments had been made to the temple and that members of all classes of Hindus were freely participating in worship there, which could be presumed to be a matter of right, leading to the conclusion that the temple had become dedicated to the Hindu public generally. In contrast, the learned Judges of the High Court reached a different conclusion. They followed the decision in Devaraja Shenoy v. State of Madras and held that the temple was a denominational one. The learned Solicitor‑General challenged this finding on two grounds. First, he argued that even if the temple had been dedicated to the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, that would make it merely a communal institution and not a denominational one, unless it could be shown that there were specific religious tenets and practices unique to that community, a fact that had not been established.

The Court observed that the facts established were that members of this community migrated from Gowda Desa first to the Goa region and subsequently to the south, that they carried their idols with them, and that when they first settled in Moolky a temple was founded and those idols were installed therein. Consequently, the Court said it was dealing with the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins not merely as a section of a broader community but as a sect associated with the foundation and maintenance of the Sri Venkataramana Temple, that is, as a religious denomination rather than a simple denomination. Evidence of the first witness indicated that the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins recognised three Gurus, that those residing in Moolky Petah were followers of the head of the Kashi Mutt, and that this head performed several important ceremonies in the temple. Exhibit A, a document dated 1826‑27, showed that the head of the Kashi Mutt settled disputes among the Archakas and that the Archakas agreed to conduct puja under his orders. The uncontradicted testimony of the first witness also demonstrated that during certain religious ceremonies persons who were not Gowda Saraswath Brahmins were wholly excluded. These facts led the Court irresistibly to conclude that the temple was a denominational one, as contended by the appellants. The respondent’s second argument was that the evidence disclosed that all communities had been freely admitted into the temple, and although the first witness stated that persons other than Gowda Saraswath Brahmins could enter only with the permission of the trustees, there was no instance in which such permission was refused. The respondent inferred from this that the Hindu public generally possessed a right to worship in the temple. The Court noted that the law on this subject was well settled: when the nature and extent of a temple’s dedication is in question, it must be determined from the deed of endowment if that deed is available, and where it is not, from other legally admissible material, with long and uninterrupted use serving as cogent evidence of the dedication’s terms. Because the original deed of endowment was not available and it was found that all persons worshipped in the temple without hindrance, the Court held that it would be a proper inference that they did so as a matter of right and that the original foundation was for their benefit as well. However, where the deed of endowment or other proof establishes that the original dedication was for the benefit of a particular community, the fact that members of other communities were allowed to worship cannot lead to the inference that the dedication was also for their benefit. Referring to Babu Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Saroop, the Court observed that it would not, in general, be consonant with Hindu sentiment or practice to turn worshippers away.

The Court observed that the customary practice of turning worshippers away was not applicable in the present situation. It relied upon the findings of the earlier judgment reported in 1939 L. R. 67 I. A. 1, which had held that the foundation of the temple was originally intended for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community. The Court noted that, even though other classes of Hindus were subsequently admitted to worship freely in the temple, such admission did not alter the original scope of the dedication so as to convert it into a dedication for the public at large. After a full consideration of the material placed before it, the Court found no reason to depart from the conclusion reached by the learned judges of the lower court, namely that the suit temple was a denominational temple founded expressly for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. This conclusion was further reinforced by the decision of another bench of learned judges in Devaraja Shenoy v. State of Madras, which had arrived at a similar finding. Consequently, the Court saw no necessity to examine whether the issue was barred by the doctrine of res judicata on account of the decision rendered in Writ Petition No. 668 of 1951.

Having affirmed the finding that the Sri Venkataramana Temple at Moolky is a denominational institution established for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, the Court turned to the question of whether the appellants could lawfully exclude members of other communities from entering the temple for worship on the ground that such exclusion fell within the protection afforded by Article 26(b) of the Constitution. The learned Solicitor‑General contended that the mere exclusion of persons from a temple could not, by itself, be characterised as a matter of religion. According to him, whether such exclusion qualified as a religious matter depended upon the specific tenets of the religion represented by the institution, and he asserted that no evidence of such tenets had been produced in the present case.

The Court then examined the precise meaning of the expression “matters of religion,” a question that had earlier been considered by this Court in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt. In that authority the Court held that “matters of religion” encompassed not only doctrines and beliefs but also religious practices. In other words, the term covered both the knowledge (Gnana) and the devotional (Bakti) and ritual (Karma) aspects of Hindu theology. The observations of Justice Mukherjea, as then recorded, were regarded as especially relevant. He explained that the essential part of a religion is primarily to be identified with reference to that religion’s own doctrines. He illustrated that if the doctrines of any Hindu sect prescribe offerings of food to an idol at particular times of day, require that periodic ceremonies be performed in a specific manner at designated times of the year, or demand daily recitation of sacred texts or oblations to the sacred fire, all such activities are to be treated as integral parts of the religion. Moreover, the mere fact that these activities involve expenditure of money, employment of priests and attendants, or the use of marketable commodities does not transform them into secular activities.

In the earlier discussion, the Court had held that activities possessing a commercial or economic character could nevertheless be regarded as religious practices and therefore fell within the meaning of article 26 (b). Having established that article 26 (b) encompassed practices that the community considered part of its religion, the Court then turned to the question of whether the denial of a person’s entry into a temple for worship constituted a religious matter under Hindu ceremonial law. The Court observed that scholars differed on whether image worship belonged to the Hindu religion as described in the Vedas. On one side, the Vedic hymns praised various deities, while on the other side, the Upanishads presented highly philosophical passages that described the Supreme Being as omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent and beyond all names and forms. When the discussion moved to the Puranas, the Court noted a marked shift, with the emergence of a trinity of gods—Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva—who were understood as manifestations of the three functions of creation, preservation and destruction that the Upanishads attributed to the Supreme Being. The Court quoted a passage from the Taittiriya Upanishad, Brigu Valli, First Anuvaka, which described the Supreme Being as “that from which all beings are born, by which they live and into which they enter and merge.” The Court explained that the gods acquired distinct forms and that their worship at home and in temples was prescribed as a means of attaining salvation. These injunctions, the Court said, had taken deep root in popular consciousness, so that daily worship of a deity in a temple became regarded as an obligatory duty of a Hindu. The Court observed that during this period temples were erected throughout the country, dedicated to Vishnu, Rudra, Devi, Skanda, Ganesha and other deities, and that temple worship had become the practical religion of all Hindu sections. With the increasing importance of temples and of worship carried out therein, the Court noted that greater attention was paid to the ceremonial law governing temple construction, idol installation and the conduct of worship. Numerous treatises were written to explain these rules; they are known as the Agamas. The Court mentioned that there were as many as twenty‑eight Agamas dealing with Saiva temples, the most important among them being the Kamikagama, the Karanagama and the Suprabedagama, while the Vikhānasa and the Pancharatra served as the chief Agamas for Vaishnavas. The Court explained that these Agamas contained detailed regulations concerning the manner in which a temple should be built, the location where the principal deity should be consecrated, the placement of subsidiary deities, and the positions where various classes of worshippers should stand during worship. Finally, the Court referred to a passage from the judgment of Sadasiva Aiyar J. in Gopala Muppanar v. Subramania Aiyar (1), which summarized the prescription contained in one of the Agamas.

The judgment recorded that the Nirvachanapaddhathi prescribed that Sivadwijas were to worship in the Garbagriham, Brahmins were to occupy the ante‑chamber or Sabah Mantabam, Kshatriyas, Vysyas and Sudras were to stand in the Mahamantabham, the dancer and the musician were to be placed in the Nrithamantabham to the east of the Mahamantabham, and that castes considered lower in rank were to be satisfied with merely viewing the Gopuram. The other Agamas were reported to contain comparable regulations governing the placement of worshippers. According to the Agamas, any departure from or violation of these prescribed rules rendered the idol defiled, and consequently a purificatory ceremony known as Samprokshana was required to restore the shrine’s sanctity. The Court referred to the judgment in Gopala Muppanar v. Subramania Aiyar (1914) 27 M.L.J. 253, rendered by Sadasiva Aiyar J., for support. In the case of Sankaralinga Nadan v. Raja Rajeswara Dorai, the Privy Council, affirming the Madras High Court’s decision, held that a trustee who permitted persons who, under the Agamas and the temple’s custom, were not entitled to worship inside the temple had committed a breach of trust. The Court therefore affirmed that, under the ceremonial law applicable to temples, the questions of who may enter a temple for worship, where each class of worshipper may stand, and how the worship must be conducted are matters of religion.

The Court observed that the conclusion is implicit in Article 25, which declares that all persons are freely entitled to profess, practice and propagate religion, but also states that such freedom should not affect the operation of any law that opens Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus. After addressing the Solicitor‑General’s argument that exclusion from a temple had not been shown to be a matter of religion under Hindu tenets, the Court held that if the appellants’ rights were to be determined solely under Article 26(b), then section 3 of Act V of 1947 must be declared invalid as it infringed that right. The Court identified the principal question of the appeal as whether the right guaranteed by Article 26(b) is subject to a law protected by Article 25(2)(b) that opens a “suit temple” to all classes and sections of Hindus. The Court then examined the wording of the two constitutional provisions. Article 25, in relevant part, reads: “(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion. (2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law… providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes”. The cited authority for this passage was (1908) L.R. 35 I.A. 176.

Article 26 was quoted in full, stating that, subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section of it possessed the right to (a) establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes; (b) manage its own affairs in matters of religion; (c) own and acquire both movable and immovable property; and (d) administer such property in accordance with law. The Court had previously held that the phrase “matters of religion” in clause (b) encompassed the authority to exclude persons who were not permitted by the institution’s doctrines to take part in worship. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, on the basis of Article 26, the appellants were entitled to prohibit all individuals except Gowda Saraswath Brahmins from entering the temple for the purpose of worship. By contrast, Article 25(2)(b) declared that a law opening public temples to every class of Hindus was constitutionally valid. The Court interpreted the word “public” in its ordinary sense to include any segment of the public, and therefore regarded the suit temple as a public institution within the meaning of Article 25(2)(b). Consequently, Section 3 of the relevant Act fell within the protection afforded by Article 25. The Court observed that, on its face, the two constitutional provisions appeared to be in conflict because Article 26 permitted exclusion while Article 25(2)(b) mandated openness.

Mr. M. K. Nambiar submitted that the apparent conflict could be resolved if the expression “religious institutions of a public character” were understood to refer only to institutions dedicated to the Hindu community at large, even though custom might exclude certain sections from entry. He argued that, under this interpretation, denominational institutions established for the benefit of a particular segment of Hindus would lie outside the scope of Article 25(2)(b) because they were not intended for the entire Hindu community. To support this view, he referred to the law governing the entry of excluded classes into Hindu temples and to the legislative history of such statutes in Madras. The Court noted that, according to the Agamas, a public temple was deemed to exist only when it was not shown to have been founded for the benefit of any specific community, and such a temple was intended for the benefit of all Hindus, including those traditionally excluded. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that the degree of participation permitted to an individual depended on the caste to which the individual belonged. The Court cited the case of Venkatachalapathi v. Subbarayadu, where the learned judges had approved the statement that a temple was intended for all castes but that entry restrictions existed: “Pariahs cannot go into the court of the temple even. Sudras and Baniyas can go into the hall of the temple. Brahmins can go into the holy of the holies.” The Court also referred to Gopala Muppanar v. Subramania Aiyar, where Justice Sadasiva Aiyar observed that temples were meant for worshippers of all four castes without exception, but that outcastes were subjected to severe restrictions, such as being barred from passing beyond the Dwajastambam or, at times, even the outer gate of the temple.

In the earlier discussion it was observed that the excluded classes were not permitted to see the images except during festival processions. The Court then explained that, although the statutes and case law recognised that the excluded classes were technically entitled to the benefits of a temple dedication, their actual participation in worship was minimal. To correct this inconsistency, the legislature of Madras enacted a series of statutes over a period of about ten years. The first such measure was the Malabar Temple Entry Act, cited as Madras Act XX of 1938. The Act expressly declared that its purpose was “to remove the disabilities imposed by custom and usage on certain classes of Hindus in respect of their entry into, and offering worship in, Hindu temples.” Section 2(4) of that Act defined the term ‘temple’ as “a place which is used as a place of public worship by the Hindu community generally except excluded classes …”. Sections 4 and 5 empowered the trustees of temples to open such temples to persons belonging to the excluded classes, subject to certain conditions, and the Act applied only to the District of Malabar. Subsequently, the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation and Indemnity Act, identified as Madras Act XXII of 1939, was passed. The preamble of that Act recorded that “there has been a growing volume of public opinion demanding the removal of disabilities imposed by custom and usage on certain classes of Hindus in respect of their entry into and offering worship in Hindu temples”, and further observed that “it is just and desirable to authorize the trustees in charge of such temples to throw them open to … the said classes”. Section 3 of this Act gave trustees the authority to open temples to the excluded classes, and unlike the earlier statute, its territorial extent covered the entire Province of Madras. The litigation before this Court concerned the provisions of Act V of 1947. As already noted, the original purpose of that Act was to lift the prohibition on entry into temples for communities that customarily had been excluded, and the Act also defined a ‘temple’ as a place dedicated to Hindus generally. The appellant, Mr Nambiar, argued that Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution must be interpreted in the context of the legal principles established in Gopala Muppanar v. Subramania Aiyar and the statutory definitions of ‘temple’ set out in the earlier Acts. According to that argument, the phrase “religious institutions of a public character” should be read to mean institutions dedicated for worship by the Hindu community at large, even though custom may have prohibited certain sections of the community from entering. Consequently, under that interpretation, denominational temples, which were founded for the benefit of particular Hindu sects, would fall outside the sweep of Article 25(2)(b). The Court recognised that this line of reasoning possessed considerable merit. It also noted that a major concern of Hindu social reformers before the adoption of the Constitution was the existence of untouchable communities who were barred by custom from accessing public roads and institutions that were otherwise open to all Hindus.

In the facts before the Court, it was observed that denying certain Hindus access to temples and other public places solely because of their birth could not be justified on any sound democratic principle, and that legislative measures were being taken to abolish such discrimination. This legislative effort resulted in the enactment of Article 17, which declares that “Untouchability is abolished and its practice in any form is forbidden. The enforcement of any disability arising out of ‘Untouchability’ shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.” When Article 25(2)(b) is read in the light of Article 17, the Court noted that the purpose of the former appears to be limited to allowing members of the excluded classes to enter temples that are otherwise open to all Hindus, and that this purpose would not extend to denominational temples. Denominational temples, the Court explained, are established specifically for the benefit of particular sections of Hindus, and the Constitution, through Article 26, recognises them as valid institutions. Consequently, the Court questioned what justification could exist for permitting persons who are not the intended beneficiaries to enter such temples. It drew an analogy with a trustee who diverts trust funds for purposes outside the trust; such a diversion would constitute a breach of trust, and the Court was reluctant to infer that Article 25(2)(b) authorises a breach of trust without a clear policy reason comparable to that underlying Article 17. The Court further distinguished two situations: first, the exclusion of persons from temples that serve the Hindu public at large on the ground of untouchability, which would be struck down by Article 17; and second, the exclusion of persons from denominational temples on the basis that they fall outside the objects of the foundation, a circumstance protected by Article 26. The appellants contended that Article 25(2)(b) should be applied only to the first category and not to denominational temples. They also argued that while Article 26 protects denominational institutions of all religions, Article 25(2)(b) is confined to Hindu temples, and therefore it could not have been intended to impose a limitation that would apply to institutions of one community and not to others. The Court rejected this contention, stating that no such limitation can be read into the language of Article 25(2)(b); the provision applies, in terms, to all religious institutions of a public character without any qualification or reservation.

The Court observed that “public character” under Article 25(2)(b) embraces not only temples devoted to the entire public but also those established for the benefit of particular sections, and that denominational temples are therefore included. It stressed that the wording of the provision is plain and unambiguous, and that the Court cannot insert restrictions that are absent from the text by speculating about the Legislature’s intended purpose. The Court explained that any intention must be derived solely from the words actually employed in the Constitution; what is not expressed carries no weight and cannot be treated as intended. Consequently, the Court held that denominational institutions fall within the sweep of Article 25(2)(b).

The Court then turned to the argument that interpreting the phrase “religious institutions of a public character” to include denominational institutions would collide with Article 26(b), and that, if such a conflict existed, Article 26(b) should be given precedence over Article 25(2)(b). Three grounds supporting this contention were examined. The first ground asserted that Article 25 is qualified by the expression “subject to the other provisions of this Part,” whereas no comparable limitation appears in Article 26, leading to the conclusion that Article 26(b) must prevail. The Court clarified that the qualifying phrase occurs only in clause (1) of Article 25 and not in clause (2). Clause (1) guarantees the right to freedom of conscience and the freedom to profess, practise, and propagate religion, subject to other provisions of the Fundamental Rights Chapter. One of those other provisions is Article 25(2); therefore, a law falling within Article 25(2)(b) regulates the right conferred by Article 25(1), and the limitation in Article 25(1) does not apply to that law. The second ground contended that while the right under Article 26(d) is subject to legislation, the right under Article 26(b) enjoys no such restriction, and hence any law infringing Article 26(b) must be invalid, rendering section 3 of Act V of 1947 void. The argument relied on observations made by the Court in the case of The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, page 1023, to support this position. The Court acknowledged that the right under Article 26(b) cannot be abridged by any legislation, but it noted that the validity of section 3 of the Act does not depend on its own force; rather, it depends on Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution.

The Court observed that the Constitution, while being invoked to declare section 3 of the Madras Act void for contradicting Article 26(b), simultaneously granted validity to that same provision through Article 25(2)(b). Consequently, the appellants could succeed only if they proved that Article 25(2)(b) was itself inoperative in relation to Article 26(b). The Court also noted the appellants’ argument that Article 25 protects individual rights whereas Article 26 safeguards denominational rights, and that the appellants’ claim to exclude non‑members of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin denomination would therefore remain untouched by Article 25(2)(b). The Court rejected this contention, explaining that Article 25(2)(b) confers a right on “all classes and sections of Hindus” to enter a public temple. The provision uses unqualified language, meaning the right must be available whether it is exercised against an individual under Article 25(1) or against a denomination under Article 26(b). The Court emphasized that although Article 25(1) deals with individual rights, Article 25(2) is broader, addressing community rights and controlling both Article 25(1) and Article 26(b). Thus, the two provisions possess equal authority and neither can be said to dominate the other.

The Court then turned to the method for resolving the apparent conflict between the provisions. It recalled the settled rule of construction that when two provisions of an enactment cannot be reconciled, they should be interpreted, if possible, so that effect can be given to both – a principle known as harmonious construction. Applying this principle, the Court explained that if the appellants’ view were accepted, Article 25(2)(b) would become entirely ineffective with respect to denominational temples, even though the language of the article expressly includes them. Conversely, if the respondents’ view were accepted, full effect could be given to Article 26(b) in all religious matters, subject only to the fact that, regarding entry into a temple for worship, the right declared in Article 25(2)(b) would prevail. In the first scenario, Article 25(2)(b) would be wholly displaced; in the second, both Article 25(2)(b) and Article 26(b) could operate together. Accordingly, the Court held that Article 26(b) must be read subject to Article 25(2)(b).

The Court proceeded to consider whether the modifications made by the High Court in favour of the appellants were valid. Those modifications pertained to various ceremonies related to the worship of the deity, scheduled at specific times each day and on particular occasions. The testimony of the first witness confirmed that, on those occasions, every person other than Gowda Saraswath Brahmins was excluded from participating. This evidence remained uncontradicted, and

The finding of the lower court judges was accepted, and no party before this Court challenged the correctness of that finding. It was undisputed that the modifications mentioned by the High Court related, as established in the earlier decision of the Court in The Commissioners Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, to matters of religion and were intimately connected with the worship of the deity. Because the suit temple had been identified as a denominational temple, the modifications ordered by the High Court fell within the protection afforded by Article 26(b) of the Constitution. The Solicitor‑General appearing for the respondents attacked this portion of the decree on two separate grounds. First, he argued that the right to enter a temple protected by Article 25(2)(b) is essentially a right to enter for the purpose of worship, that this right must be interpreted broadly in favour of the public, and that the modifications in question seriously infringed upon that right and therefore should be struck down as unconstitutional. The Court concurred that Article 25(2)(b) indeed guarantees a right to enter a temple for worship and that that right must be given a liberal construction to protect public interests. However, the Court also noted that a liberal construction does not make the right absolute or unlimited. For example, no member of the Hindu public could claim, under Article 25(2)(b), that a temple must remain open for worship at all hours of the day and night, nor could an individual demand to perform rites that are reserved exclusively for the Archakas. It is a well‑recognised practice among religious institutions of all denominations to restrict certain services to persons who have undergone special initiation, while at other times allowing the general public to participate in worship. Consequently, the right recognized by Article 25(2)(b) is necessarily subject to reasonable limitations or regulations, and one such limitation arises when the Court seeks to harmonise that right with the right protected by Article 26(b). The Court had previously held that a denomination’s right to completely exclude the public from worship in a temple, though covered by Article 26(b), must yield to the overriding public right under Article 25(2)(b) to enter a temple for worship. Nevertheless, where the right claimed by a denomination does not amount to an absolute, total exclusion of the public from all worship at all times, but rather to the exclusion from specific religious services that, according to the denomination’s rules, are limited to its own members, the issue is not whether Article 25(2)(b) automatically overrides and extinguishes that right. Instead, the true question is whether it is possible to regulate the rights protected by Article 25(2)(b) in such a way that both constitutional rights can be given effect. If the denominational rights were such that giving them effect would substantially diminish the public right, then the public right would prevail; otherwise, a balanced approach could preserve both sets of rights.

It was observed that if the judgment of the Constitution declares that the provision of article 25 (2) (b) overrides the provision of article 26 (b), then any right claimed under article 26 (b) must disappear. However, the Court explained that when the rights of a denomination are exercised and the remaining right of the public to worship remains substantial and not merely a token, article 25 (2) (b) may be interpreted so that it co‑exists with article 26 (b). The critical inquiry, therefore, became a question of fact: whether the rights asserted by the appellants were strictly denominational in nature, and whether, after those rights were given effect, the public still retained a substantial right of worship.

The evidence recorded by the High Court demonstrated that the rights granted to the appellants were indeed purely denominational. The first witness on behalf of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins advanced two separate claims. The initial claim stated that only members of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community possessed the right to worship in the temple at any time without permission from anyone else. The witness conceded, however, that members of the general public were regularly worshipping in the temple and that permission had never been denied to them. Consequently, this claim fell within the ambit of article 25 (2) (b) and could not be sustained. The second claim presented by the witness asserted that during particular ceremonies and special occasions, only members of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community were entitled to participate, and that all other persons were to be excluded on those occasions. This second claim was recognised as a strictly denominational right.

The Court then examined whether recognising this denominational right would leave the public with a substantial right under article 25 (2) (b). The learned Solicitor‑General himself admitted that, apart from the special occasions reserved for the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, the remaining occasions of worship were numerous and considerable, a view with which the Court concurred. Accordingly, the Court found that it was possible to protect the appellants’ rights on the designated special occasions without materially diminishing the public’s right of worship. The decree of the High Court was therefore held to strike an appropriate balance between the rights of the Hindu public under article 25 (2) (b) and the denominational rights of the appellants under article 26 (b), and it was not open to objection.

Finally, the argument was raised that members of the public were not parties to the litigation and therefore could not be bound by its outcome, suggesting that the matter should be dismissed. The Court noted that even if the public were necessary parties, this circumstance would not prevent the declaration of the appellants’ rights against the parties to the action. Thus, the existence or non‑existence of the public as litigants did not bar the recognition of the appellants’ denominational rights.

The suit had been filed expressly to challenge a Government order that held that every class of Hindus was entitled to worship in the temple that formed the subject of the litigation. While the suit was still pending, the Constitution came into operation, and the Government, in response to the claim advanced by the plaintiffs under article 26(b), set up the rights of the Hindu public under article 25(2)(b) as a counter‑claim. A full trial was conducted on all of the questions raised, and a judgment was pronounced that identified and declared the rights of the appellants together with the rights of the public. After that judgment, the appellants applied to this Court for special leave to appeal. The Government opposed that application, inter alia, on the ground that the decree of the High Court was a proper decree that recognised the rights of all sections of the public. In the view of the Court, the objection that the public were not parties to the suit in a technical sense had no substance, because it was the public’s rights that had been agitated by the Government and not any right belonging exclusively to the Government. Accordingly, the Court held that there was no basis to allow the appeal or the special leave application to proceed. Both the appeal and the application for special leave to appeal were therefore dismissed. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs throughout the proceedings, and the appellants were directed to recover their costs from the funds of the temple. The appeals were dismissed.