Shrimant Sardar Bhujangaraodaulatrao... vs Shrimant Malojirao Daulatraoghorpade...

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1950

Decision Date: 30 January 1952

Coram: Vivian Bose, M. Patanjali Sastri, Das

In this case the parties were Shrimant Sardar Bhujangaraodaulatrao … (the petitioner) and Shrimant Malojirao Daulatraoghorpade … together with other respondents. The judgment was delivered on 30 January 1952 by a bench consisting of Justice Vivian Bose, who also authored the opinion, and Justice M. Patanjali Sastri. The citation of the decision is 1952 AIR 138 and 1952 SCR 402, with a later citation in the law reports as E and D 1964 SC 436 (13). The dispute was examined under the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act of 1876, section 4(a), which deals with saranjam lands and the question of the maintainability of suits concerning them.

The factual background concerned the Gajendragad estate, which had been recognised by the British government as a saranjam. In 1868 the Bombay High Court declared the estate to be partible. The matter was revisited in 1891 when the Government issued a resolution stating that the entire Gajendragad estate was a hereditary saranjam that could be inherited by all male legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of the British conquest. In 1932 the Government issued another resolution that formally resumed the grant and re-granted it to the petitioner, who belonged to the first branch of the original grantee’s family, directing that the grant be entered in his sole name in the Collector’s accounts. The two other branches of the family, feeling aggrieved, prompted the Government in 1936 to issue a further resolution. This 1936 resolution confirmed the 1891 resolution and modified the 1932 resolution by declaring that the portions of the estate held by the other two branches would be entered as de facto shares, each share being continuable hereditarily as if it were a separate saranjam estate. The petitioner then instituted a suit in which the representatives of the two other branches were impleaded as defendants 1 and 2, and the Province of Bombay was impleaded as defendant 3. The petitioner alleged that the 1936 resolution was ultra vires and prayed for (A) a declaration that (i) defendants 1 and 2 had no right to rely on the 1932 resolution under which the petitioner had been recognised as the sole saranjamdar, and that the assignments held by the defendants were merely “potgi” holdings; (ii) the petitioner possessed the exclusive right to all privileges attached to the office of saranjamdar; and (iii) the Government had no authority to amend the 1932 resolution, and (B) an injunction restraining defendants 1 and 2 from acting in contravention of the petitioner’s asserted rights.

The Court held that the suit was a suit “against the Crown” and also a suit “relating to lands held as saranjam” within the meaning of section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the civil courts possessed no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

The Court held that the plaintiff could not obtain any relief against the first and second defendants in isolation, because the rights asserted against those defendants could not be separated from the plaintiff’s claim against the Government and therefore could not be considered independently. The Court further observed that, even if the plaintiff’s claim against the Government were to be disregarded, such disregard could arise only on the ground that the Government’s orders were not open to judicial challenge. In the event that those orders were deemed valid, the plaintiff could not succeed, since both the plaintiff and the defendants derived their respective property rights from the same governmental orders.

The Court approved the decisions in Basalingappagowda v. Secretary of State (28 Bombay Law Reporter 651) and Basangauda v. Secretary of State (32 Bombay Law Reporter 1370). It distinguished the earlier case of Province of Bombay v. Hormusji Maneklal (74 Indian Appeals 03). The Court also held that section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act would apply even where the only relief sought against the Government consisted of a declaratory judgment. The decision in Dattatreya Viswanath v. Secretary of State for India (Indian Law Reports 1948 Bombay 809) was disapproved, whereas the earlier ruling in Daulatrao v. Government of Bombay (47 Bombay Law Reporter 214) was approved.

The judgment concerned Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1950, an appeal from the judgment and decree of the High Court of Bombay dated 16 December 1948 in Second Appeal No. 1226 of 1945, which itself confirmed the judgment and decree of the District Judge of Dharwar in Appeal No. 123 of 1943. The facts of the case and the arguments presented by counsel were set out in the earlier judgment. Counsel for the appellant consisted of two advocates assisted by a junior. Counsel for the first and second respondents were represented by the Attorney-General for India assisted by a junior counsel. The third respondent, the State of Bombay, was also represented by the Attorney-General for India with assistance from a junior advocate. The appeal was decided on 30 January 1952, and the judgment was delivered by Justice Bose, with Chief Justice Patanjali Sastri and Justice Das concurring with his opinion.

The plaintiff’s appeal concerned a suit relating to a Saranjam estate situated in the State of Bombay. The plaintiff asserted that he was the sole Saranjamdar of the estate and therefore sought various declarations and other reliefs appropriate to that status. The first and second defendants were identified as members of the plaintiff’s own family, while the third defendant was the State of Bombay, referred to as the Province of Bombay at the time the suit was filed. The sole question for determination was whether the suit was barred by section 4(a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, also known as Bombay Act X of 1876. The Court illustrated the family relationships with a genealogical chart: the original British grantee, Bhujangrao Appasaheb, was succeeded by Daulatrao I (who died on 24 July 1864); thereafter the line continued through Bhujangrao I, Malojirao, Yeshwantrao (alias), Annasaheb, his widow Krishnabai, Daulatrao III, Bhujangrao II, Daulatrao II (deceased on 8 May 1931, the first defendant), and finally Bhujangrao III, who is the plaintiff. The factual background set out that a common ancestor of the parties had been granted the Gajendragad estate as a Saranjam before British rule. When the British arrived, the successors endeavoured to preserve the existing Saranjams, jagirs and inams, and consequently framed rules under Schedule B, Rule 10 of the Bombay Rent-Free Estates Act of 1852 to regulate the recognition, succession and tenure conditions of such Saranjams, which were analogous to jagirs.

In accordance with the authority of the earlier sovereigns who had granted Saranjams, the parties created rules under Schedule B, Rule 10 of the Bombay Act XI of 1852, also known as the Bombay Rent-Free Estates Act, to regulate how recognition, succession, and conditions of tenure for Saranjams—land tenures comparable to jagirs—should be administered. Following those rules, the common ancestor shown at the head of the genealogical tree was officially acknowledged by the British Government as the Saranjamdar of the Gajendragad estate; for convenience this ancestor is referred to in the record as the British Grantee. The register identified as Exhibit P-53 records that the estate comprised twenty-six villages. Although the exact date of British recognition is not provided, the tenure is described as continuable to all male legitimate descendants of the holder at the time of the British conquest, namely Bhujangrao Appasaheb, the first British Grantee and son of Bahirojirao Ghorpade. Upon the death of Bhujangrao Appasaheb, his son Daulatrao I succeeded to the estate and subsequently died on 24 July 1864. Daulatrao I left three sons: Bhujangrao I, Yeshwantrao, and Malojirao. In 1866 Bhujangrao I and his brother Yeshwantrao, who is also known as Annasaheb, instituted a suit against Malojirao seeking possession of the Saranjam. The question of impartibility was raised, but the Bombay High Court held that the property situated in British India was partible. The Court further declared that Bhujangrao I, as head of the family, was entitled to a special assignment not exceeding a quarter share for the expenses and duties attendant upon his position, and that after setting aside that assignment each of the three brothers would be entitled to an equal one-third share in the landed property in India. This judgment is reported in 5 Bom. H.C.R. 161 and is dated 12 October 1868. The duties listed at page 170 included maintaining armed retainers for the fort of Gajendragad, improving that village, which served as the chief seat of this branch of the Ghorpade family, and providing customary ceremonial presents to junior members of the family. Consequently, a division of the property was effected: Malojirao separated himself from his brothers and was allotted seven villages, while the remaining two brothers continued to hold the rest jointly. That division applied only to property located in British India; the estate’s holdings in the State of Kolhapur remained undivided. Bhujangrao I died in 1881, after which his younger brother Yeshwantrao (alias Annasaheb) claimed to succeed as the sole heir. The Political Department of the Government of India refused to recognise Yeshwantrao’s claim and instead permitted Bhujangrao I’s widow, Krishnabai, to adopt a boy from the family, recognizing the adopted child as the heir to the portion of the estate that lay within the Principality of Kolhapur.

The Government of Kolhapur recorded that the adoption of a son for the late Bhujangrao was formally approved on the third day of February in the year 1882. Following that, the Bombay Government, concerning the estates situated in British India, issued a resolution on the twenty-sixth of April 1882 which set out three principal directives. First, the resolution declared that the adoption would be acknowledged and that the adopted son would assume the same status as his adoptive father, thereby receiving one-third share of the estate together with the portion assigned to him as head of the family. Second, it ordered that Malojirao, who had already taken his allotted portion of the estate, should retain possession of that share. Third, it gave Yeshwantrao, also known as Annasaheb, the choice either to remain joint with the adopted son or to separate his interests. The resolution concluded by stating that the two brothers would hold their respective shares as private property under the authority of the High Court decree, while the Jahagir would be confined to the portion awarded by the High Court to Bhujangrao, which the adopted son would now inherit. It further emphasized that the High Court decision was not to be treated as a precedent and that no further partition of the Jahagir estate in favour of the adopted son would ever be permitted. The same governmental stance was reiterated on the twenty-second of August 1882 when Krishnabai, who had been permitted by the Government to adopt Daulatrao II, requested that her deceased husband’s one-third share of the estate likewise be recognized as private property, comparable to the shares held by the other two brothers. That request was denied, and the Government clarified that the adoption was allowed solely on the basis of Bhujangrao’s one-third share and the portion assigned to him as head of the family, which would continue to descend as an indivisible Jahagir estate in the male line according to primogeniture, without any conditions regarding Krishnabai’s enjoyment of the property during her lifetime. The Government revisited its position in 1891 and, through a resolution dated the seventeenth of March 1891, declared that the entire Gajendragad Estate constituted a Saranjam capable of hereditary continuation in the fullest sense as interpreted by the Court of Directors in paragraph nine of their Despatch No 27 dated twelve December 1855. It further observed that the estate was continuable to all legitimate male descendants of the holder at the time of the British conquest and that any future adoption sanctioned by the Government would be subject to the same terms applicable to Saranjamdars, with the property to be administered like other Saranjams within the Political Department. In the year 1901, the adopted son Daulatrao II instituted a suit for partition against Bhujangrao II, the son of Yeshwantrao. It is relevant to recall that the earlier litigation of 1866, which concluded with a judgment of the Bombay High Court reported in volume five of the Bombay High Court Reports at page 161, involved Malojirao taking sole separation of his share.

In the litigation of 1901 the earlier arrangement in which the two younger brothers had continued to hold the estate jointly was terminated. The High Court delivered its judgment on 12 March 1908 and expressly observed that the Government had not been a party to that suit, so the Government’s rights against either litigant or both were not altered by the decree. However, the Court held that the parties to the suit were bound by the earlier decision, and consequently the adopted son acquired the right to seek a partition and to obtain a separate possession of those portions of the property that formed his share. Following that ruling the two litigants divided their holdings amicably between themselves. Around the year 1930 a Record of Rights was prepared for fourteen villages in the Gajendragad Jahagir, and a fresh dispute arose among the three branches of the family. The District Deputy Collector examined the land records and noted that, in the village Inam register, the Saranjamdar’s name alone appeared in the Saranjam list and the land-alienation register, whereas in the records of the other villages the various family members were entered according to their actual possession or enjoyment (wahivat). After careful consideration the Collector concluded that the interests of both the Government and the Saranjamdar would be adequately protected if the existing pattern of entries were retained, and he therefore ordered that the entries be made in the same manner. The order further disclosed that the matter had been referred to the Legal Remembrancer of the Bombay Government for advice. In the meantime, on 5 May 1898, a set of Rules framed under Schedule B, Rule 10 of the Bombay Rent-Free Estates Act, 1852, was published in the Bombay Gazette, and these Rules were later re-published, apparently with some modifications, in the Gazette of 8 July 1901. The portions of the Rules relevant to the present case read as follows: (i) Saranjams shall ordinarily be continued in accordance with the decision already passed by the Government in each case; (ii) A Saranjam adjudged hereditarily continuable shall ordinarily descend to the eldest male representative, in the order of primogeniture, of the senior branch of the family descended from the first British grantee or any of his brothers who were undivided in interest; however, the Government reserves the right, for sufficient reasons, to direct the continuance of the Saranjam to any other member of the family, or, as an act of grace, to a person adopted into the same family with the Government’s sanction; (iii) Every Saranjam shall be held as a life estate, to be formally resumed on the death of the holder, and where it is capable of further continuance it shall be re-granted to the next holder as a fresh grant from the Government, free of any debts or charges except those specially imposed by the Government; (iv) No Saranjam shall be capable of subdivision; and (v) Every Saranjamdar shall be responsible for making a suitable provision for the maintenance of certain members of the Saranjamdar’s family as enumerated in the Rule.

The Court noted that Rule IX allowed the Government, if an order under Rule VII was not executed, to resume the entire Saranjam or any part of it for any reason and to provide maintenance for the Saranjamdar’s family from the revenues of the resumed estate. After the District Deputy Collector issued his orders on 20 May 1930, the holder of the estate, Daulatrao II, died on 8 May 1931 and the matter returned to Government consideration. On 7 June 1932 the Government issued a resolution titled “Resumption and regrant of the Gajendragad Saranjam standing at No. 91 of the Saranjam List.” The resolution directed that the Gajendragad Saranjam be formally resumed and regranted to Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade, who was the eldest son of the deceased Saranjamdar Sardar Daulatrao Bhujangrao Ghorpade, and that the regrant be entered in his sole name in the accounts of the Collector of Dharwar effective from the date of death of the last holder. The Collector was instructed to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages that had been held by the deceased. The resolution also confirmed that the assignments held by the Bhaubands as potgi holders should continue as before. The individual named Bhujangrao in the resolution corresponded to Bhujangrao III shown in the genealogical tree.

The Court observed that the other members of the family, dissatisfied with the regrant, instituted Suit No. 23 of 1934 against the plaintiff and the Secretary of State for India in Council, seeking a declaration that the villages allotted to their shares were independent private property and, if they constituted Saranjam property, that they be recognised as separate independent Saranjams distinct from the plaintiff’s estate. That suit was subsequently withdrawn, but the plaintiffs were given leave to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action against the plaintiff, though not against the Secretary of State. The defendants claimed that the withdrawal was part of an arrangement whereby the Government would issue a new resolution in accordance with the earlier resolution dated 17 March 1891. Accordingly, on 25 February 1936 the Government issued a further resolution. That resolution confirmed the decision in Government Resolution (Political Department) No. 1769 of 17 March 1891 and declared that the entire Gajendragad Estate shall remain continuable as an inalienable and impartible Saranjam subject to the conditions stated in the earlier resolution, taking into account the manner in which different portions of the estate had been held by different branches of the family.

The Governor-in-Council, by amending the orders contained in Government Resolution No 8969 dated 7 June 1932, directed that the portions of the Gajendragad Estate held respectively by Sardar Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade, Daulatrao Malojirao Ghorpade and Bhujangrao Yeshwantrao Ghorpade be entered in the Revenue Records as de facto shares. Each share was to be recorded as held by the named person in the capacity of a representative of one of the three branches of the Ghorpade family. The resolution further provided that each such de facto share would be hereditary and would be treated as if it were a separate Saranjam estate. This continuation was to be governed by the rules made for the continuance of Saranjams by the Governor-in-Council, exercised under the powers set out in the rules framed under the Bombay Rent-Free Estates Act, 1852, and section 2(3) of the Bombay Summary Settlement Act (VII of 1863), together with any special orders which the Governor-in-Council might issue concerning the Gajendragad Estate as a whole or the particular share. The resolution expressly stated that recognising these shares and entering them as separate entries in the Revenue Records would not imply that the Gajendragad Estate was partible or alienable. Accordingly, the estate would continue to be treated by the Government as a single, impartible and inalienable Saranjam. In addition, the Governor-in-Council ordered that these shares could not be subdivided and could not be alienated or encumbered except in accordance with the aforementioned rules and any special orders that might be issued.

The suit before the Court challenges the validity of the Government’s resolution. The first and second defendants are described as the current representatives of the other branches of the Ghorpade family, while the third defendant is the Province of Bombay (now the State of Bombay). The plaintiff’s plaint alleges that the Government lacks jurisdiction to deprive the plaintiff, during his lifetime, of the full benefits, rights and privileges belonging to a Saranjam holder. The plaintiff contends that the Government order dated 8 February 1936 is ultra vires and therefore cannot bind him. He further asserts that defendants 1 and 2 are not entitled to any rights or privileges that belong to the holder of an inalienable and impartible Saranjam, such as the authority to appoint village officers in any of the twenty-seven villages forming part of the Gajendragad Saranjam. The cause of action, the plaintiff states, arose in April 1938, and because the resolution and the resulting entry are ultra vires, they are not binding. Finally, the plaintiff explains that although the suit primarily seeks relief against defendants 1 and 2, defendant 3 has been made a party so that the Government can give proper effect to the decision of the Government dated 17 March 1891.

In this suit the plaintiff referred to dates of March 1891 and 7 June 1932 and asserted that defendants 1 and 2 possessed no entitlement to the position they claimed. The plaintiff sought several specific reliefs. First, the plaintiff asked that it be declared that defendants 1 and 2 could not override the Government order issued in Resolution No 8969 dated 7 June 1932, which recognized the plaintiff as the sole Saranjamdar in the revenue records, and that the assignments held by defendants 1 and 2 were merely potgi holdings. Second, the plaintiff contended that, as the sole Saranjamdar, he alone possessed, for the duration of his lifetime, the exclusive right to all rights and privileges attached to that office, including the right to be consulted on the appointment of village officers in every village forming part of the Saranjam estate, even though those villages were assigned to defendants 1 and 2 as potgi. Third, the plaintiff requested that defendants 1 and 2 be restrained from performing any act or taking any step that would infringe the plaintiff’s aforementioned right. Fourth, the plaintiff prayed that it be declared that defendant 3, the Government, had no authority to alter Resolution No 8969 of 7 June 1932, at any time during the plaintiff’s lifetime. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim on its merits, holding that the Government possessed the power to amend its resolution in the manner it had done. On appeal, the lower appellate court also dismissed the suit, basing its decision on three grounds: that earlier decisions of 1868 and 1908 operated as res judicata, that the impugned resolution was intra vires, and that sections 4(a) and 4(d) of the Revenue Jurisdiction Act barred the court’s jurisdiction. When the plaintiff sought a second appeal, the High Court confined its review to the jurisdictional issue, concurred with the lower appellate court’s finding of lack of jurisdiction, dismissed the appeal, but granted the plaintiff leave to approach this Court. The sole question for consideration before this Court therefore concerned jurisdiction. Section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876 (Bombay Act X of 1876) provides, subject to certain exceptions, that no civil court shall exercise jurisdiction over claims against the Crown relating to lands held as Saranjam. It was vigorously argued that the present suit was not a claim against the Crown but only against defendants 1 and 2. In the Court’s opinion, that argument was untenable in view of paragraphs 9 and 12 of the plaint and of reliefs (a) and (d). Counsel for the plaintiff was asked whether he would strike out the third defendant and the portions of the plaint seeking relief against that defendant; he declined to do so. The Court observed that a plaintiff could not insist on retaining a party against whom no relief was claimed, and concluded that the suit fell squarely within the meaning of a claim against the Crown under section 4(a).

In this case the Court first examined whether, assuming the suit is within jurisdiction, the matter also falls within the category of a claim “relating to lands held as Saranjam.” The Court found that the reliefs sought against the Government unquestionably relate to such lands. Paragraph 9 of the plaint specifically challenges the Government’s authority to deprive the plaintiff of the full benefit of every right and privilege that belongs to the holder of a Saranjam. The Court observed that those rights cannot exist apart from the lands that constitute the Saranjam estate, and the prayer in the plaint implies that the Government has no power to resume the Saranjam either under Rule V, which governs the death of the last Saranjamdar, or under Rule IX, which applies during the Saranjamdar’s lifetime. The Court further noted that a resumption under Rule IX can only involve the land itself because the rule mandates that, when a Saranjam is resumed, the Government must provide maintenance for the entitled persons “out of the revenues of the Saranjam so resumed.” Since such revenues can arise only from the land, the resumption would inevitably affect the land. Relief (d) in the prayer clause asks for a declaration that the Government has no authority to alter Resolution No 8969 dated 7 June 1932. The Court pointed out that this resolution directly concerns the land, as it orders the resumption of the Gajendragad Saranjam and directs the Collector to take steps to place the Saranjamdar in possession of the villages that make up the Saranjam estate. Consequently, the Court held that it is impossible to contend that the claim does not relate to lands held as Saranjam.

The plaintiff’s counsel then argued that, if the claim against the Government were to be dismissed, the plaintiff should still be allowed to obtain the reliefs claimed against the other two defendants, asserting that those reliefs do not involve land and are not claims against the “Crown.” The Court rejected this contention, stating that the suit cannot be separated into a part concerning the Government and another part concerning the other defendants. The Court explained that paragraph 10 of the plaint makes it clear that the plaintiff’s challenge to the Government’s power to deprive him of his Saranjam rights logically leads to the conclusion that the first and second defendants are also not entitled to any of the rights and privileges of the Saranjamdar. One such right, identified through Rules VII and IX, is the entitlement to collect the revenues of the entire estate in order to fulfill the obligation of paying maintenance to certain family members. Since the defendants claim to hold their lands under Government orders, and the plaintiff insists on keeping the Government as a party so that it may be bound by any decree against the other defendants, the Court found that the plaintiff’s claims against the other defendants are inseparable from his claim against the Government. The Court therefore concluded that the claim against the Government cannot be ignored without affecting the entire relief sought in the suit.

In this case the Court observed that the plaintiff’s claim against the Government could be disregarded only on the ground that the Government’s orders were not capable of being challenged; if those orders remained valid, the plaintiff could not hope to succeed because both parties possessed their respective properties on the basis of those orders. The Court referred to two decisions of the Bombay High Court that had adopted this view. The first decision was Basalingappagouda v. The Secretary of State for India, reported in 28 Born. L.R. 651, a Watan case in which the Government had recognised the second defendant as the Watandar. The plaintiff sued both the Government and the second defendant seeking a declaration and an injunction. When the plaintiff was confronted with the difficulty that a suit against the Government could not be maintained under section 4(a)(3) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, he asked the Court, as here, to exclude the Government from consideration and to decree his claim against the second defendant alone. The learned judges held that such a course would amount to striking out the principal relief sought against both defendants and would fundamentally alter the character of the suit; they further observed that “as long as the Secretary of State is a party to the suit, such a declaration could not be granted.” The second decision, Basangauda v. The Secretary of State, reported in 32 Bom. L.R. 1370, saw Beaumont C.J. and Baker J. reaching the same conclusion. Counsel for the appellant argued that the claim was not directed against the Government and therefore the Government should be struck out, but he was unwilling to do so because the Government would then not be bound by the proceedings and would continue to follow the decisions of its revenue tribunals. He therefore wished to keep the Government as a party so that it would be bound, although he sought only a declaration of title that would bind the Government and not an order affecting the way the property should be dealt with. The judges held that the jurisdiction of the courts was ousted. The Court then noted that it had been contended, relying on a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Province of Bombay v. Horrnusji Manekji, reported in 74 I A. 103, that the courts possessed jurisdiction to decide whether the Government had acted beyond its powers and that this question should be decided first. The Court opined that this precedent did not apply because the Privy Council had been dealing with a case falling under section 4(b) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, which provides that no civil court shall exercise jurisdiction over objections to the amount or incidence of any land-revenue assessment authorised by the Provincial Government.

The judgment referred to two authorities, namely 32 Bom. L.R. 1370 and 74 I A. 103. It was observed, on the submission of counsel representing the plaintiff-respondent, that the term “authorised” should be interpreted as “duly authorised”. According to that argument, the assessment that was being challenged would not be considered duly authorised if the Government Resolution dated 11-4-1990, which purported to treat the agreement relied upon by the respondent as cancelled and to authorise the levy of the full assessment, was ultra vires of section 211 of the Land Revenue Code. Consequently, before the statutory exclusion of the Civil Court’s jurisdiction under section 4(b) could be invoked, the Court was required to decide whether the resolution was ultra vires. The learned Lords therefore held that the question of ultra vires lay outside the bar created by section 4(b). The present matter, however, falls under section 4(a). Under that provision no issue arises concerning an authorised act of the Government, because the section is expressed in general terms and bars all “claims against the Crown relating to lands … held as Saranjam”. Accordingly, even if the Government’s act concerning such lands were ultra vires, a claim challenging the validity of that act would still be barred by clause (a) so long as it pertains to the land in question. The Bombay High Court has been divided on whether section 4 is triggered when the sole relief sought against the Government is a declaration. One line of decisions, exemplified by Dattatraya Vishwanath v. The Secretary of State for India (1), holds that a declaration does not constitute a “claim against Government”. The opposite view was adopted in Daulatrao v. Government of Bombay (2), a case involving the Gajendragad estate. The present opinion favours the latter approach. In the view expressed, the High Court’s decision was correct and the appeal was dismissed with costs. The Chief Justice, Patanjali Sastri, agreed, as did Justice S.R. Das. The appeal was dismissed. The appellant was represented by an agent named Ganpat Rai, while the respondents numbered one and two were represented by an agent identified as M.S.K. Sastri, and respondent three was represented by an agent named P.A. Mehta. (1) I.L.R. 1948 Born. 809 at 820. (2) 47 Bom. L.R. 214.