Bhagwandas vs The State Of Rajasthan

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: supreme-court

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 2 April, 1957

Coram: J.L. Kapur

In this case, the Court noted that Bhagwandas and Netram, two brothers, together with Mt. Rameshwari, who was a daughter of the former, had been tried before the Sessions Judge of Ganganagar for an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge acquitted both brothers, while Mt. Rameshwari was also acquitted. Upon appeal, the High Court of Rajasthan reversed the acquittal of Bhagwandas and Netram, convicting them under section 302 read with section 34 and sentencing them to transportation for life. The High Court affirmed the acquittal of Mt. Rameshwari. The convicted individuals subsequently obtained special leave to appeal under article 136 of the Constitution.

The appeal was founded on two principal grounds. First, the appellants contended that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to justify a conviction. Second, they argued that there were no compelling reasons for the High Court to set aside the original judgment of acquittal. The prosecution’s case described that after a temporary closure, the canal reopened on May 5, 1953, and although it was not the turn of the deceased Shivlal, he was permitted to take water to irrigate his fields. On May 6, the canal flowed at full capacity, and Shivlal’s allotted turn of water – six hours from eight in the morning to two in the afternoon – was reduced to two and a half hours because the village diggi (pond), which was dry, needed to be filled.

According to the testimony of Mirab Ram Karan, designated as the first prosecution witness, he, with Shivlal’s consent, diverted the water to fill the diggi, promising Shivlal that the remainder of his turn – three and a half hours – would be provided after the diggi was filled. The diggi was completed by one in the afternoon on May 7. When Shivlal subsequently attempted to divert the water into his own field, Bhagwandas obstructed him, asserting that the turn now belonged to him. Mirab Ram Karan testified that Bhagwandas’s turn followed that of Surta, whose turn was immediately after Shivlal’s.

The Court recorded that, because Shivlal was prevented from taking his turn, he began walking toward the village intending to speak with the Mirab. At that moment, Bhagwandas allegedly shouted “the enemy was going” and struck Shivlal on the head with a kassi. The second brother, Netram, then hit Shivlal with a lathi, causing him to fall, and both brothers continued to beat him. It was alleged that Mt. Rameshwari also participated in the assault, using a wooden handle of a kassi. This violent episode was witnessed by Hazari, the third prosecution witness, who was grazing his camels in the field of Surta. Hazari approached the scene, shouted at the assailants, after which they fled, leaving their kassi behind. Hazari found Shivlal seriously injured and unconscious.

Hazari sprinkled some water on Shivlal’s face, which revived him. After regaining consciousness, Shivlal asked Hazari to take him to the police station, but Hazari instead helped him walk a short distance to the threshing floor of Hukma. Hazari then left Shivlal in the company of Jora, Jagmal, Bhogar, Begaram and Binja, and, when they inquired, he told them what he had witnessed. Subsequently, Bhaggu and Jagmal placed Shivlal on a she‑camel and conveyed him to Raisinghnagar, where they took him to the shop of Gyani Ram. At Gyani Ram’s shop Shivlal narrated that Bhagwandas, Netram and Rameshwari had assaulted him over a water dispute, and he requested Gyani Ram to summon his son Ram Pratap and his commission agent Ishardas. Ram Pratap arrived at about six in the evening, Shivlal repeated his account to him, and thereafter Jagmal, Bhaggu and others escorted Shivlal to the hospital. At the hospital the treating doctor recorded that Shivlal was unconscious on arrival at five in the afternoon, bore fifteen injuries, of which the first injury was inflicted by a sharp‑edged weapon and the second by a blunt weapon; both injuries were described as grievous and, taken together, sufficient to cause death. Shivlal died the next day, the eighth of the month, at eight‑fifteen in the morning.

The First Information Report was prepared on the basis of a written statement, Exhibit P‑1, submitted by Ram Pratap, the son of Shivlal, and was recorded on the seventh of May at approximately seven‑thirty in the evening. The prosecution relied on the testimony of two eyewitnesses, the recovery of the weapon known as a kassi, and three dying declarations allegedly made to three different persons. The two eyewitnesses produced were Begaram and Hazari. The dying declarations were said to have been made first to Jora, later to Gyani Ram at his shop, and finally to Ram Pratap, who had arrived at the shop at six in the evening; the declaration to Ram Pratap, if it occurred, must have been made at that time. The doctor’s evidence confirmed that Shivlal was unconscious when brought to the hospital and listed the fifteen injuries, emphasizing that the injuries caused by the sharp‑edged and blunt weapons were each grievous and collectively fatal. The learned Sessions Judge found the prosecution’s evidence to be unreliable and not free from suspicion, and consequently acquitted the accused, holding that the material was insufficient to sustain a conviction. Begaram’s testimony was disbelieved by both the Sessions Judge and the High Court. Although the Sessions Judge described Hazari as a “facile fluent liar,” the High Court gave effect to his testimony. Both courts rejected the statement of Ram Pratap, whereas the High Court accepted the statements of Gyani Ram and Jora, which the Sessions Judge had dismissed. The High Court ultimately based its decision on Hazari’s eyewitness account and on the two witnesses before whom Shivlal was alleged to have made dying declarations, despite apparent contradictions between Hazari’s testimony and that of Begaram. The High Court disposed of the matter on these grounds.

The Court observed that Bega’s alleged presence “on the spot is open to grave doubts,” and therefore it was improper to contradict a witness who was actually present by relying on the testimony of another person who was probably not there. The learned judges then made a significant observation regarding Hazari, stating that it appeared Hazari said Bega was present because the prosecution intended to produce Bega as a witness and had likely prompted Hazari to mention his presence; furthermore, nothing in Hazari’s cross‑examination cast doubt on the part of his statement that described the incident itself. The judges also noted, without attaching importance, other contradictions in Hazari’s statements made before the trial court and before the police. They held that, if Hazari mentioned Bega’s presence merely to assist the prosecution in introducing Bega as a witness, such conduct would materially damage Hazari’s reliability, making it dangerous to accept his testimony as having any great value, a value further reduced by the finding of Mt. Rameshwari’s innocence. The prosecution’s other evidence consisted of two dying declarations made by Shivlal to Gyaniram (PW 4) and Jora (PW 7). The Court pointed out that the testimony of these two witnesses suffered from material contradictions at various stages, as highlighted by the Sessions Judge, who remarked that “in such a state of affairs I refuse to put any weight and value to the statement of Gyaniram.” Consequently, the Court concluded that these dying declarations could not form a reliable foundation for sustaining a conviction if Hazari’s testimony, the sole eye‑witness, were to be disregarded, which the Court deemed necessary; ordinarily, a dying declaration alone is insufficient to support a murder conviction. The Sessions Judge had also opined that the doctor’s (PW 11) evidence rendered the claim that Shivlal could walk a short distance on the Khala of Hukma or speak to make a dying declaration improbable. However, the High Court judges dismissed this view, stating that the doctor was relatively young and that his statements did not align with the opinions expressed in medical jurisprudence texts by authors such as Modi and Lyon. The Court noted, however, that those authors’ opinions were not given in circumstances exactly comparable to those of the present case.

In examining whether it was appropriate to dispose of the expert’s evidence without presenting to him the passages that were intended to undermine his opinion, the Court observed that such a method was unsatisfactory. The Court referred to the decision in Sundarlal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, which criticised judges for reaching adverse conclusions against an accused by relying on unchallenged excerpts of a medical witness’s testimony. Accordingly, the Court held that the learned Judges of the High Court erred in accepting the testimony of those medical witnesses as support for the correctness of the two dying declarations, and likewise concluded that the statement attributed to the deceased under the circumstances of this case could not be regarded as sufficient to sustain the conviction of the accused. The Court noted that the recovery of the kassi was a completely neutral fact because no evidence had been produced to show that the object belonged to Bhagwandas. Although the Court would not normally disturb the findings of the High Court when its conclusions on guilt or innocence differ from those of the trial Court, the Court emphasized that when the evidence is such that no tribunal could legitimately infer guilt, the conviction must be set aside. In support of this principle, the Court quoted the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Stephen Seneviratne v. The King, which stated that “there are here no grounds on the evidence, taken as a whole, upon which any Tribunal could properly, as a matter of legitimate inference, arrive at a conclusion that the appellant was guilty.” The Court further expressed its view that the evidence in the present matter was of such low quality that no legitimate inference of the accused’s guilt could be drawn. The second ground of attack on the High Court’s judgment concerned the absence of compelling reasons for overturning an acquittal. The Court reiterated that a higher court may not set aside an acquittal unless there are substantial and compelling reasons, as laid down in precedents such as Surajpal Singh v. State, Ajmer Singh v. The State of Punjab, and Aher Raja Khima v. The State of Saurashtra. The High Court’s judgment, the Court observed, failed to disclose any such reasons justifying interference with the trial Court’s findings. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court, restored the acquittal ordered by the Sessions Judge, and affirmed the other acquittals of the accused. The appeal was thus allowed.