Visweshwar Rao vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Petition No. 166 of 1951

Decision Date: 2 May, 1952

Coram: Chief Justice, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Chandrasekhara Aiyar

In the case titled Visweshwar Rao versus the State of Madhya Pradesh, decided on 2 May 1952, the Supreme Court of India issued a judgment authored by Justice Mahajan, with the bench comprising the Chief Justice, Mehr Chand Mahajan, and Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar. The matter was recorded as Petition No. 166 of 1951 and was filed under article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner, identified as Shri Visweshwar Rao, was the zamindar and proprietor of the Ahiri Zamindari estate, an estate defined pursuant to section 2(3) of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, II of 1917, and located in the tehsil of Sironcha within the district of Chanda, Madhya Pradesh. He sought the enforcement of his fundamental right to property guaranteed by article 31(1) of the Constitution, requesting that the Court issue an appropriate writ or direction restraining the State from disturbing his possession of the Ahiri estate as well as eighty malguzari villages situated in the Garchiroli tehsil of the same district.

The petitioner asserted that he and his ancestors had enjoyed full proprietary rights over these lands for several generations. On 5 April 1950, the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly enacted the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Right Act. The Act obtained the President’s assent on 22 January 1951 and was subsequently published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette on 26 January 1951 as Act I of 1951. A notification issued in a Gazette Extraordinary on 27 January 1951 fixed 31 March 1951 as the vesting date for the estates under section 3 of the Act, which meant that the petitioner would lose his estate and lands on that date. Anticipating this, on 9 March 1951—prior to the vesting date—he filed the present petition before the Supreme Court, seeking appropriate writs to prevent the government from taking possession of his property. He contended that the Madhya Pradesh Act I of 1951 was unconstitutional, void, and infringed his fundamental rights in multiple respects.

The judgment notes that a proper appreciation of the challenges to the Act’s validity requires setting out the relevant statutory provisions and explaining the factual background that led to its passage. Madhya Pradesh is described as a composite state encompassing the Central Provinces, Berar, and merged territories. An agreement of merger, dated 15 December 1947, between the former princely states and the Dominion of India integrated territories previously under the Indian States Agency into the Dominion, an integration that became effective on 1 January 1948. Subsequently, on 1 August 1949, the various states were merged to form Madhya Pradesh. At the time of the Act’s enactment, there were 106 estates in Madhya Pradesh defined under section 2(3) of Act I of 1951 and held by zamindars, with most of the lands owned by malguzars of mahals in the status of

The land system that prevailed in Madhya Pradesh was primarily malguzari, except in certain areas where the ryotwari system operated; under malguzari the malguzar acted as an intermediary between the State and the tiller. In addition, land was held under a variety of subordinate tenures, including absolute occupancy tenants, occupancy tenants, ryots, thikedars, mafidars, and ilaqadars. Land revenue in the State had last been assessed under the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act, II of 1917, and the estate holders paid revenue on the lands comprising their estates at a concessionary rate, a payment technically described as “tekoli.” In 1939 an ad hoc increase in the amount of tekoli was effected by the Central Provinces Revision of Land Revenue Estates Act, I of 1939. On 3 September 1946 the Central Provinces and Berar Legislative Assembly passed a resolution calling for the elimination of intermediaries between the State and the peasant. Following that resolution, several statutes were enacted with the purpose of achieving that result, the impugned Act being the final one in the series. In 1947 the Central Provinces Land Revenue Estates Act, XXV of 1947, was enacted; the revenue assessment, i.e., tekoli, on the estates was increased in some places from thirty to fifty percent of the full jama and in others from forty to sixty percent. In the same year the Central Provinces Land Revenue Revision Mahals Act, XXVI of 1947, was passed, and the land assessment on malguzari villages was allegedly raised to seventy-five percent from a previous range of forty-five to fifty percent of malguzari assets, a change made without any settlement. The following year, 1948, saw the enactment of the Central Provinces and Berar Revocation of Exemptions Act, XXXVII of 1948, which made previously exempt persons liable for land revenue; this legislation, it was argued, substantially reduced the net income of the proprietors. The impugned Act was introduced in the Madhya Pradesh Assembly on 11 October 1949 and referred to a Select Committee on 15 October 1949. The Select Committee reported on 9 March 1950; its report was published on 17 March 1950 and considered by the Assembly on 29 March 1950. On 30 March 1950 the opposition moved for the circulation of the Bill, but the circulation motion was negatived on 3 April 1950. The Bill was then discussed clause by clause and passed between 3 April and 5 April 1950. On 5 April 1950 the member in charge of the Bill moved: “Speaker Sir, I now move that the Central Provinces & Berar Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Bill, 1949 (No 64 of 1949) as considered by the House be passed into law.” The Speaker responded, “Motion moved that the Central Provinces & Berar Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Bill, 1949 (No 64 of 1949) as considered by the House be passed into law.”

At the stage of the third reading, a series of speeches were delivered by the members present. The opposition, reduced to a hopeless minority, offered no realistic resistance. The tenor of the speeches was uniformly laudatory, with each member describing the Bill as a landmark reform of the land system in Madhya Pradesh. No motion seeking a delay or any other dilatory measure was introduced, and in practical terms there was no opposition to the passage of the Bill. While a few members voiced the view that the Act’s provisions did not go as far as they might have, and others suggested that the compensation clauses should have been more generous, none advocated rejection of the Bill in its existing form. The official report of the proceedings dated 5 April 1950 fails to record a note indicating that the motion to pass the Bill into law was carried. This omission in the legislative record has been used to argue that the Bill was never formally enacted. The printed proceedings appeared on 21 June 1950 and were signed by the Speaker on 1 October 1950. By contrast, the original Bill sent to the President for assent was printed on 29 April 1950 and bore a certificate from the Speaker dated 10 May 1950, affirming that the Bill had been duly passed on 5 April 1950. The Speaker’s signature on this certificate preceded his signing of the printed proceedings by several months. The Act subsequently received the President’s assent on 22 January 1951 and was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette on 26 January 1951 as Madhya Pradesh Act I of 1951.

Challenges to the constitutionality of the Act were raised by several petitioners in the High Court of Nagpur, but that court dismissed all of the petitions on 9 April, while this matter and other related petitions were pending before the Supreme Court. The preamble of the Act reads: “An Act to provide for the acquisition of the rights of proprietors in estates, mahals, alienated villages and alienated lands in Madhya Pradesh and to make provision for other matters connected therewith.” The legislation clearly falls within entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, thereby establishing the undisputed competence of the Madhya Pradesh Legislature to enact it. The Act is organized into eleven chapters and three schedules. Chapter II, which deals with the vesting of proprietary rights in the State, outlines the consequences of such vesting. Section 3 of the Act states: “Save as otherwise provided in this Act, on and from a date to be specified by a notification by the State Government in this behalf all proprietary rights in an estate, mahal, alienated village or alienated land, as the …” (the provision continues in the subsequent clause).

In this case the Court set out the operative provision of Section 3 of the Act, which declared that “case may be, in the area specified in the notification vesting in a proprietor of such estate, mahal, alienated village, alienated land, or in a person having interest in such proprietary right through the proprietor, shall pass from such proprietor or such other person to and vest in the State for the purposes of the State free of all encumbrances.........." The Court then explained the effect of Section 4, which required that after a notification under Section 3 was published, every right, title and interest that vested in the proprietor or any person holding an interest through the proprietor in the notified area would cease and would vest in the State. This vesting covered all categories of land, whether cultivable or barren, as well as grassland, scrub jungle, forest trees, fish, wells, tanks, ponds, water-channels, ferries, pathways, village sites, market places, bazaars and meals. It also extended to the entire sub-soil, including any rights in mines and minerals, whether such resources were being worked or not, and all such rights would become vested in the State free of any encumbrance. The Court noted, however, that the proprietor was allowed to retain possession of his homestead, his home-farm land, and, in the Central Provisions, also any land that he had brought under cultivation after the agricultural year 1948-49 but before the vesting date. The proprietor was entitled to recover any sums that had become due to him prior to the vesting date by virtue of his proprietary rights. The Court further observed that all open enclosures used for agricultural or domestic purposes, all buildings, places of worship, wells situated in, and trees standing on, lands included in such enclosures or house sites, would continue to remain in the possession of the proprietor and would be settled with him by the State Government on such terms and conditions as the Government might determine. Similarly, certain private wells, trees, tanks and groves would continue to remain in the possession of the proprietor or any other person having an interest in them. The Court then turned to Chapter III, which dealt with the assessment of compensation. Section 8 required the State Government to pay compensation to the proprietor in accordance with the rules contained in Schedule I. In addition to the amount fixed by those rules, the Government was obliged to pay compensation for any expenditure incurred on the construction of a tank or well used for agricultural purposes where such tank or well vested in the State Government. Moreover, the Government had to pay compensation for lands situated within the limits of a municipality or cantonment as prescribed by the rules in Schedule II. The compensation for the divestment of proprietary rights became due from the date of vesting and, according to the enactment, would attract interest at the rate of two and a half per cent per annum from the date of vesting until the date of payment. Section 9 then provided that the compensation payable under Section 8 could, in accordance with the rules made for that purpose, be paid in one or more of the following modes: (i) in cash in full or in annual instalments not exceeding thirty; or (ii) in bonds, whether negotiable or non-negotiable, carrying

In the provision dealing with payment of compensation, the Act authorized that interest could be paid at the rate prescribed in sub-section (4) of section 8 and that the compensation might be paid by way of a guaranteed face-value security whose maturity period could not exceed thirty years. The same chapter also contained rules concerning interim payments, the appointment of compensation officers, and the procedure to be followed for determining the amount of compensation payable. Under Schedule I, the compensation payable in the Central Provinces and in Berar was fixed at ten times the net income as calculated in accordance with the rules set out in that schedule. For the merged territories, the compensation was to be determined on a sliding scale that ranged from two times to ten times the net income, depending on the circumstances. Schedule II prescribed a different scale for measuring compensation, specifying that the compensation could be calculated at a factor ranging from five to fifteen times the assessed value of the land as listed in the schedule. Section 2 of Schedule I laid down the method for computing the gross income of a proprietor. The gross income was to be arrived at by adding together three components: first, the income received by the proprietor from all rents payable by tenants, as recorded in the jamabandi for the agricultural year immediately preceding the vesting; second, the so-called siwai income, which comprised earnings from activities such as jalkar, bankar, phalkar, market stalls, fairs, grazing and village forest, and which was to be calculated at twice the amount recorded in the settlement of 1923; and third, the consent money received on the transfer of tenancy lands, measured as the average of such transactions recorded in the village papers for the ten years preceding the agricultural year in which the vesting took place. The schedule also described separate methods for determining the gross income of a mahal, of an alienated village, and of alienated land, and it provided specific provisions for calculating income arising from mines and forests. To arrive at the net income, the schedule required that certain deductions be made from the gross income. The deductions included the assessed land revenue, sums payable in the previous agricultural year for cesses and local rates, the average income tax paid on income derived from large forests over the thirty agricultural years preceding the relevant year, and a management cost that varied between eight and fifteen percent of the gross annual income for incomes ranging from Rs 2,000 to Rs 15,000. In addition, the schedule stipulated that, notwithstanding any other provision, the net income could not be reduced to less than five percent of the gross income. Chapter IV addressed incidental matters relating to the determination of proprietors’ debts and contained provisions analogous to those found in the Debt Conciliation or Relief of Indebtedness Act. Chapter V explained how the actual amount of compensation was to be calculated and disbursed. Chapter VI dealt specifically with the portion of Madhya Pradesh that the Act identified as the Central Provinces, and it provided that a proprietor who had been divested of his estate would retain malik-makbuza rights over his homestead lands. The chapter also recognized that absolute occupancy tenants could acquire malik-makbuza rights.

The Court observed that occupancy tenants were likewise entitled to acquire malik-makbuza rights, the same proprietary interest previously reserved for absolute occupants. It further stated that the statute made specific provision for the reservation of grazing lands and for the systematic collection of land revenue. Similar provisions were reproduced in Chapter VII of the Act, which dealt with the management and tenures of land in the territories that had been merged with the State. Chapter VIII was described as dealing with the management and tenures of lands in Berat, and a separate provision was highlighted for the determination of compensation payable to lessees of mines and minerals. Under the provisions of section 218 of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act and section 44 of the Berar Land Revenue Code, the Court explained that there existed a statutory presumption that all mines and minerals belonged to the State, and that any proprietary rights in such minerals could be granted by the State to any person. Whenever a right in minerals had been assigned, the Act contained provisions relating to the acquisition of that right and to the consequences that would follow such acquisition. The legislation also provided for the granting of a rehabilitation grant to proprietors who had been ex-propriated, the amount of which was to be chosen within a range specified in Schedule III. The final chapter of the Act was said to deal with miscellaneous matters, including the power to make rules.

The Court then turned to the purpose of the legislation, noting that its main objective was to bring the actual tillers of the soil into a direct contractual relationship with the State by eliminating intermediary holders. In short, the Act was described as aiming to convert the existing malguzari system into a ryotwari land system. It was further stated that the Act intended to vest gram panchayats with the management of common lands, thereby freeing those lands from the control of proprietors and envisaging the establishment of self-government for villages. Regarding compensation, the Court observed that although the provisions did not provide a monetary equivalent of the property taken and might therefore be considered inadequate, they could not be described as illusory. The Act was characterized as a definite improvement over the Bihar Act because it left rent arrears in the hands of proprietors and did not artificially reduce net income by any device. Moreover, the statute mandated that net income could not fall below five per cent of gross income, ensuring that some amount of money would always be payable by the State as compensation, never resulting in a negative or zero figure. In other respects, the compensation provisions followed the pattern common to all zamindari legislation, namely inflating expenditure while deflating actual income. The Court noted that the siwai income from jalkar, bankar and village forests was calculated at twice the amount recorded in the 1923 settlement, even though the Act itself had been passed in 1951 and the 1923 figures were considerably lower than the actual income from those sources in 1951. Similarly, the income from consent money was to be calculated by taking the average income for the preceding period, as prescribed by the statute.

In this case, the Court noted that the Act calculates compensation on the basis of the average income earned during the ten years immediately before the date on which the property was vested, and not on the actual income that the proprietor received from rent in the most recent agricultural year. The Court observed that the expenditure component of the formula had been inflated by applying, for large forest areas, the average income-tax paid over a period of thirty agricultural years, even though agricultural income-tax had not existed for most of that period and was only introduced recently. The cost of management was fixed at a flat rate ranging from eight to fifteen percent. Consequently, the Court concluded that the principles laid down for determining compensation could not be described as equitable and did not provide for the payment of just compensation to the expropriated proprietor. The petitioner contended that, according to the statutory formula, a compensation amount of twenty-five lakh rupees, which would correspond to the value of the property taken, had been reduced to a sum of sixty-five thousand rupees, payable in thirty unspecified installments, rendering the award purely nominal and illusory. The petitioner’s calculation was as follows: gross income from rents amounted to fifty-five thousand rupees; siwai income was shown as eighty-thousand five hundred rupees, although the petitioner’s affidavit indicated that actual siwai income was four lakh sixty-five thousand rupees. The total gross income therefore stood at one lakh thirty-five thousand rupees. Permissible deductions under the Act comprised revenue of forty-five thousand rupees, income-tax based on a thirty-year average of sixty-six thousand six hundred rupees, and cost of management of twenty-one thousand rupees, making total deductions one lakh thirty-two thousand six hundred rupees. After deducting these amounts, the net income was calculated to be two thousand four hundred rupees. Ten times this net income would yield twenty-four thousand rupees; however, the Act stipulates that net income cannot be reduced below five percent of the gross income, which in this case is six thousand five hundred rupees. Accordingly, the compensation payable was fixed at sixty-five thousand rupees, despite the petitioner’s annual income being approximately five lakh sixty-five thousand rupees and the market value of his property being twenty-five lakh rupees.

The Court also recorded that the principal objection raised to the validity of the Act was that the Bill had never been passed into law. Counsel for the petitioner argued that the proceedings of the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly dated 5 April 1950 omitted any statement indicating that the Bill had been presented to the House by the Speaker and subsequently passed. Reference was made to rules 20, 22, 34 and 115 of the procedural rules governing the legislature, which were framed under the Government of India Act 1935 in 1936. Rule 20(1) provides that a matter requiring the decision of the Assembly shall be decided by a question put by the Speaker on a motion made by a member. Rule 22 requires the Speaker to read any motion for the Assembly’s consideration after it has been made. Rule 34(1) states that votes may be taken by voice or division, with division to be used if any member so desires, and the Speaker determines the method of taking votes by division. Rule 34(2) says that the result of a division shall be announced by the Speaker and shall not be challenged. Rule 115(1) obliges the Secretary to prepare a full report of the Assembly’s proceedings at each meeting and to publish it as soon as practicable, while Rule 115(2) requires one printed copy of this report to be submitted to the Speaker for his confirmation and signature, after which it constitutes the authentic record. Counsel urged that the authentic report of the Assembly’s proceedings conclusively showed that the Bill had not been put to the Assembly as a question and had not been voted upon, and therefore could not be said to have been passed by the legislature. Even assuming there was no overt opposition to the Bill’s passage, counsel argued that there remained a possibility that, had it been presented, the Assembly might have rejected it. The Court noted that the proceedings were signed by the Speaker on 1 October 1950, while the certificate that...

The Court observed that the procedural rules mandated that a division announced by the Speaker could not be disputed, and that Rule 115 required the Secretary to prepare a complete report of each Assembly meeting, to publish it promptly, and to submit a printed copy to the Speaker for his confirmation and signature, the signed copy then constituting the authentic record of the proceedings. It was submitted that this authentic report conclusively showed that the Bill had not been presented to the Assembly as a question nor voted upon, and therefore could not be said to have been passed by the legislature. Counsel further argued that even in the absence of any open opposition, the Bill might have been rejected if it had been properly put to the House. The Court noted that the proceedings were signed by the Speaker on 1 October 1950, whereas the Speaker’s certificate stating that the Bill had been passed was recorded on the original Bill when it was presented to the President for assent on 10 May 1950. The Court referred to the authority in Craies’ Statute Law (4th edition, p. 36) that a Speaker’s certificate is conclusive that a Bill has been passed by the legislature. It appeared, in the Court’s view, that an oversight had occurred because the proceedings did not record that the motion was put to and passed by the House; the Speaker, signing the record six months after the event, failed to notice this omission. Nevertheless, the Court held that there was no doubt that the sentiment of the House on 5 April 1950 was in favour of passing the Bill and that no member was present to oppose it. The motion before the House was for the Bill to be passed, and the Speaker could not have attached a certificate stating that the Bill was passed by the House if that had not actually occurred. Consequently, the Court found no basis to question the correctness of the Speaker’s certificate and dismissed the contention that the Bill had not become law. The Court then considered the next argument that Articles 31-A and 31-B of the Constitution did not apply because the Bill had not become law through the constitutional procedure, and that those articles applied only to a Bill that had become an Act. It was noted that the Legislature of Madhya Pradesh comprised the Governor and the Legislative Assembly. It was further argued that even if the Assembly had passed the Bill, it had not received the Governor’s assent but had been sent directly to the President, and that without the Governor’s assent the Bill could not become law despite the President’s assent. The Court referenced sub-clause (3) of Article 31 of the Constitution in this context.

In this case the Court considered the statement that the term “law” is reserved for the President’s consideration and that a mere “Bill” does not fall within that description. The Court said that this contention lacks persuasive force when examined in the light of the language and ambit of article 200 of the Constitution. Article 200 authorises the Governor to either give his assent to a Bill or, at his discretion, to reserve the Bill for the President’s consideration. Once the Governor has exercised the power to reserve, the subsequent step lies with the President, who may either assent to the Bill or withhold his assent. The Court held that when the President does give his assent, the Bill must be regarded as having been enacted into law. The Court further observed that the Constitution does not intend a situation in which the Governor first assents to a Bill, thereby making it a full-fledged law, and thereafter reserves the same Bill for the President’s consideration so that it may obtain effect. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Somayya, argued that the President could not discharge both of his constitutional roles under article 200 and article 31(4) with respect to the same Bill simultaneously. According to that argument, the procedure prescribed by article 200 should first be completed: the Governor either assents to the Bill or reserves it for the President; if reservation occurs, the President must then give his assent, after which the Bill becomes law. Only after the Bill has become law, the counsel said, should the Governor again reserve the law for the President’s consideration as required by article 31(3), thereby rendering the law effective against the restriction imposed by article 31(2). The counsel further maintained that only by following this double-layered procedure could it be said that the President had examined the law to ensure that it did not violate article 31(2). The Court rejected this submission as untenable. It described the proposed double assent as a meaningless formality, pointing out that there is no constitutional requirement for the President to assent to the same Bill twice. The Court could not conceive of any reason why the President could not perform both functions conferred on him by articles 200 and 31(3) and 31(4) in a single act. The Constitution does not prohibit the President from considering the Bill once, determining whether it satisfies the conditions of article 31(2), and accordingly giving or withholding assent. Consequently, the Court held that once the President has given his assent, the Bill attracts the operation of articles 31-A and 31-B, and therefore the rights guaranteed to affected persons under Part III of the Constitution are thereby curtailed. Finally, the Court observed that the provisions of article 31(4) support the view expressed by the learned Attorney-General that the document to be transmitted to the President is the Bill as passed by the legislature, and not a Bill that has already received the Governor’s assent.

In this case, the Court examined the provision that applies after a Bill has received the Governor’s assent. The provision states: “If any Bill pending at the commencement of this Constitution in the Legislature of a State has, after it has been passed by such Legislature, been sent for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, then notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the law so assented to shall not be called in question in any court on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2).” The Court observed that, for the purpose of this provision, the term “Legislature” refers only to the House or Houses of the Legislature and does not include the Governor within its ambit. It further noted that the word “Legislature” does not carry a uniform meaning throughout the Constitution; in some articles it includes the Governor together with the legislative houses, while in other articles it refers exclusively to the legislative houses themselves. Consequently, Article 31(4) is interpreted to mean that when a Bill that violates clause (2) of Article 31 is passed by the House or Houses of the Legislature, is subsequently reserved for the President’s consideration, and the President gives his assent, the Bill thereafter becomes law and cannot be challenged on the basis of that violation. The Court emphasized that this wording is designed to give finality to laws once the President has acted, thereby preventing courts from reopening the validity of such statutes on the ground of contravention of clause (2). (23)

The Court then addressed the argument that the duty to pay compensation was implicit in the legislative power contained in entry 36 of List II and that the Act was unconstitutional because it authorised acquisition of zamindaris without payment of compensation, rendering its provisions illusory. The Court rejected this contention, relying on the reasoning set out in its earlier judgment in the Bihar case. The Court held that the compensation stipulated in the impugned Act cannot be described as illusory; while it may be grossly inadequate and may not reflect the full market value of the property, the adequacy of compensation is not a justiciable issue because Article 31(4) bars any judicial review of that question. The Bill in question was pending at the commencement of the Constitution, was reserved for the President’s consideration, and obtained the President’s assent, thereby satisfying the conditions for the operation of Article 31(4). In addition to the bar created by Article 31(4), the Court identified two further impediments to the petitioner’s claim: the provisions of Articles 31-A and 31-B, introduced by constitutional amendments, also preclude any enquiry into the quantum of compensation. The Court also dismissed the claim that the Act lacked a public purpose, relying again on the reasoning in the Bihar case. It explained that the purpose of the Act is to create a direct relationship between cultivators and the Government, to eliminate middlemen, and to promote the welfare of society as a whole. It further aims to grant malik-maqbuza status to occupancy tenants, improve their position, and vest the management of village affairs and cultivation in a democratic village body. (24) (25)

In this case, the Court observed that the purpose of the legislation was to give the village body a role in administration, and it was no longer plausible to argue that reform in that direction did not serve the general public interest. The Court then turned to the argument advanced by counsel for the petitioner that the Act amounted to a fraud on the Constitution because, by using entry 42 of List III, it purported to eliminate the requirement of compensation. The Court rejected that contention, relying on the reasoning set out in the earlier Bihar case. The Court explained that the Act contains explicit provisions that guarantee some amount of compensation in every circumstance; the compensation cannot be reduced to zero. Moreover, the Court noted that while the amount awarded may vary, in most cases the compensation is not insufficient. The petitioner had claimed that a compensation of sixty-five thousand rupees for a property valued at twenty-five lakh rupees was merely illusory. The Court held that the assessment of value presented by the petitioner could not be accepted at face value and that the payment of a sum of sixty-five thousand rupees could not be characterised as no compensation at all. If the statute provides for payment in instalments, the Court said, the instalment schedule must be fixed by the rules made under the Act, and any rule that amounts to an abuse of that power may be challenged. The Court also rejected the contention that the Act was invalid because it delegated essential legislative authority to the executive, again relying on the rationale given in the Bihar case.

Another point raised concerned the effect of the constitutional amendments embodied in articles 31-A and 31-B on the petitioner's guaranteed rights under Part III of the Constitution, specifically with respect to the eighty villages referred to as “malguzari” villages. The petitioner argued that those villages did not fall within the definition of “estate” found in article 31-A, and therefore the amendments could not affect his rights. Article 31-A defines “estate” in sub-clause (2)(a) as having the same meaning as the expression used in the local law relating to land tenures, and also includes any jagir, inam, muafi or similar grant. Section 2(3) of the 1917 C. P. Land Revenue Act defines “estate” as an estate declared by the State Government. The Advocate-General conceded that the villages were not captured by that definition, but argued that they were covered by the definition in article 31-A because, in the Central Provisions, mahals are the local equivalents of “estate” even if not formally declared by the Act. The Court found no material on record to support this contention. While the petitioner's claim that the eighty mahals are not “estate” and therefore fall outside article 31-A is noted, the Court observed that the argument does not substantially advance the petitioner's case, since the obstacles created by articles 31-B and 31(4) remain in his way.

It was submitted that Article 31A of the Constitution did not apply to the subject matter, and therefore Article 31B should also be excluded from consideration. The argument advanced held that Article 31B merely illustrated the rule expressed in Article 31A, and in the absence of a valid application of Article 31A, Article 31B ought to be disregarded. To support this position, reference was made to a decision of the Privy Council in the case of King Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee (1945 L.R. 72 I.A. 241; [1945] F.C.R. 195). In that decision the Court examined sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 2 of the Defence of India Act. The relevant portion of section 2 read as follows: “(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, make such rules as appear to it to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of war, or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (1), the rule may provide for, or may empower any authority to make orders providing for any of the following matters, namely ….” The Privy Council then observed that the language of sub-section (2) was purely illustrative. It explained that the substantive rule-making authority was granted by sub-section (1), and that the “rules” mentioned at the beginning of sub-section (2) were those authorised under sub-section (1). Furthermore, the Council stressed that the provisions of sub-section (2) did not limit the broader powers conferred by sub-section (1), as expressly indicated by the words “without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred by sub-section (1)”. The judgment then reproduced the text of Article 31B, which states: “Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31A, none of the Acts and Regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule nor any of the provisions thereof shall be deemed to be void… on the ground that such Act, Regulation or provision is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by, any provisions of this Part, and notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the court or tribunal to the contrary, each of the said Acts and Regulations shall, subject to the power of any competent Legislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.”

The argument advanced relied on the similarity between the opening phrase of Article 31B—“without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Article 31A”—and the wording of sub-section (2) of section 2 of the Defence of India Act. It was contended that, just as sub-section (2) served only an illustrative function in relation to sub-section (1), Article 31B must be viewed as merely illustrative of Article 31A, and therefore its reach should be limited to the estates defined in Article 31A. In the view of the Court, however, the observations made in Sibnath Banerjee did not lend support to that contention. The Court concluded that the Privy Council’s remarks concerning the illustrative nature of sub-section (2) could not be extended to uphold the argument that Article 31B is confined to the same scope as Article 31A. Consequently, the Court rejected the submission that Article 31B should be disregarded on the ground of the inapplicability of Article 31A.

In this case the Court observed that Article 31-B of the Constitution expressly validates certain statutes listed in its schedule, and that this validation operates notwithstanding the provisions contained in Article 31-A. The Court emphasized that Article 31-B is not merely illustrative of Article 31-A; rather, it stands on its own and confers independent authority on the statutes it mentions. Accordingly, the statute that had been relied upon for the acquisition of the eighty malguzari villages could not be struck down on the basis that it violated Article 31(2) of the Constitution or any other provision of Part III. The Court further held that the reach of Article 31(4) is not confined to estates, and that its provisions protect the law in its entirety. On these grounds, the petition bearing number 317 of 1951 was dismissed. The Court noted that, in the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs would be made.

The petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Bindra, sought to rely on the observations of Chief Justice Holmes in the United States case Communications Associations v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), quoting that constitutional provisions are not rigid formulas but “organic living institutions transplanted from English soil,” and that their meaning must be understood by considering their origins and development, not merely by dictionary definitions. Mr. Bindra argued that, if the Indian Constitution were read in accordance with this approach, then despite the explicit language of Article 31(2) there existed an underlying principle that made the payment of full compensation a necessary incident of any compulsory acquisition of property. He further contended that the right to compensation was implied in Entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule, asserting that Article 31(2) does not create the right but merely safeguards it. The Court noted that Mr. Bindra’s attempt to substitute the arguments of Mr. Das achieved no better result, and rejected the proposition that the Holmes dictum could be applied to a Constitution that expressly obliges the payment of compensation on compulsory acquisition and, by subsequent amendment, had removed that right for persons affected by the impugned Act.

Mr. Bindra also submitted another line of argument, claiming that “nationalisation” of land constituted a separate head of legislation and that “acquisition in general” fell outside the scope of Entry 36 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. To support this view, he referenced a passage from Stephen’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, Volume III, page 541. The Court examined the passage in its entirety and found that it actually contradicted the contention. It further observed that, under the powers of compulsory acquisition, a number of properties have been nationalised in England and other jurisdictions. Finally, Mr. Bindra alleged that the legislation under scrutiny was not enacted in good faith; he maintained that, after the 1946 resolution to abolish zamindari estates, the legislature had enacted statutes designed to defeat the constitutional guarantee of compensation through various devices, beginning with an increase in land revenue to reduce the zamindars’ gross income. The Court found this argument to be without merit, noting that the government possessed the competence to adjust land revenue and to withdraw exemptions, and that there was no evidence that the enactments were intended fraudulently to circumvent compensation provisions, especially considering that many of those statutes pre-dated the coming into force of the Constitution.

It was submitted that the increase in land revenue had been intended to reduce the gross income of the zamindars and that subsequent statutes mentioned earlier in the judgment were enacted for the same purpose. The Court regarded this contention as lacking any persuasive force. The Court observed that the Government possessed the authority, within the scope of its governmental powers, to raise land revenue, to withdraw any exemptions that had previously been granted, and to enact other legislation of a similar character. No evidence was found to demonstrate that these enactments were passed with a fraudulent design to defeat the constitutional provisions concerning the payment of compensation. Moreover, the Constitution had not yet come into force at the time many of those statutes were enacted. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and the Court expressly refrained from making any order as to costs.

The Court then turned to the remaining issue of the petition, noting that it related to lands belonging to the petitioner that had been acquired under the statute before the territory in which they lay merged into Madhya Pradesh. The petitioner argued that, by virtue of the covenant of merger, those lands were designated as his private properties and therefore fell under the protection of Article 362 of the Constitution, rendering the impugned Act invalid because it allegedly contravened that Article. Article 362, as quoted, required that the exercise of legislative or executive power respect guarantees given in covenants concerning the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the ruler of a State. Article 363, however, removed judicial jurisdiction over disputes arising out of treaties, covenants, engagements or sanads. The Court held that, although the covenant of merger transformed the petitioner’s lands into private property, the petitioner’s position was no different from that of any other private landowner. Article 362 did not prohibit acquisition of private property nor guarantee its perpetual existence; it merely ensured that such property would not be claimed as State property. The guarantee was therefore fully respected by the impugned statute, which treated the lands as private property and sought to acquire them on that basis. In view of the comprehensive language of Article 363, the Court found the matter to be non-justiciable. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed, and no order as to costs was made.

The Court observed that no order of costs was made and then listed fifteen pending petitions, namely numbers 228, 230, 237, 245, 246, 257, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 287, 288 and 289 of 1951. In each of these petitions the counsel identified as Mr Swami appeared on behalf of the petitioners. Seven of the petitions were filed by zamindars from Madhya Pradesh who possessed estates, while the petitioner identified in petition number 246 also owned certain malguzari villages. The petitioner in petition number 237 was a malguzar of eighteen villages but did not own an estate. Petitions numbered 280 to 285 as well as petition number 257 concerned merged territories. The petitioner in petition number 282 had previously been the ruler of the State of Jashpur and the petition related to his private properties. Petitioners in petitions numbers 283, 284 and 285 were Ilakadars, and in petitions numbers 280 and 285 they were identified as mafidars. The petitioner in petition number 281 was a thikedar, that is, a revenue farmer of three villages. Mr Swami reiterated the contention previously raised by counsel Mr Somayya that the Act had not been duly passed by the legislature; for the reasons explained in petition number 166 of 1951, the Court found that contention to lack merit. He also reiterated counsel Mr Bindra’s submission that the legislation was not enacted in good faith; the reasons set out in petition number 317 of 1951 led the Court to reject that submission as well. Mr Swami further argued vehemently that the Government, by virtue of the Act, had become a “super-zamindar”, that there was no public purpose behind the legislation, that it produced no material change in the existing order, that tenants remained in the same position, that the malikan-cabza already existed, that acquisition of that status by occupancy tenants was possible under existing statutes, and that those tenants also possessed the power to transfer their holdings. The Court considered this line of argument to be founded on a fallacy, noting that the purpose of the Act was expressly to bring about reforms in the land-tenure system of the State by establishing a direct relationship between the tillers of the soil and the Government. Consequently, the Court dismissed all fifteen petitions and made no order of costs in any of them.

The Court further noted that the counsel identified as Mr Mukherji, who appeared in petition number 487 of 1951, merely adopted arguments advanced by other petitioners, and for the reasons previously given the Court dismissed that petition as well, again without ordering costs. In petition number 487, counsel identified as Mr Jog raised the same points that had been raised in the other petitions; the Court found those points insufficient and dismissed the petition, also making no order as to costs. Justice Mukherjea agreed with the Chief Justice that all of the petitions should be dismissed, and Justice Das expressed the same view. The Court then turned to the statutory background, stating that the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act 1950, also known as Act I of 1951, received the President’s assent on 22 January 1951. A notification of the Act was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette on 27 January 1951, fixing 31 March 1951 as the date on which all proprietary rights vested in the State pursuant to section 3 of the Act.

In this matter, several applications were filed under article 226 of the Constitution in the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The applications were made by, or on behalf of, individuals variously described as Zamindars, Malguzars or proprietors of “alienated villages.” Each applicant sought the issuance of appropriate writs against the State of Madhya Pradesh, seeking to restrain the State from proceeding under the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950. The validity of that Act was contested on a number of grounds. Eleven of the applications were placed before a Full Bench of the High Court consisting of Chief Justice B. P. Sinha and Justices Mangalmurthi and Mudholkar. On 9 April 1951 the Full Bench dismissed all eleven applications. The High Court then certified, under article 132(1), that the matters raised involved a substantial question of law concerning the interpretation of the Constitution. No appeal was recorded, apparently because the same petitioners had already filed applications under article 32 of the Constitution in this Court, rendering a further appeal unnecessary.

The Court noted that similar abolition legislation had been enacted by the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, and that those statutes had also been challenged by affected proprietors. The High Court of Allahabad upheld the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Act, whereas the High Court of Patna declared the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 to be unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution. In response to these controversies, the Constituent Assembly enacted the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951. Sections 4 and 5 of that amendment introduced two new articles—article 31-A and article 31-B—into the Constitution and added a Ninth Schedule listing thirteen Acts and regulations, including the Madhya Pradesh Act, I of 1951. Although the validity of the First Amendment was itself challenged, this Court upheld it and directed all courts to give effect to the newly inserted articles, which now form substantive parts of the Constitution. Article 31-A applies retrospectively to the Constitution, while article 31-B relates to the dates of the Acts and regulations enumerated in the Ninth Schedule. The present batch of petitions, filed under article 32, challenges the validity of the Madhya Pradesh Act and seeks writs, directions and orders to restrain the State from acting under that Act and from disturbing the petitioners’ title to, or possession of, their estates, villages or properties. Counsel for the petitioners accepted that, because of the constitutional amendments, the impugned Act no longer falls within Part III of the Constitution, and therefore any challenge to it must be based on other constitutional provisions. Mr B. Somayya appeared on behalf of the petitioner in Petition No. 166 of 1951 (Visweshwar Rao v. The State of Madhya Pradesh).

The petitioners contested the validity of the Act on several distinct grounds. First, they asserted that the Bill had never been passed by the Madhya Pradesh Legislature. Second, they claimed that the procedure prescribed in article 31(3) of the Constitution had not been observed. Third, they argued that the Madhya Pradesh Legislature lacked competence to enact the Act because the acquisition contemplated under the Act was not for a public purpose and because the Act contained no provision for payment of compensation in the legal sense. Fourth, they contended that the Act amounted to a fraud on the Constitution. Fifth, they maintained that the Act was unenforceable because it provided for payment of compensation by instalments without specifying the amount of those instalments. Sixth, they alleged that the Act improperly delegated essential legislative functions to the executive government. Seventh, they claimed that the portion of the Act purporting to acquire the Malguzari villages or Mahals was not protected by article 31-A. Counsel for the other petitioners adopted and, to some extent, reinforced the arguments presented by Mr B Somayya. Regarding the first ground, the Court found it useful to trace the legislative history of the Bill before it entered the statute book. There is no dispute about the correctness of the dates supplied by the petitioners’ counsel. The Bill was introduced in the Madhya Pradesh Assembly on 11 October 1949 and was referred to a Select Committee on 15 October 1949. The Select Committee submitted its report on 9 March 1950, and this report was laid before the Assembly on 29 March 1950. The Assembly examined the Bill in light of the report between that date and 5 April 1950, during which time the amendments recommended by the Select Committee were moved and disposed of. The official proceedings of the Madhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly dated 5 April 1950 indicate that after the final amendment had been presented to the House and accepted, the Honourable Minister for Education, Sri P. S. Deshmukh, moved that the Bill be passed into law and delivered a brief speech urging the members to pass the Bill. The Speaker then read the motion. Subsequently, eleven speakers addressed the House, congratulating the Government and various members who had actively contributed to the passage of this significant land-reform measure intended to provide relief to tillers of the soil. No reasoned amendment was proposed, and the tenor of the speeches suggested that the House accepted the Bill. However, the official report does not show that the Speaker formally put the motion to a vote or declared it carried; instead, it records that the House proceeded to discuss another measure, namely the Madhya Pradesh State Aid to Industries (Amendment) Bill, 1950. The next version of the Bill, as it emerged through the House, was printed on 29 April 1950, and the Speaker signed a copy of that printed Bill.

On 5 May 1950 the Bill was printed and the Speaker certified that the Bill had been passed by the House and then forwarded it to the Governor. The Governor, by endorsing that same printed copy, reserved the Bill for the assent of the President. The President, on 22 January 1951, indicated his assent by signing at the foot of that printed copy. The advocate general subsequently produced the original printed Act showing the signatures of the Speaker, the Governor and the President. It also became apparent that the official Report of Proceedings of the Legislative Assembly for the meeting held on 5 April 1950 was printed in June 1950 and that a copy of this report was signed by the Speaker on 1 October 1950 together with the proceedings of many other Assembly meetings. It is noteworthy that the Speaker’s signature on the printed proceedings did not contain any observation, either affirmative or negative, as to whether the Bill in question had been passed by the Assembly.

The petitioners, through their counsel, raised an objection that was founded on the Rules of Procedure framed by the Assembly under section 84 of the Government of India Act, 1953, rules that remained in force until new rules were framed under article 208 of the Constitution. The petitioners did not dispute that the requirement of rule 22—namely that after a motion was made the Speaker should read the motion for the Assembly’s consideration—had been complied with. Their contention, however, was that the provisions of the earlier rule 20(1) had not been observed. Rule 20(1) provided: “A matter requiring the decision of the Assembly shall be decided by means of a question put by the Speaker on a motion made by a member.” The petitioners argued that the question of whether the Bill should be passed into law was never put to the Assembly under rule 20, and that, even if it had been, the result of the vote—whether by voice or division—was never announced by the Speaker as required by the former rule 34. Because a presumption of regularity attaches to all official business, the burden was on the petitioners to allege and prove that the procedural requirements prescribed by the rules had not been followed. No affidavit was offered by any person who was present at the Assembly meeting of 5 April 1950 to describe what actually transpired on that day. The petitioners relied only on the absence in the Official Report of any mention that the question had been put or that the Bill had been carried. The Official Proceedings, however, were prepared and confirmed in accordance with the old rule 115, which stated: “(1) The Secretary shall cause to be prepared a full report of the proceedings of the Assembly at each of its meetings and publish it as soon as practicable. (2) One impression of this printed report shall be submitted to the Speaker for his confirmation and signature and when signed shall constitute the authentic record of the proceedings of the Assembly.”

The Court observed that the petitioners argued that the initial burden of proof, which lay on them, had been fully satisfied by the authentic record of the Assembly’s proceedings and therefore the Bill could not have become law. The Court was not prepared to accept this contention. It noted that the original printed Act before it clearly showed that on 5 May 1950 the Speaker had certified that the Bill had been passed by the Assembly. The Court further pointed out that the old rule 87, under which the Speaker gave this certification, did not confer finality or conclusiveness on the Speaker’s certificate in the way that old rules 34(2) or 39(3) did. Consequently, the certification under old rule 87 could not override the authenticity of the record that had been confirmed and signed by the Speaker under old rule 115. The Court held that the real issue was whether, as a matter of fact, the Bill had been duly passed in accordance with the rules. It noted that the Speaker’s certification was made within a month of the Assembly meeting on 5 April 1950, whereas the confirmation of the proceedings took place on 1 October 1950. Because the Speaker’s memory would have been fresher on 5 May 1950 than on 1 October 1950, the Court placed greater reliance on the earlier certification than on the later confirmation. The Court considered that the omission of any mention of the question being put to and carried by the Assembly was likely an accidental slip. Moreover, the speeches of the eleven speakers indicated that there was no opposition to the Bill, so putting the question after the third reading would have been merely a formality. Referring to May’s Parliamentary Practice (14th ed., p. 544), the Court stated that the Speaker’s declaration constitutes the final result. In British parliamentary practice, the Speaker’s authentication on the printed Act is treated as conclusive, as noted in Cries on Statute Law (4th ed., p. 36). The petitioners, however, relied heavily on the official Report of the Proceedings. The Court reminded that Article 208 of the Constitution preserved the old rules until new rules were framed. It observed that the new rules came into force on 8 September 1950, and that the new rule 148 did not reproduce sub-rule (2) of old rule 115. Accordingly, after the new rules became effective, the Speaker’s duty to confirm the proceedings ceased.

The Court noted that, once the new procedural rules had become effective, the Speaker no longer possessed any duty to confirm legislative proceedings. Consequently, the purported confirmation made by the Speaker on 1 October 1950 could not be accorded any legal validity. The Court therefore held that the argument relying on authentication under the now-defunct rule 115(2) lost all force. It further observed that any procedural irregularity, if it existed, was expressly remedied by article 212 of the Constitution. The Court expressed disappointment with the counsel’s attempt to draw a fine distinction between an irregularity of procedure and a mere omission of a procedural step, concluding that such an omission amounted to an irregularity of procedure. In its judgment, the Court found that this line of attack on the validity of the Act was not well-founded and consequently rejected it.

Turning to the second ground of attack, the Court examined article 31(3), which reads: “No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made by the Legislature of a State shall have effect unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent.” The Court stressed the importance of the words “law” and “Legislature of a State.” It observed that article 168 defines the Legislature of each State as consisting of the Governor and, in the case of Madhya Pradesh, a single House called the Legislative Assembly. The petitioners argued that article 31(3) required a “law” to be reserved for the President’s consideration, and that a Bill which the Governor reserved without first giving his assent remained a Bill, not a law. They therefore contended that the Governor should first assent to the Bill, turning it into law, and only thereafter could the law be reserved for the President; because this sequence had not been followed, they claimed that article 31(3) was violated and that the Act could have no effect. The Court rejected this reasoning, holding that it incorrectly assumed that a Bill could become law only through the Governor’s assent. The Court reminded that the procedure after a Bill is passed by the State Assembly is prescribed by article 200, which empowers the Governor to either assent to the Bill making it law, withhold assent, or reserve it for the President’s consideration. In the latter scenario, the President’s assent under article 201 would in turn render the Bill a law. Thus, the Court concluded that the petitioners’ argument entailed an untenable conclusion that a law once assented to by the President would have to be again reserved for the President’s consideration.

The Court explained that when a Bill passed by a State Assembly is presented to the Governor, the Governor may act in one of three ways prescribed by Article 200. First, the Governor may declare his assent, and in that case the Bill immediately becomes law. Second, the Governor may withhold his assent; if he does so, the Bill fails unless the special procedure mentioned in the proviso to Article 200 is followed. Third, the Governor may reserve the Bill for the President’s consideration. If reservation occurs, the President must follow the procedure set out in Article 201. Under Article 201 the President either assents to the Bill, thereby making it law, or withholds assent, in which event the Bill again fails unless the proviso-specified procedure is complied with. Consequently, a Bill that originates in a State Assembly can become law either by the Governor’s direct assent or, after reservation, by the President’s assent. The Court noted that the petitioners’ counsel argued that once a Bill becomes law by the President’s assent, it must once more be reserved to the President to be effective, a conclusion the Court described as curious and one it would be reluctant to adopt unless compelled. The Court observed that Article 200 does not envisage a second reservation by the Governor, and that the plain meaning of Article 31(3) does not support such a view.

The Court turned to the interpretation of the word “law” in Article 31(3). It held that the term does not necessarily refer only to a measure that had already become law before receiving the President’s assent. If that were the intended meaning, the provision would have been phrased “unless such law, having been reserved for the President’s consideration, receives his assent.” Instead, the expression “has received his assent” signifies an accomplished fact, and the clause as a whole does not exclude a measure that eventually becomes law after the President’s assent. The Court explained that the question of whether the requirements of Article 31(3) have been fulfilled arises only when a State attempts to acquire a person’s property under a statute and the affected person disputes the statute’s efficacy. At that juncture the Court must ask whether the statute in question is “a law which, having been reserved for the President’s consideration, has received his assent.” The Court concluded that the word “law” is to be understood as the statute that, at the time of the dispute, is asserted to be law. The language of Article 31(4) supports this reading. Accordingly, the Court held that a proper interpretation of Article 31(3) does not require the Governor first to assent to the Bill to convert it into law before reserving it for the President’s consideration. The Court also reiterated that Article 200 does not contemplate a second reservation by the Governor.

The Court observed that the Constitution does not require a second reservation of a Bill for the President’s consideration when the Governor has already assented to the Bill. Accordingly, the Court found no merit in the second objection raised and dismissed it as unsubstantial. The objections labelled (c) through (f) were similar to those previously presented by counsel for the petitioners in the Bihar appeals and were again adopted by counsel for the petitioners in the President’s proceedings. The brief argument put forward by the petitioners was that, although the impugned Act could not be attacked on the basis of articles 31(4) and 31-B for allegedly infringing fundamental rights, it could still be challenged on other grounds. Specifically, the petitioners sought to demonstrate that the Madhya Pradesh Legislature lacked the authority to enact the law, or that the law violated other constitutional provisions.

Counsel for the petitioners attempted to reinforce these submissions by citing additional passages from textbooks and reported cases. The substantive provisions of the impugned Act had already been examined and summarised by Justice Mahajan in his earlier judgment, and the Court saw no need to repeat that analysis. Likewise, there was no necessity to detail each of the various lines of argument that were based primarily on claims of legislative incompetence of the Madhya Pradesh Legislature, given the entries listed in the Seventh Schedule – namely entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in List III – or on the basis that the Act constituted a fraud upon the Constitution or improperly delegated essential legislative power to the executive. The Court therefore upheld the reasoning set out in the earlier Bihar judgments and rejected all of those heads of objection.

The Court noted that, if anything, the public purpose underlying the Madhya Pradesh Act appeared clearer than that of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. Moreover, the compensation scheme in the Madhya Pradesh legislation was more generous; under clause 4(2) of Schedule I the net income of a property could never be reduced below five per cent of its gross income. Consequently, the Court held that the Act could not be challenged on the ground of lacking a public purpose or on the ground of inadequate compensation, as previously decided in the Bihar appeals.

The Court also observed that the Madhya Pradesh Legislature had enacted several statutes in succession, including the C.P. Revision of the Land Revenue of Mahals Act 1947, which increased the land revenue of the Mahals; the C.P. Revision of Land Revenue of Estates Acts of 1939 and 1947, which raised the land revenue of estates; and the Revocations of Exemptions Act 1948, which removed revenue exemptions enjoyed by certain proprietors, before finally passing the impugned Act. While the petitioners argued that this series of enactments evidenced a systematic scheme to dispossess zamindars and amounted to a fraud on the Constitution, the Court rejected that line of reasoning, finding that the legislation could have been introduced in good faith at different times. The Court concluded that the existence of these prior Acts did not invalidate the impugned Act.

In this case the Court observed that the series of statutes mentioned – including the acts concerning revision of land revenue of mahals and estates and the revocation of exemptions – had been presented by the petitioner as evidence of a deliberate programme intended to dispossess the zamindars, alleging that such a course amounted to a fraud on the Constitution. The Court could not accept this line of reasoning, noting that the legislation listed could very well have been conceived and enacted over time in the utmost good faith. The Court further explained that although section 9 of the impugned Act did not expressly specify the commencement date of the instalments or the exact quantum of each instalment, the provision clearly envisaged that those details would be worked out by rules to be framed under section 91 of the same Act. In addition, the Court pointed out that section 10 imposed on the State Government a duty to order the payment of an interim compensation equal to one-tenth of the estimated compensation amount where the entire amount was not paid within six months from the date the property vested in the State. The Court found no improper delegation of legislative power in these provisions and consequently rejected all the heads of objection raised against the Act.

The Court then turned to the specific ground identified as (g), which challenged the acquisition of the eighty Malaguzari Mahals belonging to the petitioner in Petition No. 166 of 1951 on the basis that those Mahals were not estates and therefore the impugned Act, insofar as it sought to acquire them, was not a law protected by article 31-A. The Advocate-General of Madhya Pradesh conceded that the Malaguzari Mahals did not fall within the meaning of “estate” under the C. P. Land Revenue Act, but he argued that article 31-A employed the term “estate” in a broader sense. The Advocate-General also maintained that, irrespective of the interpretation of article 31-A, the impugned Act was protected by article 31-B. The Court held that it was unnecessary to discuss the precise meaning of “estate” as used in article 31-A, because, in its view, the argument based on article 31-B was well-founded and should prevail. The Court noted that counsel B. Somayya had drawn attention to the words “without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of article 31-A” appearing at the beginning of article 31-B and had contended that the interpretation given to those words by the Judicial Committee in the Shibnath Banerjee case ((1945) L.R. 72 I.A. 241; [1945] F.C.R. 195) should be applied. The Court rejected that submission, observing that the principles articulated by the Judicial Committee could not be relevant to the construction of article 31-B. It emphasized that article 31-B was neither illustrative of nor dependent upon article 31-A, and that the wording in article 31-B was intended expressly to pre-empt any argument that article 31-B might diminish the scope or ambit of the general language employed in article 31-A.

Subsequently, a question was raised by counsel Asthana on behalf of the Ruler of Khairagarh, who was the petitioner in Petition No. 268 of 1951. The Court noted that Khairagarh had formerly been part of the Eastern States Agency, and that on 15 December 1947 the Ruler had entered into a covenant of merger in which the properties in dispute were recognized as the Ruler’s personal property, distinct from the property of the State. The Court indicated that reference was made to article 362, which obliges the Parliament or a State Legislature, when making laws, and the Union or State executive, when exercising executive power, to give due regard to any guarantee or assurance given under such a covenant or agreement, as referred to in clause (1) of article 291, concerning the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State. The petitioner argued that the impugned Act was infirm because it allegedly violated those constitutional provisions. The Court indicated that several answers to that contention were forthcoming, beginning with the observation that the guarantee or assurance to which due regard must be given is limited to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler in his capacity as a Ruler, and does not extend to personal property, which is separate from personal rights.

The Ruler entered into a covenant of merger, and that covenant expressly identified the properties that were the subject of the dispute as the personal properties of the Ruler, separating them clearly from any property that belonged to the State. The judgment then referred to article 362, which stipulates that when Parliament or a State Legislature enacts legislation, or when the executive authority of the Union or a State is exercised, due regard must be given to any guarantee or assurance contained in a covenant or agreement that is mentioned in clause (1) of article 291, specifically with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State. It was contended that the impugned Act violated these constitutional provisions. The Court considered several responses to that contention. It held that the guarantee or assurance for which due regard must be shown is confined to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler in his capacity as Ruler. This guarantee does not extend to the Ruler’s personal property, which is distinct from personal rights. Moreover, the provision in article 362 creates only an assurance and does not impose a legally enforceable obligation upon the legislature or the executive. The covenant’s effect was limited to recognising the Ruler’s title as the owner of the specified properties.

The Court further explained that acknowledging the Ruler’s ownership of certain properties does not mean that those properties may never be taken by the State. The fact that the State sought to acquire the Ruler’s personal properties on payment of compensation demonstrates that the Ruler’s title was recognised in the same manner as the titles of other private proprietors. Additionally, the Court noted that article 363 bars the jurisdiction of the Court to adjudicate any dispute arising out of the covenant. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, for the reasons articulated above and those set out in its earlier judgment on the Bihar appeals, the petitioners’ case must be dismissed. Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar concurred with this view, stating that he had nothing further to add and that he agreed with the orders issued by the Chief Justice and the other judges. The petition was therefore dismissed.