D. N. Banerji vs P. R. Mukherjee And Others

Rewritten Version Notice: This is a rewritten version of the original judgment.

Court: Supreme Court of India

Case Number: Case No. 282 of 1951

Decision Date: 5 December 1952

Coram: N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, M. Patanjali Sastri, B.K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose, Ghulam Hasan

In the matter titled D. N. Banerji versus P. R. Mukherjee and Others, a judgment was delivered on the fifth day of December, 1952 by the Supreme Court of India. The opinion was prepared by Justice N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, who also sat on the bench together with Justices M. Patanjali Sastri, B. K. Mukherjea, Vivian Bose and Ghulam Hasan. The parties were identified as the petitioner D. N. Banerji and the respondents comprising P. R. Mukherjee along with other individuals. The judgment was recorded on the same date, 5 December 1952, and the bench composition was reiterated as Justice Aiyar, Justice Sastri, Justice Mukherjea, Justice Bose and Justice Hasan. The case has been reported in several law reports, including the 1953 volume of the All India Reporter at page 58, the 1953 Supreme Court Reports at page 302, and is cited in numerous subsequent decisions such as RF 1956 SC 676, R 1957 SC 110, R 1957 SC 532, R 1958 SC 321, RF 1958 SC 353, R 1960 SC 610, E&R 1960 SC 675, R 1961 SC 1567, E 1964 SC 903, RF 1968 SC 554, R 1970 SC 1453, R 1972 SC 763, E&R 1978 SC 548, R 1980 SC 2181, F 1987 SC 117, R 1988 SC 1182, R 1990 SC 2047, R 1992 SC 780 and many others. The statutory provision under discussion was Section 2(j) and (k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which defines “industry” and “industrial dispute”. The citation record also references the case’s relevance to the interpretation of these provisions.

The headnote of the judgment explained that the term “industrial dispute” in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, embraces conflicts between municipalities and their employees when the work involved can be regarded as analogous to the carrying on of a trade or business. The definition of “undertaking” in the first part of the definition and “industrial occupation or avocation” in the second part were interpreted to extend far beyond the ordinary meaning of trade or business, indicating that the legislature intended to include matters that might not strictly be classified as a trade or business venture. The factual backdrop involved the chairman of a municipality who dismissed two employees—a Sanitary Inspector and a Head Clerk—both of whom were members of the Municipal Workers’ Union. The union questioned the legality of the dismissals and sought reinstatement of the employees. The government referred the dispute to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act, while the municipality objected, asserting that the matter did not constitute an industrial dispute. The Court held that the definition of “industrial dispute” in the Act was sufficiently wide to cover the dispute between the municipality and its employees, and therefore the matter could properly be referred to a Tribunal for adjudication under the Act. Additionally, the Court observed that although the Tribunal’s power to order reinstatement interfered with the authority granted to the municipal chairman by Sections 66 and 67 of the Bengal Municipal Act to appoint and dismiss employees, this did not render the Industrial Disputes Act invalid. The Court concluded that the Act, in substance, dealt with industrial and labour disputes and was therefore constitutionally valid despite the overlap with provincial municipal legislation.

The Court noted that the matters discussed in the present appeal had been referred to earlier authorities such as Profulla Kumar Mookerjee v. Bank of Conbinerce Ltd., Khulna (L.R. 74 I.A. 23), Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay ([1949] F.C.R. 321), National Association 303 of Local Government Officers v. Bolton Corporation ([1943] A.C. 16) and Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees’ Union of Australia v. Melbourne Corporation (26 Com. L.R. 508). The appeal, recorded as Civil Appellate Jurisdiction Case No. 282 of 1951, was filed under article 132 (1) of the Constitution of India against the judgment and order dated 1 June 1950 issued by the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta, where Justice Harries C. J. and Justice Banerjee J. had sat. The original proceedings were Civil Rule No. 563 of 1950 and Original Side Matter No. 25 of 1950. Counsel for the appellant consisted of Panchanan Ghose together with A. K. Dutt and B. L. Jarafdar. The respondents were represented by B. Sen for respondents numbered one and two, and by S. N. Mukherjee for respondent number three. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Justice Chandra Sekhara Aiyar on 5 December 1952.

In the factual matrix, Pratul Chandra Mitra held the position of Head Clerk and Phanindra Nath Ghose served as the Sanitary Inspector of the Budge Budge Municipality; both men were members of the Municipal Workers’ Union. Following receipt of complaints alleging negligence, insubordination and indiscipline, the Chairman of the Municipality suspended the two officers on 13 July 1949, issued separate proceedings against each of them and required them to submit explanations by a specified deadline. After the explanations were received, the Commissioners considered the matter at a meeting held on 6 August 1949 and, by a majority vote, confirmed the suspensions and ordered the dismissal of both employees. The Municipal Workers’ Union, challenging the propriety of the dismissals, prompted the Government of West Bengal to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal on 24 September 1949 for adjudication under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Tribunal rendered its award on 13 February 1950, finding that the suspension and dismissal constituted victimisation and directing that the two employees be reinstated to their respective posts. The Municipality responded by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Calcutta High Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, seeking the quashing of the Tribunal’s proceedings, cancellation of its award and an injunction restraining any action to give effect to the award. A separate application under article 227 was also filed. Both petitions were heard by Justice Harries C. J. and Justice Sambhu Nath Banerjee. The petitioners raised five questions: (a) whether any industrial dispute existed, thereby precluding reference to a Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act; (b) whether the Act applied to disputes involving Municipalities; (c) whether, even if applicable, it was ultra vires; (d) whether the Tribunal should have directed reinstatement of the employees; and (e) whether the award was unsound on its merits.

The Court observed that the petitioners had raised five specific objections, the fifth of which claimed that the award was unsound on its merits. The learned judges rejected all of these contentions and dismissed the petitions. However, the petitioners were subsequently granted leave to appeal under article 132(1) of the Constitution, and consequently the matter reached this Court. The Court noted that it was unnecessary to elaborate at length on the third, fourth and fifth points raised by the petitioners. The Court then considered the consequence of assuming that the Industrial Disputes Act applied to municipalities and their employees. In that circumstance, the authority of a Tribunal to order the reinstatement of dismissed employees, an authority affirmed in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay and Others (1949) F.C.R. 321, would unquestionably conflict with the power to appoint and dismiss municipal officers that is conferred upon the Chairman and Commissioners by sections 66 and 67 of the Bengal Municipal Act. The Court explained that such an overlap into a field of provincial legislation does not, however, invalidate the central legislation, because the primary focus must be on the substance—or “pith and substance”—of the contested Act when assessing any possible jurisdictional clash. The Court emphasized that industrial and labour disputes fall within the competence of the central legislature, and the impugned Act deals with that subject matter rather than with matters of local government, a principle also addressed in Profulla Kumar Mookerjee v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna (1947) L.R.

The Court further stated that, on the facts of any particular case, the determination of whether a dismissal was wrongful or justified is principally a matter for the Tribunal. In the present case the Tribunal had held that the two dismissals amounted to victimisation and were therefore wrongful. Unless there existed a grave miscarriage of justice or a flagrant breach of law that warranted intervention, the High Court could not intervene under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The Court noted that the first two objections were interrelated. It pointed out that the two dismissals had been challenged by the Municipal Workers’ Union as grossly improper, establishing a dispute between the employer—the municipality—and the workmen represented by the Union. The municipality, however, argued that the controversy did not constitute an “industrial dispute” within the meaning of the Act, and therefore the government lacked jurisdiction to refer the matter to a Tribunal. The municipality contended that in performing its ordinary duties of local self-government it was not engaged in any “industry” as defined by the Act. The Court therefore deemed it necessary to examine closely the relevant provisions of the Act to ascertain their true scope and meaning. It cited the definitions of “industry” and “industrial dispute” found in section 2, clauses (j) and (k) of the Act, which describe industry as any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers.

In interpreting the statutory terms, the Court quoted the definition of “industry” contained in section I.A.23, which states that industry includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. The definition of “industrial dispute” in clause (k) describes it as any dispute or difference between employers and employers, between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen. It is a dispute that is connected with the employment or non-employment, the terms of employment, or the conditions of labour of any person. Because clause (k) refers to workmen, the Court examined the definition of “workman” in clause (s). Clause (s) reads that a workman means any person employed, including an apprentice, in any industry to perform any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward; it further includes a workman who is discharged during the pendency of an industrial dispute, but expressly excludes persons employed in the naval, military or air service of the Government. The Court also noted that the Industrial Courts Act of 1919, section 8, provides comparable definitions. That provision states that “trade dispute” means any dispute or difference between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, connected with the employment or non-employment, the terms of employment, or the conditions of labour of any person. It further defines “workman” as any person who has entered into or works under a contract with an employer, whether the contract relates to manual labour, clerical work, or any other service, and whether the contract is expressed or implied, oral or written, and whether it is a contract of service, apprenticeship, or a personal contract to execute any work or labour. The Court observed that the expression “trade dispute” in the English legislation and “industrial dispute” in the present Act are practically synonymous. It was further accepted that an industry may be carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government, a State Government, or a local authority, as indicated by sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of section 2 and by the definition of “employer” in clause (g). Clause (g) provides that for an industry carried on by a central or state department, the employer is the authority prescribed for that purpose, or where no authority is prescribed, the head of the department; and for an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the employer is the chief executive officer of that authority. Consequently, when a dispute arises in such an industry between employees on one side and the Central Government, a State Government, or the local body on the other side, it unquestionably qualifies as an industrial dispute; however, a dispute concerning the termination of ordinary governmental or local-body activities does not automatically fall within that category.

It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the controversy could not be classified as an industrial dispute, and the Court noted that this contention required examination. In ordinary, non-technical language, the term “industry” or “business” was understood by the layperson to denote an undertaking in which capital and labour cooperated to produce wealth in the form of goods, machines, tools and similar items, with the objective of earning profits. This ordinary conception of industry was regarded as applicable even to activities such as agriculture, horticulture, pisciculture and related pursuits. The Court further observed, however, that the mere existence of an employer-employee relationship did not automatically convert the activity into an industry as commonly understood. For example, the relationship between a master and a servant, between a government and its secretariat, or between medical professionals working in a hospital, would not ordinarily be thought of as an industry by a person unacquainted with advanced legal definitions. To regard such relationships as industrial would, in the view of the Court, be absurd and contrary to the ordinary perception of a layman.

Nevertheless, the Court explained that a statute was free to give the words “industry” and “industrial dispute” a broader and more comprehensive meaning so as to meet the demands of rapid industrial development and to promote industrial peace and economic efficiency. By extending the definition, the legislature could facilitate a fair and satisfactory adjustment of relations between employers and workmen across a wide variety of fields of activity. The Court pointed out that the narrow concept of industry that prevailed in earlier times had to give way to a much wider concept capable of encompassing diverse forms of industry. Such an expanded definition allowed disputes arising in connection with these varied activities to be settled quickly, without causing excessive disruption or disorganisation of societal needs, and it favoured methods of conciliation and settlement rather than a rigid determination of rights and liabilities based solely on strict legal procedure and principles.

The Court further observed that contemporary conflicts between capital and labour were now to be determined more from the standpoint of status than of contract. Without adopting this broader approach, the numerous problems that now manifested as industrial disputes could not be tackled satisfactorily. This necessity explained why every civilized government had introduced machinery of conciliation officers, boards and tribunals for the effective settlement of disputes. Consequently, the Court held that it was incumbent upon the judiciary to ascertain what the statute meant by “industry” and “industrial dispute”, setting aside the original, simpler meaning of those words which applied in a society where there was perhaps a single employer engaged in a particular trade, using his own tools, material and skill, employing a few workmen, and where disputes were confined to the individual level and did not evolve into large-scale strikes or widespread social unrest.

In earlier times, conflicts between workers and employers were limited to isolated disputes, and large-scale strikes or organized walk-outs that threw society into disorder were practically unknown. As industrial relations evolved, legislation had to keep pace with the changing circumstances and provide for new situations. Social evolution represented a continual process of growth, and the State could not remain idle; it had to adopt appropriate legislative measures to address the significant and emerging problems that arose regularly in the industrial sector. The Court explained that these observations were essential for a proper understanding of the terms used in the statute. While it was undisputed that the meaning of a term should be derived from the words employed in its definition, the surrounding circumstances and context were also relevant for determining the precise intention behind the terminology.

The Court referred to Lord Atkinson’s observation in Keates v. Lewis Merthyr Consolidated Collieries (1911) A.C. 641 at 642, noting that when construing a statute it is always permissible to consider the conditions that existed at the time the law was enacted and the evils that the legislation was intended to remedy. The Court stated that if the language of a provision allowed only a single meaning, that meaning must be adopted; however, if the words were capable of a broader import, the Court must consider the purpose that the legislature had in mind. The Court further observed that even when two statutes contain similar definitions, the objectives sought to be achieved—reflected not only in the preamble but also in the legislative history—may differ substantially. Consequently, the same words may convey one meaning in one statute and a different meaning in another.

Because of this principle, the Court held that decisions interpreting specific words in other statutes were of limited value when applying the language of the statute under consideration. Such earlier decisions might offer assistance, but they could not be treated as binding guides or precedents. The Court then turned to the expression “industrial dispute.” It explained that, to the ordinary mind, the phrase denotes a dispute that affects large groups of workers and employers positioned on opposite sides of a general issue that unites each group by a common set of interests. These interests typically include matters such as wages, bonuses, allowances, pensions, provident funds, the number of working hours per week, holidays, and similar questions. The Court noted that, in the context of a business, it would be difficult to describe a case in which an individual employee was dismissed and the dismissal was contested as wrongful as an “industrial dispute.” Nevertheless, the Court recognized that modern societal conditions had led capital and labour to organise themselves into groups for the purpose of fighting and settling their disputes on the basis of the theory that in union...

In this case, the Court observed that because collective bargaining has become an established feature of labour relations, a grievance involving a single employee can evolve into an industrial dispute. The Court explained that this often occurs when the employee’s trade union, of which the employee is a member, decides to intervene and there is a coordinated demand by the workers for redress. Such disputes may originate in a single workplace, such as an establishment or a factory, but they can also spread so that the original complaint expands into a grievance representing all workers in the entire industry. The Court noted that the extension of labour unrest from an isolated incident to a widespread industrial conflict is not a rare event; it happens with some frequency. When the unrest spreads, a dispute that began in a particular business acquires the character of a large-scale industrial dispute, and the Government cannot treat it as a trivial problem that can be settled merely between the individual employer and employee. The Court further pointed out that at the time the relevant Act was enacted, labour disputes had already grown to a considerable magnitude, and there were numerous confrontations between workers and employers. Consequently, the Court inferred that the legislation was intended to address precisely such a situation, and therefore the terms used in the Act to describe these disputes must be given a broad and generous meaning wherever reasonable.

The Court then turned to the definitions of “industry”, “industrial dispute” and “workman” contained in the Act. It observed that the word “undertaking” appearing in the definition of “industry” is positioned between “business” and “trade” on one side and “manufacture” on the other. While this placement might suggest that “undertaking” refers only to a business or trade venture, the Court argued that if that were the sole meaning there would be no reason to use a separate term distinct from “business” or “trade”. The Court highlighted that the broader sense becomes even clearer when the definition proceeds to speak of “calling, service, employment, or industrial occupation or a vocation of workmen”. In this context, both “undertaking” in the first clause and “industrial occupation or avocation” in the second clause convey a meaning that extends well beyond the ordinary idea of trade or business. The Court concluded that the definition was deliberately crafted to encompass activities that might not strictly be characterised as a trade or business undertaking. Finally, the Court referred to the provision in Section 2, sub-clause (n), which defines “public utility service”. This definition lists several categories, namely: (i) any railway service; (ii) any part of an industrial establishment whose safety of the establishment or of the workmen depends on its operation; (iii) any postal, telegraph or telephone service; (iv) any industry that supplies power, light, or water to the public; (v) any system of public conservancy or sanitation; and (vi) any industry specified in the Schedule. The Court indicated that this definition is highly relevant for interpreting the terms “industry” and “industrial dispute”.

In this case the Court noted that the Schedule empowered the appropriate Government, when it was satisfied that a public emergency or a public interest required it, to declare by a notification in the official Gazette that a particular service was a public utility service for the purposes of the Act. The declaration could be made for a period that the notification specified, but the initial period was not allowed to exceed six months. The same Government could, by a further notification, extend the period from time to time, each extension being for a period not exceeding six months, provided that it was still satisfied that a further public emergency or public interest justified the extension. The Court observed that a public utility service such as railways, telephones, or the supply of power, light or water to the public could be carried on by private companies or business corporations. Conservancy or sanitation services could also be carried on in the same manner, although after the introduction of local self-government most countries had assigned such work to local bodies, for example municipalities, district boards or local boards. The Court further explained that a dispute between an employer and workmen in any of these services was an industrial dispute. The proviso to section 10 required that when such a dispute arose and a notice under section 22 had been given, the appropriate Government had to make a reference under the relevant sub-section. The Court then examined whether a public utility service that was carried on by a statutory corporation such as a municipality ceased to be an industry because it functioned under a statutory charter. It considered the argument that a municipal undertaking did not involve the investment of capital or the profit-making motive that usually characterise a private business. The Court held, however, that neither capital investment nor a profit motive was an essential condition for something to be regarded as an industry in the modern conception. The Court referred to section 108 of the Bengal Municipal Act (XV of 1932), which listed thirty-six heads of municipal duties, including the construction and maintenance of streets, lighting, water supply, conservancy, maintenance of dairy farms and milk depots, and the leasing of markets. These items described the ordinary functions of a municipality. Some of those functions could be described as having the nature of an industry, while others could not. For example, the supply of power and light to municipal inhabitants could be seen as an industry, whereas the operation of charitable hospitals and dispensaries for the poor could not. In ordinary language the former might be called an industry, but the latter would not. The Court therefore concluded that assigning such duties to local bodies was not intended to remove them from the sphere of industry but to replace private employers with public authorities and to minimise the profit motive, while still keeping the activities within the ambit of what is understood as an industry.

In this case, the Court explained that assigning those duties or functions to local bodies was not meant to withdraw them from the sphere of industry; rather, it was intended to substitute public authorities for private employers and to eliminate, as far as possible, the motive of profit-making. The Court observed that levying taxes for the maintenance of sanitation, conservancy, or for the supply of light and water was a method devised to compensate for the lack of capital. Even though such undertakings or services were carried out with the aid of taxation and were not expected to generate immediate material profit, the Court held that they still fell within the ambit of what is understood to be an industry.

The Court then referred to the case of National Association of Local Government Officers v. Bolton Corporation (1). After examining the definitions of “trade dispute” and “workman” contained in the order of reference to the National Arbitration Tribunal and noting that these definitions were identical to those in the Industrial Courts Act, 1919, Lord Wright made the following observation at page 184 of the Report: “The appellant contended that they include the members of the appellant trade union. The respondents disputed this because, they said, the definitions do not include employees of a public or local authority like the respondents, and, in particular, such (1) [1943] A. C. 166. employees who are engaged in professional, technical or administrative services.”

Lord Wright continued that, in his opinion, the respondents’ contention would unduly narrow and limit the wide connotation that should be given to “trade” and to “workman”. He pointed out that Section II of the 1919 Act showed that “trade” was used as including “industry” because the Act referred to a trade dispute in the industry of agriculture. He noted that the same inference could be drawn from the short title, which described the legislation as an act to provide for the establishment of an industrial court in connexion with trade disputes. Consequently, trade and industry were treated as interchangeable terms.

Lord Wright emphasized that “trade” was not merely an etymological or dictionary term but, in legal usage, a term of the widest scope. He explained that the word originally connected with “tread” indicated a way of life or an occupation. In ordinary usage, it could denote the occupation of a small shopkeeper as well as that of a commercial magnate, and it could also refer to a skilled craft. While it is often contrasted with a profession, he said that a professional worker would not ordinarily be called a tradesman, yet the word “trade” was applied in the broadest sense to the appellation “trade unions”. He added that professions have their own trade unions and that the Trade Boards Act used the term to include industrial undertakings.

Finally, Lord Wright concluded that there was no reason to exclude the activities of local authorities from the operation of the Industrial Courts Act, even without considering that such authorities now commonly carry on important industrial undertakings. He observed that the order expressly states in its

The Court observed that the definition section expressly states that the terms “trade” or “industry” encompass the performance of functions by a public local authority. Although these expressions appear in Part III, which deals with recognized terms and conditions of employment, and in Part IV, which addresses departures from trade practices in any industry or undertaking, they do not occur in Part I, which concerns national arbitration and is the portion directly relevant to the present dispute. Nevertheless, the Court treated the wording in Parts III and IV as illustrative of contemporary conditions, indicating that the activities of local authorities may fall within the meaning of trade or industry. The Court further noted that the same expansive interpretation applies to the Industrial Courts Act and to Regulation 68-A, where the word “trade” is employed in a very wide sense, particularly in modern legislation governing conditions of employment, collective bargaining and related matters. To support this point, the Court cited a foreign decision that dealt with the precise issue now before it. In the Australian case of Federated Municipal and Shire Council Employees’ Union of Australia v. Melbourne Corporation, the judgments of several learned judges were considered instructive. In that case, a union registered under the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 1914-1915, was formed in connection with municipal and shire councils, municipal trusts and similar industries. The union asserted claims on behalf of its members employed by certain municipal corporations to perform the making, maintenance, control and lighting of public streets. The original description of the dispute characterized it as relating to operations of the municipal corporations that did not consist of municipal trading; during argument this description was amended to state that the dispute concerned activities that do consist of the making, maintenance, control and lighting of public streets. Two questions were put before the High Court. The first question concerned the scope of immunity enjoyed by municipalities as instrumentalities of State governments, a matter the Court deemed irrelevant to the present case. The second, and material, question was whether the employees of municipalities could be said to be engaged in an industrial dispute within the meaning of section 51, subsection 35, of the Constitution. The municipal corporations contended that they were not engaged in any industry but were merely performing the ordinary statutory functions assigned to them, and therefore no industrial dispute existed that could be referred to the arbitration court. Consequently, the Court needed to determine the meaning of the words “industrial disputes” used in that constitutional subsection. The majority of the learned judges ultimately addressed this interpretative issue.

Four of the learned judges, opposed by two, resolved the question in favour of the Union. Both parties advanced diametrically opposed arguments. The claimant asserted that the term “industrial” should be understood merely as “relating to industry in the abstract,” covering activities in trade, commerce, science or learned professions. In contrast, the municipal corporations argued that an “industrial dispute” should be interpreted as a “trade dispute,” and that a “trade dispute” meant a dispute arising out of trade conducted by an employer for profit. To bridge these extremes, Justices Isaacs and Rich, who formed part of the four-judge majority, articulated an intermediate formula: industrial disputes arose when, in operations where capital and labour were jointly contributed to satisfy human wants and desires, the participants in that cooperation disagreed about the basis to be observed, whether concerning a share of the product or any other terms and conditions of their cooperation. After citing extensively from the 1890 Royal Commission report on labour problems in England, they concluded on page 664 that, although the profit-making motive might be relevant for income-tax considerations, it was irrelevant for the purpose of determining an industrial dispute, stating that it did not matter whether the expenses were covered by passenger fares or by rates. Addressing the corporations’ insistence that a profit motive was essential to characterize a trade or industrial dispute, Deputy President Powers J. of the Arbitration Tribunal observed that the argument, after rejecting the notion that the councils were exempt as State instrumentalities, rested on the claim that municipal corporations did not conduct their work for profit in the ordinary sense, even though they generally performed the work themselves to avoid contractors’ profits. He illustrated that, if that contention were accepted, a philanthropist who purchased a clothing factory and employed the same workers as the former owner would not be engaged in an occupation capable of giving rise to an industrial dispute if he gave away the garments free of charge or sold them at cost. Conversely, if the respondents’ view were correct, a private company operating a ferry would be engaged in an industrial occupation, whereas a municipal corporation operating the same service would not. He noted that the same reasoning would extend to municipal baths, bridge-building, quarries, sanitary contracts, gas-making for street lighting and public halls, municipal construction of houses or halls, and many similar undertakings. He further remarked that even coal-mining for municipal railways or tramways would not qualify as industrial work if carried out by a municipal corporation.

The Court observed that the respondents’ contention was that work performed by contractors or private persons would be characterized as industrial, whereas the same work undertaken by municipal corporations would not fall within the meaning of the Arbitration Act or the Constitution. The Court could not accept this distinction. Referring to the definitions contained in the Act, the Court considered the purpose that the Legislature intended and the wide range of disputes that arise between employers and employees. From this analysis the Court concluded that the definitions in the Act also encompass disputes that may arise between municipalities and their employees where the work is analogous to the conduct of a trade or business. The Court held that it was unnecessary to determine whether disputes arising purely from administrative functions fall within the scope of the definition, because the existence of an industrial dispute is ultimately a question for the Government to ascertain. Only when the Government determines that an industrial dispute exists does it acquire jurisdiction to refer the matter, and the Government is not compelled to refer every such dispute; referral depends on considerations of expediency. The Court noted that no argument had been presented before it or the High Court that the Sanitary Inspector and the Head Clerk of the Municipality were officers rather than “workmen” as contemplated by the Act. Consequently, the dispute raised on their behalf by the Workers’ Union of which they were members was, in the Court’s view, an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. The order of the High Court was therefore affirmed. The appeal was dismissed with costs, the costs to be shared between respondent 2 and respondent 3. The Court directed that the appellant be represented by counsel for the appellant, respondent 1 and respondent 2 by counsel for those respondents, and respondent 3 by counsel for that respondent.