Automobile Products of India Ltd. v. Rukmaji Bala and Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 2 and 4 of 1955

Decision Date: 03/02/1955

Coram: Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Syed Jaffer Imam, Das

In this matter, the Supreme Court of India delivered its judgment on 3 February 1955 in the case titled Automobile Products of India Ltd. versus Rukmaji Bala and Others, together with connected proceedings. The petition was filed by the Automobile Products of India Ltd. and the respondents were Rukmaji Bala and the other appellants. The bench that heard the appeal comprised Justice Natwarlal H. Bhagwati, Justice Syed Jaffer Imam, Justice Das and Justice Sudhi Ranjan. The decision was reported in the 1955 volume of the All India Reporter at page 258 and also appears in the 1955 Supreme Court Reports (First) at page 1241.

The Court examined the scope of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (Act XLVIII of 1950), particularly section 22, and considered whether the Labour Appellate Tribunal possessed authority to impose conditions when it granted permission to an employer to retrench workmen. The Court also considered the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947), namely section 33 as amended by the 1950 Act, and the newly inserted section 33-A, together with section 23 of the 1950 Act. The question was whether the Tribunal’s jurisdiction extended beyond deciding a failure to obtain permission and included the power to determine the merits of an industrial dispute and to grant appropriate relief.

The headnote summarizes the Court’s holdings. First, it affirmed that the ordinary and primary jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal created under the 1950 Act is appellate in nature. Second, it held that section 22 of that Act confers a special jurisdiction on the Tribunal that is original, allowing it to grant or withhold permission. Third, the Court observed that section 23 also gives the Tribunal an additional jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaint as if it were an appeal pending before it. Fourth, the Court noted that section 23 provides the workmen with a further remedy not available under the 1947 Act alone.

The Court explained that the two newly inserted sections 33 and 33-A in the 1947 Act, by virtue of the 1950 amendment, bestowed distinct benefits on the workmen and expanded the powers of the authorities mentioned therein. Section 33-A directs the Tribunal to decide the complaint “as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it,” to submit its award to the appropriate Government, and to apply the provisions of the Act to that award. These provisions correspond in substance and purpose to sections 22 and 23 of the 1950 Act and are similar in wording. The Court further clarified that sections 22 of the 1950 Act and 33 of the 1947 Act place a ban on the employer’s ordinary right to act under the general law of contract of employment. This ban is intended to protect workmen from victimisation, to ensure that industrial disputes are concluded peacefully, and to limit the authority’s function to granting or refusing permission, that is, to lift or maintain the ban. The Court concluded that these sections do not give the Tribunal power to adjudicate any other dispute beyond the specific matters authorized by the statutes.

The Court explained that under section twenty-two of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (Act XLVIII of 1950), the Labour Appellate Tribunal possessed no authority to impose any condition as a pre-requisite for granting an employer permission to retrench workmen. The Court further held that, in accordance with section thirty-three-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and section twenty-three of the 1950 Act, the Tribunal’s jurisdiction extended beyond merely determining whether an employer had failed to obtain the required permission before taking action; it also included the power to decide the merits of an industrial dispute and to award appropriate relief. Such relief, once published by the appropriate Government, became enforceable under the respective statutes. The Court referred to several authorities to support this proposition, namely Serampore Belting Mazdoor Union v. Serampore Belting Co., Ltd. ([1951] 1 Lab. L.J. 341), Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality ([1952] 54 Bom. L.R. 922), Raj Narain v. Employers’ Association of Northern India ([1952] 1 Lab. L.J. 381), The Queen v. County Council of West Riding of Yorkshire ([1896] 1 Q.B. 386), Carlsbad Mineral Works Co., Ltd. v. Their Workmen ([1953] 1 Lab. L.J. 85), Atherton West & Co., Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union ([1953] S.C.R. 780) and Bhattacharji v. Parry & Co., Ltd., Calcutta ([1954] 2 Lab. L.J. 635). The judgment was rendered in a civil appellate jurisdiction concerning Civil Appeals Nos. 2 and 4 of 1955, arising from a special leave appeal against an order dated 18 November 1954 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench, in Application (Misc.) Bombay No. 773 of 1954. Counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1955 and respondent in Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1955 were H. M. Seervai, J. B. Dadachanji and Rajinder Narain; counsel for the respondents in Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1955 and appellants in Civil Appeal No. 4 of 1955 were D. H. Buch and I. N. Shroff; and M. C. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, assisted by G. N. Joshi and P. C. Gokhale, represented the Intervener, the Union of India. The judgment was delivered on 3 February 1955 by Justice Das.

The Court noted that the present appeal concerned a special leave petition challenging the order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Bombay Bench, dated 18 November 1954. That order had arisen from an application filed by the appellant company on 6 September 1954 under section twenty-two of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, hereinafter referred to as the 1950 Act. The appellant, identified as an assembler of motor vehicles, imported completely knocked down (CKD) assemblies into India for assembly. At the time of the appeal, an earlier dispute between the appellant and its workmen was pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The appellant alleged that the Government of India had removed its name from the list of approved manufacturers maintained by the Government, which, in turn, prevented the company from securing additional import licences for CKD assemblies. Consequently, the company claimed that it was forced to lay off a number of workmen because it could not operate its factory at normal capacity.

In this case, the company explained that because the government had removed its name from the list of approved manufacturers, it could not obtain further licences to import completely knocked down motor-vehicle kits. Consequently, from 1 November 1953 the company was forced to reduce the strength of all its factory departments and had to lay off a number of its employees. The company foresaw no possibility of expanding its present operations in a way that would create jobs for those workers, and therefore it deemed it necessary to retrench the employees listed in Annexure A to the application. Since the same employees were parties to the appeal already pending before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, the company filed an application to that Tribunal under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, seeking permission to carry out the retrenchments.

The respondents, represented by the Automobile Manufacturers’ Employees’ Association of Bombay, filed a written statement on 1 November 1954. In that statement they made a series of allegations against the company. They argued that the company itself was responsible for the layoffs and that there was no immediate justification for the retrenchment application. They further contended that the company was motivated by an ulterior purpose of depriving the workers of the dues that, according to the company, would become payable after the expiry of the one-year lay-off period. The respondents also claimed that in or about April 1954 the company recalled some of the laid-off workers in a manner that violated the established principles governing any recall, and that this arbitrary and unscientific recall imposed a disproportionate workload on the recalled employees, thereby unjustly altering their conditions of service.

The respondents maintained that the application for permission to retrench was not maintainable in law, was brought in bad faith, and should be dismissed. In the penultimate paragraph of their written statement they stipulated that, should the Labour Appellate Tribunal grant the permission, whether in whole or in part, such permission should be subject to the following conditions: first, payment of full wages together with dearness allowance for the entire period of lay-off; second, payment of one month’s notice pay and retrenchment compensation calculated at the rate of one month’s wages, including dearness allowance, for each completed year of service and any part thereof, in addition to the gratuity provided under the company’s scheme; third, alternatively to the second condition, if the Tribunal were to hold that the lay-off was governed by section 25-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the respondents asked for compensation equal to fifty per cent of the workers’ wages plus dearness allowance for the whole lay-off period up to the date of discharge, together with the notice pay and gratuity mentioned in the second condition; and fourth, payment of leave wages according to the existing rules, treating the entire lay-off period as service. A number of documents were filed by both sides in support of their respective contentions.

At the beginning of the judgment that was being appealed, the tribunal set out its substantive finding on the merits of the company’s proposed retrenchment. It observed that there could be little doubt that the retrenchment resulted from the company’s inability to obtain sufficient work because it lacked the necessary government licences; consequently the retrenchment was deemed inevitable and the application before the tribunal was considered bona fide. The tribunal stated that while permission to retrench could not be denied, that permission would be made conditional upon the company fulfilling certain terms, which it would specify thereafter.

The company argued before the Labour Appellate Tribunal that, in dealing with an application under section 22 of the 1950 Act, its role was limited to granting or refusing permission. The tribunal rejected this contention, holding that the view was untenable and had been repeatedly rejected by the tribunal in earlier decisions. The tribunal explained that it is the authority to which an application for permission to retrench must be made, and that, upon receiving such an application, it must necessarily exercise its judgment and discretion to ensure that the company, when it retrenches, does justice to its employees.

The tribunal’s reasoning was guided by a consideration it set out in its own words. It explained that refusing retrenchment would not advance the interests of either the employees or the company because the case for retrenchment had already been established. The tribunal added that allowing workmen to leave promptly and seek other employment would be better for them. However, to be satisfied that the employees would receive what justice required at the time of retrenchment, the tribunal decided to grant permission subject to certain conditions that it regarded as inherent in the Act and, apart from the Act, just and equitable in the particular circumstances of the case.

In line with this view, the tribunal expressly declined to leave the question of lay-off compensation unresolved as a lingering issue, stating that the workmen to be retrenched already had sufficient concerns without the need to make further claims that would have to be adjudicated before a tribunal. Consequently, the tribunal granted the appellant company permission to retrench, subject to the terms and conditions of Act XLIII of 1953. It required that each workman be paid at the rate of one-half of his basic wages together with dearness allowance for the entire period from the date of lay-off up to the date of retrenchment, after deducting any sums already received as lay-off compensation. The tribunal also authorised the company to set off the lay-off compensation against the retrenchment relief provided under the Act.

Aggrieved by this order, the appellant company obtained special leave to appeal from this Court. Subsequently, the respondents filed an application for special leave to appeal against the same decision.

In the matter before the Court, it was recorded that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had not granted the full amount claimed by the petitioners, as had been summarised earlier, and that the Tribunal had also struck the names of seventeen individuals from the claim on the ground asserted by the company that those persons were not workmen. The respondents filed an application to contest these actions, and that application was allowed; consequently, the two appeals were heard together. The Union of India subsequently applied for leave to intervene on the basis that the case raised important questions regarding the construction of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (referred to as the 1947 Act) and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1950. The Court granted the Union’s request for intervention, and counsel for the Union, together with counsel for the other parties, were heard. The Court observed that the specific issue of whether the names of the seventeen workmen could be struck off from the application had not been pressed in any depth before it. Instead, the parties had principally framed two points for consideration. The first point concerned whether, under section 22 of the 1950 Act, the Tribunal possessed the jurisdiction to impose conditions when granting the permission sought by the appellant. The second point concerned whether the conditions that had been imposed in the present case were consistent with the law. The Court noted that if the answer to the first point turned out to be negative, the second point would become moot and would not require a decision on this occasion. To answer the questions correctly, the Court found it necessary to keep in mind the overall scheme of the two Acts. It explained that the purpose of the 1947 Act is, among other things, to provide mechanisms for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. To achieve that purpose, the Act creates several distinct authorities. Section 3 provides for the constitution of a Works Committee whose duty is to promote measures that secure and preserve amity and good relations between employers and workmen. Section 4 authorises the appropriate Government to appoint conciliation officers who are tasked with mediating and promoting the settlement of industrial disputes. Section 5 authorises the Government to constitute a Board of Conciliation for the same purpose. Section 6 empowers the Government to establish a Court of Inquiry to inquire into any matter that appears to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute. Finally, section 7 provides for the constitution of Industrial Tribunals to adjudicate industrial disputes in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Section 10 of the same Act deals with the reference of disputes to a Board, Court or Tribunal and makes clear that only the appropriate Government may make such a reference and thereby set the relevant authority in motion. The powers, procedures and duties of conciliation officers, Boards, Courts and Tribunals are set out in detail in sections 11 to 15. The Court highlighted that while a conciliation officer, a Board or a Court must prepare a report and forward it to the appropriate Government, a Tribunal is required to submit its award directly to the appropriate Government. The report

Under section 17 of the Industrial Disputes Act, any report issued by a Board or a Court and any award rendered by a Tribunal must be published by the appropriate Government within one month after the Government receives the document. Section 17-A further stipulates that a Tribunal’s award becomes enforceable thirty days after its publication; the award will also take effect on a specific date if the award itself specifies such a date, and in the absence of any such specification the date of enforceability—thirty days after publication—will be deemed the commencement date. Section 19 then prescribes the period for which settlements and awards remain in operation. The chapter that follows deals with strikes and lock-outs, and sections 26 to 31, grouped under the heading “Penalties,” define the punishments for contraventions of the Act. In particular, section 31(I) provides that any employer who violates the provisions of section 33 is liable to imprisonment for a term that may extend to six months, or to a fine that may extend to one thousand rupees, or to both penalties. Section 33, which the previous provision criminalises, forbids an employer, while any conciliation proceedings or Tribunal proceedings are pending, from altering the conditions of service applicable to the workmen concerned in a manner that prejudices them. The section also requires that, except with the express permission of the conciliation officer, Board or Tribunal, the employer may not dismiss, discharge or otherwise punish any workman during the pendency of the proceedings, unless the dismissal is for misconduct unrelated to the dispute. The prohibition on altering conditions of service under this provision is absolute, and permission is required only for discharge, dismissal or punishment; even then, no permission is needed when the workman is guilty of misconduct not connected with the pending dispute. The sole deterrent against an employer’s contravention of section 33 was the possibility of prosecution under section 31. This offered little relief to workmen, because if an employer chose to risk prosecution and acted contrary to section 33, the workmen could only raise an industrial dispute and request that the appropriate Government refer the matter to a Tribunal. Should the Government refuse the request, the workmen would have no further remedy. This situation prevailed under the 1947 Act until it was amended in 1950. The 1950 Act introduced an Appellate Tribunal for industrial disputes. Chapter II of that Act deals with the constitution, composition and functions of the appellate tribunal. Section 7 outlines the jurisdiction of the appellate tribunal, while section 9 confers upon the appellate tribunal all powers that a civil court possesses when hearing an appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Finally, section 10 prescribes the limitation period within which appeals must be filed before the appellate tribunal.

Under section 15, the decision of the appellate tribunal became enforceable after a period of thirty days from the date on which the decision was pronounced. If the appropriate Government considered it imprudent on public grounds to give effect to the whole or any part of that decision, it could intervene. Before the thirty-day period expired, the Government could issue an order in the Official Gazette either rejecting the decision or modifying it. Section 22 of the Act stipulated that during the thirty-day period for filing an appeal under section 10, or while any appeal under the Act was pending, an employer could not alter the conditions of service to the prejudice of the workmen concerned. The employer also could not discharge or punish any of those workmen unless the Appellate Tribunal gave express written permission. Section 23, cited by the respondents’ counsel and the intervener, provided that if an employer contravened section 22 while proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal were ongoing, an aggrieved employee could make a written complaint in the prescribed manner to that Tribunal. Upon receipt of such a complaint, the Tribunal would decide it as if it were an appeal pending before it, applying the Act’s provisions and issuing a decision accordingly. Section 29 prescribed that a violation of section 22 could attract imprisonment of up to six months, a fine of up to one thousand rupees, or both. The Court noted four principal points from the discussion. First, the ordinary and primary jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal remained appellate in nature. Second, section 22 conferred on the Tribunal a special jurisdiction that was essentially original. Third, section 23 added an additional jurisdiction allowing the Tribunal to decide a complaint as if it were an appeal pending before it. Fourth, section 23 gave workmen a remedial right that was unavailable under the 1947 Act. To fill up the lacuna in the 1947 Act, section 34 of the 1950 Act provided for certain amendments of the 1947 Act. Amongst other things, it substituted a new section for the old section 33 of the 1947 Act. The new section 33 was drafted as follows: “During the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal in respect of any industrial dispute, no employer-shall- (a) alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them”.

The Court noted that Section 33 of the 1947 Act provides that, during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, an employer shall not (a) alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or (b) discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in writing of the conciliation officer, Board or Tribunal, as the case may be. The Court observed that this provision introduces several important changes. Firstly, it makes the obtaining of written permission a condition precedent both for altering conditions of service and for discharging or punishing the workmen, and it does not provide any exception even where the alleged misconduct is unrelated to the pending dispute. In addition, the Court explained that a new provision, designated as Section 33-A, was inserted into the 1947 Act. Section 33-A reads: “Where an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the pendency of proceedings before a Tribunal, any employee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing, in the prescribed manner to such Tribunal and on receipt of such complaint that Tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit its award to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly.” The Court pointed out that the insertion of Sections 33 and 33-A confers distinct benefits on workmen and also extends additional jurisdiction and powers to the authorities named in the provisions. Specifically, Section 33-A obliges the Tribunal to treat the complaint as if it were a dispute already before it and to transmit its award to the appropriate Government, with the Act’s provisions governing the award. The Court further observed that the two new sections correspond in substance and purpose to Sections 22 and 23 of the 1950 Act, being essentially on the same terms. The central issue, the Court said, is to determine the meaning, scope and effect of these sections. A basic reading of Section 33-A of the 1947 Act together with Section 23 of the 1950 Act shows that a breach by the employer of the provisions of Section 33 in the former case, and of Section 22 in the latter case, creates a cause of action for the workmen to approach the respective authority specified in the section. Such breach operates as the condition precedent for the authority to exercise the additional jurisdiction and powers granted by the statutes. The Court emphasized that the authority referred to in these sections is a court of limited jurisdiction and therefore must be strictly confined to the functions and powers expressly conferred upon it by the Act that created it. Consequently, the Court posed the question of what precisely constitutes the scope and ambit of the functions and powers vested in that authority by these provisions.

When an employer breaches the provisions of section 33 of the 1947 Act or of section 22 of the 1950 Act, the workmen who are affected inevitably acquire a grievance. The Court described this grievance as having two distinct components. First, the workmen suffer because the employer has acted against them without obtaining the written permission of the authority that the statutes require, thereby stripping them of the protective measure that the legislature intended to shield them from victimisation. Second, beyond this statutory grievance, the workmen may possess an additional grievance on the merits, which can be of far greater seriousness. This second grievance arises where, in reality, the employer’s arbitrary action has unfairly prejudiced the workmen’s interests.

The statutes in question expressly grant the workmen the right to approach the designated authority by filing a complaint. This entitlement is a special benefit, for apart from the provisions of these sections, the workmen do not possess any general right to refer a dispute for adjudication. The complaint must be lodged in the manner prescribed by the relevant rules. Under the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1947, rule 51-A requires the use of Form DD, which is framed under section 38 of the 1947 Act. In parallel, the 1950 Act requires the use of Form E under section 35. Both forms obligate the complainant workmen to set out, in their petition, not only the manner in which the alleged breach occurred but also the specific grounds on which the employer’s order or act is being challenged.

This procedural requirement demonstrates that the authority receiving the complaint must consider two distinct issues: first, whether a breach of the statutory provision has indeed taken place; and second, the merits of the employer’s act or order that is being contested. The statutes further clarify the nature of the authority’s jurisdiction. Section 33-A of the 1947 Act directs the authority to adjudicate the complaint “as if it were a dispute referred to or pending before it.” Likewise, section 23 of the 1950 Act directs the authority to decide the complaint “as if it were an appeal pending before it.” These language choices convey that the authority’s jurisdiction extends beyond merely determining whether the employer failed to obtain the required permission. The authority must also examine the substantive merits of the complaint and, where appropriate, grant suitable relief.

The Court rejected the extreme argument that, under section 33-A of the 1947 Act, the Tribunal’s only duty upon finding a breach is to issue a declaratory statement, leaving the workmen to pursue further steps on their own. This narrow view was expressly disapproved in the Labour Appellate Tribunal’s decision in Serampore Belting Mazdoor Union v. Serampore Belting Co., Ltd. and was also repudiated by the Bombay High Court in Batuk K. Vyas v. Surat Borough Municipality. Both authorities affirmed that the Tribunal must go beyond a mere declaration and address the substantive aspects of the complaint, thereby providing the workmen with effective remedial relief.

The Court noted that the principle articulated in the Borough Municipality case had been accepted and applied by a Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in the decision of Raj Narain v. Employers’ Association of Northern India. The Court agreed with the interpretation given to section 33-A of the 1947 Act and to section 23 of the 1950 Act in those authorities. In the Court’s view, the range and breadth of the jurisdiction assigned to the authority named in those two provisions were broader than the jurisdiction conferred on a Criminal Court by section 31 of the 1947 Act and by section 29 of the 1950 Act. The Criminal Court, under the latter provisions, dealt only with the preliminary question of whether a breach of the statutory provisions had occurred – a simple yes or no determination. By contrast, the authority exercising jurisdiction under section 33-A of the 1947 Act and under section 23 of the 1950 Act was required to treat the complaint as if it were a dispute already referred to or pending before it, or as if it were an appeal already before it. Consequently, that authority was obligated to examine the merits of the alleged violation and to decide the complaint on its substantive content. This broader scope meant that the authority’s jurisdiction was unquestionably wider than that of the Criminal Court which was limited to penal questions. Because the inquiry under section 33-A of the 1947 Act and section 23 of the 1950 Act was intended to go to the substance of the grievance, the Court held that the power of the authority to grant relief must be co-extensive with its power to grant relief on a reference or an appeal. The statutory requirement that the authority submit its award to the appropriate Government, together with the application of the relevant Acts to that award, reinforced the view that the authority’s decision was a substantive determination on the merits of an industrial dispute. Once the award was published by the appropriate Government, it became enforceable under the respective Acts. Therefore, the Court concluded that the authority referred to in the two sections possessed the jurisdiction to render complete justice between the parties on the matters in dispute and to provide such relief as the nature of the case required, as also indicated by the prayer clause in Forms DD and E. In effect, those two sections gave workmen a direct right to approach the Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal for redress of their grievance without needing the intervention of the appropriate Government, a right that had not existed before the 1950 legislation.

The Court observed that the provisions enabled the workmen to obtain a right of redress that they had not possessed before 1950, and that these provisions were intended to secure a swift determination of industrial disputes while preventing a multiplicity of proceedings. By granting complete relief to the workmen for grievances arising from employer actions that violated the relevant statutory sections, the law sought to provide a comprehensive remedy. It was further noted that this jurisdiction or power was vested in the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal, bodies whose ordinary function is to decide or adjudicate industrial disputes, rather than in any conciliation officer or Board whose usual duty is to bring about settlement of disputes. Counsel for the respondents and for the intervener submitted that the scope of section 33 of the 1947 Act and of section 22 of the 1950 Act was precisely the same as that of section 33-A of the 1947 Act and of section 23 of the 1950 Act. Their argument was that the latter two sections had been enacted solely to give workmen an opportunity that they had been denied at an earlier stage because the employer had taken the law into his own hands and acted against them without first obtaining the sanction of the appropriate authority. They contended that if the law permitted workmen to air their grievances at a later stage under section 33-A of the 1947 Act and section 23 of the 1950 Act, there was no logical reason why the law could not permit them to do so at the earlier stage under section 33 of the 1947 Act and section 22 of the 1950 Act. The submissions further emphasized that the purpose of labour legislation is to maintain industrial peace and to restore amity and goodwill between employer and workmen, and therefore the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal should, at every stage, endeavour to resolve all disputes connected with the matter before it. Finally, the argument was made that whenever an authority is vested with the power to do or refrain from doing an act, that authority must be regarded as having discretion, and in exercising that discretion it should be presumed to have the power to impose appropriate conditions. Reliance was placed on the decision in The Queen v. County Council of West Riding of Yorkshire(1), contending that the authority concerned, under section 33 of the 1947 Act and section 22 of the 1950 Act, could impose conditions that would effectively grant the same relief that could be granted to workmen under section 33-A of the 1947 Act and section 23 of the 1950 Act. The Court stated that it could not accept this contention and proceeded to give reasons. It further explained that the object of section 22 of the 1950 Act, like that of section 33 of the 1947 Act as amended, is to protect the workmen concerned in disputes which form

The Court explained that the provisions in question were intended to protect workers who were facing victimisation by their employer because they had either raised industrial disputes or were continuing existing proceedings. The purpose of the two statutory sections was also to ensure that any industrial dispute already before the authorities would be brought to a peaceful conclusion, and that during the pendency of such proceedings the employer should not take any action that could create new disputes or worsen the already strained relationship between employer and workmen. To achieve this aim, the statutes imposed a prohibition on the ordinary right of the employer that is ordinarily available under the general law governing employment contracts. Both section 22 of the 1950 Act and section 33 of the 1947 Act, which impose the prohibition, also contain a mechanism by which the ban may be lifted if the authority specified in the statutes grants express written permission in appropriate cases. The object of these two sections, being to determine whether the ban should be removed, requires the authority exercising jurisdiction under them merely to grant or withhold such permission. The Court noted that the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Carlsbad Mineral Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen correctly held that the purpose of section 33 of the 1947 Act was not to confer a general power to adjudicate disputes. A brief examination of section 33 makes it clear that the provision was not intended to create a broad adjudicatory power. Under that section, the power to grant or withhold permission is vested in the conciliation officer, the Board, or the Tribunal. The conciliation officer or the Board ordinarily lack any authority under the 1947 Act to decide an industrial dispute; their role is confined to attempting to bring about a settlement. Only the Tribunal, by virtue of its award, can finally decide a dispute that is referred to it. Since section 33 confers jurisdiction and power on all three authorities in the same wording, it cannot be interpreted to give a larger or different power to the Tribunal compared with the conciliation officer or the Board. There is no indication that the legislature, by a side-wind, granted the conciliation officer and the Board powers of adjudication that they do not normally possess or for which they may lack competence. Moreover, if the purpose of the section had been to give all named authorities the power to decide industrial disputes, the statute would have included a provision enabling them to make and submit an award, as is provided in section 33-A of the 1947 Act. The absence of such a provision confirms that the primary effect of the sections is to impose a ban on the employer’s usual right, leaving the authority’s function limited to granting or refusing permission to lift that ban.

The Court observed that neither section 33 of the 1947 Act nor section 23 of the 1950 Act contained any mechanism for enforcing the decision of the authority named in those provisions. This lack of enforcement machinery indicated that the purpose of those sections was merely to impose a prohibition on the employer’s right, requiring the authority only to grant or withhold permission, effectively to lift or maintain the ban. The Court referred to its earlier decision in Atherton West & Co., Ltd. v. Suti Mill Mazdoor Union, a case decided under clause 23 of the Uttar Pradesh Government Notification, and cited the authorities [1953] 1 Lab. L.J. 85 and [1953] S.C.R. 780, 786-7. The Court held that section 22 of the 1950 Act was pari materia with section 33 of the 1947 Act and with the aforementioned clause 23, and that the considerations applicable to the earlier provisions applied mutatis mutandis to section 22 of the 1950 Act. It further stated that the imposition of any conditions was entirely collateral to the purpose of the sections and that the authority was not empowered to impose such conditions. The Court agreed with the earlier judgment in G. C. Bhattacharji v. Parry & Co., Ltd., Calcutta, and concluded that the authority could not lawfully attach conditions to its permission. Considering the overall scheme of the Acts and the specific language of the sections, the Court ruled that the general principle articulated in The Queen v. The County Council of West Riding could not be applied to disputes governed by these provisions. Accordingly, the Court found that the Labour Appellate Tribunal had erred in holding that it possessed jurisdiction to impose conditions as a prerequisite for granting the company permission to retrench its workmen, and therefore answered the first question in the negative. Having resolved the first issue, the Court stated that it was unnecessary to opine on the second matter raised before it. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal, and remanded the case to that Tribunal to consider the company’s application and to issue an appropriate order in accordance with the law. The Court declined to make any order as to costs in the present case. Furthermore, Appeal No. 4 of 1955 was dismissed without costs, as recorded in the citation [1954] 2 Lab. L.J. 635.