Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak... vs Raja Shiv Rattan Dev Singh And Ors.

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Not extracted

Decision Date: 24 March, 1955

Coram: Jagannadhadas, J.

The judgment concerns an appeal filed by the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee against the order of the Punjab High Court dated 20 June 1950. Leave to appeal was granted under Article 133 of the Constitution together with Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order 45, Rule 2 of the same Code. The appeal originates from a suit that was instituted in 1938 by Raja Shiv Rattan Dev Singh, the Raja of Poonch, against three respondents: the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar; the Local Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee of Sri Darbar Sahib, Amritsar; and a group of fifty-seven Sikhs. The plaintiff sought a declaration that a house known as Bunga Raja Dhian Singh in Amritsar together with four adjoining shops, two of which stood near the Sikh Gurdwara Sri Darbar Sahib, were his private property and did not constitute a Sikh Gurdwara. The trial court dismissed the suit on certain preliminary issues, a dismissal that was reversed on the first appeal, resulting in the remand of the suit to the trial court. On a second appeal to the High Court, a single judge restored the trial court’s original dismissal in 1941. The aggrieved party then preferred a letters-patent appeal to a larger bench of the High Court. The bench, after hearing arguments and reaching tentative conclusions on the points raised, issued an order on 16 June 1941 adjourning the hearing to a later date for reasons recorded in that order. For reasons not recorded in the report, the appeal remained inactive for a considerable period before finally being taken up for final disposal by a full bench of the High Court in 1950. The High Court, by its judgment of 20 June 1950, made specific findings on the preliminary issues, reversed the earlier single-judge order, allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the trial court “for proceeding in accordance! with law”. The present appeal before the Supreme Court challenges the directions issued by the High Court in that 1950 judgment.

A preliminary objection was raised at the outset, contending that the present appeal was incompetent because the provision under which the High Court granted leave did not apply to the order being challenged. The objection asserted that the order of the High Court was not a final order within the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution and therefore could not be the subject of a further appeal. In addition, the learned Attorney-General informed the Court that after the High Court’s order of 1950, the trial court proceeded to dispose of the suit without any stay of its jurisdiction. The Attorney-General further indicated that the trial court subsequently decreed relief in favour of the present respondent and that no appeal had been filed against that decree. A certified copy of the trial court’s judgment on remand has been placed before the Court, and the Court has heard additional arguments on the preliminary objection in light of that judgment. The Court noted that the question of whether the High Court’s remand order qualified as a final decision was pivotal to determining the jurisdiction of the present appeal. The Court stated that it would consider the merits of the preliminary objection after concluding its overall reasoning.

The Court noted that the trial Court, on remand, had rendered a decree in favour of the present respondent and that, because no appeal had been filed against that decree, an additional ground existed to render the present appeal incompetent. A certified copy of the trial Court’s judgment on remand had been placed before the Court, and further arguments on this preliminary objection had been heard in light of that copy. The Court indicated that the consideration of this preliminary objection would be postponed until the conclusion of the judgment.

The litigation before the Court arose from a series of events concerning certain suit properties that were governed by the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 (Punjab Act VIII of 1925), hereinafter referred to as the Act, which had come into force on 1 November 1925. Under Section 3(2) of the Act, the Provincial Government issued a notification on 13 December 1927, referring to a claim and a list forwarded to the Government under Section 3(1) alleging that the suit properties belonged to the Sikh Gurdwara Harmandir Sahib (Darbar Sahib). Three persons, including the present respondent, filed objections to that notification under Section 5(1) of the Act, each asserting ownership of the properties. The objections of the other two persons, namely Nikka Singh and Suchat Singh, were eventually withdrawn or dismissed. The objection lodged by the respondent, identified as the Raja of Pooneh, was taken up before the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal constituted under the Act. A compromise was subsequently reached between the Raja and the Local Committee of the Gurdwara, and on the basis of that compromise the Tribunal issued a decree on 17 June 1933. The terms of the compromise provided that the property, consisting of a Bunga and adjoining shops, was acknowledged as the Raja’s property; however, the Bunga, excluding the shops, was to be held as a waqf for the use of pilgrims to the Darbar Sahib. The income generated by the shops was to be applied to the interests of the Bunga, while the management of the Bunga was to be entrusted to the Local Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, subject to the prior written consent of the Raja and to his general advice and direction. The authority to let the shops and to evict their tenants rested with the Raja, and the rent received from the shops was to be made available for the expenses of the Bunga. The Court explained that a “Bunga” is a hostel where pilgrims traveling from various parts of India to visit the Golden Temple may stay, as defined in Gurdwaras Committee, Amritsar v. Indar Singh, AIR 1933 Lah 1041 (A), quoting Mehr Singh v. Sochet Singh, AIR 1916 Lah 98 (B). It was further observed that in the earlier proceedings the suit properties were claimed only as belonging to the main Gurdwara Darbar Sahib and not as constituting a Sikh Gurdwara in their own right, and that the claim had been resolved by acknowledging the Raja’s title while imposing the condition that the property would be held for the benefit of the pilgrims.

The earlier settlement relating to the benefit of pilgrims to the Darbar Sahib was separate from another set of proceedings that had been initiated under Section 7 of the Act. On 24 October 1926, an application was filed by fifty-seven Sikhs claiming that the properties in question themselves constituted a Sikh Gurdwara. In response, the Government issued a notification on 23 July 1929 pursuant to Section 7(3) of the Act. The accompanying list, which was attached to the application filed under Section 7(1) and made reference to the provisions of Section 7(3), indicated that the properties were then in the possession of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, Amritsar. Apart from this general notification, there is no evidence that individual notices were served as required by Section 7(4) of the Act.

Objections to the notification were subsequently lodged under Section 10 of the Act by two individuals, Nikka Singh and Suchet Singh, who had earlier filed objections to a notification made under Section 3(1). Both of these later objections were ultimately dismissed, either for default or for non-prosecution, in a manner similar to the dismissal of their earlier objections filed under Section 5(1). The present plaintiff, the Raja, did not file any objection under Section 10 claiming the alleged Gurdwara as his private property. This lack of objection appears to have resulted from the absence of a specific notice to him of the claim made under Section 7. No person filed any objection to the notification issued under Section 8, and despite the lack of any such objection, the Government did not issue a notification under Section 9.

It may be noted that following the compromise reached in 1933, the parties apparently complied with the terms of that compromise smoothly until some time in the years 1937 to 1938. During that later period, however, a dispute arose which led the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee to approach the Provincial Government for the issuance of a notification under Section 9 of the Act. On 5 July 1938, the Provincial Government sent a letter to the Raja asking whether he had any objection to a Section 9 notification that would declare the suit properties to be a Sikh Gurdwara. The Raja responded by strongly objecting to the issuance of any such notification. Consequently, the Government refrained from publishing a Section 9 notification and, on 2 November 1938, referred the matter to the Civil Court. This referral gave rise to the suit that is the subject of the present appeal.

The trial Court identified four preliminary questions for determination. The first question was whether the plaintiff was in possession of the property that was the subject of the suit, other than the shops situated on the premises. The second question asked, if possession could not be proved, whether the suit could nevertheless proceed in its present form concerning the disputed property. The third question concerned whether the Court possessed jurisdiction to try the suit, and the fourth question examined whether the suit was barred by any limitation. After hearing the matter, the Court held that, with respect to the first two questions, the suit for a declaration concerning the disputed property was maintainable when instituted by the plaintiff. The Court then proceeded to decide the remaining two questions concerning jurisdiction and limitation, the outcomes of which will be addressed in subsequent portions of the judgment.

The first appellate court affirmed the trial court’s findings on the first two preliminary issues and, in addition, held in favour of the plaintiff on the remaining two issues, namely issues numbered three and four. Consequently, the appellate court set aside the earlier dismissal of the suit and remanded the matter back to the trial court, directing that the case be proceeded with in accordance with the law and that a decision be rendered on the merits of the claim. The appeal to the High Court was pursued in two separate stages. Initially the appeal was heard by a single judge, and thereafter the aggrieved party sought further remedy by invoking the provisions for appeal under the Letters Patent. The judgments rendered in the High Court that favoured the plaintiff on issues one, two and four do not appear to have been challenged thereafter; the only dispute that continued to be litigated before the High Court concerned the question of jurisdiction raised in issue three. It is worth noting that, during the second hearing of the Letters Patent appeal in the year 1950, a contention was raised that the death of one of the respondents while the appeal was pending, together with the failure to bring that respondent’s legal representatives onto the record, should cause the appeal to be deemed abandoned as against all respondents. The High Court rejected that submission, and the matter was not re-raised before the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the sole substantive question that remained before the Supreme Court was the jurisdictional issue embodied in issue three. In order to appreciate the arguments presented by both sides on that jurisdictional point, it is necessary to examine briefly the structure of the governing legislation. As its preamble states, the Act was enacted to provide for the better administration of certain Sikh Gurdwaras and to enable inquiries and the settlement of disputes connected therewith. Part III of the Act contains detailed provisions for the control and administration of Sikh Gurdwaras through a Central Board, a Judicial Commission and various local committees that are to be constituted in accordance with that part. Section 41 of the Act provides that the management of every Gurdwara that has been notified under the Act shall be administered by the committee constituted for that purpose, the Board and the Commission, all in conformity with the provisions of the Act. A “Notified Sikh Gurdwara” is defined as any Gurdwara that the Provincial Government has declared, by means of a notification issued under the Act, to be a Sikh Gurdwara. The procedures relating to such notification and the mechanisms for the settlement of disputes that arise prior to notification are set out in Part I of the Act. Part I relies on a legislative classification of Gurdwaras found in Schedules I and II of the Act. All Gurdwaras listed in Schedule I are deemed Sikh Gurdwaras, whereas Schedule II lists certain institutions that are expressly not Sikh Gurdwaras. Sections 3 to 6 of the Act deal with the Gurdwaras enumerated in Schedule I. In particular, Section 3(1) provides that any Sikh or any present office-holder of a Gurdwara specified in Schedule I may forward to the Provincial Government, within ninety days from the commencement of the Act, a list of properties claimed to belong to that Gurdwara, including the Gurdwara itself, together with the names of the persons in possession of those properties.

In the provisions of the Act, section 3(1) required that any person who held a position in a Gurdwara listed in Schedule I could, within ninety days after the Act commenced, submit to the Provincial Government a detailed inventory of all properties claimed to belong to that Gurdwara in Punjab, together with the name of each person then in possession of those properties. Under section 3(2), once the Provincial Government received any such inventory, it was obliged to issue a notification declaring the concerned Gurdwara to be a Sikh Gurdwara and, subsequently, to publish a consolidated list that combined the property details contained in all the inventories received under subsection (1). Section 3(3) provided that the notice of the claim, as shown in the consolidated list, was to be communicated to each of the persons named therein as being in possession of the respective properties. The Court observed that the moment the notification and the consolidated list were published under subsection (2), the provisions of Part III relating to the administration of the Gurdwara became effective from the date of that publication.

Section 5 dealt with subsequent claims on the properties listed in the consolidated list. It stipulated that, after the notification of section 3(2) was published, any person who claimed a right, title, or interest in any property shown in the consolidated list—excluding a claim to the Gurdwara itself—had ninety days to file a petition with the Provincial Government. If no such claim was filed within that period, section 5(3) directed the Provincial Government, after the expiry of the prescribed time, to issue a notification stating the rights, titles, or interests in those properties for which no claim had been made. The Court emphasized that the issuance of this notification served as conclusive proof that no claim existed concerning any right, title, or interest specified in it. Section 6 further provided that hereditary office-holders could file a claim for compensation in respect of a Sikh Gurdwara that had been notified under the foregoing provisions.

The next set of provisions, sections 7 to 11, applied to Gurdwaras alleged to be Sikh but not enumerated in Schedules I or II. Section 7 permitted any group of fifty worshippers of such a Gurdwara to submit an application to the Provincial Government asserting that the Gurdwara was a Sikh Gurdwara, provided the application was accompanied by a list of all its properties, including the property that constituted the Gurdwara itself. Upon receipt of such an application, section 7(3) required the Provincial Government to publish a notification containing the application and its accompanying list and to give notice to the interested parties. Following the publication of this notification, three distinct categories of claims could be made to the Provincial Government: (a) under section 8, any hereditary office-holder of the Gurdwara or any twenty or more worshippers could object to the Gurdwara’s declaration as a Sikh Gurdwara; (b) under section 10, any person could claim a right, title, or interest in any item of property listed in the published inventory; and (c) under section 11, any past or present hereditary office-holder could claim compensation for loss suffered or anticipated loss.

The Act provides that a claim to the right, title, or interest in any item of property listed in a notification may be made under Section 10, while a past or present hereditary office-holder of the Gurdwara may seek compensation for loss suffered under Section 11. Section 9 states that if, after a notification under Section 7(3) is published, no petition is received within ninety days under Section 8 objecting to the declaration of a Sikh Gurdwara, the Provincial Government must, after the expiry of that period, publish a further notification declaring the Gurdwara to be a Sikh Gurdwara. The mechanisms for determining the various claims arising under Sections 3 to 11 are set out in Sections 12 and 14. Section 12 authorises the Provincial Government to constitute one or more Tribunals from time to time for the purpose of deciding all claims made under the provisions of Sections 5, 6, 8, 10 or 11. Section 14 requires the Provincial Government to forward all such petitions to a Tribunal, which shall dispose of them by order in accordance with the Act. Consequently, Part I together with Schedules I and II broadly provides for (i) determination and notification of which Gurdwaras are Sikh Gurdwaras, (ii) determination of the properties belonging to each Sikh Gurdwara, (iii) determination of compensation for office-holders of those Gurdwaras for losses incurred on such notification, and (iv) establishment of Tribunals to settle the various disputes. Section 34 creates a right of appeal to the High Court against a Tribunal’s determination. Sections 29, 30, 31 and 37 delineate the jurisdiction of these Tribunals in relation to the ordinary civil courts, a point that will be examined presently.

The jurisdictional issue in the present case arises from competing arguments. The appellant contends that the plaintiff’s claim to the suit property should have been presented as an objection under Section 10 of the Act and that such a claim falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal. The respondent argues that no such claim is maintainable under Section 10 and that Sections 7 to 11 operate on the fundamental premise that a Gurdwara exists, thereby allowing objections to its character and disputes over the properties belonging to it. The respondent further maintains that deciding whether this basic premise is correct lies beyond the Tribunal’s powers and must be determined by a civil court when the question is raised. In other words, the respondent asserts that the Tribunal cannot decide whether a particular item of property is private or constitutes a Gurdwara; that determination belongs to the civil judiciary. Both sides have presented elaborate arguments, and the court has considered the views expressed by the learned judges of the High Court in their respective judgments. The ensuing discussion therefore focuses on whether the plaintiff’s claim falls within Section 10 and, if so, whether that alone resolves the question of jurisdiction.

Whether a particular item of property is the private property of an individual or whether it, by its nature, constitutes a Gurdwara is a question that must be answered by the Civil Court whenever that issue is raised. The Court has heard detailed arguments on these points and has also considered the observations made by the learned Judges of the High Court in their separate judgments in this matter. The matters raised are not simple to resolve because the relevant sections of the Act have been drafted in a manner that is both intricate and, in places, defective. After careful and thorough consideration, the Court decided that it was neither necessary nor appropriate to express a view on those broader questions. Instead, the Court held that, based on the facts of the present case, the appeal could be decided on a more limited set of grounds without addressing the larger jurisdictional issues.

Assuming, without deciding, that the appellant’s contention is correct—that the plaintiff’s claim should have been presented under Section 10 of the Act—does not, by itself, settle the jurisdictional question. The removal of the Civil Court’s jurisdiction over such a claim must be founded on a specific provision contained in the Act. The provision relied upon for this purpose is Section 29, which reads as follows: “29. Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or enactment for the time being in force no suit shall be instituted and no Court shall entertain or continue any suit or proceeding in so far as such suit or proceeding involves— (1) any claim to, or prayer for the restoration of any person to an office in a Notified Sikh Gurdwara or any prayer for the restoration or establishment of any system of management of a Notified Sikh Gurdwara other than a system of management established under the provisions of Part III; (2) any claim to, or prayer for the restoration of any person to an office in or any prayer for the restoration or establishment of any system of management of, any Gurdwara in respect of which a notification has been published in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (3) of Section 7 unless and until it has been decided under the provisions of Section 16 that such Gurdwara should not be declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara.” Section 29(1) does not apply in the present dispute because the property involved has not been notified under Section 9 and therefore does not qualify as a “Notified Sikh Gurdwara” within the meaning of the Act, a point that is not contested. The focus, therefore, shifts to Section 29(2), which is relevant because a notification under Section 7(3) has been issued concerning the alleged Sikh Gurdwara in question. It is submitted that Section 29(2) bars the Civil Court from taking cognizance of any claim relating to that Gurdwara. The learned Judges of the High Court have expressed differing views on how to construct Section 29(2), a matter that the Court notes but does not need to resolve for the purposes of deciding the present appeal.

In the present proceedings the judges expressed divergent opinions on the construction of the relevant statutory provision. Justice Abdul Rashid adopted an interpretation that favored the appellant’s argument, whereas Justice Kapur read the provision differently and rejected the appellant’s contention. The Court deemed it unnecessary to resolve this narrow disagreement because, irrespective of which interpretation is accepted, the operative consequence of the sub-section is the same. The provision requires that a court may not "entertain the claim or continue the suit unless and until it has been decided under the provisions of section 16 that such Gurdwara should not be declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara." The reference to section 16 clearly points to a proceeding before the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal in which the limited question of whether the disputed place is or is not a Sikh Gurdwara must be determined as a preliminary issue under section 16.

The only sections of the Act that can bring a matter involving that preliminary issue before the Tribunal are sections 14 and 32. It is noted that sections 19, 20, 21 and 27 also confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal over other types of proceedings, but those sections are irrelevant to the present case. Consequently, the language of the clause – "unless and until it has been decided under the provisions of section 16…" – applies only where a proceeding concerning the status of the Gurdwara reaches the Tribunal by way of either section 14 or section 32. In the facts before the Court, neither of those sections can be invoked. Section 32 is inapplicable because the Gurdwara in question has not been notified under section 9 and therefore is not a "Notified Sikh Gurdwara." Section 14 is likewise inapplicable because there is no petition filed under section 10 that has been, or could be, transmitted to the Tribunal.

If, as the appellant contends, section 29(2) were held to apply to the present dispute, the result would be an anomalous situation in which the civil court’s jurisdiction would be barred or suspended indefinitely, effectively leaving the matter without a forum for resolution. The wording of section 29, which states that "no court shall entertain or continue any suit or proceeding," does not possess sufficient breadth to divest the civil court of its jurisdiction entirely; instead, it imposes a conditional stay that operates only "unless and until" the specific issue is decided by the Tribunal under section 16. Therefore, the effect of section 29(2) is not to exclude jurisdiction altogether but to create a temporary stay limited to cases where the Tribunal can adjudicate the question of whether the property constitutes a Sikh Gurdwara. As such, the provision cannot be applied to the present case, where there is no mechanism within the Act for the Tribunal to determine that issue.

The Court noted that, given the facts of the case, there was no possibility for the Tribunal to determine the issue in question through the mechanism provided by the Act, and therefore the provision of Section 29 could not be invoked to exclude the Civil Court’s jurisdiction. It held that the removal of a Civil Court’s jurisdiction over a suit or issue that normally falls within its competence requires either an explicit and unmistakable statutory language or a necessary implication of such a bar. In passing, the Court observed that Sections 30 and 31 of the Act were not relied upon as grounds for barring the Civil Court’s jurisdiction in the present matter. It explained that Section 30 was inapplicable because the case did not involve a “Notified Sikh Gurdwara,” and that Section 31(2), even if argued to apply, could not do so for the same reasons previously articulated in relation to Section 29(2). Consequently, the Court concluded that none of the provisions of the Act barred the Civil Court from exercising jurisdiction over the issues that arose for determination in this case. The Court then referred to the conclusions recorded by the learned Judges of the High Court towards the end of their judgment. These conclusions were: (1) that a claim under Section 7(1) could not be made by fifty Sikh worshippers unless the institution was a Gurdwara, and consequently no notification could be issued; (2) that the notification dated 23-7-1929 issued under Section 7(1) was inconsistent with the claim made and published in the notification dated 13-12-1927 under Section 3(2); (3) that, based on a prior adjudication dated 17-6-1933, the building in dispute was neither a Gurdwara nor a Sikh Gurdwara but merely the private property of the plaintiff; and (4) that neither Section 29 nor Section 31 of the Act barred the Civil Court’s jurisdiction, and that if Section 29 were to bar any claim to a Gurdwara, the inevitable result would be that no Court would be competent to decide whether a particular institution is or is not a Gurdwara. The Court expressed agreement with conclusion 4, albeit for reasons different from those relied upon by the High Court judges. Regarding conclusions 1 and 2, the Court indicated that they were relevant only to the question of whether the proceedings initiated under Section 7 of the Act were valid for the purpose of invoking Section 10 against the plaintiff’s claim and thereby excluding the Civil Court’s jurisdiction with respect to that claim. While the Court adopted its view on the jurisdictional issue and left the applicability of Section 10 open, it found it unnecessary to give an opinion on the specific questions raised in conclusions 1 and 2.

The Court noted that the conclusions numbered 1 and 2 that had been recorded by the High Court were therefore vacated. Conclusion No. 3, which was based on Section 37 of the Act, remained to be considered. However, the Court indicated that, given the approach it intended to follow, it was unnecessary at this stage to examine the effect of Section 37 on the present case in reference to the earlier procedural history. The Court observed that the learned judges, having remanded the suit and leaving certain factual issues on the merits to be determined, should not have effectively concluded the suit by the type of finding they had recorded. Consequently, the Court also vacated conclusion No. 3 of the learned judges and left that issue open for further consideration. The vacating of these conclusions meant that the earlier determinations regarding jurisdiction and the classification of the property were set aside, and the matter would be revisited in accordance with the proper legal standards. The Court further recounted that, as stated at the outset, the suit had been disposed of in the lower courts only on preliminary questions. Among those preliminary questions, only the one concerning jurisdiction had survived to the present stage. After full consideration of the facts, the Court finally held that the Civil Court possessed the jurisdiction to entertain the suit that had been instituted and to decide the material issues raised therein. On the pleadings, the Court identified two substantive questions on the merits: first, whether the compromise decree dated 17-6-1933 of the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal, issued in the proceedings arising out of the plaintiff’s claim under Section 5 of the Act, was binding between the parties to the present suit; and second, if the decree was not binding, whether the properties that formed the subject of the suit belonged to the plaintiff as claimed. The Court expressed that it was necessary and desirable to obtain findings from the trial Court on these two matters before the appeal could be finally disposed of.

The remaining issue for the Court to consider was the maintainability of the present appeal on the certificate that had been granted by the High Court. The Court recalled that this question had been raised as a preliminary objection. The High Court had granted the certificate pursuant to Sections 109 and 110 of the Act, Order 45, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, and Article 133 of the Constitution. The objection argued that, because the High Court’s order merely remanded the suit to the trial Court for further proceedings in accordance with law, there was no final order, as contemplated by the cited provisions, against which a certificate could be issued. The learned judges, however, examined the matter and observed that, although the order was framed as a remand, it in fact amounted to a final decision on the dispute. The judges quoted the order, stating that it finally determined that the building in dispute was private property, not a Gurdwara nor a Sikh Gurdwara, and that no claim could be made by the fifty-six worshippers merely on the basis that it was a Gurdwara. The Court therefore concluded that the High Court’s judgment, as appealed, constituted a final order within the meaning of the statutory provisions, and thus the certificate was valid. Consequently, the preliminary objection to maintainability was dismissed, and the appeal could proceed to be heard on its merits.

The Court observed that the notification issued in 1929 conflicted with the earlier notification made under Section 3 of the 1927 Act. It held that the decision on these three points—namely the inconsistency of the two notifications, the character of the building, and the entitlement of the worshippers—would finally settle the parties’ rights concerning ownership of the property. The Court further stated that, if the property were to be held as private property, as it had previously found, the plaintiff was entitled to the declaration it had prayed for, and that such a declaration would inevitably give rise to the injunction also sought by the plaintiff. The Court noted that this view of the effect of the order had been adopted by the trial Court after it was remanded.

The Court explained that, in deference to that view, the trial Court did nothing beyond passing a decree that reflected the terms of the order. Consequently, the Court found no substance in the preliminary objection raised. It further observed that, on the facts of the present case, the judgment of the High Court that was appealed against amounted to a final order. Nevertheless, the Court dismissed the argument that the subsequent decree, passed in favour of the plaintiff after the remand, rendered the appeal untenable because no appeal had been filed against that decree. The Court could not accept that contention in the present circumstances.

The Court recorded that the application to the High Court for leave to appeal had been filed on 23-September-1950 and that leave had been granted on 18-July-1952. It also pointed out that the decree of the trial Court, issued after the remand, had been passed on 4-December-1951, i.e., between the filing of the application and the granting of leave. In the Court’s view, the decree must be treated as subject to the outcome of the present appeal. The Court then stated that the case fell within the principle recognised by the Privy Council in Shama Purshad v. Hurro Purshad, 10 Moo Ind App 203 (PC), and not the principle set out in Nanganna Naidu v. Venkatapayya, AIR 1923 PC 167.

Accordingly, the Court directed the trial Court to take such further evidence as may be necessary and to submit its findings on the two issues identified earlier, within three months of receiving the records. The Court further provided that, upon receipt of those findings, either party would be permitted to file objections within ten days, after which the appeal would be scheduled for final disposal.