Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh vs State Of Punjab

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 10 April, 1957

Coram: Gajendragadkar, J.

In the matter titled Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh versus State of Punjab, reported as a decision of the Supreme Court of India dated 10 April 1957, the judgment was authored by Justice B. P. Sinha, with Justice Gajendragadkar, J. also participating. The factual background involved three accused—Harbans Singh, Gurdial Singh and Sarwan Singh—who were tried before the learned Additional Sessions Judge at Lodhiana for an alleged violation of Section 302 of the Penal Code, which prescribes punishment for murder. According to the prosecution, the accused, together with Banta Singh who later turned approver, had deliberately caused the death of Gurdev Singh on 23 November 1955 by inflicting fatal injuries with a kirpan, a toki and a dang within the limits of the village of Sohian, which falls under the jurisdiction of the Jagrson police station. The trial judge found that the charge framed against each of the three accused was proved beyond reasonable doubt and consequently convicted all of them, imposing the death penalty on each. The matter was then taken on appeal to the High Court of Punjab. The High Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence of Harbans Singh and Sarwan Singh, but reversed the judgment against Gurdial Singh, ordering his acquittal and discharge. Following this partial confirmation, Harbans Singh (identified as accused 1) and Sarwan Singh (identified as accused 3) obtained special leave to appeal before this Court.

The prosecution’s case was summarized for convenience. The victim, Gurdev Singh, was the brother of the first accused, Harbans Singh. It was noted that the brothers’ father had departed from the village several years earlier and was apparently no longer alive. The prosecution portrayed Harbans Singh as a shirker and a wasteful person, a characterization that allegedly induced impatience in Gurdev Singh. When Gurdev Singh attempted to reform Harbans Singh, the latter is said to have resented these efforts, his irritation escalating to a point where he allegedly resolved to murder his brother. According to the prosecution narrative, Harbans Singh approached his acquaintances Sarwan Singh and Gurdial Singh, requesting their assistance in executing the plan to eliminate Gurdev Singh. The prosecution further asserted that Gurdial Singh harbored personal animosity toward Gurdev Singh because of a dispute involving jokes made at the latter’s sister. In the days preceding the alleged offence, Harbans Singh and Sarwan Singh were described as sitting on a canal bank near their village, drinking liquor, when Banta Singh joined them, was invited to partake, and was informed of the murder plot. Subsequent meetings among the three men led to an agreement to procure weapons for the contemplated homicide. Consequently, an individual named Rakha was approached; following negotiations, Rakha sold a country‑made pistol and a cartridge to Sarwan Singh for a price of Rs 40. Rakha was also asked to become a participant in the conspiracy, although he ultimately declined to join the conspirators.

On the day of the offence, Sarwan Singh, Gurdial Singh and Banta Singh travelled together by bus and alighted near the road that leads to the village of Sohian. From there they proceeded on foot until they met Harbans Singh near a canal minor. Harbans Singh instructed his co‑conspirators to conceal themselves in the bushes, then produced a bottle of liquor from which all four men drank. The drinking continued until sunset, at which point Harbans Singh departed from the place and assured his friends that he would bring his brother to the spot where they were hidden. He further told them that he would give a signal by clapping his hands as soon as his brother approached the concealed location. In accordance with this plan Harbans Singh persuaded his brother, Gurdev Singh, to go ahead. While Gurdev Singh was moving, Sarwan Singh produced a cough that raised Gurdev Singh’s suspicion that some persons might be lying in wait for him. Consequently, Gurdev Singh called out to his brother Harbans Singh and expressed his doubts, to which Harbans Singh replied that he would join him shortly. At the appointed moment the three assailants emerged from their hiding place and attacked Gurdev Singh. Harbans Singh arrived at the scene and joined the assault. According to the prosecution, Harbans Singh was armed with a kirpan, Gurdial Singh wielded a lathi, the approver Banta Singh possessed a toki, and Sarwan Singh also used a kirpan. The attack was described as brutal and callous, resulting in sixty‑nine incised wounds and two contused injuries caused by a blunt weapon. After inflicting the injuries, the assailants fled the scene. Harbans Singh then returned to his village and raised a hue and cry, claiming that his brother had been carried away by a number of persons. He initially alleged that the perpetrators were Darshan Singh, Jagat Singh, Gurnam Singh and Banta Singh of the village of Pona. However, the villagers observed that Harbans Singh had not participated in rendering assistance to the victim nor in pursuing the attackers. Eventually, the villagers persuaded Harbans Singh to accompany them, and together they reached the location where Gurdev Singh’s body lay in a pool of blood. After this, Harbans Singh proceeded to the police station and, at around ten thirty p.m., filed a report stating that his brother had been murdered by the four aforementioned persons of the village of Pona. Acting upon this report, the police reached the spot in the early hours of the following morning and commenced their investigation.

From the outset the police harboured doubts about the veracity of the report lodged by Harbans Singh and suspected that Harbans Singh together with his friends might have been involved in the commission of the offence. Consequently the police arrested Sarwan Singh, Gurdial Singh and Banta Singh on 25 November and detained Harbans Singh a day later, on 26 November. During the investigation the officer recovered from Sarwan Singh a blood‑stained shirt and a chadar, and, based on information supplied by him, also retrieved from his residence a pistol and an empty cartridge. From Gurdial Singh a blood‑stained turban was seized, and the information he gave led the police to a blood‑stained wooden stick, known as a lathi. From Banta Singh a blood‑stained chadar was obtained, and his testimony enabled the discovery of a kirpan and a toki that had been thrown into a well after the crime was committed. The prosecution further alleged that, relying on the statements of Harbans Singh, police recovered additional blood‑stained clothing from Gurdev Kaur, who is the sister of Gurdial Singh. On 30 November Sarwan Singh volunteered to make a confessional statement, and the confession was recorded on the same day. Two days later, on 2 December, Banta Singh was granted a pardon and agreed to become an approver, thereby furnishing testimony against the other accused. In summary, these were the material facts and evidence presented by the prosecution.

All three accused maintained that they had no connection with the alleged murder. The learned Sessions Judge found Banta Singh to be a reliable witness and, notwithstanding his status as an approver, held that his testimony had been corroborated by material particulars. The Judge further concluded that Sarwan Singh’s confession was voluntary and truthful, and that the circumstantial evidence—including the testimony of Rakha, the blood‑stained clothing recovered from each accused, and the weapons retrieved—provided sufficient corroboration of the material points. On that basis the Judge held that the charge of murder was proved against the three accused. On appeal, the learned Judges of the Punjab High Court observed that the approver’s evidence against Gurdial Singh was highly inconsistent and therefore unreliable, leading them to acquit Gurdial Singh on the ground that the case against him was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, the High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of Harbans Singh and Sarwan Singh, reasoning that the approver’s testimony, when read together with the corroborating circumstantial evidence and Sarwan Singh’s confession, fully supported the prosecution’s case against them. The two appellants challenged this view before the Supreme Court.

In the present appeals, which were instituted under the provision of Special Leave to Appeal prescribed in Article 136 of the Constitution, the appellants would ordinarily be precluded from canvassing questions of fact before this Court. The convictions and sentences imposed upon the appellants appear, on their face, to be founded upon concurrent findings of fact. Accordingly, this Court is generally reluctant to disturb such findings unless it is convinced that the determinations are impaired by legal errors or that the conclusions drawn by the lower courts are so unmistakably at variance with established judicial principles that they may be described as wholly unjustified or even perverse. On behalf of the appellant Harbans Singh, it was submitted that the judgment of the High Court of Punjab contains a serious flaw because, in examining the testimony of the approver, the learned judges failed to address the preliminary issue of the approver’s reliability as a witness. The difficulty presented by the testimony of an approver has been examined on numerous occasions by the Privy Council and by Indian courts, and it is unnecessary to restate the legal position in exhaustive detail. An accomplice is unquestionably a competent witness under the Indian Evidence Act; however, the mere fact that the witness participated in the commission of the offence indelibly stains his evidence. Consequently, courts are naturally hesitant to rely on such tainted testimony unless it is corroborated in material particulars by independent evidence. It would be improper to require that such independent corroboration encompass the entire prosecution narrative or every material detail, for that would render the accomplice’s evidence redundant. Conversely, it would also be unsafe to accept the approver’s account merely because it is supported by minor or incidental details, as such limited corroboration does not provide the assurance necessary to accept the principal story disclosed by the approver as reliable. Nevertheless, before the Court can assess the adequacy of corroboration, the first and essential question must be whether the accomplice, acting as approver, is a trustworthy witness. If the answer to this preliminary query is negative, the matter ends there and no consideration of corroboration is required. In other words, the evaluation of an approver’s testimony must satisfy a two‑fold test: firstly, the testimony must demonstrate that the approver is a reliable witness—a requirement common to all witnesses; secondly, assuming this reliability is established, the testimony must then be supported by sufficient corroboration, a test that is particularly stringent in cases involving weak or tainted evidence such as that of an approver.

The Court observed that the evidence of an approver must be supported by adequate corroboration, a requirement that is unique to weak or tainted testimony such as that of an approver. The counsel for the petitioner argued that the learned Judges of the High Court of Punjab had failed to address the preliminary issue of whether the approver was a reliable witness, and that this omission rendered their assessment of the approver’s evidence seriously defective. The Court agreed with this submission. After a careful reading of the High Court’s judgment, the Court found no indication that the learned Judges examined the character of the approver’s evidence or concluded that it was given by a reliable witness. The only passage in the judgment that touched upon this subject merely noted that, because the approver’s testimony constituted the principal evidence, each appellant’s case had to be considered individually. The Court considered this observation open to the criticism raised by the counsel for the petitioner. The failure to consider the reliability of the approver could not be dismissed as a purely academic matter, because the approver’s evidence in this case was so riddled with contradictions that it was difficult to avoid the inference that the approver was entirely unreliable. The Court further noted that the High Court itself had criticized the approver’s statements in the prosecution case against Gurdial Singh, describing the account as unreliable and observing that, although circumstantial evidence generated some suspicion, it was insufficient to sustain a conviction. The Court reasoned that, had the High Court found the approver’s narrative against one accused wholly discrepant, it should have inevitably prompted a more cautious scrutiny of his testimony concerning the remaining accused. Moreover, the Court expressed regret that the High Court judges apparently did not notice even more serious inconsistencies in the approver’s version regarding the role assigned to Harbans Singh in the offence. In the trial‑court testimony, the approver unequivocally implicated Harbans Singh in the commission of the offence. However, during cross‑examination, it emerged that the approver’s initial statement to the investigating officer on 25 November was wholly inconsistent with his later narrative. In that first statement, the approver asserted that only three persons—himself, Sarwan Singh, and Gurdial Singh—were involved in the crime and expressly stated that Harbans Singh did not participate in the murder of Gurdev Singh. The Court highlighted that, with respect to almost every material aspect of Harbans Singh’s participation, the trial‑court account conflicted with the initial police statement.

In the approver’s first statement to the police, he had asserted that Harbans Singh did not take part in the murder of Gurdev Singh. The Court observed that, with respect to almost every material point concerning the role of Harbans Singh in the offence, the narrative presented by the approver at trial contradicted his earlier statement to the police. At trial, the approver alleged that Gurdial Singh possessed a lathi, that Gurdial Singh subsequently seized a kirpan from Sarwan Singh and used it to kill Gurdev Singh, and that thereafter Harbans Singh himself struck the victim on the neck with the kirpan. By contrast, in his police statement the approver merely said that Gurdial Singh carried a kirpan and made no reference to Harbans Singh delivering a blow. The Court noted that it was deliberately omitting discussion of several other minor inconsistencies that emerged during the approver’s cross‑examination.

The Court further expressed the view that the inconsistencies identified in the approver’s testimony concerning the prosecution’s case against Gurdial Singh, together with the more serious contradictions concerning the case against Harbans Singh, led to a single conclusion: the approver appeared to have no regard for truth. It was acknowledged that the approver’s second statement, recorded on 29 November, substantially altered his original version by implicating Harbans Singh in the crime, and that, in this respect, the later statement could be described as consistent with his trial testimony. However, the Court could not ignore the circumstance that, within three days of recording the second statement, the approver was granted a pardon and his statement was formally recorded under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code on the same day. Consequently, the accused were entitled to argue that the additional allegations in the later statement might have been motivated by a promise of pardon.

Beyond that consideration, the Court emphasized that the positive assertions made in the approver’s first recorded statement left no doubt that the subsequent accusations against Harbans Singh were merely embellishments intended to involve him in the offence. The Court remarked that if the later statements had simply added details absent from the initial account, the situation might have been viewed differently. While acknowledging that omissions do not always carry the same weight as direct contradictions, the Court found that, in the present case, the two sets of statements were wholly inconsistent and irreconcilable, thereby creating a serious defect in the witness’s character. The Court regretted that the High Court judges had not been made aware of this critical aspect and had not been invited to examine the fundamental question of whether the approver, Banta Singh, could be considered a reliable witness at all.

The Court observed that a person may possess the competency to testify yet still lack the reliability required of an approver, and that the reliability test must be satisfied before any consideration is given to corroborating the approver’s evidence in criminal proceedings. The Court further held that if the approver’s testimony is dismissed as unreliable, the prosecution’s case against Harbans Singh must inevitably collapse. The prosecution, it noted, did rely on certain circumstances that appeared against the accused. For example, the evidence of the witness identified as Rakha (P.W. 8) indicated that Harbans Singh and the other accused had been involved in the purchase of a pistol from Rakha. The Court pointed out that the pistol in question was never employed in the commission of the offence, making it difficult to explain its relevance. While the purchase of the pistol might arouse suspicion against Harbans Singh, the Court emphasized that even strong suspicion cannot substitute for proof. The Court also recorded that Harbans Singh sustained injuries and that his conduct immediately after the alleged offence was highly suspicious. Again, the Court stressed that such suspicious circumstances, without the foundation of the approver’s testimony, could not play an effective role in a criminal trial. Furthermore, the Court held that the discovery of clothing allegedly made at Gurdev Kaur’s place could not be pressed against Harbans Singh because Gurdev Kaur herself had not been examined, and the recovery of a kirpan and a red scabbard from the spot, though noteworthy, did not by itself establish guilt. In the Court’s opinion, there was no doubt that if the approver’s evidence were rejected as unreliable, the remaining evidence on which the prosecution relied could not sustain a conviction for murder. Consequently, the Court concluded that the High Court’s finding that the offence of murder had been proved against Harbans Singh was vitiated by a serious infirmity and must be reversed. The Court also noted that the High Court had failed to address the preliminary legal question before examining the merits of the approver’s evidence and had omitted to consider the glaring inconsistencies in the approver’s account, thereby allowing the appellant to challenge the validity of that conclusion. Accordingly, the Court allowed Harbans Singh’s appeal, set aside the order of conviction and sentence, and acquitted and discharged him.

The discussion then turned to accused number 3, Sarwan Singh. The Court reiterated that the High Court’s conviction of Sarwan Singh was founded, as stated in its judgment, on the approver’s evidence and that this evidence was said to be corroborated in every particular by Sarwan Singh’s own confessional statement. The Court further noted that, in addition to the approver’s testimony, other circumstantial evidence had been referred to earlier in the proceedings, which supported the conviction.

In this judgment the Court described the prosecution narrative at its outset and observed that if the approver is found to be an unreliable witness, then the foundation of the High Court’s evidence, which relied on the approver while dealing with the case against Sarwan Singh, becomes unsettled. The Court explained that if the approver lacks credibility, it would not be possible to entertain the question of whether the approver’s evidence is corroborated by the confessional statement made by Sarwan Singh himself. The Court noted that Sarwan Singh did make a confession and that, in law, a conviction could be based on that confession even though he later retracted it. Nevertheless, the Court stated that ordinarily courts require some corroboration of a confessional statement before convicting an accused on that basis, and the amount of corroboration needed is a factual determination dependent on the circumstances of each case. In the present case the learned Sessions Judge examined the voluntariness of Sarwan Singh’s confession and found in favour of its protection. The High Court judgment indicates that the High Court judges agreed with the trial judge because the magistrate’s evidence, who recorded the confession, appeared to show that the confession was voluntary. That view is now seriously challenged before this Court by counsel for Sarwan Singh. The Court observed that whether the confession is voluntary is a question of fact and it would be reluctant to interfere with a factual finding unless it is convinced that the finding was reached without applying the proper legal tests. As with the approver’s testimony, the Court noted that the lower courts apparently did not consider certain salient and grave features that have a material bearing on the voluntariness of the confession. Sarwan Singh was arrested on 25 November; his clothes were found stained with blood and it is alleged that he was inclined to assist the prosecution by making the statement that led to the discovery of incriminating articles. All of these events occurred on the same day, yet, without any clear explanation, Sarwan Singh remained in police custody until 30 November. That fact must be borne in mind when assessing the voluntariness of his confession. Moreover, on 30 November a further significant development occurred: on that day he was taken before the magistrate to record his confessional statement. The evidence of Magistrate Mr Grower shows

According to the record, the accused was brought before the Magistrate at approximately 2.30 p.m. He was allowed roughly half an hour to consider the statement he intended to make, and shortly thereafter his confessional statement was recorded. The Magistrate did ask the prescribed questions that had been set out in the circulars issued by the High Court of Punjab. When the learned Magistrate was later questioned about why he had not afforded the accused a longer period before recording the confession, his answer was straightforward and candid. He explained that the accused seemed eager to give his statement immediately and therefore did not delay the procedure.

The police Sub‑Inspector who had escorted the accused to the Magistrate’s chambers was reported to be standing on the verandah outside the Magistrate’s office. Although the office doors were closed, the Sub‑Inspector remained positioned outside. The Magistrate’s testimony further indicates that, once the statement was completed, the Sub‑Inspector re‑entered the Magistrate’s room. At that moment the accused exhibited visible injuries, yet the learned Magistrate did not inquire into the origin or cause of those injuries.

These surrounding circumstances raise the crucial question of whether the confession obtained from the accused can be considered voluntary. It is essential to underscore that the procedure for recording confessions under Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code is a solemn act. In performing his duties under that provision, the Magistrate must ensure that the conditions laid down in sub‑section (3) of Section 164 are fully satisfied. While it is necessary in every case to pose the questions prescribed by the High Court circulars, those questions must not become a mere mechanical exercise. No element of casualness should be permitted to infiltrate the process, and the Magistrate must be convinced that the confessional statement the accused wishes to make is truly voluntary in fact and in substance.

The Court observed that the circulars issued by the High Court of Punjab governing the procedure and the specific questions to be asked by Magistrates while recording confessions under Section 164 might require revision. It suggested that appropriate amendments and additions be made to those circulars, taking into account similar procedural circulars issued by the High Courts of Uttar Pradcsh, Bombay and Madras. The fundamental purpose of interrogating an accused who offers to confess is to obtain assurance that the confession is not the result of any inducement, threat or promise relating to the charge against the accused, as contemplated in Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. There can be no doubt that, when an accused is produced before the Magistrate by the investigating officer, the utmost care must be taken to ensure that the accused’s mind is free from any possible police influence before a confession is recorded.

The Court observed that it was essential for the mind of an accused person to be completely free from any possible influence of the police before a confession could be recorded. The most effective method of ensuring such freedom, the Court held, was to place the accused in jail custody and to allow him adequate time to consider whether he should make a confession at all. While the Court acknowledged that it would be difficult to lay down a rigid rule governing the period that must be permitted to an accused in every case, it expressed the view that, as a general principle, an accused should be given at least twenty‑four hours to decide whether to confess. Furthermore, the Court stated that when there are reasons to suspect that the accused has been persuaded or coerced, an even longer period should be allowed before his statement is recorded. Applying this principle to the present case, the Court found it impossible to accept the submission that the accused, Sarwan Singh, had been given sufficient time to reflect. The Court noted that any magistrate with adequate criminal experience would have immediately decided to grant a longer interval to Sarwan Singh, because the magistrate observed that the accused was eager to make a confession straightaway. The learned magistrate himself had indicated that he would have allowed more time but for the accused’s insistence on an immediate confession. This insistence, the Court said, should have alerted the magistrate to possible police pressure or inducement. The Court further observed that the lower courts, both the Sessions Judge and the High Court, had failed to consider the magistrate’s failure to grant adequate time, and had completely ignored this aspect in their findings.

The Court also pointed out that no attention had been given by either court to the fact that Sarwan Singh appeared to have been kept in police custody without justification from the 26th of November to the 30th of November. After examining all the relevant facts, the Court concluded that the High Court judges’ omission of these material facts created a serious legal infirmity in their conclusion that the confession was voluntary, and therefore the Court felt compelled to reverse that conclusion. In addition, the Court identified another fatal defect in the prosecution case. Even assuming that the confession were voluntary, the Court explained that it must still be established that the confession is true. To determine truth, the confession must be examined and compared with the rest of the prosecution evidence and the probabilities of the case. The Court expressed the opinion that certain material points mentioned in the confessional statement were not demonstrated to be true.

In this case, Sarwan Singh reported that at the time Gurdev Singh was assaulted he and his brother Harbans Singh were walking together. The prosecution, however, presented a different version. According to the prosecution, Harbans Singh first contacted his accomplices and told them that he would send Gurdev Singh to a location where the accomplices were lying in wait. The prosecution further alleged that when Gurdev Singh sensed the presence of people nearby, he shouted for Harbans Singh, and before Harbans could reach the spot, the assault on Gurdev began. This version, as given by the approver, conflicted with the statements contained in Sarwan Singh’s confession. The confession claimed that Dial Singh struck Gurdev Singh on the head from the front, a claim that was not supported by the medical evidence because no head injury corresponding to such a blow was found on Gurdev Singh. Sarwan Singh also said that he seized a kirpan, which had originally been used by Harbans Singh, and delivered two blows to Gurdev Singh’s thigh. Again, the medical reports did not show injuries on the thigh that matched the alleged blows. Moreover, Sarwan Singh asserted that the handle of the kirpan broke during the incident and that he injured his own finger with the broken piece. This assertion could not be reconciled with the medical evidence concerning the finger injury. The learned judges of the High Court, after concluding that the confession was voluntary, apparently assumed that the confession was also true, a conclusion that the present Court found to be another infirmity because the discrepancies between the confession and the prosecution’s principal evidence were not noted.

Turning to the physical injuries sustained by Sarwan Singh, the doctor described four distinct wounds. The first wound was a superficial incised injury with a scab measuring three‑eighths of an inch by one‑twelfth of an inch, located on the left side of the face just above the left moustache. The second wound was an abrasion with a scab measuring one‑half inch by one‑quarter inch on the opposite surface of the middle digit of the left ring finger. The third wound was an abrasion with a scab measuring one‑eighth of an inch by one‑eighth of an inch on the outer surface of the middle digit of the left little finger. The fourth wound was an abrasion with a scab measuring one‑quarter inch by one‑quarter inch on the outer surface of the terminal inter‑digital joint of the left little finger. All of these injuries were simple, had been present for approximately two days, and were described by the doctor as caused by a sharp‑edged weapon in the case of the first wound and by a blunt weapon in the cases of the remaining three wounds. During cross‑examination, the doctor acknowledged that the first injury could have been caused by a razor blade, as suggested by counsel for Sarwan Singh, and that injuries two through four could have resulted from rubbing against a hard object. Consequently, the medical evidence did not conclusively refute Sarwan Singh’s explanation of how the injuries occurred.

The Court examined the evidence concerning the blood‑stains on the shirt and chadar worn by Sarwan Singh. It held that if the explanation offered by Sarwan Singh for his injury was not unreasonable, then the presence of blood‑stains on his clothing could not be pressed against him as substantial proof of guilt. The testimony of Rakha regarding negotiations and the purchase of a pistol, and regarding Sarwan Singh’s participation in that transaction, might suggest an association with the criminals, but the Court found that such an implication was insufficient to prove the charge of murder. Moreover, as previously observed, the Court noted the difficulty of understanding why a pistol that had allegedly been purchased was not employed in the commission of the crime.

The Court also considered the evidence of the shoes that were discovered at the scene. The shoemaker, Santa Singh, testified that he identified the pair of shoes as belonging to Sarwan Singh on the night of the incident and that he manufactured such shoes, although only in limited quantities. The Court observed that during the forensic examination under Section 342 of the Code, no question was put to Sarwan Singh about these shoes, thereby denying him an opportunity to demonstrate that the shoes did not fit his feet. The Court held that this failure to allow an explanation under Section 342 supported the argument that the shoe evidence should not be used against him. In addition, the Court regarded the identification of the shoes, like Rakha’s testimony, as a minor circumstance when measured against the serious charge of murder. Consequently, the Court concluded that if the approver’s testimony were discarded as unreliable and the accused’s withdrawn confession excluded as involuntary or false, the remaining circumstantial evidence would be insufficient to sustain the murder charge. In that event, the Court determined that the High Court had erred in convicting Sarwan Singh of murder. While acknowledging the regrettable prospect of a cold‑blooded murder remaining unpunished, the Court noted that counsel for the State, Mr Gopal Singh, had vigorously argued that the prosecution story contained an element of truth concerning both appellants and that, taken as a whole, the narrative might be plausible. However, the Court emphasized that the gap between what “may be true” and what “must be true” must be bridged by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence. After carefully considering all arguments presented by counsel for the State, the Court found that the approver could not be regarded as a reliable witness and that the confession of Sarwan Singh could not be considered voluntary or true. In the result the appeal

The Court concluded that the appeal lodged by Sarwan Singh was to be granted. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the judgment which had convicted him and the punishment that had been awarded against him be set aside. In other words, the conviction and the sentence that had previously been imposed were to be declared void. As a result of this decision, the accused was to be found not guilty of the charge for which he had been tried. The Court further directed that, having been acquitted, Sarwan Singh was to be discharged and released from any further legal consequences arising from the proceedings. This direction effectively removed the previous finding of guilt and any associated penalties, restoring his legal status to that of a person who had not been convicted of the alleged offence.